Gordon Clark: A semi-defense of Francis Schaeffer (Christian Scholar's Review)

1982. A Semi-defense of Francis Schaeffer. Christian Scholars Review. Vol. 11, No. 2. 148-149.

In the Christian Scholar's Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (1981) Dr. Ron Ruegsegger criticizes Francis Schaeffer's philosophy. The article is well researched, well written, and well worth reading. Even so, I find some irrelevancies, one misapprehension, and certain omissions.

The irrelevancies come in the first half of the article. The first half is indeed good, in that it compares Schaeffer's historical and logical remarks with the views of philosophers he opposes. But the method does not seem just. Ruegsegger opposes Schaeffer's interpretation of (for example) Hegel and Kierkegaard on the ground that some recent critics interpret these philosophers differently. The suggestion then is, modestly expressed, that Schaeffer's philosophy suffers therefrom. To argue cogently, however, Ruegsegger would have to show that Schaeffer's interpretation is wrong, and that a recent view is correct. This he does not do.

On page 249 Ruegsegger charges Schaeffer with a logical fallacy. He writes, "Schaeffer frequently defends what he calls the Christian presuppositions against its contradictories, but he seldom argues for it against its contraries." On this point it is the critic who commits the fallacy.

The contradictory of "All dogs have four legs" is "Some dogs do not have four legs." Its contrary is, "No dogs have four legs." Now, being a good Christian presuppositionalist, I wish to defend the true Calvinist position that "All dogs have four legs." To do so, I construct a fine argument in refutation of the thesis "Some dogs do not have four legs." If this latter proposition is false, then the affirmative must be true. But note that if this is what I do, it is not necessary to disprove the contrary also. If the contradictory is false, the contrary must also be false. It is Ruegsegger who falls into the logical blunder with which he charges Schaeffer.

There is another point also. It is similar to the preceding insofar as it charges Schaeffer with missing an alternate view. Schaeffer, when discussing ethics, states that if one abandons Christianity "there are three (and only three) alternatives: hedonism, sociological law, and totalitarianism." The critic insists there are more than three: "utilitarian, intuitionistic, naturalistic, ... and none of these are [sic] reducible to either hedonism, sociological law, or totalitarianism." If the critic will read either Bentham himself, the founder of utilitarianism, or Sidgwick's great work on The Methods of Ethics, he will discover that utilitarianism is based on psychological hedonism, from which is attempts to produce a universal hedonism. 

In connection with Schaeffer's ethics there is another point that his critic objects to. Schaeffer's normative principles are distinctively revelation or biblical; but, complains Ruegsegger, not one of his nine arguments against abortion is biblical. He says "curiously enough" (p. 252), and contrasts Schaeffer's theory with his practice, condemning the latter as "inconsistent." Yet it is not inconsistent," as Ruegsegger almost sees. In opposing secular advocates of abortion and greedy politicians, it is legitimate to use ad hominem arguments. These arguments are legitimate even in geometry. One tries to show inconsistencies in the opponent's position. One tries to point out conclusions, logically drawn from the abortionist's principles but which he either does not like or is afraid to admit in public.

These notes, however, are only a semi-defense of Francis Schaeffer. If I were criticizing him, I should first say that he is not a philosopher at all. To be sure, he discusses certain philosophical problems, but he omits so much that he does not deserve the title. In fact, I rather guess that he admits that he is not a philosopher. His great work lies in other fields, particularly the field of evangelism. And there are others who discuss more of philosophy than he does and still omit a great deal. It is not enough to state that the doctrine of the Trinity solve the one-many problem. One must state what the problem is and show just how the Trinity solves it. It is not enough to assert the trustworthiness of sensory experience in an attempt to avoid skepticism. One must define sensation, prove that there are uninterpreted elements in the mind, show how these can be combined into perceptions, and then develop concepts without assuming, what is factually false, that all men have sensory images. Besides which, one much choose from among Plato's, Aristotle's, and Kant's theories of individuation, or produce a further alternative. Schaeffer is not the only one who omits these essential elements in a philosophy.