In the comments of a recent post, I was recently asked some challenging questions regarding Trinitarianism, Christology, and anthopology. In the past few years, I've mentioned several times the need for humility and balance when positing a doctrine of God (see here and pursuant links). On the one hand, I aim to do a better job of avoiding dogmatism on points of speculation. On the other hand, even in the case that answers to certain questions are underdetermined by biblical data, apologetic concerns warrant consideration of possibilities to prevent one's faith from being undercut.
In what follows, my goal is to provide answers that are faithful to Scripture insofar as they are deducible from or coherent with it. Keeping in mind that this latter qualification - coherence - is a necessary but insufficient condition for truth, the questions I was asked will be indented:
I'm trying to also keep in my the Trinity, with the three persons united in one being. Being would be identical to nature (divine nature), would it not?
On the concept of "unity," this post would provide a helpful background for my own thoughts (excepting a few uncareful remarks in the final paragraph).
I don't think the Trinity are united "in one being" if that means persons are subsumed under nature. Don't get me wrong: natures don't exist without persons, and persons do not exist without natures. Yet insofar as "nature" or "being" discusses what is common to individuals, natures belong to and are predicated of persons, not persons to natures. "Enhypostasis" - nature is in the hypostasis. If persons were "in" natures, then Christ's having two natures would seem to imply Nestorianism.
Now, the members of the Trinity are consubstantial. In fact, I think the meaning of their being consubstantial is just the same as the meaning of you and I being consubstantial, although the manner of consubstantiality differs between Trinitarian members (eternal, necessary) and us as men (temporal, contingent). Regardless, they indeed are of the same nature.
But I would balk at certain theories of divine simplicity that may be implicit in the phrasing of your question. That is, Trinitarian consubstantiality does not imply only one concrete nature. Recall that you mentioned mind is "indexed" to nature: if we subsumed the divine persons under or in a single, concrete divine nature, then, that would entail that there is just one divine mind. The problem with that - as you seem to recognize - is that it runs against biblical data suggesting the members have distinct, self-reflective thoughts (e.g. John 17). On that note:
So the mind of the Son would have self-referential propositions that the Father would not (e.g. "I am the eternally begotten one"), but that mind would not be coextensive with the person of the Son? What would be the remainder? Would it be something like the shared divine nature that extends beyond the self-referential thoughts of the mind?
While the mode of the Son's existence is eternal, He is also eternally begotten. Here is precisely where I think Clark, for example, went wrong: it is not merely that the Son thinks something of Himself that is different than His thought of the Father or Spirit; rather, this thought corresponds to something about the Son Himself. I argue Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in the 1940s led him to collapse persons into propositions/thoughts (link). I further argue I think Clark's reasons for rejecting it only pertain to a certain kind of correspondence theory of truth (link).
What I am saying, then, is that the persons of the Trinity are not simply minds - and again, since you agree minds are "indexed" to nature, that would not constitute a differentiating principle between the individual Trinitarian persons anyway. Nor are the persons the thoughts of the mind (as if it is intelligible to suggest the divine persons are products of three minds?). On the contrary, the thoughts of the persons of the Trinity about themselves reflect or correspond to something unique about the way that they themselves are: unbegotton/originate, eternally begotten/generation, eternally spirated/process. Epistemological and ontological categories should not be collapsed.
Also remember that in the original post on Clark and Nestorius, I was only attempting to provide a connotative definition of "person" in general. I was not talking individual persons/hypostases/subjects. For example, I think the Father, Son, Spirit, the angels, and humans are all "persons" because they have something in common: they each have a mind or minds. But this definition does not individuate any one individual "person" from any other. Well, that makes sense, for we agree that the having of a mind (or minds) is something properly belonging to the category of nature - not that we have the same nature as God, of course, but the overlap explains (at least partially) in what sense creaturely persons might be images of divine persons.
So what individuates individual persons/hypostases/subjects? We might posit (as Clark did) that they can be individuated by their thoughts (of themselves). In a cursory analysis, this might be sufficient. But foundationally, note again that thoughts are products of thinkers. To the extent that an individual's thoughts of himself is relevant to this question, that to which the thoughts correspond - the individual himself - is all the more so.
Let me suggest that an individual person is the correspondent of whatever may truly be predicated of him either timelessly (if His mode of existence is timeless, e.g. the Father) or at time t (if his given his mode of existence is temporal, e.g. an angel or human). What I "think" of myself is irrelevant, because my thoughts of myself are potentially false. Rather, true propositions about me (corresponding to my existence at time t) are those thoughts God thinks about me (corresponding to my existence at time t).
The above is perfectly intelligible to me. Even the case of Christ incarnate can be nuanced (example). Here is one catch, however: it suggests that the divine nature is concretized in the three persons. This should be obvious anyways if we accept a model of the Trinity on which each member of the Trinity has a distinct mind, but it should be noted. Not all (or even most) Trinitarian models would accept this. If we take Clark's definitions of thoughts/beliefs as involving volition, three concrete minds also entails three concrete wills.
Clark's own reasoning supports this, for he reject faculty psychology in the context of anthropology and Trinitarianism:
In the case of God, the simplicity of his reality should favor still more such a identification, rather than a development of divine faculty psychology. (April 3, 1937, Letter to J. Oliver Buswell)
A man is not a compound of three things, an intellect, a will, and an emotion. Each man is a single personality. (1943. On the Primacy of the Intellect. Westminster Theological Journal Vol. 5 No. 2, May. 182-195)
The question has to do with Ephesian 4 where it speaks of man’s mind being darkened. Well, I would include in the functions of mind the assent as well as the notitia, but I distinguish between the two functions. This is not faculty psychology, but it is two functions of the same spirit. (1977. A Defense of Christian Presuppositions in the Light of Non-Christian Presuppositions)
Just as in the post on "unity" I linked to above, these statements exhibit an internal inconsistency in Clark's thought. If the same spirit has two functions - assent and notitia or knowledge - then on what grounds could Clark affirm three distinct functions in one respect (self-knowledge) but not the other (assent)? If only the Son thinks "I am the Son," what does it mean to "think" if assent is not involved?
We can certainly differentiate the relationship between our persons to propositions we "know" (acquisitional, receptive) to the relationship between the Trinitarian persons and propositions they "know" (active, generative). In both cases, the objects of knowledge - truth-bearing propositions - are the same, although the psychological activity of "knowing" differs.
To reiterate, on the model I gravitate towards, the Trinitarian persons are consubstantial just as you and I are consubstantial. What it means for the divine nature to be "in" each person is the same, is true, and therefore corresponds to the existence of each person. There is just one "divine nature" that we conceptualize: all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, etc. Each member of the Trinity is all-wise, all-good, etc.
It's just that how consubstantiality cashes out is not in persons being found "in[side]" of a common nature but rather along the lines that a person who is a principle or "fount" (e.g. the Father; Adam) communicates his same nature to others who find their "origin" in him (e.g. the Son/Spirit; the rest of humanity). This bears on the unity of persons and explains the connection to traducianism, by the way, which I'll return to momentarily.
In the context of the Trinity, there is a necessary connection between the members. The property of the Father, the attributes of the divine nature He enhypostatizes, and mode of the communication of His divine nature to His Son and Spirit is such that the three persons 1) mutually depend on each other - for example, the Father is not who He is without His Son and Spirit - and 2) always act conjointly and agreeably.
A comparison could reasonably be made between 1) three distinct knowers who distinctly and reflexively index the same, objective body of propositional meaning, and 2) three distinct operators or actors who necessarily produce one and the same conjoint operation or act (which, incidentally, includes the body of propositional meaning comprised of necessary and contingent truths).
A traducian friend of mine (Ken Hamrick) uses the language of "shared agency" to describe our participation in Adam's sin while the mode of "our" being was not yet (i.e. at the time of the Fall) as individuals but as the singular nature of Adam through which he sinned and out of whom we were not yet propagated as individuals (link). I agree with him, although how we think this analogizes to the Trinity differs.
Ken would emphasize the numerical sameness of the spirit traduced to us and thereby argue for the numerical sameness of essence shared among the Trinity (link). I would emphasize that once we are propagated out of Adam, our possession of the same spirit is nevertheless concretely distinct and thereby argue that the Trinitarian persons exhibit an analogy to "shared agency" in the eternal communication of the divine nature through which the persons operate even as they are eternally individuated and individuals. As I mentioned at the outset, these are rather deep waters to stake out a dogmatic claim that one can confidently swim them.
In either model - Ken's or mine - there is an analogy one could make between Trinitarianism and traducianism. There are also disanalogies in either case, of course. For Ken, whereas we have distinct, concrete natures (albeit inherited through our fathers once we are propogated out of them into a different mode of being, i.e. as individuals), the members of the Trinity would not. On my end, the manner of consubstantiality between the Father, Son, and Spirit would be eternal and grounded in their intrapersonal relations rather than temporal (such as my relation to my father). This interesting impasse at once suggests an argumentative parallel between Trinitarianism and traducianism regardless of which one of us is correct as well as that other reasons must be given for independent support for either of our positions.
I think my model goes some way in explaining biblical texts like John 17, the covenant of redemption, and the resonance between theology proper and anthropology.
Further, on the subject of anthropology in general and traducianism in particular, I think this model (and Ken's) also avoids nominalism while affirming a realism in the contexts of original sin and justification which does not devolve into erroneous positions. For example, erroneous positions such as:
1) one wherein Christ assumes a sinful nature (cf. uncareful statements of the doctrine of original sin),
2) one wherein I am unjustly punished for sins which are really and completely alien to me (cf. representationalist theories of original sin),
3) one wherein Christ assumes and glorifies a human nature under which all persons are said to be subsumed (cf. Eastern Orthodoxy and deification, despite the protestations of its apologists to believe that natures are in hypostases rather than the reverse),
4) one wherein infused righteousness is argued as necessary for justification to be justly possible in this lifetime (cf. Roman Catholic apologists, although those who argue this are themselves inconsistent).
On several of these points, see here for more. Further potential advantages of this model are that it seems to cohere with other metaphysical ideas which have separate appeal: theistic propositional realism (i.e. divine conceptualism), a version of divine simplicity which allows for formal distinctions, an Aristotelian theory of universals, etc.
I've thought about this quite a lot, and while the above is not a full story, it's probably the best articulation I can come up with at the present. To your next question:
If by inheriting one's father's "spirit" means those immaterial attributes that he possesses (analogous to the material attributes one possesses), then I think I can get my mind around what "spirit" means. Just as our bodies are made from our parents's bodies without being identical to them, so our spirits are made from our parents's spirits without being identical to them.
But then what distinguishes mind and spirit, or are they the same?
I think they are the same. Christ assumed a body and a rational soul or spirit without assuming a person, so there is no Christological difficulty, at least. Ken has elsewhere suggested that the "spirit is the seat of the will regarding moral matters" (link), and I think this all dovetails with Clark's aforementioned thought that knowledge and assent are two functions of the same spirit.
Finally, I had written:
The separation of body and spirit is "death," and such is predicated of our persons; but so too is the separation of our spirit from the Spirit "death" also predicated of our persons... suggesting the relationship between man's body and his spirit is analogically related to the dependency of our spirit to God's Spirit?
Maybe all of this becomes simplified by looking at a case most Christians would agree with: Christians will be conscious in the intermediate state. Are these Christians still human? If so, then it appears that they just are, ontologically speaking, spirits. To say that the person experiences death is to say that his body has been separated from his spirit (i.e. himself). Men are not, ontologically speaking, composite beings, for although these spirits do normally have bodies, the separation of the normal unity between spirit and body does not ontologically change a person (spirit). Likewise, the separation of the designed unity between spirit and Spirit does not ontologically change a person (spirit). If physical death is not an ontological change, neither would be spiritual death.
Your question:
As for the subsequent post wherein you discuss the intermediate state, have you considered also that our spiritual bodies may be of a different order than our physical bodies? Paul's statements about the natural body and spiritual body are puzzling. "Adam became a living being. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." The first man was made of the earth from dust, the last man is from heaven. Is it not safe to say that even in our present state we not "fully human" but are "incomplete" because the body we were given (even Adam's sinless body) was only the seed of what will only be completed in the resurrection? So, it may be the case that there is no ontological change since the separation of the spirit from the body in death is part of the planned transformation from natural body to spiritual body (like the seed germinating).
Did you mean to ask whether it's possible that "even in our present state we [are] not "fully human" but are "incomplete""? If so, did the incarnate and yet-be-glorified Son assume a fully human nature? Further, when this Son died and was buried (prior to His resurrection), was He fully human or not? Surely the former.
I would also keep in mind the question of whether or not the reprobate are fully human: they will experience a bodily resurrection too, but their spirit remains severed from the life-giving Spirit of God and, thus, experience a second death. These points cumulatively suggest that death entails no change in nature.
Now, my original comment was about whether is ontological change at the time of death. Here, on the other hand, I am here emphasizing that there is never a change to the human essence each of us has. Ontology is indeed a broader category than humanity, I just wanted to answer your specific questions by distinguishing between an eschatological telos and a change in nature.
36 comments:
Hey Ryan, thank you for clarifying. I'm tracking until the place where you discuss individuation:
/Let me suggest that an individual person is the correspondent of whatever may truly be predicated of him either timelessly (if His mode of existence is timeless, e.g. the Father) or at time t (if his given his mode of existence is temporal, e.g. an angel or human). What I "think" of myself is irrelevant, because my thoughts of myself are potentially false. Rather, true propositions about me (corresponding to my existence at time t) are those thoughts God thinks about me (corresponding to my existence at time t)./
I agree that one's thoughts about oneself would not constitute truth--a man can be self-deceived--yet it is the self-referencing that is important, apart from the truth value of the reference, is it not? If Tom Cruise thinks, "I am Jesus Christ," he would be wrong, but his self-reference would still individuate him from all others, would it not? This is not to deny that God's own thought of each individual is not determinate, but rather to acknowledge that self-reference does matter. One implication has to do with conscience--isn't part of what makes man culpable for sin his own knowledge that he is a sinner--even in spite of certain superficial self-denials?
Next, I reread a few times and cannot discern what you are saying about your own view about God's will. You clearly indicate that Clark implies that there are three wills in the Godhead while denying it elsewhere. Is this just stating the difficulty? If so, I don't see how tritheism is avoided--three individual minds, three individual natures, three individual wills. I read your post on Unity and it seems to end by affirming the Creedal statements, but without explaining how monotheism and trinitarianism were reconciled.
/To reiterate, on the model I gravitate towards, the Trinitarian persons are consubstantial just as you and I are consubstantial. What it means for the divine nature to be "in" each person is the same, is true, and therefore corresponds to the existence of each person. There is just one "divine nature" that we conceptualize: all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, etc. Each member of the Trinity is all-wise, all-good, etc./
Does this statement reflect your understanding of "generic" unity--where each individual participates in the same attributes? If God is His attributes, is it by virtue of this participation, or something else?
/It's just that how consubstantiality cashes out is not in persons being found "in[side]" of a common nature but rather along the lines that a person who is a principle or "fount" (e.g. the Father; Adam) communicates his same nature to others who find their "origin" in him (e.g. the Son/Spirit; the rest of humanity). This bears on the unity of persons and explains the connection to traducianism, by the way, which I'll return to momentarily./
Is this a fair summary: The Father eternally begets the Son, conveying to Him all of His divine attributes, and the Spirit proceeds (from this eternal generation?) from the Father and the Son with the same attributes having been conveyed to Him (from the Father and the Son? From the Father only?) Is another way of expressing the self-reflection of any given person of the Trinity such that they are simultaneously affirming their unity and diversity in every acknowledgement? E.g. The Son says, "I am the all-wise God (as the eternally begotten one)" both in unity with the Father and the Spirit, but also distinctively as the Son?
(1/2)
I'm confused by your discussion of Traducianism with respect to spirit and mind. You admit that mind and spirit are the same, but doesn't that imply that we are possessed of the same spirit/mind in Adam? Perhaps it is more of a problem for your friend Ken, since you adopt the idea of "shared agency," but how does "shared agency" explain away the individuation of minds from one previously existing mind? How are our spirits individuated from the spirit of Adam?
Finally, to clarify my last comment about the resurrection body and the intermediate state, I think that in responding to the original place I may have been conflating ontology and eschatology--since the seed contains the same nature as the tree, though in a different state of formation. Mea culpa.
(2/2)
"If Tom Cruise thinks, "I am Jesus Christ," he would be wrong, but his self-reference would still individuate him from all others, would it not? "
I already noted this when I wrote:
"So what individuates individual persons/hypostases/subjects? We might posit (as Clark did) that they can be individuated by their thoughts (of themselves). In a cursory analysis, this might be sufficient."
My point is that the method you describe is less foundational or fundamental. Individuating person's by their thoughts is possible but already presupposes individuated thinkers... unless one were to ontologically equate persons to thoughts as did Clark, but I've already noted the problem with this elsewhere - see my post on "Clark's Gradual Metaphysical Synthesis" last month.
"Is another way of expressing the self-reflection of any given person of the Trinity such that they are simultaneously affirming their unity and diversity in every acknowledgement?"
Yours seems to be a fine way to put it, I think. With respect to the Trinity, every self-affirmation would implicitly invoke the mode of existence by which they make such self-affirmations. In turn, even such self-affirmations as emphasize the distinctiveness of the persons (e.g. the Son affirming "I am eternally begotten") implicitly invoke the Father and, by extension, His Spirit.
I am more or less ambivalent about the filioque, perhaps with a slight tendency towards denial.
"Does this statement reflect your understanding of "generic" unity--where each individual participates in the same attributes? If God is His attributes, is it by virtue of this participation, or something else?"
I am dissatisfied with the language of "participation." It sounds as if there is some Platonic divine nature higher or above the Trinitarian persons. If we consider the idea of the divine nature (the divine attributes) and denotatively list the persons to whom this idea applies, we would list the Trinity. But I would now want to emphasize a distinction between this way of categorizing the members of the Trinity and the ontological reality (for, as I suggest in the original post, persons are not subsumed under nature).
Rather, the divine nature is possessed by the Father of Himself - the Father is auto-theos. The Father is divine of Himself. The Son (as with the Spirit) is God of God (i.e. [divine] of [the Father]). The Trinitarian members are thereby consubstantial. Our idea of or thought about their consubstantiality corresponds to the nature within each person. But our being able to have an idea of the divine nature each person has does not imply that the nature somehow antecedes (logically or really) any one of them. I think the nature of the Father is in the Father, not the Father in the nature. Or, equivalently, we would predicate divinity of the Father, not Fatherhood of the divine nature.
"I don't see how tritheism is avoided--three individual minds, three individual natures, three individual wills. I read your post on Unity and it seems to end by affirming the Creedal statements, but without explaining how monotheism and trinitarianism were reconciled."
Before going further, let me reiterate that the answer I am providing is somewhat speculative. While I don't know of a better answer (i.e. one more faithful to Scripture or coherent with it), I don't rule out the possibility of there being one.
It is true that the view I am suggesting has to reckon with the charge of tritheism. This is also true of other views. Each Trinitarian model attempts to answer this and similar charges in different ways. For example:
The Eastern Orthodox believe Scripture and the early church teach the monarchy of the Father: the Father is the "one God" in a proper noun sense (e.g. John 17:3, the Nicene Creed's "one God, the Father Almighty"). Ever with the Father are His consubstantial Son and Spirit (cf. the Nicene Creed: "God of God," "very God of very God," "true God of true God"). On this view, the Father is the cause of the consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit with Him. To this point, the answer I posit in the original post would be similar.
On Eastern Orthodoxy, however (and unlike the view I posit in the original post), there is only one, concrete divine nature. Thus, I find this view has difficulties in explaining:
1) the distinct indexicals used by the divine Son in John 17 (which I best understand entail different minds),
2) the covenant of redemption (which I best understand to mean the Father and Son "covenant" via distinct, concrete wills), and
3) to sustain consistency in meaning (i.e. lack of equivocation) of nature-person terminology in Trinitarian and anthropological contexts.
Roman Catholics believe in the monarchy of the Father but also in a Thomistic view of divine simplicity. This "Latin" tradition might be an alternative way to argue for monotheism but is disputed by the Eastern Orthodox due to their essence-energies distinction. I think the Eastern Orthodox views itself is flawed (on their problems in theology proper, see the last sections of this post: https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html) but that their criticisms of Thomistic divine simplicity are fair (e.g. if God is identical to His knowledge, it would seem to follow there are not contingent truths, i.e. necessitarianism).
Clark bites the bullet on necessitarianism. He also affirms numerically distinct divine minds but tries to split the remainder by agreeing with Calvin and (largely) the Reformed tradition: Clark thinks there is one, concrete, divine will (inconsistently) and that each person of the Trinity is autotheos. This means the monarchy of the Father is rejected.
Setting aside Clark's inconsistency, the Reformed, triple-autotheism view has the same problems as ones I mentioned above for Eastern Orthodoxy AND further difficulties in explaining what eternal generation and procession mean (assuming natures are in persons and not vice versa). Since many Reformed follow Roman Catholics regarding Thomistic divine simplicity, they also inherit those difficulties.
Some Reformed theologians diverge from the standard view I'm communicating. This is just a general landscape. For reasons mentioned, I find none of these standard options are particularly attractive. The monarchy of the Father could be a way in which monotheism can be affirmed, whereas the criticism that what I am positing is tritheistic is, I think, mitigated by John 17 et al.
I also don't take for granted that we are no longer in the "early church." That phrase is relative: it may be that from the perspective of a 200th century Christian, we are the early church. I make no assumptions either way.
What gives me more pause than church history is the question of whether eternal generation and procession (in the context of an acceptance of the monarchy of the Father) would in fact preclude the Son and Spirit from being consubstantial with the Father. For example, must aseity (self-existence) be regarded as a divine attribute? If so, then the views of the Nicene fathers, Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and my speculation would be in trouble (since the Son is of the Father, not of Himself). Steve Hays argued 1) that the persons of the Trinity are autotheos and rejected 2) eternal generation and procession because He believed 1) and 2) to be inconsistent. The way I understand it, he's right about the inconsistency. I just don't agree with his resolution (which, ironically, also leads to a charge of tritheism). But I'm nondogmatic for these reasons, open to correction, confirmation, or further insight.
Again, thanks Ryan for the cogent replies.
I think I'm with you on individuation. An person's individuation depends upon the truths predicated of them as subjects, originating and completing in the mind of God. Perhaps it could be said that one's self-consciousness is a consequence of God's instantiating one (upon the theory that God implants each soul) or a consequence of generation from the union of father's spirit and mother's spirit at conception (upon the Traducian view)?
As for filioque, I've got nothing to add. Augustine's views seem to support it, but I don't know if his views are what Scripture teaches, even if they may be coherent with Scriptural data. Perhaps he is saying more than can be said.
Regarding Traducianism--yes! I was being puzzled by the comment about numerical sameness of the spirit traduced to us. You've cleared it up for me, I think. Let me try, and see if I'm representing things well. Traducianism serves as a good analogy for the Trinity (or vice versa) because just as the Father as Divine-spirited Father generates (eternally) the Son as Divine-spirited Son, so the human father as human-spirited father generates (temporally) the son as human-spirited son. Each father provides of his own essence, but the result is a distinct individual of the same spiritedness, a divine-spirited or human-spirited son, respectively. Although the language remains somewhat undefined, it at least makes sense (and avoids Plato's terms).
Finally, I do see the problems on either side of the issue (three wills/one will; three natures/one nature). Perhaps it is one of the areas where mystery succeeds over all formulations, since it is so difficult for us to understand something that is truly unique--a Unity in Trinity.
But is is good to remember that for faithful Christians who disagree, we should all embody faith seeking understanding, credo ut intelligam, as Augustine and Anselm put it.
To push a bit further with will, can will and spirit/mind/nature be distinguished ontologically by their function/action? Nature grounds (subsists?), spirit conceives/thinks, and will assents/enacts? Could the one will of God be predicated upon the complete unity of assent/enactment of the persons of the Godhead?
"An person's individuation depends upon the truths predicated of them as subjects, originating and completing in the mind of God. Perhaps it could be said that one's self-consciousness is a consequence of God's instantiating one (upon the theory that God implants each soul) or a consequence of generation from the union of father's spirit and mother's spirit at conception (upon the Traducian view)?"
Thank you for reminding me of something else I was going to say before I got distracted: another we cannot consider self-consciousness to be the foundational for individuation among persons is that infants are not actively self-conscious. Infants do have minds or spirits by which they have a capacity for self-consciousness, but one oughtn't need to think a zygote is self-conscious in order to be a self.
Consider Romans 9:10-11. After conception yet before birth, we are told that the persons of Jacob and Esau had not yet acted. Well, that means they had not yet actively thought, let alone about themselves. To be sure, though, they had spirits/minds/natures and did have sinful dispositions (cf. "Understanding, Assent, and Dispositions" here: https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/12/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html).
Let me try, and see if I'm representing things well."
Yes, you are.
"Perhaps it is one of the areas where mystery succeeds over all formulations, since it is so difficult for us to understand something that is truly unique--a Unity in Trinity."
That the subject matter is underdetermined by divine revelation is quite possible. If it were not for purposes of apologetic engagement, I would not feel any impetus to provide possible, speculative answers to questions I myself have raised. For example, see an interesting discussion here between a Muslim and an Eastern Orthodox PhD: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyCe6TuxM44. The latter is a participant in a 4 views book coming out later this year on God and the Trinity (with William Lane Craig, William Hasker, and Dale Tuggy). There are certain respects in which the PhD had difficulty answering.
"Could the one will of God be predicated upon the complete unity of assent/enactment of the persons of the Godhead?"
I have thought about this. There is certainly a unity of purpose in their free action (and, I think, one which necessarily follows from their consubstantiality). But there is still a concrete or numerical distinction that seems to be made. For example, the economic actions of the Trinity mirror their intraTrinitarian distinctions: the Father sent the Son. The Spirit did not send the Son.
Ryan and Joshua,
Samuel Baird is my favorite theologian, but I don't agree with him on everything. Not only is the dualism not "gross and revolting," it is inescapable. The very reason why men and the whole world was created as material in nature was so that the Son of God could assume a nature and a life that could be sacrificially destroyed to redeem His people from sin--it's also the reason that sin was permitted in God's plan. The picture of God breathing the spirit of lives into Adam's face--and he became a living soul--is obviously speaking of the spirit being put into Adam's body. Further, there can be no common moral relation or moral character between the body and the spirit, because material can only be amoral.
Ryan, I think that when the spirit is considered in itself, you are right that the mind is the spirit. Where the difference comes in is when that spirit inhabits a fallen physical body, which puts limits on the exercise (or, thinking) of that mind. For example, since a zygote does have a spirit, I think that at some deepest level of spirit prior to a developed brain, that spirit cannot not be conscious at the spirit level. If the one-celled child dies and is separated from the body, the spirit is no longer limited by the body and is able to freely think, etc. I guess I'm advocating for some minimum essential characteristics of a spirit that may be suppressed but not eliminated by the body.
As believers, we are commanded to renew our minds. Whatever renewing of our spirits that occurs is done by the Holy Spirit, but we are told to renew our minds. Of course, the renewing of our minds must be done from within and is only possible because of the Spirit of God in us, but I think that what is spoken of here is the fact that our minds as living in these fallen bodies develops thought patterns and ways of thinking that are stubbornly written--like ruts in a dirt road--into the physicality of our brains. Our brains are similar to computers, but with a "ghost in the machine." The ghost may be changed in a moment, but the massive amount of bad data by which calculations are made needs to be worked on for a lifetime. Yet, when we leave these bodies, we leave all mental imperfections behind; and our glorified bodies will be fit for spiritual use and without such limitations.
As I see it, the body has a will concerning physical things, which it let's us know about; the spirit has a moral will; and the mind seems to be the intimate connection between the material and the immaterial, since it exists in both natures and expresses the will of both the spirit and the body.
Here's a quote from a recent study I've been working on: "As the image of God in man, the human spirit is analogous to the Spirit of God in the way that the human spirit transcends the natural world—even transcending the human body, as the body may be destroyed into nonexistence, but never the spirit. Of course, this is merely analogical, since the human spirit is part of the creation, and God’s spirit transcends all of creation, including the spirits of men; but the analogy is undeniable and valid enough to put the spirits of men in the same category of supernatural as are found the spirits of angels and of God. What is spirit or spiritual cannot be measured or discovered by scientific means. Spirits are not part of the natural creation in the sense that spirits do not conform to any laws of nature—they do not take up any space, they have no weight, and are forever undetectable by any natural means or senses. We are amazingly like God in these respects. The whole world may be taken out of existence, but the spirits of mankind will live on forever, either in heaven or in hell. The human spirit is supernatural and analogically transcendent."
There is indeed a designed correspondence between brain and mind such that damage to the former naturally affects the latter.
If you don't mind clarifying, I know you reject gnosticism (as we all should), so how would you nuance the conversation to avoid any implication that the fallen body itself is ethically corrupt? Are you saying that the ethical corruption of the spirit traduced from Adam in turn affects the material corruption of bodies? If so, what, then, of Christ? Was not His body was materially corruptible (but then, His concrete human spirit was without sin)? Or did He assume an uncorrupted body which He voluntarily sacrificed?
In the case of Adam, the sinful choice of his spirit caused immediate spiritual death as well as eventual physical death. The first conditioned the second, no?
Perhaps you are saying that there is an analogical coding of our spiritual corruption into our physical bodies such that while the latter does not entail ethical corruption, it nevertheless cyclically reinforces our sinful, spiritual dispositions? I'm not quite sure, but in any case, we must 1) avoid gnosticism and 2) explain how what is being discussed pertains to Christ's body.
Speaking of angels and science, this past Sunday, I was quite struck by Revelation 21:17 and that an angel's measurements are the same as humans'. I think that's a relevant analogy to consider in the context of some conversations about time God took to create the world (e.g. against some ideas about an "upper/heavenly register" time vs. "lower/earthly register" time).
Gnosticism must be rejected, of course. There is nothing immoral or unethical in or about the body in any way. Jesus' body was necessarily the same as ours in every respect. Sin at the fall morally corrupted that which was able to be morally corrupted (the spirit) and physically corrupted that which was able to be physically corrupted (everything material). Spiritual death and physical mortality were simultaneous results of the first sin. If the latter was conditioned on the former, then we might expect that Christians would not die.
Just as a sinner who comes to faith will find that his laptop still is in the habit of recommending sinful websites (as it was programmed to anticipate the desires of its user), he will also find that his own brain has been programmed to gravitate toward sinful patterns of thinking, etc. The brain itself is not the cause but only the tool of his own spirit, but there is a principle of reaping what was sowed (to change the figure). The addict who gets saved can't blame the body for continuing to crave the abused substance. In the case of our Lord, no sinful thought patterns were ever ingrained, since He never sinned--unlike us, there was no well-worn path of sinful thinking because He never went down that path.
Good point about the necessary correlation to Christ's body. The physical body and mind certainly didn't militate against the spiritual in His case, so that would need to be amended. How about this: the physicality of our minds in these fallen bodies and in this fallen world provides a means whereby we can suppress spiritual truth if we are sinfully averse to it; but abusing one's mind in this way creates habits and patterns of thought that are not easily overcome.
God point about Rev. 21:17 also!
My wife - who has been going to graduate school for counseling - has been reading a book called "The Body Keeps the Score." It's about how "traumatic stress... literally rearranges the brain’s wiring—specifically areas dedicated to pleasure, engagement, control, and trust." The body will react in certain ways instinctively (and often without our awareness of such) based on certain experiences. I think this is along the lines of what you are suggesting, contextualized with respect to disorganized desires (in which context our bodies have an evident role).
Returning to the case of Christ, separate thought from the above: if Christ needn't have assumed a [morally] corrupt human spirit, why need we believe He assumed a [materially] corruptible body? I'm not suggesting that for Him to assume such is impossible - again, gnosticism must be denied - only asking what the argument is for staking a claim that the former is true rather than the latter.
//Returning to the case of Christ, separate thought from the above: if Christ needn't have assumed a [morally] corrupt human spirit, why need we believe He assumed a [materially] corruptible body? I'm not suggesting that for Him to assume such is impossible - again, gnosticism must be denied - only asking what the argument is for staking a claim that the former is true rather than the latter.//
Do we assume that the body Christ assumes is corrupt as opposed to merely subject to corruption? I've heard some arguments that Christ could not suffer illness or disease because of his divine nature being united to his human nature--the one who came to restore human flesh could not succumb to the power of corruption, but rather overcame it. If I recall correctly, it was an Eastern Orthodox arguing the point.
Does it destroy the idea of "whatever is not assumed is not redeemed" to posit an uncorrupt flesh that the Son takes up? I don't see how it would.
"Do we assume that the body Christ assumes is corrupt as opposed to merely subject to corruption? I've heard some arguments that Christ could not suffer illness or disease because of his divine nature being united to his human nature--the one who came to restore human flesh could not succumb to the power of corruption, but rather overcame it. If I recall correctly, it was an Eastern Orthodox arguing the point."
Jesus experienced human frailties - tiredness, for example. I'm not sure that such signifies natural mortality or physical corruption, though.
"Does it destroy the idea of "whatever is not assumed is not redeemed" to posit an uncorrupt flesh that the Son takes up? I don't see how it would."
I don't see clearly yet how it would matter in either case. What we can say is that physical corruptibility or physical incorruptibility are accidental rather than essential to human nature. Adam was man both before and after his body became physically corruptible. We will still be men when given incorruptible bodies. If the human nature the Son assumes is concretely distinct from that of everyone else, the main thing is that His risen body be incorruptible for the benefit of those in Him. So I'm open to evidence on either side.
"Therefore, since the children share in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise also partook of the same, that through death He might render powerless him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, and might free those who through fear of death were subject to slavery all their lives." Heb. 2:14-15.
The idea that Jesus' body was fundamentally different from ours but appeared to be the same is docetic. Tertullian said, "For One who was to be truly a man, even unto death, it was necessary that He should be clothed with that flesh to which death belongs." By all the descriptions in Scripture, we have every reason to believe that His body was the same as ours, and no reason to think otherwise. The fact that He died is all that is needed to prove His mortality. And we must reject any idea that our bodies give us a moral handicap that He did not have. Even being born of Mary is a divine testimony that He was of her flesh (and ours by extension). If God wanted Jesus body to not be corrupted, the forthright and efficient thing would have been to create His body directly, as was the first Adam.
Finally, we must look to why physical corruption might be seen as incompatible with the incarnate Son of God. It seems to me that this idea is gnostic and is but a hair's breadth away from seeing physical corruption as antithetical to holiness--and thus, blurring into an immoral quality. Certainly, there are many today who think our bodies are morally corrupt (did not sin deprave us in all our faculties?) and the body of Jesus was "without moral corruption." But such a view gives us an excuse for our sin and thereby diminishes the righteousness that Jesus achieved.
What do you guys think?
"Even being born of Mary is a divine testimony that He was of her flesh (and ours by extension). If God wanted Jesus body to not be corrupted, the forthright and efficient thing would have been to create His body directly, as was the first Adam."
This (coupled with the bodily frailties Christ experienced in the course of His life) is probably the strong argument.
As for the analogy of traducianism, I think that in the case of timelessness and immutability, the Father and the Son might be in a constant state of traduction--ever begun but never completed. In the case of temporal men, it may be said that prior to my conception, I was in my father; and after my conception, it may be said that my father is in me. I would add the qualifier, exhaustively, in both.
I agree that natures are owned by persons, but the nature makes the person possible, such that person is grounded in nature. Is this acceptable? Can all three Persons of the Trinity, as individual Persons, each exhaustively own the nature?
Joshua stated: "I'm confused by your discussion of Traducianism with respect to spirit and mind. You admit that mind and spirit are the same, but doesn't that imply that we are possessed of the same spirit/mind in Adam? Perhaps it is more of a problem for your friend Ken, since you adopt the idea of "shared agency," but how does "shared agency" explain away the individuation of minds from one previously existing mind? How are our spirits individuated from the spirit of Adam?"
If spirit is mind, it loses all its memories when propagated--memories would belong only to persons. And a man is more than a spirit, as each one has his own time and place in this world, with his own memories. Add to this the fact that the spirit changes over time and with different experiences in life.
Another side note: In an email from last year, I asked about your thoughts on marital union:
"I was going to ask about marital union - another example of unity of persons - and your thoughts on what grounds the union in reality (voluntary vows of faithfulness in accordance with the established covenantal terms established by God?)."
I was recently reading a Catholic article on which the original sin constituted a subversion of the naturally ordered, one-flesh marital union between man and woman. Christ recapitulates this one-flesh union between Himself and His bride, the church. It's an idea I haven't engaged too much, but I see you already anticipated this, Ken:
https://theforgottenrealist.blog/2018/12/22/the-role-of-the-holy-spirit-in-justification/
Anyways, the reading stimulated the following line of thinking the calls back my question from last year.
The grounds for the union between husband and wife is a function of divine design: man and woman were created with the other in mind. Yet the union itself is only consummated volitionally.
What does marriage image? The relationship between God and His bride, believers. The grounds for the union between God and mankind is a function of divine design: mankind was created with God in mind (cf. our chief purpose). Yet the union itself is only consummated volitionally.
Whereas men and woman relate contingently, all men who contingently exist necessarily relate to the necessary God. Was, then, Adam ever disunited from God? Did he ever lack [voluntary] faith? If not, it would appear Adam was concreated originally righteous (which I don't recall if you accept) - already disposed to faith in God and the covenant inscribed upon his heart - and/or indwelled by the Spirit.
"I agree that natures are owned by persons, but the nature makes the person possible, such that person is grounded in nature. Is this acceptable? Can all three Persons of the Trinity, as individual Persons, each exhaustively own the nature?"
If you have a theory as to how each person a) indexes certain truths about themselves (e.g. such that only the Son thinks/affirms/wills/utters "*I* am the Son") or b) acts distinctively (e.g. such that only the Son incarnates or takes up a certain role in the covenant of redemption) without requiring a concretely and numerically distinct divine nature, I would be interested.
We might subsume a) and b) under the term "operation." Does not distinct operations entail a concretely and numerically distinct divine nature (cf. mankind)? Alternatively, if one rejects distinct operations, 1) how then are the Trinitarian persons distinguished and 2) is a rejection of a) and b) intelligible/biblical?
"If spirit is mind, it loses all its memories when propagated--memories would belong only to persons."
Right. Spirit/mind is natural. To inherit one's father's nature is not to inherit his products of said nature (e.g. memories).
Regarding the body of Jesus, let me see if I can be more clear about the argument I'm trying to recall.
I think the issue is less about whether the body Jesus assumed is of a different kind that every other human body, but whether his union with it constituted something different, not in kind, but in effect, by virtue of his divinity.
A question that brings this out: "Could Jesus experience disease?".
On one side we could say, "Yes, because he has a body like ours in every respect."
But on the other side we could say, "No, because despite having a body like ours, the perfection of his divine nature overcomes all corruptions of the flesh he assumed."
Another way of phrasing the question: "Since Jesus had the power to heal all disease, does that power prevent him from contracting disease actually, though is flesh is subject to it potentially?"
It would seem that Jesus growing hungry or tired refutes the claim that he is not subject to corruption, but that is true only if hunger and fatigue are results of corruption rather than mortality irrespective of corruption (For example, Adam and Eve were free to eat, which seems to imply a desire to do so, which is hunger.) If things like hunger and third and fatigue are precluded from corruption, do we have any other indications in Scripture where Jesus experiences the effects of corruption rather than overcoming its effects?
One answer would be death, but then one could ask, "how did Jesus die?" The text says that he gave up his spirit, which could mean that the divine nature surrendered to the corruption of death to which all fallen flesh is subject--a willing subjection rather than a necessary one.
I'm not convinced of the argument, but it is intriguing to me, because it demonstrates how the union of the divine nature to human nature overcomes the corruption of that nature in an active way, as opposed to being subject to it in a passive way--the Son of God carries human nature through the domain of death and all of its effects, yet without allowing it to be corrupted.
Thoughts?
I think Ken's point regarding Christ being conceived of Mary (implying biological, genetic inheritance) is a better reason for the thought His body was corruptible than my own. But I don't mind teasing out the other:
Luke 22:44 And being in agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down to the ground.
Pain and sweat are physical consequences of the original sin (Genesis 3:17-19). To say Jesus had the potential to miraculously sustain Himself without food et al. in virtue of His divinity does not mean we can predicate such of His humanity (cf. Eutychianism; not that I think you're implying this).
"The text says that he gave up his spirit, which could mean that the divine nature surrendered to the corruption of death to which all fallen flesh is subject--a willing subjection rather than a necessary one."
Certainly, John 10 is clear Jesus' sacrificial death was voluntary. So was His incarnation. This is not in question. What is in question is whether Christ's body would naturally have decayed. Well, Jesus certainly experienced bodily strain and discomfort (another physical consequence of the Fall), and His body's reaction to that exhibits all the characteristics of a "fallen" body.
Let's also consider an argument from probatory parallel: the last Adam's humanity is not glorified prior to the fulfillment of the Adamic covenant. Insofar as Jesus must deal with the consequences of Adam's failure as well as the fulfillment of the terms of said covenant, it makes sense that He is also *subject* to the consequences of Adam's failure except in contexts that such would entail sin or guilt. John 7:39 is possibly relevant here.
Very good, Ryan. I think those are sufficient counterclaims to refute the argument.
I'm still working through reading/thinking on the other comments.
I recently wrote about this the study we're going through at my church:
Why did God name it, “the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil?” Should we ignore the implication that, prior to coming to a moral decision at that tree, the first couple did not yet have the knowledge of good and evil? While God created Adam and Eve as adults and gave them understanding of language and ideas that would ordinarily have taken them years to learn, what He did not give them is years of experience. When it came to making moral decisions, they were like the little children, spoken of in Deut. 1:39, who had “no knowledge of good or evil” (compare Rom. 9:11).
To attain the knowledge of good and evil is to arrive at a morally accountable understanding—knowing right from wrong and choosing between them. This is what waited for them at the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. They were given one command, simple enough for them to understand what was required and what the penalty would be; and yet, to fully comprehend the morality involved would require them to make their first moral decision. In choosing to obey or disobey, they would engage a new moral comprehension. Either choice would gain them the knowledge of good and evil. Choosing rightly would gain them that knowledge together with an earned righteousness; but instead, they gained that knowledge with an earned condemnation.
God created two kinds of moral creatures: men and angels; and He conspicuously put both to the moral test almost immediately. One-third of the angels fell, while the rest were confirmed in righteousness. Then God put man to the test, and man fell. But, why the test? Whatever righteousness God gifted them with at creation, none of their acts would have any real moral significance until they made their first moral choice. Not one of their supposed righteous acts up to that point mattered; because even if they were created with a righteous nature, no righteousness could accrue until they willfully and knowledgeably chose to act righteously.
What this means is that sin and righteousness, in finite creatures, always involves the will—there is no such thing as an unearned human righteousness or unearned condemnation. Even in the case of believers, who, without earning any righteousness, gain the righteousness of Christ by faith, it remains a righteousness that was earned by Christ in His human life. Even though the Son of God is immutably and eternally righteous as God, we could not be saved by a divine righteousness, because we need a human righteousness—earned by a human—to be saved from the requirements of the Law. God’s righteousness as God can no more be given to us than His immutability or omniscience. God must become a man and His divine righteousness must be worked out into a righteous, human life—and then, that human righteousness can be imputed to us. Therefore, both angels and mankind had to undergo a test to establish their moral position before God.
It is said by many that there was nothing righteous that Adam could do to merit or earn anything, since he already owed complete obedience. However, there is a difference between earning a moral merit that goes beyond what one already owes (a surplus of good in one’s moral account, so to speak), and earning a righteousness by performing the righteous deeds according to what one does owe (but never actually result in a surplus of good in one’s moral account). I think that what objectors really mean is that he must perform the righteousness required but it will earn him nothing by way of surplus. Nonetheless, earning a righteousness of his own is what was required.
In passing the test, Adam would have earned the righteousness that He owed; therefore, the reward that God would have given would have been due only to God’s gracious condescension in offering the blessed covenant promises that He did not have to offer. But, if a gifted, “original” righteousness had been sufficient in God’s eyes, there would have been no need for the test.
An important distinction in Adam's union with God prior to the fall was that it was not an identifying union, such as we have in Christ and as is pictured in marriage. The incarnation was prerequisite to a union of identity, as we cannot identify with Deity. Thus, no one prior to Christ's death had an identifying union with God, though many had the Holy Spirit.
Reading John of Damascus's comments (in the section Ryan noted), would it be incorrect to say the following?
The Father, Son, and Spirit are three individuals in the one category of God? Each possess the essence or nature of God individually, but are considered as one class of being the existence of which is only realized/existent in the three persons?
Adding to the above, this view would represent Aristotelian realism, would it not?
If you are referring to a deleted comment, I need to reread that. I may have mistook John of Damascus's view for someone he is criticizing who is not a realist. I'm going through his book on the Foundations of Knowledge now.
Gotcha.
A few points upon further reading:
"Christ could not suffer illness or disease because of his divine nature being united to his human nature--the one who came to restore human flesh could not succumb to the power of corruption, but rather overcame it."
John of Damascus:
"The word destruction has two meanings. Thus, it means human sufferings such as hunger, thirst, weariness, piercing with nails, death-that is separation of the soul from the body-and the like. In this sense, we say that the Lord's body was destructible, because He endured all these things freely."
Not that I think John of Damascus ought to be followed in all respects, only that he, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Maximus the Confessor, and Palamas are those whom you will find EO apologists citing most often, so it's useful to have a point of contact where possible. See also the following by Maximus the Confessor:
"Mystical theology teaches us, who through faith have been adopted by grace and brought to the knowledge of truth, to recognize one nature and power of the Divinity, that is to say, one God contemplated in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It teaches us to know God as a single unoriginate Intellect, self-existent, the begetter of a single, self-existent, unoriginate Logos, and the source of a single everlasting life, self-existent as the Holy Spirit: a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. The Divinity is not one thing in another thing: the Trinity is not in the Unity like an accident in a substance or vice versa, for God is without qualities. The Divinity is not one thing and another thing: the Unity does not differ from the Trinity by distinction of nature; the nature is simple and single in both. Nor in the Divinity is one thing dependent on or prior to another: the Trinity is not distinguished from the Unity, or the Unity from the Trinity, by inferiority of power; nor is the Unity distinguished from the Trinity as something common and general abstracted in a purely conceptual manner from the particulars in which it occurs: it is a substantively self-subsistent essence and a truly self-consolidating power. Nor in the Divinity has one thing come into being through another: there is within it no such mediating relationship as that of cause and effect, since it is altogether identical with itself and free from relationships. Nor in the Divinity is one thing derived from another: the Trinity does not derive from the Unity, since it is ungenerated and self-manifested. On the contrary, the Unity and the Trinity are both affirmed and conceived as truly one and the same, the first denoting the principle of essence, the second the mode of existence. The whole is the single Unity, not divided by the Persons; and the whole is also the single Trinity, the Persons of which are not confused by the Unity. Thus polytheism is not introduced by division of the Unity or disbelief in the true God by confusion of the Persons."
https://orthodoxchurchfathers.com/fathers/philokalia/maximus-confessor-on-the-lord-s-prayer-a-short-interpretation-addressed-to-a-dev.html
Affirming each person as "self-existent" and the divine essence as a "self-subsistent essence and a truly self-consolidating power" can scarcely be distinguished from the position of many Reformed theologians (the question would only be whether each person is autotheos).
Now, in what sense it is intelligible that the mode of existence of the Son and Spirit is caused by the Father yet that each can be said to be "self-existent" is debatable. On that point, I've heard of "tri-seity" as an possibly preferable alternative insofar as the existence of the "Father" necessarily implies the existence of a Son [and Spirit]. But again, the above quote and others provide some grounds for discussion.
Following the last comment, a question Ken asked earlier:
"I agree that natures are owned by persons, but the nature makes the person possible, such that person is grounded in nature. Is this acceptable? Can all three Persons of the Trinity, as individual Persons, each exhaustively own the nature?"
Earlier, I played devil's advocate in asking difficult questions (or what I think are difficult, anyway). But let's attempt a positive construction to Ken's position:
1. To avoid equivocation, language we use to describe Trinitarian "persons" and the divine "nature" must be univocal in meaning to that which we use to describe human "persons" and "nature" (including other, related terms). After all, if we accept the Chalcedonian statement that Christ is "consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood," surely "consubstantial" in the one case must find overlap in meaning with the other (i.e. following Clark, analogy presupposes univocity).
2. Will is a faculty or function of a certain kind of [personal] nature, not one which is grounded in hypostasis. Otherwise, Christ has two wills and, therefore, two hypostases (Nestorianism). Thus, Ken, I think you were right to suggest that persons are "grounded" in nature - thought we would agree that it is not as if nature can exist apart from persons (i.e. we reject a Platonic, "ante rem" view of universals). Rather, following Samuel Baird on this point, "universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, — the universals not having an existence of their own separate from the individuals through which they are manifested." (cf. The Elohim Revealed, pg. 149). This is an "in re" view of universals: https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/question-on-nominalism-realism-and-salvation.111310/
There are not, then, numerically distinct "wills" (although there may be numerically distinct *uses* or *tropos* or *modes* of the natural will, which I will return to later). Another good argument against this can be read here (pgs. 29-30)
https://www.academia.edu/100560521/There_cannot_be_two_omnipotent_beings
3. The problem with a view like John Philoponus is that it leads to (at most) a "post rem" view of universals, one in which metaphysical "particulars" (individuals, hypostases) antecede "universals" such that the latter are mere, conceptual abstractions from that which may be predicated of the former:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27832083?read-now=1&seq=7
https://www.academia.edu/39228098/Patristic_Argument_and_the_Use_of_Philosophy_in_the_Tritheist_Controversy_of_the_Sixth_Century
This seems to lead to metaphysical monophysitism, as that which we abstract (e.g. Christ's "divinity" or "humanity") must first be derived from that which is predicable of the hypostases as such (e.g. Christ). That is, if these "universals" do not have grounds in reality, then what is the reality? The reality would just be Christ (the particular hypostases). As I understand it, this would lead to metaphysical monophysitism and contradiction.
Take the following example:
Christ is omniscient (from which we can abstract His divinity).
Christ is not omniscient (from which we can abstract His humanity).
If a "post rem" view of universals is correct - if universals are grounded in hypostases (contra Ken and most theologians in the early and Reformed church) - then the reality to which the above example refers is contradictory: the particular is omniscient and not-omniscient at the same time and in the same sense. If one wishes to say He is not both omniscient and not-omniscient in the same sense, then I think one must reject a "post rem" view of universals.
The following still needs some fleshing out, but returning to a few Eastern Orthodox apologists, there seems to be a distinction made between the will and its use. For example:
https://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2005/05/04/synergy-in-christ/
See also here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=In3hE3u3uFo (1:40:50-2:07:00)
In both cases, EO apologists distinguish between the will with respect to human *nature* and the *personal* use of said will, including the mode of one's will*ing*. This is interesting in at least two respects:
1. In both cases (following Maximus the Confessor), a "gnomic" mode of willing (a mode of willing which entails deliberation) is affirmed of us and denied of Christ. It is not clear to me whether EO apologists would affirm or deny that Christ experienced "concupiscence," but the fact they are willing to distinguish between the nature/will which Christ assumed (same as any other individual who is human) and the alleged mode of said will (which might be called "accidental" in the Aristotelian sense) undercuts objections they often have to the doctrine of original sin, especially if laden in the context of traducianism (in which case a sinful mode of will - one which shared or participated in the initial sin - could/would be inherited from our father).
Ken, I don't know if you're following my thought on this? I'm essentially hypothesizing a distintion between human "nature" (common to *all* of whom humanity may be predicated, Christ included) and a "mode" of said nature which Christ does not have but we do: that which is concretely traduced to us and in virtue of which Adam participated in the initial sin as contrasted to that mode of human [will] with which Christ was born which allows Him to remain consubstantial to us (yet without corruption).
See especially 1:45:00-1:46:00 in the Dyer video, where he admits Christ did not assume a "*fallen* human nature." That is, fallenness is "accidental" to human nature. This is something anyone who is Reformed could affirm, as no one would say Christ assumed a fallen, corrupted *will.* It is in the nature of humans to have a moral characteristic. But whether one is *disposed* (an important concept which Dyer overlooks, perhaps due to his understanding of libertarian free will) and therefore tends to act towards good or away from good is accidental to human nature, which is why we can be totally depraved yet the righteous Christ can be consubstantial with us.
2. While I don't know to what extent I agree with some of John of Damascus's definitions, the following are helpful:
"...the person has that which is common plus that which is individuating, and, besides this, existence in itself. Substance does not subsist in itself, but is to be found in persons."
See also: pg. 289, chapter 11. This and what has already been said in Point 1 may go some way in allowing the possibility of explaining how one divine will is compatible with multiple divine thoughts (John of Damascus agrees with Clark on the two faculties of the soul, cf. pg. 247: "cognitive" and "vital"). That is, each divine person might engage a "hypostatic use" of (cf. the first link in this comment) the one, natural will. The only question would be regarding whether such a "use" would entail distinct "energies" or "operations." Ironically, this is something I've mentioned before as a possible difficulty for EO:
https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/a-critical-evaluation-of-eastern.html
I'll have to think more on this point in particular.
Just a couple quick thoughts. Human nature being both material and immaterial, only the material is consubstantial with all, since the immaterial was not consubstantial with Christ. His immaterial nature was common in the sense that its essential characteristics were shared by all, but its substance was created ex nihilo for Him as it was for the first Adam. I'll have to think more on the different modes of willing, and read the links, before I can understand it. My strengths are in anthropology rather than trinity--and as you wisely point out, Christology is the bridge between the two. One thing for sure: both Shedd and Strong badly messed up in Christology, thinking that Jesus' human soul came from Mary. I don't remember how Baird dealt with it.
A question, Ryan: does consubstantial mean of an identically the same substance, or, of one-and-the-same substance? You said: “ I think the meaning of their being consubstantial is just the same as the meaning of you and I being consubstantial, although the manner of consubstantiality differs between Trinitarian members (eternal, necessary) and us as men (temporal, contingent). Regardless, they indeed are of the same nature.”
Both realists and Representationists see a continuity of immaterial substance by propagation; but the former is continuity of being while the latter is continuity of characteristics—the former as the one-and-the-same substance whereas the latter is merely an identical substance. But even with the realists, the continuity and discontinuity are both there. There is no present consubstantiality between the human father and his son, but there was consubstantiality between them in the propagation of the son out of the father’s substance.
As for you and I, even the realist would see the consubstantiality as only remotely through a common progenitor.
I think a lot of the same words are used in different ways depending on differing, theological background.
Your body and my body are numerically different. Your soul and my soul are presently numerically different. Yet the latter two are sourced in the one soul of Adam out of whom we were multiplied.
Are these different "substances"? Did Christ assume two different "substances"? That might depend on a definition. For example, we say that Christ assumed "human nature." He assumed humanity.
1) Is *that* the [one] substance Christ assumed - a total package, so to speak, of which "soul" and "body" are parts? That is, does the one "nature" Christ assumed = one "substance"?
2) Or did Christ assume two "substances"? If this latter, surely we would not say Christ assumed two humanities or human natures... right? So are the "substance[s]" of soul and body (if it is right to speak of each that way) subsumed under a definition of "nature"?
The soul and body are certainly distinct *somethings* that are separated at the point of physical death. We can all agree on that. At the same time, I would think Christ's body and soul were still "linked" to His hypostasis/person even as they were separated from each other. It was always *His* body that lay in the grave.
"...the immaterial was not consubstantial with Christ."
This causes me pause. Christ's human soul was not traduced from Adam, but does this entail that the immaterial is not consubstantial? Does being *of* the same nature require being *from* the same nature? When the Lord created male and female pairs of animals, were not those animals *of* the same nature even though both were created ex nihilo? Or would you say that two original deer (say) were not consubstantial?
If "His immaterial nature was common in the sense that its essential characteristics were shared by all," in my mind, this seems sufficient for consubstantiality. Is not consubstantiality a precondition for the possibility of the sort of union for which we advocate?
Precise definitions are difficult business, of course. I've only provided some thoughts that might help shape a definition (one way or another - I'm open to counters). I'll also have to think more about it.
I think your 2) is better. Human nature consists in two substances. We are the nexus of the physical and spiritual worlds. But I think that neither our persons nor Christ's Person remain(ed) joined to the dissolving physical bodies after death. But then again, there is something that transcends the material even in the body itself, since every molecule is replaced in a 10-year cycle. It was indeed His body that lay in the grave, and it may well be my body that will one day lay in a grave--but will it be my body when it turns to dust and is scattered?
"This causes me pause. Christ's human soul was not traduced from Adam, but does this entail that the immaterial is not consubstantial? Does being *of* the same nature require being *from* the same nature? When the Lord created male and female pairs of animals, were not those animals *of* the same nature even though both were created ex nihilo? Or would you say that two original deer (say) were not consubstantial?"
Does the Realist have no bone to pick with Representationists who claim that they agree that the immaterial nature was ruined in Adam through natural union and propagated to all men in its sinful condition? Rather, we object that they are abusing the terms, natural union and propagation, meaning no more by them than the possession of an identical substance, avoiding entirely the idea of shared being by having at one time shared the one-and-the-same substance.
If Jesus's immaterial nature was identical in all those characteristics and qualities necessary to define Him as human, then that was all that is needed. His redeeming union with sinners happens when we are indwelt with the Holy Spirit.
Interesting - I hadn't thought to connect the ship of Theseus paradox to this context.
Do you have thoughts on Robert Shaw's commentary on the WCF XXXII.2:
"The dead shall be raised with the selfsame bodies, although with very different qualities. The very term resurrection implies that the same bodies shall be raised that fell by death; for if God should form new bodies, and unite them to departed souls, it would not be a resurrection, but a new creation. Our Saviour declares: "All that are in the graves shall come forth." This certainly implies that the same bodies which were committed to the graves shall be raised; for, if new bodies were to be produced, and united to their souls, they could not, with truth, be said to come out of their graves. The Apostle Paul affirms, that the same body shall be raised which is sown in corruption, and declares: "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality;" pointing, as it were, to that corruptible and mortal body which he then carried about. But, though the bodies of the saints will be the same in all essentials as to substance, they will be vastly changed as to qualities."
"Does the Realist have no bone to pick with Representationists who claim that they agree that the immaterial nature was ruined in Adam through natural union and propagated to all men in its sinful condition? Rather, we object that they are abusing the terms, natural union and propagation, meaning no more by them than the possession of an identical substance, avoiding entirely the idea of shared being by having at one time shared the one-and-the-same substance."
Sure, I agree with this. As I mentioned earlier:
//I'm essentially hypothesizing a distintion between human "nature" (common to *all* of whom humanity may be predicated, Christ included) and a "mode" of said nature which Christ does not have but we do: that which is concretely traduced to us and in virtue of which Adam participated in the initial sin as contrasted to that mode of human [will] with which Christ was born which allows Him to remain consubstantial to us (yet without corruption).//
In short, I am suggesting traducianism is *not* a necessary condition for consubstantiality (although it is a sufficient condition). Traducianism *is* a necessary condition for shared agency and participation in Adam's sin.
"If Jesus's immaterial nature was identical in all those characteristics and qualities necessary to define Him as human, then that was all that is needed."
Right - if He and we are human, I would think He is consubstantial with us, i.e. He is *of* the same [immaterial] substance without being *from* the same [immaterial] substance (Adam's).
As to Shaw’s comments, he’s right that God will raise us in the same bodies that died, but those bodies will no longer be in the same condition—going from mortal to immortal, etc. The same principle of identity that answers the Ship of Theseus paradox prior to death would answer it after resurrection. The molecules—indeed the very nature and internal systems—may change but the principle of physical identity remains unchanged. Like other apparent paradoxes of Christianity, we can’t explain the mechanics but we affirm the limiting concepts (Van Til). God knows how to accomplish such things and has no dilemmas.
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