These are strong terms, but that’s deliberate. My
interest in this sort of knowledge stems from its necessity. Suppose one denies
he [or anyone else] has any philosophic knowledge. Well, then it is possible that he
is mistaken in the denial itself. In other words, he could actually accept that
he necessarily has such knowledge. But then it is evident that anything he says
could, in fact, mean the contrary. He would not even be able to state his
absolute, unmistakable acceptance of this as a logical consequence. He would not
even be able to know what a mistake is. In denying the possibility of the sort
of knowledge I describe, it is evident one either assumes such knowledge by claiming he is not
mistaken that knowledge isn’t necessary, or he implicitly admits to losing
meaning and intelligibility. Both are self-defeating. Even Neurath’s boat presupposes
one plank on the Good Ship Worldview that can’t be replaced: the need for a
boat.
Note that the above does not suggest everyone actually possesses
philosophic knowledge. It suggests everyone implicitly claims to possess
philosophic knowledge. They may or may not be able to justify this and other knowledge claims.
1 comment:
Yup, some people are certain that nothing is certain. I like Vincent Cheung, though. He's very certain of himself.
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