The Problem with a Literal, Pecuniary Atonement

At what point in our lives is the Father's wrath against us propitiated? At what point in our lives are we viewed as righteous in His sight? Most Christians reject eternal justification, the idea that we are justified in His sight before we are even born. I would further argue that we are not justified until we come to faith in Christ. I have wondered, however, whether Owen's view implies that justification happened at the time of Christ's death on the cross. Here is what Owen writes in Death of Death in the Death of Christ (link):

...by death he did deliver us from death, and that actually, so far as that the elect are said to die and rise with him. He did actually, or ipso facto, deliver us from the curse, by being made a curse for us; and the handwriting that was against us, even the whole obligation, was taken out of the way and nailed to his cross. It is true, all for whom he did this do not instantly actually apprehend and perceive it, which is impossible: but yet that hinders not but that they have all the fruits of his death in actual right, though not in actual possession, which last they cannot have until at least it be made known to them. As, if a man pay a ransom for a prisoner detained in a foreign country, the very day of the payment and acceptation of it the prisoner hath right to his liberty, although he cannot enjoy it until such time as tidings of it are brought unto him, and a warrant produced for his delivery.

What Owen says here seems to imply while there might be an epistemic dimension still to come whereby we become aware of the fact that we already are actually justified, the fact is, we are already justified. If I'm being honest and distance myself from the name "John Owen," this statement appears dangerous to me, and I'll be glad for anyone to explain it other than how I currently understand it. This appears similar to the eternal justification position in that it is not at the moment of faith that we are justified in God's sight.

Now, I will note that in the very next chapter later, Owen says (link):

...when [Christ] comes to bestow faith and actually to justify a man, until he hath so done he is not justified.

Therefore, I'm not sure if Owen just doesn't catch the implication of the previous paragraph or if I'm misunderstanding him. But if I am misunderstanding him, so are a lot of people who think his view is a pecuniary view of the atonement.

I believe it is possible he may have changed his position, as I will also note that in a book on The Doctrine of the Trinity, which he wrote twenty-one years after The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, he rejects a purely pecuniary view of the atonement and seems to reverse his position on the matter (link):

Neither does it follow, that, on the supposition of the satisfaction pleaded for, the freedom, pardon, or acquitment of the person originally guilty and liable to punishment must immediately and “ipso facto” ensue. It is not of the nature of every solution or satisfaction, that deliverance must “ipso facto” follow. And the reason of it is, because this satisfaction, by a succedaneous substitution of one to undergo punishment for another, must be founded in a voluntary compact and agreement. For there is required unto it a relaxation of the law, though not as unto the punishment to be inflicted, yet as unto the person to be punished. And it is otherwise in personal guilt than in pecuniary debts. In these, the debt itself is solely intended, the person only obliged with reference whereunto. In the other, the person is firstly and principally under the obligation. And therefore, when a pecuniary debt is paid, by whomsoever it be paid, the obligation of the person himself unto payment ceases “ipso facto.” But in things criminal, the guilty person himself being firstly, immediately, and intentionally under the obligation unto punishment, when there is introduced by compact a vicarious solution, in the substitution of another to suffer, though he suffer the same absolutely which those should have done for whom he suffers, yet, because of the acceptation of his person to suffer, which might have been refused, and could not be admitted without some relaxation of the law, deliverance of the guilty persons cannot ensue “ipso facto,” but by the intervention of the terms fixed on in the covenant or agreement for an admittance of the substitution.

It appears, from what has been spoken, that, in this matter of satisfaction, God is not considered as a creditor, and sin as a debt; and the law as an obligation to the payment of that debt, and the Lord Christ as paying it; — though these notions may have been used by some for the illustration of the whole matter, and that not without countenance from sundry expressions in the Scripture to the same purpose. But God is considered as the infinitely holy and righteous author of the law, and supreme governor of all mankind, according to the tenor and sanction of it. Man is considered as a sinner, a transgressor of that law, and thereby obnoxious and liable to the punishment constituted in it and by it, — answerably unto the justice and holiness of its author. The substitution of Christ was merely voluntary on the part of God, and of himself, undertaking to be a sponsor, to answer for the sins of men by undergoing the punishment due unto them. To this end there was a relaxation of the law as to the persons that were to suffer, though not as to what was to be suffered. Without the former, the substitution mentioned could not have been admitted; and on supposition of the latter, the suffering of Christ could not have had the nature of punishment, properly so called: for punishment relates to the justice and righteousness in government of him that exacts it and inflicts it; and this the justice of God does not but by the law. Nor could the law be any way satisfied or fulfilled by the suffering of Christ, if, antecedently thereunto, its obligation, or power of obliging unto the penalty constituted in its sanction unto sin, was relaxed, dissolved, or dispensed withal. Nor was it agreeable to justice, nor would the nature of the things themselves admit of it, that another punishment should be inflicted on Christ than what we had deserved; nor could our sin be the impulsive cause of his death; nor could we have had any benefit thereby. And this may suffice to be added unto what was spoken before as to the nature of satisfaction, so far as the brevity of the discourse whereunto we are confined will bear, or the use whereunto it is designed does require.

Contrast the above to what Owen says earlier in The Death of Death in the Death of Christ (link):

Satisfaction is a term borrowed from the law, applied properly to things, thence translated and accommodated unto persons; and it is a full compensation of the creditor from the debtor. To whom any thing is due from any man, he is in that regard that man's creditor; and the other is his debtor, upon whom there is an obligation to pay or restore what is so due from him, until he be freed by a lawful breaking of that obligation, by making it null and void; which must be done by yielding satisfaction to what his creditor can require by virtue of that obligation: as, if I owe a man a hundred pounds, I am his debtor, by virtue of the bond wherein I am bound, until some such thing be done as recompenseth him, and moveth him to cancel the bond; which is called satisfaction. Hence, from things real, it was and is translated to things personal. Personal debts are injuries and faults; which when a man hath committed, he is liable to punishment. He that is to inflict that punishment or upon whom it lieth to see that it be done, is, or may be, the creditor; which he must do, unless satisfaction be made. Now, there may be a twofold satisfaction:-- First, By a solution, or paying the very thing that is in the obligation, either by the party himself that is bound, or by some other in his stead: as, if I owe a man twenty pounds, and my friend goeth and payeth it, my creditor is fully satisfied. Secondly, By a solution, or paying of so much, although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which, by the creditor's acceptation, stands in the lieu of it; upon which, also, freedom from the obligation followeth, not necessarily, but by virtue of an act of favour. In the business in hand,--First, the debtor is man; he oweth the ten thousand talents, Matt. 28:24. Secondly, The debt is sin: "Forgive us our debts," Matt. 6:12. Thirdly, That which is required in lieu thereof to make satisfaction for it, is death: "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," Gen 2:17; "The wages of sin is death," Rom. 6:23. Fourthly, The obligation whereby the debtor is tied and bound is the law, "Cursed is every one," etc., Gal. 3:10; Deut. 27:26; the justice of God, Rom. 1:32; and the truth of God, Gen. 3:3. Fifthly, The creditor that requireth this of us is God, considered as the party offended, severe Judge, and supreme Lord of all things. Sixthly, That which interveneth to the destruction of the obligation is the ransom paid by Christ: Rom. 3:25, "God set him forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood.

After this, Owen essentially says Christ's death was the solution of "another kind" (since we are not saved by "paying" for our own sins). He continues in the chapter to make the statement I quoted first (see above), that by being made a curse for us on the cross, He "ipso facto" "deliver[ed] us from the curse."

In short, given the contrast between the two quotes written twenty-one years apart, I think Owen changed his mind and rejected the idea that the nature of the atonement is pecuniary, so I don't think the double payment argument works. This is not to say I reject the idea of limited atonement, only that there are better arguments to be made for it. I know several Reformed theologians also rejected the view that the atonement is pecuniary in nature (e.g. Dabney, Hodge), and others have pointed out the relevancy of a rejection of this to the double payment objection (e.g. Crisp). But I'm not sure how many have noted that Owen himself seems to have changed his mind.