Reviewed by Gordon H. Clark, Covenant College
This is not the first book a student should read as he begins to study St. Augustine. It is rather difficult, though it deals with some elementary matters. First, the author traces, chronologically, Augustine's developing use of figurative language (inner man, eye of the mind, fountain of truth, the sight of the heart, truths made visible by the sun) and tries to explain its meaning and purpose.
Second, he gives an exceedingly detailed analysis of Augustine's argument (if I am mistaken, I exist) against skepticism. This includes remarks about other analyses. In particular he distinguishes between proving that "I am" and that "I know I am." One who has already studied St. Augustine will realize that this leads on to an analysis of memory. Chapter 4 is on "Memory" (pp. 61-92). It is a chapter worth studying, quite apart from its bearing on St. Augustine.
Those who have dabbled a little in Augustine know that the theory of causality in his day rules out any action of a body on the mind or soul. Causality always proceeds downwards, never upwards. Therefore a physical object cannot produce a sensation or an image in the soul. It is the soul which is active; the physical body is passive. This view of causality sounds strange in modern ears. Author Bubacz believes that the history of philosophy in the past fifteen centuries provides analyses that could have improved Augustine's arguments, had he known the, These improvements are considered in Chapter 5 on "Perception." The author makes it quite clear that Augustine is not an empiricist; but the reviewer suspects that he makes him insufficiently Platonic. In this section, it seems to me that Bubacz views the Augustinian corpus as more consistent than it really is. I do not wish to make Augustine too inconsistent; but he did develop and change his mind as time went on. Bubacz's following chapter on "Illumination" is much better; in fact, it is superb.
Yet I am puzzled when the author tries to excuse Augustine for accepting the theory of ostensive definition (pp. 182ff.), since Augustine explicitly rejects it in de Magistro. Other readers may also be puzzled when Bubacz argues that Augustine was a pragmatist. He even suggests that Augustine was "advancing a cognitive Darwinism" (p. 218). Yet on the same page this Darwinian pragmatist becomes an "Absolute Idealist: Material objects owe their existence to the existence of a perceiving mind."
Of course, Bubacz mentions at least one reservation. Augustine was a Christian, but he believed that "reason could also serve as a path to truth."
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