Spontaneity and Monstrosity in Aristotle1
Although Aristotle's interest in discussing irregularities in natural law lay more within the sphere of human conduct, a fact which leads even in the Physics to an emphasis on luck rather than spontaneity,2 nevertheless he also had in mind certain exceptions to the laws which govern animals, plants, and inanimate objects. The question this article seeks to answer is, Are monstrosties spontaneous events? Those who have put this question explicitly seem to be unanimously of the affirmative opinion.3
In antiquity Alexander Aphrodisias unequivocally call monstrosities examples of spontaneity.4 And perhaps the best modern expression of this opinion is that of Torstrik whose commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, II, 4-6, is indispensable for any study of spontaneity. Because he clearly states the position and because it will be necessary again to refer to his argument, it seems best to quote the paragraph in full.5
Ferner ist 197b33 mit E, Simplicius and Philoponus χωριζομενον του απο τυχης zu lesen. Subject ist das αυτοματος im engeren Sinne. Ubrigens ist diese Behauptung nicht ohne Schwierigkeit. In den von Aristoteles angefuehrten Beispielen von dem Pferde und dem herabfallenden Stein handelt es sich um Naturvorgaenge welche nur in Beziehung auf menschliche Wuenche απο ταυτοματου waren, und auch sonst giebt es davon bei Aristoteles Biespiel genug, vid. Bon. Ind. s. v. αυτοματος: hier sehen wir dass dasselbe gilt in Beziehung auf das ειδος Den Zweck der Natur. Danach ist also die generatio aequivoca auszuschliessen, trotz ihres Names, αυτοματος γενεσις, den hier wird der Naturzweck erreicht ohne Nebenfolgen, auch geschieht sie bei gewissen Arten der Thiere und Pflanzen regelmaessig. Es bleiben also nur die τερατα ubrig, den diese sind παρα φυσιν 770b5, 9, und sie sind αμαρτηματα του ενεχα του: die Natur will etwas erreichen und wahrend sie dies verfehlt, entsteht etwas anderes. Themistius ist zwar hiemit nicht einverstanden, [Sp.] 187, 22. οιον τον εξαδαχτυλον η οτρουθοχεφαλον. η ταυτα ουχ εοτιν απο ταυταματον; εχει γαρ οιχειαν αιτιαν την προυπαρχουσαν εν αυτιας η γαρ ψυξιν η ελλειψιv η πλεονασμον της μλης. Aber diese Dinge sind nicht οιχειαι αιτιαι sondern stoeren vielmehr die nach dem Zweck wirkende Ursache, und das bewirkt die Missgeburt.Torstrik has argued well. But it is seen that there is not absolute unanimity. Even if Themistius’ reasons appear poor at first, at least one commentator denies that monstrosities are spontaneous events. The trend of this article will be to produce reasons supporting Themistius’ viewpoint; it will certainly be difficult, perhaps impossible to overthrow the prevailing theory, but the literature does not appear to have done justice to a position which, to say no more, deserves explicit refutation.
Before one can decide whether a monstrosity occurs spontaneously, It is necessary to understand what spontaneity is. This unfortunately leads to a long digression, but a digression which is interesting for its own sake and which because of the apparent confusion in Aristotle’s thought can stand independent treatment. Torstrik, in spite of rather than because of his love of conjectural emendation, has cleared up some difficult points. And Hamelin in his commentary, Aristotle, Physique II, has done excellent work in criticizing the ancient commentators. But still several things remain to be said.
Spontaneity, for others as well as for Aristotle, designates some sort of irregularity in the laws of nature. Obviously then, a theory of the spontaneous derive its peculiarities from the underlying worldview. And it is precisely in this relation that Aristotle introduced his chapters on the subject. As Torstrik has well said, Aristotle asks himself the question, what sort of a cause is spontaneity? This point needs emphasis when the subject is monstrosity because we are to view spontaneity from a different angle from that of Aristotle. Our final interest lies in the event due to spontaneity rather than in spontaneity regarded as a cause. The need of such a distinction is obvious from the text of the Physics. We cannot here discuss Aristotle’s views on nature in general. Physics, II, 1-3, requires separate study. But briefly there are for Aristotle no more than four components in a complete explanation of a given event. Mathematical formulae, which dominate modern science, get scarce attention from him. Hence causality for him is entirely different from what a contemporary philosopher might mean by the term. We are accustomed to consider causality as working from the past to the future; but because three of Aristotle’s four causes are but varying aspects of one thing, purpose, and this is the most important part of causality, we must think of Aristotle’s cause as working from the future to the present or past. The purpose or ends so direct processes that they occur either always in the same manner or with but slight variations. All natural law is of this type and an event is explained when its purpose is known. For example, if the life cycle of a plant is to be explained, we must know that the plant has been developed from a seed which was produced by another plant of the same species, and that its various present activities are for the purpose of producing another mature plant similar to the parent. When the new plan has reached maturity, the end of its growing process, we have the form of that species embodied in the matter before us.
That Aristotle’s causality works backwards, so to speak, must always be borne in mind because irrelevant objections are occasionally based on some other, more modern, conception of cause. Perhaps Aristotle made causality work backwards because he anticipated Hum in rejecting a cause which by some inner force produced a given effect with unfailing regularity. And if in physical experimentation the sources of constant error be infinite in number, an analogy may be drawn between Aristotle and others later than Hume who deny the sufficiency of any observable causes.
However, assuming Aristotle’s view on nature, spontaneity is in some way an exception to them. Since everyday speech contains many references to chance and luck, there must be some vague meaning corresponding. The philosopher is obliged to make this meaning more precise. This may result in denying any scientific import to chance and luck on the assumption that common language uses the terms merely to cover common ignorance. It has been suggested, therefore, that however much Aristotle may talk about spontaneity and luck, there is really no absolute indeterminism in his system. If spontaneity is, as we shall see, an accidental cause, there must always be, so Alexander Aphrodisias argues, a per se cause for the accident to attach to. The reason a white man built a house is that a Caucasian was born according to biological laws and by a determinate education became an architect. Or it may be said that spontaneity is merely the point of intersection of two relatively independent lines of causation.7 This views gains plausibility from the passages of luck which do not strictly imply indeterminism.8 Such passages may at least be partially explained as being intended to refute cruder forms of determinism. Man is, of course, not an atom nor a mechanical aggregation of them; he does not tumble downhill like a stone, nor must he always be pushed in order to go. Thought and bile are not homogeneous. Refutation of the cruder views still leaves room for the more profound determinism which takes more careful account of psychological phenomena. But this is far from proving that Aristotle accepted determinism in any form. He is clearly dissatisfied with the explanation which would call luck merely a cover for man’s ignorance, though in a sense luck and spontaneity are something unknown,9 or more precisely, unknowable. But it seems that the characterization of the Aristotelian system as indeterministic need little emphasis. As his treatment of propositions referring to the future, as well as his discussion of mechanism shows, the past and the present do not guarantee the future.10
Those who hold that monstrosities are the results of spontaneity naturally hold also that all contingency or abnormality falls within the sphere of spontaneity. The thesis here maintained must affirm another kind of irregularity outside that sphere. The first, spontaneity, now stands in need of more precise definition. Physics, II 4, may be passed in silence; it is an historical critique. Chapter five begins Aristotle’s own explanation, and it opens with a confusion we should like to avoid, because a thorough discussion would carry us far into a detailed explanation of Aristotle’s logic. Nevertheless the present subject is so dependent on logic, as Heidel shows,11 that one cannot omit all reference to basic theory. For a discussion of logic more thorough than that of Heidel’s article, one may consult the excellent analysis by M. Robin.12 This eminent French savant has undertaken to show that, and how, there is a constant concordance between the generation of effects by their causes and the generation of conclusions by their middle terms. Now since spontaneity is an accidental cause and accident is an element of logic, there is a strict and definite relationship between logic and this aspect of physics. M. Robin points out that Aristotelian logic is fundamentally a connotative system, not an extensive or nominalistic one. The class is not just the sum of its individuals; it is still an Idea even if dehypostatized. M. Robin goes on to explain that in spite of this fundamental character of Aristotelian logic, many extensive elements crept in until the system loses a great deal of self-consistency. Now Physics, II, 5, begins apparently with such an extensive element. επειδη ορωμεν τα μεν αει ωσαυτως γιγνομενα, τα δε ως επι πομυ, φανερον οτι ουδετερον τουτων αιτια η τυχη λεγετιαι. Natural processes, then, in these lines and those immediately following, are divided into two distinct classes, depending on whether they are regular – and this class is subdivided into “always” and “for the most part” – or irregular. The assertion immediately follows that nothing in the first class is spontaneous; the second, called “neither always nor for the most part,” seems, however, to be made definitely co-extensive with the notion of spontaneity.13
If this statement of co-extension be taken strictly, then monstrosities fall within the sphere of the spontaneous. Now it is not the desire to force a thesis on Aristotle which leads to discounting his explicit statement. Both Hamelin and Torstrik, who class monstrosities with spontaneous productions, refuse to take these lines seriously. While Torstrik justified this procedure, arguing that these lines state the genus of the spontaneous event and the following lines give the specific difference, for on no other assumption do they make sense, he nevertheless connects thi argument with what I apprehend to be a misunderstanding of the opening paragraph of Physics, II, 5. Yet since Hamelin is of the same opinion, it is evidently a common misunderstanding. It is the view which would make the concept “irregular,” i.e. neither always nor for the most part, identical with the denotative concept of “rare” or seldom.” To quote from Hamelin14:
Cette conception tout extensive parait bien compter serieusement dans la pensée d’Aristote, puisque nous le voyons admettre que, s’il n’y a de science au plus haut sens du mot que de l’universel, il y a pourtant aussi une certaine science de ce qui arrive le plus souvent.And further on,15 speaking more specifically of the rarity of spontaneous events:
Remarquons que la caracteristique invoquee par Aristote, et qui releve du point de vue de l’extension, est extremement defectueuse. Il se peut qu’un fait de hazard soit, au moins en general, un fait rare. Mais, quoiqu’ Aristote en dise, il n’y a pas reciprocite. S’il parvient a dire sur le hazard des choses qui portent, c’est grace a l’emploi des expressions “par accident,” “accidentel,” auxquelles il donne le sens non pas de rare, maid de contingent.To my mind this is multiplying difficulties where enough already exist. It seems strange that neither of these men attempted to understand επι το πολν connotatively, although Torstrik remarks, more significantly than he intended, that Aristotle never uses the phrase το επ ελαττον for the irregular. Yet no phrase would have been more appropriate if το επι το πολν meant “in the majority of cases.” It ought, then, to be more reasonable to suppose that Aristotle did not mean rare when he said irregular, i.e., neither always nor for the most part. We need not trace history back to Philoponus to see that rare events are not necessarily spontaneous. A large pearl is rare enough, but the more perfect it is (hence the rarer it is), the less is it the result of spontaneity. It is rather an extreme and admirable example of how nature works when unhindered. And conversely, an indication that frequency is insufficient to establish teleology in the occurrence of events, such as stroking the beard while lecturing, which are frequent but not επι το πολν in the strict sense, that is purposive. The strange notion16 of επι το πολν must then be taken connotatively rather than extensively. It is of course easy, and therefore possibly superficial, to claim that ninety-seven potato eyes grow and produce potatoes while only three die. Such an account requires the extensive and literal interpretation of επι το πολν. Shifting the viewpoint one might retort, however, that nine and ninety-seven fish eggs die for every three which become fish. “For the most part” may even yet be extensive, but it is no longer literal. In reality we must not let it remain extensive at all. It does not refer to any given percentage of successes or failures; rather it denotes the norm in natural processes. We have just seen that the rare as well as the frequent can be the norm. Now by showing that the frequent as well as the rare can be abnormal, we may conclude that the rare is a concept neither equivalent to nor generic to spontaneity.17
This additional evidence in favor of such a connotative interpretation is found in the extremely wide sphere of monstrosities in the strict sense. For whether monstrosities are spontaneous or not, if “for the most part” if literal or denotative, there will be few exceptions. But there are more exceptions than regularities. “Even he who does not resemble his parents is already in a certain sense a monstrosity; for in these cases nature has in a way departed from type. The first departure is indeed that the offspring should become female rather than male.”18 To call monstrous all females and even those males which do not resemble their parents requires, as Aristotle admits in De gen. an. IV, 4, 770b3-27 (by distinguishing material and formal natures and taking notice of regular irregularities), some colloquial modifications. Yet his original position respecting all females and most males at least makes possible the question: Does anything ever occur strictly ως επι το πολν? Certainly very few things are strictly such and hence it seems inconsistent with what Is characteristic of Aristotle to suppose he understood the regular, the lawful, as an extensive concept.
That Torstrik failed even to refute such an interpretation and apparently held as obvious the extensional position is all the more surprising in view of his keen and humorous penetration of an equally puzzling phrase in 196b18.19
The next step, then, is to determine the specific difference which narrows the irregular, in the sense of abnormal, to the sphere of spontaneity and see if we have included or excluded monstrosities. No reasonable doubt can obscure this characteristic. It is simply το ενεχα του.20 In other words, if there are two kinds of abnormal processes, that one only which is a means to an end is the result of spontaneity. Of course ends as well as processes may come from luck or spontaneity,21 but it is interesting to note, as Torstrik has pointed out, that Aristotle in chapters five and six, contrary to superficial – if not modern – views, is thinking primarily of spontaneous processes. Hence the phraseology of his illustrations may at first seem a little peculiar.22 The explanation is that Aristotle is treating spontaneity as a case, and naturally enough as a cause of processes. To speak accurately, an abnormal or unnatural form is a contradiction in terms. Therefore an end is a spontaneous event only when it results from a spontaneous process, and such a process is, we argue, one which is both abnormal and purposive. This slight confusion between end and means does not, however, affect the fundamental nature of the problem. To the one question, Is monstrosity a spontaneous event? we merely substitute another, Is the monstrosity the result of a spontaneous process?
One must answer negatively because the process resulting in a monstrosity is not a means. It may have begun as a means and the animal may have developed normally for a time, but then something interfered and the continuity of the process was destroyed. And if the continuity has been broken, the process strictly no longer exists, or at least the end of which the means was the means failed of realization. But if the means is the means of an end, and if the monstrosity is not the end,23 neither is the monstrosity the result of spontaneity.
What first strikes one’s attention with regard to this problem is the fact that Aristotle never uses a monstrosity as an example of a spontaneous fact. Indeed, with the exception of a very few obscure passages, he seems never to hunt at such a notion. This argument from silence must be accorded some psychological weight in the final conclusion, especially since he does not leave us without any indication of what he has in mind. But before bringing forward such indications, there is one more indirect argument against monstrosities being spontaneous.
In the Physics, as has been remarked, Aristotle’s interested centers in human moral activity. We may disregard his illustrations, because, while all of them – including the saved horse and the falling stool, which are classed as spontaneous, as well as the lucky event of obtaining the money – have as a result a good and not an evil, which would be the analogue of monstrosity; this, if it were nothing further on which to base an argument, could be regarded as a chance coincidence. But there is something further.
The definition of luck requires that the effect of luck be των προαιρετων.24 This phrase, it appears, should be translated “of things which might be chosen.” Now obviously it is possible to choose something evil, and because of such a possibility Torstrik has adopted the view here rejected.25 The position of this paper also assumes that Aristotle asked himself the question about going into the forest to chop wood and being beaten by robbers. But it holds further, contrary to Torstrik, that such an event does not fall within the sphere of luck. Naturally enough we, and Aristotle too, call such a call unlucky, but such phrases26 are to be regarded as concessions to popular usage; it is well known that Aristotle made concessions of that kind. But his theory would require the event in question to be called not so much “unlucky” as simply “no luck at all.” And this too is popular usage. Now, then, to resume, while it is possible to choose something that turns out evil, Aristotle holds that one always chooses the apparent good. Is it too much to say, then, that nature never makes a mistake in her choosing, or more strictly, her desiring of ends? Monstrosities are imperfections and privations; nature is never directed toward them. To put it plainly, the spontaneous event is the good result which occurs without the normal means; the monstrosity arises from a normal means which, by frustration, never attains its end.27
Now we may mention what Aristotle would consider a spontaneous event. The most usual illustration is health.28 The reference to art in these passages again suggests that only the form of good result can possibly be the result of spontaneity; for art never chooses the worse.
Further, it seems desirable to hold, against Torstrik again, that the results of spontaneous generation do not belie their name, The reasons29 are certainly superficial, for whether the original purpose of going to market is obtained or not, “ohne Nebenfolgen,” listening to Socrates for example, the obtaining of money is still lucky. With reference to spontaneous generation, therefore, we must determine if the animal so generated could have been produced by normal means, for if this be not true, the animal cannot be the result of spontaneity.30 In one specific instance this question cannot be clearly answered. For although in one place31 it appears that Aristotle leaves open the possibility that some Testacea, particularly snails, may originate through ordinary method, later he apparently decides that all Testacea are spontaneously generated.32 If this were the only and final word, it would be impossible to hold that Testacea are spontaneous productions in the strict sense of spontaneity. But in another work he clarifies the situation by a categorical statement, though he does not give specific examples. Some things, he holds,33 may be produced either from seed or without seed. That this does not refer to slips of plants and the like, but to spontaneous generation, is clear from the context. We hope that this is a sufficient proof that forms, such as health and perfect animals, are the only possible effects of spontaneity, and that monstrosities in particular are not such. It remains in fairness to point out whatever difficulties attach to this view, because, as we saw, even ancient commentators took the opposite position. This very fact is in itself a difficulty, for while, as this paper may unfortunately become evidence, commentators misunderstand their texts, the explanations of a student like Alexander Aphrodisias are not lightly to be disregarded. Simplicius too gives an illustration, which, though not referring to monstrosities, has as the spontaneous event something evil or unfortunate. And if the Eudemus from whom Simplicius got the story be the faithful disciple of Aristotle, the opposition can boast an exceedingly dangerous antiquity.34
If, however, the commentators have misunderstood Aristotle, it would be interesting to determine where the error first made a definite appearance. Since Theophrastus’ works were handy, it have me little trouble to see what he had to say on the subject. But it was trouble wasted, because his botanical writings use the word αυτοματος in such a popular sense that nothing can be made of it. It even serves to distinguish wild flowers from cultivated ones.35 This in effect identifies spontaneity with nature. But setting aside the question of who first introduced the error, let us return to the previous question of passages in Aristotle which would make the error possible or plausible.
First, and most important, are those passages which make the explanation of monstrosities depend on matter. All spontaneity likewise depends on matter. Similarly both spontaneity and monstrosities are παρα φυσιν or, more specifically, παρα το ως επι το πολυ.
The similarity of explanation at once suggests a closer relation between the two classes, even though the second figure syllogism36 is invalid. It may have been that the growing influence of extensive over connotative logic led to the discarding of a useless distinction between two types of παρα φυσιν but such a distinction, it seems to me, is an Aristotelian characteristic. These passages are the only real difficulty and are undoubtedly the source of the other interpretation. All other difficulties, so far as I have determined, are incidental and obscure phrases easily regarded as unintentional inconsistencies. For example, a happy monstrosity is hinted at in the Eudemian Ethics,37 but its bearing on the present problem is so slight that one might reasonably object even to mentioning it. A later reference in the same work38 is decidedly more to the point. If the work is Aristotle’s, we must plead inconsistency; if not, then Eudemus here is consistent with Eudemus in the quotation from Simplicius, and we would be forced to say that once, at least, Eudemus deviated from Aristotle’s teaching. In either case, the reference is insufficient in itself to counterbalance the other evidence. All objections to the present thesis must attack the main body of the argument.
The conclusion, then, is that Themistius in the quotation cited early in the article has correctly interpreted Aristotle’s thought as expressed most clearly in Metaphysics Z, 9, 1034a9-21. Monstrosities are therefore not effects of spontaneity for precisely the reason that Themistius gives and which may now be restated: Spontaneity exists where there is a final but no efficient cause, monstrosities exist when there is an efficient but no final cause.
1. The New Scholasticism, January 1934.
2. It is unfortunate that the Oxford translation does not use “luck” for τυχη, because the two are more nearly colloquial parallels. For example, in English we say “good luck” but not “good chance.”
3. Robin, L., La Pensee Greque, page 349; Hamelin O., Systeme D’Aristote, page 267; Werner - Aristote et l’idealisme Platonicien, page 115, “La necessite materielle n’est sutre que le hazard” and page 116n3, and page 117n1, - seem to imply as much without explicitly making the affirmation. I have not found any definite statement in Zeller.
4. De anime, liber alter, περι τυχης, Bruns, page 178, 25-26.
5. Hermes (1875), page 465.
6. For example, D. D. Heath, “Misconceptions of Aristotle’s Doctrine,” Journal of Philology (Vol. VII), points out such in Mill and Grote, but is himself, as I conceive, somewhat in the same fault.
7. Zeller, 3rd ed. II, 2, page 335h3: “Verwandter Art, aber fur die gegenwartige Untersuchung, ist das zeitliche Zusammentreffen zqeier Begebenheiten, zwischen denen gar kein ursachlicher Zusammentreffen stattfindet, wie etwa eines Spaziergangs und einer Mondsfinsterniss. Ein solches Zusammentreffen (in welchen sich die Natur des Zufalligen eigentlich am reinsten darstellt) nennt Arist. συμπτωμα Divin. p. s. 1. 462t26ff.”
8. For example, De part. ann. 1, 1, 640a28-32; Eudem. Ethics, VII, 14, 1247b26; 1248a30.
9. 197a10.
10. De interp. 9; Physics, II, 8, 9.
11. W. A Heidel, The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System (Chicago, 1896).
12. “La conception aristoteliecienne de la causalite,” Archiv fur metaphysicam vim syllogism inesse demonstraverit (these, Paris, 1897).
13. 196b15-17. τα τε γαρ τοιαυτα απο τυχης χαι τα απο τυχης τοιαυτα οντα ιομεν.
14. Systeme d’Aristote, page 237; compare page 126.
15. Ibid., page 227.
16. Hamelin, page 126.
17. To the objection, most fish come from eggs and therefore is extensive, the following paragraph applies.
18. De an. gen. IV, 2, 767b4-8, Oxford translation.
19. Op. cit., page 441.
20. This is amply stated in 196b20, 21; 23, 24, understanding τα οη τοιαυτα as referring to ενεχα του of line 21; 29-31, 33.
21. 199b12-22.
22. 196b33. This is the going to the market instead of recovering the money which occurs by chance. Similarly 197b15, 16.
23. De an. gen. II, 3, 736b3: υοτερον γαρ γινεται το τελος, το δ’ιδιον εοτι το εχαστου της γενεσεως τελος. De part. an., I, 1, 641b23sqq. πανταχου δε λενομεν τοδε τουοε ενεχα, οπουαν φαινηται τελος… υνοενος ερμοοιζοντος. And the context
24. 197b20. Compare 198a5-7.
25. Op. cit., page 446.
26. For example, 197a27.
27. Metaphysics, Λ, 13, 1070a6-8 seems to mean that in spontaneity it is the efficient cause and not the final cause which is lacking. W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Volume II, page 355, on the words αι δε λοιπαι αιτιαν of 1070a9 seems, so far as a hint can show, to be in some agreement with the general position of this paper.
28. De part. an., I, 1, 640a27-29; Metaphysics, Z, 9, 1034a9-21.
29. Torstrik, page 465. Ross, page 183, again is inclined in favor of the present thesis.
30. According to the argument των προαιρετων.
31. De an. gen. III, 11, 762a2, 33.
32. Ibid., II, 3, 736a26.
33. Metaphysics, Z, 7, 1032a28-32. Such perplexing passages as Hist. an., V, 1, 539a23-b16 are not actually inconsistent with the position of this article and even if they were, it would prove little, for Aristotle can easily forget the strictness of his more philosophical definitions when dealing with detailed problems of zoology.
34. Simplicius, page 330, 18 in Arist. Phys. 196a14.
35. Caus. Plant., I, xvi, 10, as, 13. II, i 1. Other instances of loose usage are I, xx, 3; Hist. Plant., IV, xv, 1. IX, viii, 2.
36. All monstrosities are due to matter; all spontaneous events are due to matter; therefore, monstrosities are spontaneous.
37. III, 2, 1231a4.
38. VII, 14, 1247b3-4.
39. This conclusion has a bearing on another problem, the relation of luck to happiness. A suggestion for an article on this subject comes orally from M. Robin and formally from Hamelin, pages 390-392.
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