Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's tenth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.
Speculative Apologetics
Mr. Lazar follows his last chapter about extra-biblical knowledge (reviewed here) with an effort to "explore how Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology can help Neo-Scripturalism account for the [epistemic] status of extra-Biblical beliefs" (emphasis mine). Whatever critiques I have offered about Mr. Lazar's choice of chapter placement for such exploration or whether such exploration requires a "Neo"-Scripturalism, Mr. Lazar's intention is well-worth pursuing. As much as I have tried to advocate that Scripturalists refine Clark's epistemology, it seems Mr. Lazar and I are of the same mind (link), which is to provide a useful though speculative answer as to how extra-biblical knowledge is possible or what extra-biblical knowledge means (e.g. Mark 6:38, 13:28, 15:44-45):
I do think that there is a place for speculation in apologetics, such as when providing a defense - which, given available information, we neither know to be true or false - against allegations of internal contradictions. In these cases, the point is to shift the burden of proof to the accuser. But care must be taken to keep in mind the fact that the defense is just a speculation, not fact, and to make sure that it is actually the case that the speculation is compatible with what is currently knowable. (link)
Clark offered a definition of "natural knowledge" he thought heathens could have, the context of which would be consistent with Scripturalism (link). So, too, Mr. Lazar, Plantinga, etc. can propose a definition of "knowledge," as long as the meaning intended by the word is possibly that which God's word intends (in given, relevant passages in which the word is used). Such a proposal might well supplement the Scripturalist in enabling him to provide a possible explanation for how people could [have] "know[n]" things in certain contexts.
The proposed explanation might even be better than that which Clark himself offered in being able to offer some sort of justification for a colloquial application of "knowledge" to everyday beliefs. As I mentioned in an earlier review, "I would find it implausible" if Clark were to have argued that the aforementioned passages in Mark are instances of "knowledge" as mere "belief in or acceptance of a true proposition." Perhaps what Plantinga and Mr. Lazar have on offer is relatively better.
On the other hand, at minimum, I would have to see an exegetical case that "knowledge" couldn't be construed in Clark's [or others'] way[s] of thinking for Plantinga's or Mr. Lazar's definition of "knowledge" to become, in my mind, necessary. After reading through this chapter, I did not find a logical or exegetical defense of the necessity of construing "knowledge" in the particular way Plantinga or Mr. Lazar do (in contrast, say, to the case I made for the necessity of internalist knowledge in an earlier review). Perhaps one exists - if so, I should like to read it.
Thus, the thrust of this chapter seems to be about a useful though speculative apologetic for one interpretation of extra-biblical knowledge. Like I said, that is a goal worth pursuing, and, for all we "know," Plantinga's and Mr. Lazar's view might be more useful as a live possibility than or in opposition to Clark's view (at least, in some Scriptural contexts). One might even be right to conclude so.
However, the lack of argumentation in Mr. Lazar's chapter to this effect regarding the necessity of such a conclusion - in fact, the seeming impossibility to, on externalism, [construct an argument by which one could] be aware of one's justification for his belief that his interpretation is true (link) - must be kept in mind when one reads Mr. Lazar say:
Reformed Epistemology provides Neo-Scripturalism with a better definition of knowledge. As you may remember, Nash criticized Clark for having an idiosyncratic definition of knowledge, that it was too narrow, reducing most of what we know (or claim to know) to skepticism, such as beliefs that we are married we children. With the help of Reformed Epistemology, Neo-Scripturalism can better account for what is popularly taken as knowledge.
More accurate might have been a statement that in some contexts, Reformed Epistemology might provide a "better definition of knowledge" than Clark did. The reader may also take note of the word "idiosyncratic." One might ask Mr. Lazar or Nash how they "know" that Clark's definition is idiosyncratic. An appeal to what is "popular" likewise begs the question as to how one "knows" what is popular. Are such things "knowable" and, if so, how? Would such things be knowable on Clark's definition of knowledge? If not, does it not beg the question against Clark's understanding of "knowledge" to dismiss it solely on the basis of being "idiosyncratic"?
Moreover, even if it is granted that Clark's definition is idiosyncratic, why does that ipso facto imply his definition of knowledge is not better? This line of thought would, if we pursued it, take us a bit far afield of the present topic, but it is one I address elsewhere in a discussion of "the Problem of the Criterion" (link). Here, I only reiterate that without extended argumentation for or comparison between definitions and whether or how each may fit into important contexts, one isn't forced to accept one definition over against another.
[Parenthetical: there is nothing inconsistent about being a Scripturalist and believing oneself to be married "with" (as I believe Mr. Lazar meant to write) children. In fact, I find it quite funny that on some purely externalist views of what counts as knowledge, one could legitimately say that it was possible Clark actually did "know" his wife and just was not aware of it. Obviously, this would not be Clark's view of "knowledge" - for Clark was not an externalist - but would a Scripturalist be wrong to use "knowledge" in such a sense in some contexts? I think not. After all, the word can bear different meanings in different contexts, as Clark well "knew."]
Reformed Epistemology: Limitations
As this was one of Mr. Lazar's longer chapters, I had some difficulty deciding what to address and in what order to address it. After some thought, I decided to begin with a look at the conclusion:
So what's the epistemic status of our extra-Biblical beliefs? Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology can be used to show how they're properly basic, justified, and have warrant because, as we've deduced from our master axiom, God designed our cognitive faculties to produce true beliefs.
I take it that this is the goal by which the success or failure of Mr. Lazar's understanding of Reformed Epistemology is to be measured. As such, a few explanations of key terms are in order, and we can thank Mr. Lazar for doing the legwork in providing them throughout the chapter:
Properly basic: beliefs in which one is "rational... whether you have... arguments or not... Taking a belief as basic doesn't mean believing in it no matter what. You can have defeaters for your belief."
Justified: "...justification for a belief can either have an internalist strategy or an externalist one... Plantinga offered an externalist defense of beliefs... If your cognitive faculties are properly functioning in an environment for which they were designed, then the beliefs formed by them are rational... your belief is justified."
Warrant: "According to Plantinga, warrant is the property that transforms true belief into knowledge. Under the right conditions, the Christian is not only within his rights to believe that God exists without evidence, but he can also know that God exists. How? Kenneth Boyce summarizes Plantinga's view:
(1) The belief in question is formed by way of cognitive faculties that are properly functioning.(2) The cognitive faculties in question are aimed at the production of true beliefs.(3) The design plan is a good one. That is, when a belief is formed by way of truth-aimed cognitive proper function in the sort of environment for which the cognitive faculties in question were designed, there is a high objective probability that the resulting belief is true.(4) The belief is formed in the sort of environment for which the cognitive faculties in question were designed."
Thus, Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology is a species of externalism and fallibilism. I have already focused on limitations of externalism in the past several reviews. At the risk of overkill, I'm going to continue highlighting its limitations by first focusing on the concept of warrant.
As "warrant is the property that transforms true belief into knowledge," a warranted belief would entail that it is true. But this is problematic for Mr. Lazar's conclusion, stated above, that "Reformed Epistemology can be used to show how [extra-biblical beliefs...] have warrant." Can one show that a belief is warranted - is "true" - given that what is encompassed in "warrant" includes "proper function," an externalist view of epistemic justification?
I have already argued in other reviews that such is not possible - for by definition, we cannot be aware whether an justificatory feature that is "external" to our awareness (but integral to epistemic justification) is actually present in a given case. Mention of one good contemporary epistemologist (Plantinga) calls for rejoinders from a few others:
...if an epistemologist claims that a certain belief or set of beliefs, whether his own or someone else’s, has been arrived at in a reliable way, but says this on the basis of cognitive processes of his own whose reliability is for him merely an external fact to which he has no first-person, internalist access, then the proper conclusion is merely that the belief or beliefs originally in question are reliably arrived at (and perhaps thereby are justified or constitute knowledge in externalist senses) if the epistemologist’s own cognitive processes are reliable in the way that he believes them to be. Of course there might be a whole series of hypothetical results of this sort: cognitive process A is reliable if cognitive process B is reliable, cognitive process B is reliable if cognitive process C is reliable, and so forth. But the only apparent way to arrive at a result that is not ultimately hypothetical in this way is for the reliability of at least some processes to be establishable on the basis of what the epistemologist can know directly or immediately from his first-person, internalist epistemic perspective...
(Bonjour, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues)
On externalism, we are always left with hypothetical knowledge. We know something only if the environment in which we find ourselves is conducive to knowledge, and this leaves the very possibility of externalist knowledge entirely at the mercy of an ever-external environment in which we find ourselves.
Indeed, Mr. Lazar himself seems to admit this early on in the chapter: "Reformed Epistemology doesn't show that God exists (or that being such as the Great Pumpkin exist); it only shows that if God exists, belief in Him can be properly basic..." If God doesn't exist - and it seems that this is a live possibility on Reformed Epistemology - then what of the epistemic status of any of our beliefs?
Don't we want more than a mere possibility of knowledge? Don't we want, as Mr. Lazar intimated, to show we have knowledge? How is this possible unless we accept an internalist view of epistemology? As framed by another contemporary epistemologist:
An explanation of how knowledge or justification is possible has to do more than show that knowledge or justification is logically possible: that there is a way of thinking about knowledge that does not involve a contradiction. Externalists can surely manage this. They can sketch a consistent picture of the world in which we credit ourselves with reliable faculties and so, by externalist lights, with epistemically appropriate beliefs. But are we justified in believing that our faculties are reliable? Is that belief epistemically appropriate? If not, then for all we know, we have no justified beliefs. This is a significant concession to skepticism. We want a reply not just to the claim that we know nothing, but also to the meta-skeptical claim that for all we know we know nothing. We want to know that we know. This too pushes us towards internalism. (Williams, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pgs. 207-208)
These points are all the more serious when we consider whether the "deduction from our master axiom" to which Mr. Lazar refers is itself sufficient for "knowledge" or whether the person performing the deduction must not also have external justificatory factors of the sort Plantinga requires be present. Mr. Lazar seems to affirm the latter in his Conclusion to the book:
The Neo-Scripturalist can argue that, given the right conditions, his extra-Biblical beliefs are not only properly basic but also have warrant. The same strategy can be used to explain the status of beliefs deduced from the master axiom itself - they have warrant, too. (pg. 156 in Kindle, the final chapter before the Appendix)
It certainly sounds as though Mr. Lazar advocates a thoroughly externalist theory of epistemic justification. But if external justificatory factors must be present for any formed belief to be epistemically justified such that we can "know" (have "warrant" for) it, then, as Bonjour points out, we can only ever hypothesize that our beliefs were formed under "the right conditions," not show that they were so formed. Such hypothetical knowledge can perhaps supplement Scripturalism, but it cannot supplant it (link).
What Mr. Lazar proposes in this chapter is not entirely new. A synthesis of Scripturalism with beliefs which are externally justified is something I proposed a little more than 7 years ago (link). But one ought to seriously reflect on whether an internalist or externalist theory ought to be applied to the case of one's axiom and beliefs deducible from it. Beliefs justified on internalist terms must ground beliefs justified on externalist terms (if such there be). In my experience, it has, thus far, been a losing battle in efforts to convince fellow Scripturalists of the necessity of internalism. I trust that it is not a lost war.
Turning briefly to the issue of fallibilism, Mr. Lazar mentions the possibility of having "defeaters" for beliefs. Now, there may be a place for defending beliefs about which one is not certain regarding their truth-values. I have no worked out theory about this, except to say that any such possibility must be defended on the grounds of beliefs about which one cannot be mistaken. Otherwise, the very concept of "justification" is itself open to question or revision. If any belief can go, then anything goes.
For example, if properly basic beliefs can be defeated, is belief in the Bible able to be defeated? Can warranted beliefs be defeated? If there are not "undefeatable" beliefs, isn't the very concept of "defeatability" able to be defeated? Or if there can be undefeatable beliefs, what better candidates are there than divine revelation? If not divine revelation, is it "more legitimate to evaluate a creator by His creation than creation by a creator"? "Are any... options really more plausible than a self-authenticating revelation?" (link). I will leave it to the reader to consider these questions.
Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology: Following the Logic
I own a couple of books by Plantinga, but since I've only skimmed them, Mr. Lazar's summary was a helpful introduction. What follows cannot be considered a critical engagement with Plantinga - since I am really only interacting with his statements as represented through an interlocutor - but I'll mention a few questions and thoughts I had during a linear read-through of the chapter.
Probably the one, overarching question I had hoped Mr. Lazar would somewhere answer is at what points his own views varied from those of Plantinga, if at all. At some points, I read ways in which Mr. Lazar believed Plantinga's views could be developed, but there was no mention of whether every disagreed with something Plantinga has said. There could be, but if so, I would have liked to know it.
Regardless, in the first subsection, Mr. Lazar introduces Plantinga's distinction between de facto and de jure objections to Christianity. The latter are the kind of objections in which Plantinga is interested and "concern the rationality of holding Christian beliefs, irrespective of their truth." One must be careful to understand what is meant here. An important point Clark made is that one can't fully divorce rationality from truth. Sin always entails belief in a falsehood:
…all sinning is the result of fallacious thinking. Sometimes the fallacy does not lie on the surface. Evil men can run through a long series of valid syllogisms. But away back somewhere they have had a wrong thought. (The Pastoral Epistles, 1983, pg. 208)
I don't think Plantinga or Mr. Lazar would necessarily disagree. Rather, the idea is that Christians have to field objections regarding the very method by which they allegedly know God, objections which have little to do with whether a given belief about God are true and more to do with whether the method by which they claim to know about God is a method which can yield knowledge.
For instance, Mr. Lazar mentions that a coin flip would be an irrational method on which to base a belief that "Canada is north of Mexico." Whether or not the belief is true, the method by which one arrived at the belief is said to be "irrational," "unreliable." De jure objections to Christianity here considered, then, do have to do with truth, but more-so about the truth or falsity of the method of belief-formation than a belief itself.
Thereby, Mr. Lazar set up the following question well: "what is the de jure objection to Christian belief?" He attempts to answer this in the next subsections, in which he cites Plantinga's critique of "classical foundationalism," adherents of which allegedly argue that because foundational belief must be "self-evident" or "incorrigible" - and since Christian beliefs are neither - Christianity is irrational. Ironically, I have addressed this very idea before:
Thirdly: “Take the current debate between foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, and positism. No matter which of these positions you believe is correct, you won't be able to trace this philosophical belief back to properly basic beliefs” (pg. 151). Engel cites Plantinga in his footnote to this comment, further adding that this would make foundationalism self-refuting. But why Engel thinks, for instance, that the belief “divine revelation is self-authenticating” cannot be basic, I don't know. I think that belief could put one in a position to make the regress argument for foundationalism. If Engel's flat denial is due to people disagreeing about things regarding God, I don't see how that is relevant. People can disagree about everything. Does that imply there can be no incorrigible beliefs? No. Here again the importance of discussing infallibilism is demonstrated. (link)
Plantinga or Mr. Lazar may disagree that classic foundationalism itself isn't an incorrigible belief, but if we deny that, what else is there? Must all beliefs be corrigible? If that is the idea, we face the same questions about fallibilism already discussed above. Or can incorrigible beliefs be had by another method than foundationalism, such as infinitism or coherentism? I think not (link, link).
Further, in this subsection we see the beginnings of another argument: "Plantinga points out that foundationalism also tends to skepticism." Mr. Lazar mentions beliefs in backyard tress and the past as tests which classic foundationalists fail. The objection here is reminiscent of the "don't you know your wife?" objection.
Leaving aside that one could conceivably construct an argument about knowledge of the past by an argument from memory as a precondition for knowledge (link), the beliefs Mr. Lazar mentions are not "reduced to skepticism" merely because we can't "know" such (in a certain sense) on Scripturalism. That is, it is not as if the Scripturalist has control over what is and isn't "knowable." Whatever follows from a sound worldview is knowable, and whatever doesn't is not.
The Scripturalist is not at fault if it isn't possible to "know" (in a certain sense) that one is married with children or that trees are in his backyard, and his worldview is no worse for wear if what we might otherwise like to count as "knowledge" ends up not passing muster, so long as we are able to have any knowledge at all (especially if we cannot have it - in its most basic and important sense - on any other foundation).
Mr. Lazar thinks Plantinga's view makes more sense because on it, "you can believe your wife or husband has a mind without having to be a professional epistemologist first." But no Scripturalist - certainly not Clark - would have had a problem with that. Having generic beliefs is not incompatible with even the strictest epistemic standards.
It is when one attempts to ascribe an epistemic status to said beliefs that we must carefully ascertain what status they have and the implications of it. For example, let us review the status of a so-called "properly basic belief." Such beliefs are not, according to Plantinga, incorrigible. They are open to scrutiny and capable of defeat. This apparently includes belief in God, as Plantinga's response to voodoo epistemologists et al. (who attempt to copy his approach) is to say that "basic beliefs can be challenged" and mentions "defeaters" as ways to avoid "absolute relativism." I gather that this is intended to suggest Christian beliefs are the cream will rise to the top, and voodoo epistemologists et al. will be defeated.
But I find this difficult to reconcile with Mr. Lazar's statement on the same page that "the Christian community will have its own criteria for properly basic beliefs that will exclude beliefs such as belief in the Great Pumpkin." Okay - will not voodoo epistemologists have their own criteria too, then? Again, if any belief is always and in every context capable of defeat (fallibilism), this just does appear to be absolute relativism, for anyone could start anywhere and with any criteria - even about the concept of "defeaters" itself - and no absolute, incorrigible knowledge of truth could be established.
Mr. Lazar himself seems to feel the force of this point, for he starts his next subsection with, "Admittedly, proper basicality is a low threshold for rationality. Ideally, you want to be more than merely rational in what you belief - you'll want to be justified." This initially sounds like we are headed in the right direction towards providing answers to the above problems.
It might sound that way, but not so fast: "justification of belief" is explained by Plantinga in terms of "proper functioning," which is when one is in "the kind of environment your cognitive faculties were designed to function in." When this happens, "your belief is justified."
However, if "your cognitive faculties... malfunction," then "your belief... would be irrational." How, then, can one ensure such malfunction is or has not taken place? There doesn't appear to be an answer!
I can understand why. To attempt one would be to constrain oneself to an internalist understanding of "knowledge." Mr. Lazar is explicit here that "Internalists maintain that what makes a belief rational is another belief - one to which you have internal access - such as beliefs that are either self-evident or incorrigible... By contrast, Plantinga offered an externalist defense of beliefs." For Plantinga, whether one is or is not rational is not solely about what and how one thinks. One's rationality depends on factors external to the person and about which he cannot be aware by definition. We can never, then, be aware that we are or are not being rational, are or are not justified, do or don't have warrant... much less show it.
At this point in the chapter, Mr. Lazar turns to the concept of "warrant," which I have already addressed above along similar lines. Mr. Lazar concludes by asking, "when it comes to belief in God, is there a faculty that meets these criteria, and which forms beliefs about God?" He explains Plantinga's argument about a sensus divinitatis, allegedly forwarded by Aquinas and Calvin, is such a faculty which triggers warranted belief in Him. But how might a pure externalist answer questions about whether his cognitive faculties have malfunctioned in his understanding of Plantinga, in Plantinga's understanding of Aquinas and Calvin, or in Aquinas' and Calvin's understanding of a "sense of divinity"? I do not believe an answer is readily available.
Nor does the alteration Mr. Lazar attempts to apply to this view seem to help. Mr. Lazar mentions William Lane Craig as writing, "Our beliefs about God are not formed by way of a special sense organ designed to produce such beliefs, but are formed using our normal cognitive faculties that respond to the Spirit's testimony about God." Mr. Lazar goes on to say "An even better model is to clarify that the Holy Spirit often use (sic) God's Word to form our beliefs about God (cf. Rom 10:17)."
These points could be true - actually, I think they are! - but at the risk of continually fatiguing the reader, the crux of the matter is whether or not epistemic justification has an external component. God's word is something to which we can have internal access. We can reflect on it, be aware of it, meditate on it. I would agree, as Mr. Lazar says, "the Bible teaches that God created us with cognitive faculties aimed at truth." But the Bible also teaches that sin prevents us from accepting spiritual truths (1 Corinthians 2:14, Romans 8:7) apart from divine intervention.
Additionally, sin has introduced all sorts of maladies which can inhibit "proper functioning" of our cognitive faculties. To what extent these inhibitions extend in normal, everyday affairs is uncertain, and precisely for that reason we can't be sure that cognitive malfunction has not or is not occurring in a given situation.
Mr. Lazar's summarizes his exposition by asking whether "the epistemic status of our extra-Biblical beliefs... amount to mere opinion or something more? Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology suggests an answer." It does, but if such epistemologists cannot ever be aware of when their cognitive faculties malfunction - if a purely externalist theory of knowledge is being discussed - then I don't agree those who think the position amounts to more than mere opinion.
The most ironic example of this is when Mr. Lazar says, "unlike Clark, who didn't know if he was married, the Neo-Scripturalist has warrant for that belief." Mr. Lazar is begging the question that the Neo-Scripturalists beliefs were formed by each of his faculties "functioning in an environment for which it was designed." The most that can be shown, on an externalist theory of epistemic justification, is that it is possible one "knows" his wife.
That this is a possibility rather than impossibility is not irrelevant, but I will argue that is also not the makings of a basic epistemology. For a Christian should not merely argue for the possibility of assurance or possibility of a correct understanding of God's word. A Christian can have both, but only assuming he is able to [internally] reflect on all factors which contribute to his epistemic justification for being assured or having a correct understanding of God's word.
Hence, while the Holy Spirit, whom we need for salvation, is external to us, His efficient, gracious, causal work in us to believe the word of truth is not, as I have argued elsewhere, an epistemic justificatory feature of said beliefs - at least not in the most basic sense of epistemology.
Miscellaneous Comments
I had a few other thoughts while reading this chapter that didn't seem to fit elsewhere, so I will mention them here:
Firstly, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism is a fine reductio ad absurdem that Scripturalists can use against naturalists who subscribe to an externalist epistemology, whether or not the Scripturalist agrees with Plantinga's epistemic at large. Indeed, "natural selection doesn't select for beliefs that are true so much as for beliefs that lead to behavior that is more conducive to survival or reproduction." This is an excellent point that should undermines any psychological confidence naturalists with an externalist epistemology might otherwise have. Mr. Lazar is right to think that such an argument can be synthesized with the Clark's anti-empirical arguments geared towards undermining naturalists with an internalist epistemology.
Secondly, Mr. Lazar mentions that Plantinga denies doxastic voluntarism. It is hard to tell to what extent this is true, but Plantinga clearly thinks at leas some beliefs are "involuntary" such that "moral categories - duty and obligations, etc. - don't really apply to beliefs." It is after this that Mr. Lazar uses the concept of "proper functioning" to answer how it is that beliefs can be "considered rational or irrational" if "the rationality of a belief doesn't depend on choosing rightly, or fulfilling your epistemic duties (because you don't choose your beliefs at all)."
To these statements, I would point out that sinners are commanded to believe the gospel. Is it intelligible to command something to do something that is involuntary? Or rather, doesn't a command imply ability to obey the command? And doesn't obedience imply choice? Clark thought so, at least: "A command requires voluntary obedience" (Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 21).
On a side note, the mention of obligations and "epistemic duties" led me to wonder whether a pure externalist would admit that one could fulfill any and all "epistemic duties" required of him yet nevertheless be "irrational." After all, Mr. Lazar has said that in the case "your cognitive faculties... malfunction... your belief... would be irrational," and on doxastic involuntarism, one's cognitive faculties malfunctioning would not be within the purview of one's epistemic duties.
This then led me to wonder how "rationality" is defined on a purely externalist theory of knowledge. I would think the "popular" (!) understanding of rationality just has to do with reason and logic, which are features to which one would have internal, reflective access.
Lastly - and I wanted to end on this note - perhaps the Bible allows for the possibility of "warranted," extra-biblical, "properly basic beliefs." I don't want this review to come off as if I absolutely reject the notion. I only mean to emphasize what seems - from conversations that I've had with Scripturalists over the years - to need emphasis: such a possibility would not only call for, as Mr. Lazar calls it, "an external model of justification." An external model of justification must be grounded in an internal model of justification to be defensible.
In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 11, which Mr. Lazar calls Does Neo-Scripturalism Pass the Tests?
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