When I find a scan to be unreadable, I insert a [?]. I'll link to scans of the letters in question, and perhaps the reader will have better success understanding some of what was written than I have:
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[link, page 3]
November 19 1947Dr. J. Oliver Buswell Jr.
The National Bible Institute
New York, N.Y.
Dear Dr. Buswell,
I am very happy to avail myself of your kind invitation to reply in The Bible Today to your review; and I hope I have not transgressed the limits of propriety either in space or in any other way.
Perhaps you may wish to change the tentative title
As for John Dewey I can hardly agree with you that the quotations in my last letter are inconsistent with behaviorism. In their total context they seem to be strictly behavioristic. While you do not quote from Dewey’s other books, I shall try to look through them for anything that is clearly anti-behavioristic. The fact that Blanshard said emphatically that behaviorism is out proves nothing. Blanshard has always been anti-behavioristic. I mentioned him to a well known scholar who says that Dewey is a behaviorist, and who quotes Dewey as admitting behaviorism. The very fact you allude to reinforces my point: you say, “they believe in consciousness but only as a function. A function of what?” Exactly – it is a function of the muscles and organs. And one who says thinking and thought are muscular motions, or motions of the cortex, is a behaviorist. It is not necessary to reduce all conduct to the reflex arc. The essence of behaviorism is that thought or mind is behavior. If need not be restricted to the reflex.
You may be interested to know that I am starting on An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. Maybe I can get through the first draft in two years.
Cordially yours,
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[link, pages 9-11]
December 9 1947Dr. J. Oliver Buswell,
In reply to your letter of December 4, first I wish to return the check that you so kindly sent. And if I should have the fortune to continue our discussion to or three times in The Bible Today, the same principle shall apply.
In the second place, you did not make sufficiently clear the status of the rough draft of your reply to me. I assume that you have a finished copy that you will print with my remarks on your review. And I take it from the draft itself that I am at liberty to write something about “system”. If you wish the draft returned, or if I have mistaken your intent in any other way, please let me know. I would like to have the draft while writing anything further. This may be sufficient answer to page one of your recent letter, except to say that the reference to Russel which you ask for is found in The Scientific Outlook, pages 94-95. As a matter of fact I do not have this material under my eyes at the moment, but I think that this is the correct reference.
With these matters disposed of, the remainder of this letter can continue our subsidiary discussion of John Dewey. First of all let me say that I admire the thorough way you went into the subject. You have gathered together quite a number of passages, and perhaps the most pertinent ones. From all the opinions expressed, by Santayana, Blanshard, you and me, one point of agreement soon emerges: Dewey is not altogether consistent. But as to the exact import of the quotations you gather, I have some remarks to make.
In your original review of my book, page 15, you said that I erred in classing Dewey’s psychology as behavioristic. I now note that you are modifying this statement by speaking of “Watsonian behaviorism”. I should guess that this means that Dewey does not reduce knowledge or consciousness to the reflex arc. In this you are absolutely correct. Not only in the article of 1896 which you mention in your review, but in other passages your statement is justified. But, then, it is not necessary to be a Watsonian in order to be a behaviorist. There may be varieties. And I wish to show that Dewey is one of the varieties.
Blanshard, it is true, wants to think that there is more than, or something other than, behaviorism in Dewey. But Dewey himself “formally… disavows belief in any thought that is not a mode of behavior in physical things” (Blanshard, page 385). I think that Blanshard may very well say that Dewey is inconsistent; or that Dewey smuglles in by the back door what he refused admittance at the front door. But in view of Dewey’s own words, I cannot see how one can properly deny that Dewey is a behaviorist.
It does not seem to me that Blanshard has made the mistake you attribute to him. Or, in other words, I do not think your reference to Santayana, Green, and mechanism, prove what you think they prove. After all, mechanism and materialism are not the same thing. And, further, a denial of matter is not the equivalent of an assertion of consciousness (in the sense of a conscious spirit). When it is remembered that “matter for the British empiricists was something that could not be seen, touched, or sensed in any way, that is, when it is remembered that matter is not an object of experience, then Dewey’s rejection of the ontological reality of matter no longer seems to favor any spiritualism. For John Locke as well as for Aristotle matter and body are very different things. What Dewey is saying is that bodies cannot be explained by matter or by mechanism. But though Dewey rejects matter, he still makes physical, corporeal, sensible, spatial reality the ultimate reality.
The sense in which I and doubtless Blanshard also use the term behaviorism is simply that thought is behavior, or thought is a function of an organism, or that thought is the motion of bodies. I do not know that Blanshard says that Dewey is a Watsonian; and neither did I. But that Dewey teaches that thought is physical motion, I shall shortly show.
You seem to question my answer to your question, “function of what?” I replied, organs. You say that Dewey “might have given” that answer (page 3 of your letter); I say that that is the answer that Dewey as a matter of fact gave.
Take if you will Schilpp’s book. As its close there is a long contribution by Dewey himself. It cannot be accused of representing a view long discarded. It is one of Dewey’s latest writings. On page 531 I take it that Dewey accepts the phrase, “experience (is) an interaction of organism and environment.” At the top of the next page, the same notion is repeated twice. Toward the bottom of the same page (532) I assume that Dewey means that the interaction of organism with environment is the cognitive experience. I should say that this justifies the statement that for Dewey knowing is the function of the organism. If differs from Watson in that the environment is emphasised, for Watson seems to think of a reflex arc within the organism.
At the bottom pf page 533, the word “biological” indicates the same position. About ten lines from the bottom of page 535, we have a reference to the “interactions of an acculturated organism”.
And in particular, page 542: “By way of further clearing up my own position I would point out that I hold that the word subject, if it is used at all, has the organism for its proper designatum. Hence it refers to an agency of doing, not to a knower, mind, consciousness or whatever. If the words, subject and object, are to be set over against each other, it should be in these situations in which a person, self, or organism as a doer sets up purposes” etc.
Note that what he means by a person is an organism.
And on page 544 he says, “According to the naturalistic view, every experience in its direct occurrence is an interaction of environing conditions and an organism.”
Page 555, which you yourself quote, sustains my position. Here Dewey claims to be a behaviorist. True, he says, there are several forms of behaviorism; mine (Dewey's) is different from some of them, for I erase any absolute distinction between organism and environment. Behavior is not limited to something in the nervous system under the skin. But still (as I interpret Dewey) “the psychological theory involved is a form of Behaviorism.”
How, then, in the face of this explicit statement, can you say that I erred in classing Dewey as a behaviorist? Maybe Dewey is a submarine aviator, as you suggest; or better, he is a submarine, but sometimes talks as if he were in a place.
I think that this fairly well covers your remarks on Dewey; if you have further comments or further references, I should be glad to examine them.
And now I finally have time and space to wish you all a Merry Christmas. Mrs. Clark wishes to be remembered to your good wife.
Cordially yours,
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[link, pages 1-2]
October 14 1953Dr. J. Oliver Buswell, Jr.
Shelton College
Dear Dr. Buswell,
Thank you for sending me your review of my book, A Christian View of Men and Things. I wish you had told me where your review will appear. Your vigorous opposition to my views does not affect in the least my friendship toward you, and I trust that the converse is also true. Indeed, I am convinced it is.
As your review is quite long, I do not see how I could examine it in detail without writing another book, which would in turn require another review. But I should like to make one or two points.
One point is that here and there you ascribe to me views that I do not hold. Naturally your criticisms of such views is irrelevant as applied to me. One of the clearest and most comprehensive instances is found on page 15 of your MS. You say, “Looking back over Dr. Clark’s constructive efforts to prove the existence of God from the existence of truth, we must say that it takes the pattern of the cosmological argument. Taking truth as an existing datum, Dr. Clark draws the inference that because truth exists therefore God exists.” Since you admit that you are looking back over the whole of my argument, I must reply that it is the whole of my argument that you have missed. I have nowhere attempted to prove the existence of God. I have not tried to prove God’s existence from the existence of truth, and I certainly did not take truth (if truth is other than God) as an existing datum. Naturally is you miss the main idea of the book as a whole, the particular criticisms are understandably irrelevant.
A second point is what I believe to be your historical inaccuracy. You say on page 4, and you have said before, that Thomism does not regard the proofs as logically demonstrative. Would you kindly provide the evidence. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 64, supports my view.
Allow me just one instance of your irrelevancy, for I cannot possibly take the time to discuss them all. On page 13 you refer to my position that truth is mental and is not, as behaviorism teaches, a physical motion. Part of my argument is that communication requires the presence of the same thought in two minds, and also that memory requires the same thought to occur twice to one mind. But you reply that your thought of Mt. Shasta today is not the same as your thought of Mt. Shasta yesterday. This is irrelevant, for I have not argued that a thought must recur, or that any given thought is the same as a previous one. I have argued that unless one thought occurs twice, there cannot be communication or memory. The fact that a given thought, the thought of Mt. Shasta, does not occur twice, does not show that a thought cannot occur twice. The remaind of the argument, of course, is that these phenomena cannot be physical; they can only be mental.
Again let me say that I am sorry you discontinued publishing The Bible Today. Perhaps you would have permitted me to say there that I disavowed your statements of my position.
Cordially yours,
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[link, pages 5-6]
October 24 1953Dr. J. Oliver Buswell, Jr.
Shelton College
Ringwood Borough, N.J.
Dear Dr. Buswell,
I debated with myself whether or not to answer your letter of Oct. 19, for I know how busy you are. You are at perfect liberty to ignore this letter if you are pressed for time, but I concluded that I ought to ask you to implement your previous reply on one point at least.
You wrote, “I have several times pointed out that Thomas does not regard the theistic arguments as proof in the sense of what you call logical demonstration… I have quoted him extensively.”
In your letters to me you have several times asserted that Thomas did not regard his proofs as logical demonstration. But I do not remember a single time that you quoted him to support this assertion. If you could send me the references, I would certainly look them up. And Gilson, with whom I agree, would surely have discussed any statements that contradicted his view.
You suggest that I read the proofs, which you say are not lengthy. Perhaps you refer to the summary of the proofs in the Summa Theologica, which precedes the final conclusion. The proofs themselves are a hundred pages or so long. But I think the material to be examined is not the proofs, but rather Thomas’ theory of demonstration. Let me quote one little bit.
S. Th. I, Q2, Art. 2: “Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists? … I answer that demonstration can be made in two ways: one is through the cause and is called proper quid, … the other is through the effect and is called a demonstration quia… And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated… If the effect exists, the cause must preexist. Hence the existence of God can be demonstrated from those of his effects which are known to us… Reply to Obj. 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proving the cause’s existence… Reply to Obj. 3… Yet from the every effect the existence of the cause can clearly be demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from his effects…”
Now, unless you can show from Thomas’ commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, which I must examine, or from elsewhere, that Thomas rejected the Aristotelian theory of demonstration, it seems to me that the above quotation tells heavily in my favor against your interpretation. Certainly the quotation uses the term demonstration several times, refers to middle terms in some lines I omitted here, and says the cause must preexist. If this does not mean a strictly logical demonstration, such as is best exemplified in geometrical proofs, then the wording is singularly misleading.
Since you say that you have a 100 page paper on St. Thomas in multilith offset, I would be glad to receive a copy, and see if you have given reference for a non-aristotelian theory of demonstration in Thomas.
I refrain from mentioning other items in your last letter, for I fear it would complicate things entirely too much.
Very truly yours,
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[link, pages 8-9]
345 Buckingham DriveIndianapolis, Ind.
November 4 1953
Dr. J. Oliver Buswell, Jr.
Shelton College
Ringwood, N.J.
Dear Dr. Buswell,
Thank you for sending me your student of Thomas and the Bible. It has clarified the point at issue.
My statements have been that Thomas intended the arguments for God’s existence as demonstrative arguments. You say I am historically incorrect and that Thomas did not assert that these arguments are demonstrative. This seems to me to be the point at issue, and I was perplexed how you could assert that I was historically mistaken when Thomas explicitly calls the arguments demonstrative.
In your paper, page 81, you quote Schaff as saying that “the existence of God… has been demonstrated by philosophers with irrefragable proofs.” I take it therefore that Schaff agrees with me.
On page 82 you say, “the opinion that the... arguments are deductive or a priori throws confusion into the whole field… Thomas’ arguments are clearly inductive inferences a posteriori from effects to cause. Thomas makes no claim to deductive demonstration.”
Now, first, he did indeed so claim, as I quoted in my last letter. He explicitly says that the existence of God can be demonstrated.
But you apparently confuse deductive demonstration with the a priori. There are two meanings of a priori, the Kantian and the Aristotelian. If you will reread what I have written, both in my book and in my letters, you will see that I never said Thomas used a priori proofs in the Kantian sense of a priori. In fact I placed Thomas under the subsection entitled Empiricism. Nor did I ever say that the proofs were a priori in the Aristotelian sense. It is quite true that Thomas’ arguments are a posteriori, both in the Kantian sense of requiring sensation and in the Aristotelian sense of proceeding from effects to cause. And if that is induction, there are inductive proofs. But they are still deductive demonstrations. Even you admit, by quoting Robinson with approval on page 83 that “Deduction is really present in all inductive inferences.” Thomas distinguishes between two types of demonstration: from cause to effect and from effect to cause. But though the latter may be inferior in a certain respect, it is still a valid inference and Thomas still classes it as demonstration.
On page 84 you seem to quate deductive argument with the ontological proof. But if this is the limit of the term deduction, then there are no deductive arguments whatever in Aristotle or in Thomas. Surely I am not to understand you as saying that Thomas denied that he ever used deduction; but in this case he must have used a posteriori deductive arguments.
Not only have you confused demonstration with the a priori, you also characterize the arguments as probable, on pp. 83 & 85. Note that Schaff said irrefragable demonstration. Now, if Schaff is mistaken, you ought to cited references where Thomas admits that the syllogism he uses are not necessary inferences but are only probabilities. At any rate I know of no place where Thomas makes such an admission.
Hence I must continue to believe that Thomas intended his arguments to be irrefragable, strictly valid syllogisms. They claim to meet all the requirements of validity in deductive logic, and since they are not intended to be fallacious probability arguments, their conclusions claim to be necessary inferences from their premises. This is demonstration, as Thomas explicitly claimed.
Of course, I believe that Thomas was wrong in his claim, and that the arguments are really fallacious. But this is not a matter of Medieval history.
Very cordially yours,
Gordon H. Clark
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[link, page 1]
August 21 1975Mr. and Mrs. William R. Hawley
[?], Indiana
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Hawley
It was so generous of you, so kind, and so unnecessary to give my wife and me the sumptuous gift with which you have delighted us. She will write to thank you, if she can find the words. But this letter has to do with far less pleasant matters.
In the light of the Commission’s action, I do not know what you are going to do. You could attend the Bible church once every two years. I make no comment. You could join [?] church, even though it is under the same Synod. I promised to advise you to join some church, though I told the commissioners that I thought such advise was superfluous. Otherwise I do not know what to say: I need advise myself.
Let me only advise you of my great respect and affection for you, and of our prayers for your comfort in time of trouble.
Yours sincerely,
Gordon H. Clark
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[link, pages 7-9]
Rev. Stephen Smallman
McLean Presbyterian Church
7144 Old Dominion Drive
McLean, Va. 22101
September 8 1979
Dear Mr. Smallman,
First of all, I wish to thank you for the note and the papers you sent me on Aug. 20. Since I am new on this committee, there is much I do not know. In fact, I need to learn about everything the committee has done. For this reason some of my comments may be inappropriate. I trust I can work my way into your accomplishments.
Because of my ignorance your desire, expressed in the middle of you MEMO of Aug. 30, that those who write should prepare their materials so that they can be incorporated in the final report, cannot begin to be met until after I have met with the committee. Nevertheless there are some comments which I hope you will consider.
These are comments on pages 6-9 (there were no pages 1-5 nor 10ff.) with four numbered “tentative conclusions.”
May I say, with regard to the first paragraph of point 1, that I think the wording is confused because of the definition of apostasy. In a previous paper that I sent you, I tried to say that on the dictionary definition, neither the Mormons, the Roman Catholics, nor the Unitarians could be called apostate. Hence the term is useless for us, and unless redefined should be dropped.
Once, however, the word is redefined, or replaced, then “the implication of such a declaration are too enormous for a church made up of sinful people to undertake,” is a statement that precludes all discipline. The church is authorized to judge of cases. We jduge that a man is guilty of murder, or of adultery, or of embezzlement. The Westminster Assembly judged that the Pope was the Antichrist and our present Confession judges that the Romish church is a synagogue of Satan. Not to judge is to renounce our responsibilities. This is surely made clear in I Corinthians. You refer in the paragraph to a church that continues to confess Christ as Lord. A seminary professor whom I knew confessed Christ as Lord, but asserted rather forcefully that he did not accept anything as true merely because Jesus said it.
The second paragraph under point one, with the exception of the word ‘apostasy,’ is a statement with which I am in hearty agreement. Let us use the terms heretical and anathema. The latter means a curse. We should curse the synagogues of Satan. We should do all we can to rescue confused believers from their clutches.
In the first paragraph under point 2, I believe there is a historical misstatement. There is a slight possibility that I may be wrong, but I believe that Dr. Machen never “felt it necessary to prove that the PCUSA was apostates. Ed Rian, in his book, The Presbyterian Conflict, never used the word apostate. I think were all very careful not to use that word. If I am mistaken, I wish someone would provide me with the contrary documentation.
With respect to paragraph three under point 2, I have no objection against distinguishing between the legitimacy of leaving a denomination (because there is no congregation in the town to which we just moved) and the necessity of leaving a denomination. But I strongly object to the last half of the paragraph. It says that we are not “in a position to say that after we had made the separation of 1936’ it was absolutely necessary for others to do the same.” You remember that in 1934 the General Assembly decreed that the ministers and people were under the same obligation to support the boards and agencies of the denomination as they were to celebrate the Lord’s Supper. Dr. Machen refused to obey. He was adjudged guilty of breaking one of the laws of the church. Had he submitted, he would have had to support, not only financial but by personal inclusion in the body, the anti-christian activity of Pearl Buck, the translation and distribution on our mission fields of Fosdick’s peril of worshipping Jesus, and many other unchristian policies. The point is that the General Assembly commanded the church to commit sin, and the Judicial Commission upheld the penalty imposed on Machen. People who remained in the USA church by their actions supported these conditions, whether they knew it or not. Today, with even the ordination vows gone, a candidate cannot be ordained without promising to take part in ordaining women, etc. etc. etc. I conclude that it is clearly sinful to support those actions and that body. Incidentally, when in 1965 the Evangelical church united with the Reformed church, we required the Evangelical body to drop the Harvey Cedars statements,
On page eight, just below the middle, if the Bible of Evangelical church did not require a man who was previously a Romish priest to be ordained, all I can cry is Shame! In the previous paragraph, although it cites Hodge correctly, my reply is that however great a theologian Hodge was, his ecclesiology was deplorable. We today should bring our practice into conformity with our doctrine. I do not think the Reformed Presbyterians ever committed such sins; and I feel sure that my grandfather in the old OP church would have been aghast at such conduct.
With respect to the first paragraph under point 4, I would like to say that the conduct there described is an evidence of deterioration and the first steps toward the positions already taken by the heretical bodies. The declension of the denominations, or organization such as the YMCA, of the originally Christian colleges, begins with small steps. Then comes an acceleration. We should resist the beginnings.
The first half of the middle paragraph seems to be based on a Congregational rather than a Presbyterian view of the Church. Of course we should “encourage” believers in depraved churches – we should encourage them to leave. To cooperate with them, with their evil denominations, is to compromise and to weaken our doctrinal position. If we give the impression that they are not so bad off in their bodies, we encourage them to sin – encourage them to support all sorts of liberalism.
It seems to me that it would be useful to study the steps by which originally orthodox churches and universities began to decline. This is the real and present danger to us now.
Dear. Mr. Smallman, I thank you for your letter, and I recognize the time and effort that you have put into the subject. This is a letter to you. I am not sending it to the other members of the committee. Of course, I shall use the ideas in discussion whenever the occasion demands. I take all this very seriously, for I foresee the possibility that our denomination may go the way of all flesh.
Very sincerely yours,
Gordon H. Clark
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[link, pages 8-9, marginal notes, letter from Short, Dec 5, 1979]
Would a Mormon or Muslin ordination be acceptable?
Could a Muslim baptize?
March 28 1980
Dr. John W. Sanderson
Covenant Seminary
Dear John,
You wrote your letter on March 3. I just cannot keep up with time. Milton was sure stupid when he said time travels on leaden feet.
Now as for your suggestions: 24 I would be glad to have you alter this, and anything else. I took it that Paul at Ephesus, unlike his conduct at Corinth, thought that the congregating was in the power of unbelieving Jews and that he must leave them
27 does not seem to me an unsupported generalization; John viewed this particular case in which he judged that the church would or might become apostate, and he spewed out of Christ’s mouth. I am everywhere willing to have you make improvements, in substance or in form.
28 repeat the sentence above.
83 I have inked in this phrase (some), though this itself allows a doubt as to the denomination as a whole; though it would be better to say, that if the Synod does not face this challenge, the denomination as a whole is deterioting.
116 A ticklish point? How so? What about Second Pres. and Ninth Pres. in Indianapolis? Bethel and Bethlehem in Phila? And others in Phila. Are there not some in St. Louis you could mention? I am not familiar with Oklahoma City, or even Chicago. Do you know what is the case with Macartney’s church in Pittsburgh? And MacClleands? (Was that his name – the pastor of the Wnanmaker church in Phila, who went to Pittsburh. Then there are the old UP churches… Princeton, Ind. There must be a large number of such instances, but I do not know them. Volga, S. D.?
As for my conclusion. I did not condemn the whole Presbytery individually. I condemned those who voted in favor of the Overture. You refer to proposing a judicial procedure. This is a possibility. But before going to that much trouble, and it would be a trouble, I merely suggested that those in favor of the Overture withdraw. There is nothing illegal in such a suggestion. It is an appeal to their conscience, if they realize their action is subversive. However, I am not insistenet on this suggestion. What do you wish to offer. Let me see it. No doubt it will be an improvement over mine. And I hope it would be more likely to gain the support of the Synod.
Will you than take the time and trouble to amend my document. My ambitions are solely for the preservation of the purity of our denomination.
Cordially
Would a Mormon or Muslin ordination be acceptable?
Could a Muslim baptize?
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[link, pages 3-4]
March 28 1980
Dr. John W. Sanderson
Covenant Seminary
Dear John,
You wrote your letter on March 3. I just cannot keep up with time. Milton was sure stupid when he said time travels on leaden feet.
Now as for your suggestions: 24 I would be glad to have you alter this, and anything else. I took it that Paul at Ephesus, unlike his conduct at Corinth, thought that the congregating was in the power of unbelieving Jews and that he must leave them
27 does not seem to me an unsupported generalization; John viewed this particular case in which he judged that the church would or might become apostate, and he spewed out of Christ’s mouth. I am everywhere willing to have you make improvements, in substance or in form.
28 repeat the sentence above.
83 I have inked in this phrase (some), though this itself allows a doubt as to the denomination as a whole; though it would be better to say, that if the Synod does not face this challenge, the denomination as a whole is deterioting.
116 A ticklish point? How so? What about Second Pres. and Ninth Pres. in Indianapolis? Bethel and Bethlehem in Phila? And others in Phila. Are there not some in St. Louis you could mention? I am not familiar with Oklahoma City, or even Chicago. Do you know what is the case with Macartney’s church in Pittsburgh? And MacClleands? (Was that his name – the pastor of the Wnanmaker church in Phila, who went to Pittsburh. Then there are the old UP churches… Princeton, Ind. There must be a large number of such instances, but I do not know them. Volga, S. D.?
As for my conclusion. I did not condemn the whole Presbytery individually. I condemned those who voted in favor of the Overture. You refer to proposing a judicial procedure. This is a possibility. But before going to that much trouble, and it would be a trouble, I merely suggested that those in favor of the Overture withdraw. There is nothing illegal in such a suggestion. It is an appeal to their conscience, if they realize their action is subversive. However, I am not insistenet on this suggestion. What do you wish to offer. Let me see it. No doubt it will be an improvement over mine. And I hope it would be more likely to gain the support of the Synod.
Will you than take the time and trouble to amend my document. My ambitions are solely for the preservation of the purity of our denomination.
Cordially
[cf. Handwritten notes by Clark in response to Sanderson's letter on March 3, 1980:
You rephrase it
I see no unsupported generalization. John viewed apostasy as possible.
If you can make it stronger, fine!
[check mark]
Second Presbyterian Indianapolis
Bethel Philadelphia
Bethlehem “ and others.
Some St. Louis churches?
Macartney’s?
I don’t know.]
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