Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's fifth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.
The Test of Hardcore Common Sense (Performative Consistency)
The closing chapter to Part 1 of his book, which has primarily focused on apologetically critiquing Gordon Clark's views, brings up one more test Mr. Lazar believes Clark's epistemology fails. He refers to it as the test of hardcore common sense. The name is a bit unfortunate. It suggests the test has something to do with "common sense," whereas Mr. Lazar quickly distances what he intends to write about from the normal sense of "common sense." Instead, he's concerned about "ultimate presuppositions of practice." Based on what else he writes in the chapter, I suggest that Mr. Lazar refer to this as the test of "livability" or "performative consistency." At any rate, the definition of performative self-contradiction is the following (a part of which I've bolded for reasons I'll return to later):
A performative self-contradiction is an inconsistency... between a content c which some speaker S claims is true... and at least one presupposition... necessary... to warrant taking S's act of claiming... as a valid act of claiming.
That is, let's say I make a claim. In making the claim, I have implicitly presupposed various things, such as that I can make a claim. It would be a performative self-contradiction for my claim to contradict one of the things I am implicitly presupposing. Mr. Lazar's initial examples are very good ones: "It is self-contradictory - irrational - to argue against the very things presupposed by argumentation. For example, claiming that 'I can't make any claims,' involves a performative self-contradiction." This is an instance, as I mentioned in my last post, that I would like to show more appreciation to Mr. Lazar. I'm glad he is interacting with contemporary philosophers. This is important for the future of Scripturalism (link).
Actions speak louder than words, so to speak. If one's words and actions are implicitly at odds, there is a problem. A few other examples provided are also clear enough: one can't intelligibly question rationality unless one already implicitly presupposes it. One can't begin to think, argue, or make claims without implicitly presupposing the law of non-contradiction. I can't consistently claim I have no blog as I am intentionally typing up a review on one. Etc. So far, so good.
In Mr. Lazar's next section in the chapter, he asks whether living adherence to global agnosticism a performative self-contradiction. That is, suppose one is an agnostic. As Clark says, "The agnostic simply does not know. He does not know that there are no truths; merely does not know which propositions are true." (A Christian Philosophy of Education, pg. 34). Mr. Lazar wants to know 1) if agnostic philosophy is livable or 2) whether the agnostic qua agnostic is a walking, talking performative self-contradiction.
Mr. Lazar thinks the latter is the case, that "his philosophy is unlivable because he must live as if he wasn't agnostic." Before we proceed, let us recall the definition of a performative self-contradiction requires a situation in which "a content c which some speaker S claims is true." Remember what it is that an agnostic claims: he simply claims that he does not know. Must, then, an agnostic live as if he knows things to be true? Mr. Lazar seems to cite the following argument by Clark as an affirmative response to this question (emphasis mine):
As Augustine long ago pointed out, when such a man eats his dinner he believes that it is probably better to eat than starve. He does not know that he will escape starvation, but he believes that he has a better chance of survival if he eats. Neither does he know that survival is better than starvation: but he believe so. More to the point, he may say that he neither asserts nor denies the existence of God. But his actual daily life is lived in conformity with the one postulate or the other. (Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, pgs. 34-35)
I don't see how this argument by Clark supports Mr. Lazar's contention that an agnostic commits a performative self-contradiction. Actually, it seems as though this Clark quote says that an agnostic is living consistently with his claim. The agnostic doesn't make a claim to know as true that he will escape starvation, although he would make a claim to believe as true that he has a better chance of survival if he eats; hence, he eats. To me, the agnostic's eating is consistent with his belief-claim. An agnostic can live on the belief something is or could be true without claiming to know something is true. Again, I see no performative self-contradiction here. This corresponds to a Clark quote I've cited in another review:
Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? When a chess club challenges another to a match, does any suspicion of fallibility impede its action? Cannot this club distinguish the dogma ecclesiastica that there actually is another club from the dogma haeretica that no other club exists? Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 146)
Granting Clark's above line of reasoning that I have argued elsewhere as well (link), I could agree with Mr. Lazar that one who claims he suspends belief or judgment on all matters would be committing a performative self-contradiction. But I do not immediately understand why one must make a knowledge-claim to avoid a performative self-contradiction. Mr. Lazar says, "the Scripturalist must live as if he knows the very things that he denies" (emphasis mine). Clark's reply is - "no, I must live as if the things I believe are true."
For example, why must I know Mr. Lazar exists to believe I'm interacting with him? Indeed, what if Mr. Lazar doesn't exist, or that my idea of who Mr. Lazar is does not correspond to reality? What if the biography I read of him were a fabrication? Surely this is possible? I may assume my belief in Mr. Lazar's existence and biography is true and write blog posts on that basis, but why does my reviews of Mr. Lazar's book presuppose that I know he wrote a book rather than that I merely believe that he wrote one?
While I would like to see Mr. Lazar's argument spelled out a bit more, perhaps there is something wrong with global agnosticism and performative self-contradictions. I hope others take it upon themselves to consider this question, as I will (even though I think global agnosticism is problematic for other reasons, e.g. an agnostic can never have full assurance, is therefore practically condemned to a life of self-doubt, etc.). But for now, let's assume this for the sake of argument.
Even if we do this, because Scripturalists are not global agnostics, it seems we must return to the question of whether individual instances of agnosticism are problematic. And this seems to be what Mr. Lazar is, after all, concerned with anyway. He criticizes Scripturalists for "appeals to extra-Biblical knowledge to show that we cannot have extra-Biblical knowledge," and the first example he uses is of Clark's book Thales to Dewey. Was it a performative self-contradiction for Clark write a book about extra-biblical information? Is it a performative self-contradiction for a Scripturalist to refer to Clark's book?
Again, I don't see how. If Clark believed that there were other philosophers or if I believe there is a Clark book (all of which are indeed extra-biblical), does that mean I cannot consistently act upon that belief unless I claim to know it? Not at all. This takes us back to the question of whether Mr. Lazar really thinks I must know he exists as his biography describes him in order to consistently review his book.
And I cannot think that this is the case, for Mr. Lazar would be asking me to claim more than can be known... unless he is speaking about "knowledge" in a certain, externalist third-person sense, rather than in the sense in which Clark speaks of knowledge when he does (link; once again, this illustrates the importance of defining one's terms, especially in the context of one's [meta]epistemology). But even if Mr. Lazar is speaking this way, one needn't be aware of the externalist knowledge he has; even on externalist accounts of knowledge, I still may not know that Mr. Lazar exists as his biography describes him (because, once again, such might not be true). In fact, on some externalist accounts of knowledge, one cannot know that one has externalist knowledge. That's a second-order knowledge that is not necessary. But an extended discussion of this would, I think, take us a bit farther off track than is necessary, especially since the main defense I describe in this post regarding the performative consistency in acting upon one's beliefs seems to suffice. I can, however, elaborate on what I am saying here if anyone is that interested.
Returning to that main line of defense, we might ask if it a performative self-contradiction for Mr. Lazar to get various kinds of short-term insurances (life, car, house, jewelry, etc.)? I think not. We do such things precisely because we don’t know if we will die, have accidents, lose our property or have it stolen, etc. And it’s eminently reasonable to live that way, because a corollary of epistemic contentedness is epistemic humility. We don't know it all and can't (or shouldn't) act as if we do.
Let us even suppose that Mr. Lazar does not exist after all. Or let's suppose that none of the philosophers Clark mentioned ever existed. Does that mean that this blog or Thales to Dewey have become pointless enterprises? No, for the same reason (as I referenced in my last review) that I gave long ago when discussing the usefulness of opinion, i.e. of belief without knowledge:
If I cannot know that I am in dialogue, why can it seem that way? If I am going to be consistent with Scripturalism, I must indeed admit I am opining any conversation; however - and this is the point - the purpose of epistemology is not so much a justification of one's beliefs to others as it is to oneself. Self-realized problems with various epistemologies or one's own epistemology may be introduced through the medium of opinion... When one considers that one's opinions are the ultimate products of God, and that God causes everything for a reason, it is not surprising that Scripturalists should venture into alleged communication: to measure what is opined against God's word. (link)
We can look at the interactions we have in our lives as "if-then" encounters. If Augustine had a "theory of recollection," then it is reasonable for Clark to talk about it as Augustine's theory. Even if Augustine did not exist, he can still talk about the theory itself, and the benefit of associating it with "Augustine" is still that people know Clark is referring to one particular theory of "recollection rather than some other. It's the ideas that matter, not their genesis. We may act as if something is true, but even if it is not, it was still put in our lives for a divinely ordained reason. There is, therefore, no performative self-contradiction in a Scripturalist acting upon his beliefs (even if there is one for the global agnostic), for his beliefs account for both possibilities.
That is, Scripturalism does not fail this final test Mr. Lazar mentions. It has passed each one, even if - as Mr. Lazar and myself would agree - there are some areas for improvement upon Clark's philosophy as a whole.
[A small disagreement I didn't know where else to put: I would side with Clark in regarding axioms or presuppositions as chosen. Due to performative self-contradictions, it seems Mr. Lazar infers that some axioms can't be chosen. He says, "although you can choose some axioms, you must presuppose others in order to argue about anything at all - including arguing about axioms." But arguing is a choice. By definition, a performative self-contradiction requires a claim to be made. One may choose not to argue at all, in which case there seems to be no explicit claim against which to compare one's implicit [performative] presuppositions.
Even if we extended performative self-contradictions to apply thoughts in addition to explicit, argued claims - which is more along the lines of the necessary [and perhaps ontological] preconditions for knowledge I mentioned in my last review - I do think Clark was correct to say that axioms are chosen. In fact, the very possibility of "contradiction" presupposes choice. Otherwise, our acting in such a way as to not be in conformity with truth would be by nature. This can't be, as it would be an insurmountable problem to a doctrine of divine goodness.
Additionally, I suspect another problem may arise given Mr. Lazar's view that some axioms are not chosen. Does Mr. Lazar think we begin with one axiom or many? If the former, mustn't it be chosen (and sufficient)? If the latter, is that an indication that Mr. Lazar thinks we are supposed to infer what would be a sufficiency of axioms? Perhaps I am reading too much into his thought that we can choose some axioms and not others, but I would be wary of the parable of the bundle of sticks that I mentioned in my last post.]
In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 6, which Mr. Lazar calls Reformulating the Master Axiom.
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