Here is a succinct answer to a question I was asked about presuppositionalism and its relation to God's existence:
//Am I correct in thinking "presuppositional apologetics" begins on the foundation of God's being and doesn't give ground to those that would say "Let's suppose for a moment that God doesn't exist"?//
Presuppositional apologetics is simply an admission that apologetics is predicated upon the assumption of [a] first principle(s). If I ask you why you believe a proposition, you will probably give me a reason. What if I ask you why you believe that reason? You may give me another reason. Consider what would happen if I kept questioning your premises. We quickly see that there must be a proposition which is taken for granted, a proposition upon which all knowledge within a given epistemological system is deduced. Otherwise, we have no way of knowing anything, as I could ask you for external justification of your premises ad infinitum.
Christian presuppositionalists sometimes confuse metaphysics with epistemology. Metaphysics deals with ontology, epistemology deals with knowledge. Obviously, we can't know what exists if we can't justify what we know, so epistemology should take precedence. Hence, when some Christian presuppositionalists begin with "God exists," too many questions are begged for which the first principle cannot answer: which God? By what means have we discerned this? How can we understand God? Etc.
Hence, I believe that Christian presuppositionalism begins, not with God, but with God's revelation: the Bible is the sole, extant source of knowledge. From Scripture, we deduce everything we know, including God's existence and character.
Related links: On Scripturalism, Brief differences between Scripturalism and other religions, On the Self-Attestation of Scripturalism
32 comments:
Indeed. We must begin with God's revelation of himself and how the One who has revealed himself relates to creation, providence and redemption, through the interpretation given by that revelation. Apart from special revelation, the theist's jutification for knowledge, reality and ethics reduces merely to a conceptual necessity (a convenient organizing principle), but a conceptual necessity need not imply an ontological necessity that is in reality true. At the very least, a God who is all powerful can only be known if in fact he has revealed himself.
Best wishes,
Ron
Thanks, Ron.
"A conceptual necessity need not imply an ontological necessity that is in reality true."
I recalled reading something to that effect while thumbing through various criticisms of the TAG on wikipedia:
"The TAG moves from conceptual necessity to necessary existence. This criticism argues that proving the conceptual necessity of a worldview doesn't establish its ontological reality. In other words: one may need to think about the world in a certain way in order to make sense of one's experience and knowledge, but that doesn't prove that the world actually is that way. David P. Hoover has raised this objection in his article For the Sake of Argument."
While I have my own criticisms, that one does seem pretty damning, and it's generalizable.
Ryan,
Ah, but TAG doesn't move from conceptual necessity to truth. My point was that by beginning with revelation, as TAG does, we are not simply presupposing a conceptual necessity that might not be true. In other words, we are not inductively testing a hypothesis (of some arbitrary organizing principle, in this case Scripture) to see whether it works. And we are in no way suggesting that if it works therefore it becomes true, or even must be true (because it works). Rather, we are presupposing the revelation we know to be true and in turn demonstrating (not testing) that organizing principle which makes sense of gives intelligence to experience.
Blessings,
Ron
"Rather, we are presupposing the revelation we know to be true and in turn demonstrating (not testing) that organizing principle which makes sense of gives intelligence to experience."
This gives me the impression that you believe one's first principle must be Scriptural revelation. Is that true? If so, why? Perhaps you could elaborate on the above.
Ryan,
It must be so for the effective apologist. It need not be so for would-be autonomous man. With that said, the reason it must be so for the effective apologist is that special revelation (now only contained in Scripture) offers the only possible way for one to prove anything.
I don't believe the orginaal question was ever answered, and I think it actually implied a false dilemma: "Am I correct in thinking "presuppositional apologetics" begins on the foundation of God's being and doesn't give ground to those that would say "Let's suppose for a moment that God doesn't exist"?"
Presuppositional apologetics presupposes God's revelation from the outset and in doing so presupposes God. Also, on the reductio side of presuppositional apologetics, it is posited for argument sake that God does not exist. Both are true - God is presupposed in the presupposing of special revelation and God is rejected in the apologist's use of modus tollens (in the presupposing of the false presuppositions of the opposing worldview); though in another sense modus tollens does indeed presuppose God, since logic does. As the Proverb implies, we are to answer a fool according to his ways, as well as not answer him according to his ways. The former is the reductio (to reduce the unbeliever to absuridity), and the latter can be taken to be a transcendental challenge (in our showing what must be first true for anything else to be true).
I'm seeing some ambiguity going on here that might lend itself to a two-way phone discussion.
Cheers,
Ron
This is my first principle:
"...the Bible is the sole, extant source of knowledge"
When you say that presupposing special revelation presupposes God, I would disagree. The deduction from Scripture is trivial, of course, but a deduction nonetheless.
"...in another sense modus tollens does indeed presuppose God, since logic does."
How would you go about demonstrating this?
I don't give out my phone #, but if you think an email exchange would be more conducive to dialogue, you can forward any replies to:
dark_aggravation@yahoo.com
Hi Ryan,
If you won't agree that "God's revelation presupposes God's existence" then I don't think I can help you until you think about that one a bit more. Moreover, if you think there can be (and that you can know there can be) true universal, abstract entities that are invarient (such as the laws of logic in general and MT in particular) apart from God, then I would suggest you have abandoned some of the biblical implications of creation and providence, while making the mistake of thinking that your inferences about past logical relationships must apply in the future. There's too much here to discuss over written correspondence. You might begin by thinking about the common Creator who preinterprets the otherwise brute particulars that and in turn provides the fruitful connection between your mind and the mind-independent world.
Best of providence young man.
Ron
I have to know who God is before the propositions "God exists" is meaningful. The only way I know God is by His revelation, true, but you'll notice I specifically phrased my first principle in such a way that this too is [trivially] deducible from it: "the Bible is the sole, extant source of knowledge." This avoids some confusions, imo, such as the idea God is presupposed when we presuppose Scripture. The first principle you are purporting is not clear to me. That's the reason I asked you for a demonstration - not because I think abstract truths are possible apart from God (at least, certainly not within my own epistemic system) - but because I'm confused by the implication that a first principle is necessarily true.
I can understand, however, that this can be a little more complex than a comment box discussion can afford. I still hope to hear your input in future posts! God bless.
Ryan,
Your own axiom contains the presupposition of God within it, for what else is "the Bible" than "God's Word"? To know that the Bible is God's Word is to know the God whose Word it is. Clark recognizes this in his own axiom: "The Bible is the Word of God." It is impossible to separate knowledge of God from knowledge of His revelation, for they are mutually entailed.
I agree with Ron that the original question poses a false dilemma. However, one potential objection to starting with the bare proposition, "God exists," is that it does not contain sufficient specificity in its terms, and requires a prior understanding that "God" is "the God of Scripture, which is His self-revelation."
I think it is proper for men to begin with epistemology, but when we consider the nature of God, the distinction between knowledge (epistemology) and being (ontology) isn't a true distinction, for what else is God's Being than His thoughts concerning Himself?
"...what else is God's Being than His thoughts concerning Himself?"
Interesting point. I'll think about that.
While you're here, could you explain, assuming you agree with Ron on this point, why one's first principle must be Scriptural revelation? It seems to me that to assert such requires a differentiable unique to Christianity which is demonstrably necessary in order to think &c.
I have always operated under the assumption that, given the infinite # of possible first principles, we must refute alternate first principles and, as Clark wrote: "when finally the opponent is reduced to silence and we can get in a word edgewise, we present the word of God and pray that God cause him to believe." If I could show that Scripturalism is necessary, I'd skip the reductio and go straight for the throat, so to speak.
Ryan,
I think your question touches on the only substantive difference between Clark and Van Til, and where, I am willing to grant that Van Til outshines Clark.
There are many proofs that Scripturalism is necessary, but not apart from the first principle of Revelation. The TAG argument forces the opponent to confront the "impossibility of the contrary," that is, "apart from Christian presuppositions, justifiable knowledge of intelligible reality is not possible." While TAG does not furnish us a magic bullet with regard to persuasion--since the unbeliever can always refuse to accept the challenge, or deny its import--it places the believer in a firm position of confidence with regard to his own first principle.
Clark's approach stressed the reductio because his goal was to strip away prior to asserting the necessity of Christianity. I happen to prefer Clark's approach. Van Til and Bahnsen stressed the necessity first in order to have the unbeliever confront the truth of Scripture from the outset, followed by the reductio. One speculation of my own is that Clark used the reductio first because he found himself in a philosophy department at Butler, while Van Til and Bahnsen went with the challenge of Scripture first, because they were at a Reformed Seminary. This is not to say that either of them were wrong, but only why one approach or the other may have found easier berth.
For the believer, there is not an infinite number of first principles, because the truth has been revealed, and logic is bound to follow it, as opposed to seek it out (which, strictly speaking, logic cannot do). Knowing this to be true, the believer may assert with the confidence that no true alternatives exist, which can adequately explain reality. Any attempt that tries has to necessarily presuppose universal, invariant principles that only the One True God provides.
No unbeliever is forced to accept this truth, even though they must ultimately rely upon this truth in order to make arguments against it. Their refusal is at its base, ethical, not intellectual; given the sensus divinitatis and their culpability in Adam (and in any presentation of the truth which they have already received). Hence Clark's advice to pray that God would cause the unbeliever to believe.
Ron has several good articles on his website about TAG and how proof and persuasion are separate matters in apologetics.
I don't know if this is a long-winded evasion of your question, or if hits the mark of your inquiry. I trust you'll let me know.
~Joshua
Here is my main point of contention:
"...apart from Christian presuppositions, justifiable knowledge of intelligible reality is not possible..."
To say that one must presuppose Christianity in order to justify knowledge of intelligible reality intelligibly seems to commit the fallacy of induction, as there are infinitely many first principles (not strictly a believer) one can posit.
If the [above] TAG can avoid the fallacy of induction, it must provide an answer to the following question: "what unique characteristic of Christianity must be presupposed such that without it, one cannot justify knowledge of intelligible reality?" If there is no unique characteristic, there is no way to set up the argument as a dichotomy between A and ~A (Christianity and ~Christianity). What, then, is that uniquely Christian doctrine that must be presupposed?
A friend and I had a similar discussion in this topic (beginning with post 22), and neither he nor I could understand what Christian doctrine must be presupposed (or why).
But I will certainly thumb through Ron's articles to see if he provides an answer.
Ryan,
I think your discussion has progressed quite well. Let me link you to this address: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/search/label/TAG if you are interested in thumbing through some musings of mine.
I'm finally getting to putting labels on my archives. :-) Actually, a few things you've been touching upon are addressed in these posts. I must say, you are certainly getting to the heart of the matter as I see it, which is a good thing.
Email me at rondig1@comcast.net if you want to have some discourse. Or, feel free to post on any of the threads. I choose to screen posts so it might take a bit of time for your post to get registered.
Best wishes,
Ron
Ryan,
I think you'll benefit more from reading Ron's posts that in continuing with me. I will say that the simple answer is that God imposes the truth of TAG upon the mind of the believer, and withholds it from the unbeliever. As you'll see when you read Ron's posts, there really aren't an infinite number of alternatives. There is the affirmation of the One True God, and there is the denial of the One True God. Every argument is but a form of one or the other.
A. Assent to the truth = persuasion
B. Demonstration of the truth = proof
One may deny B because they deny A, but the denial of A does not invalidate B.
Joshua, I'm aware of the distinction between proof and assent - I just haven't seen the former.
Ron, I see that you have on your blog a link to an article by Michael Butler, the very man who my friend cited in the above facebook topic to which I linked. His proposal of the Trinity as that unique doctrine which must be presupposed was also the topic of discussion with my friend, and even more particularly the quadrinity (I actually cited Binitarianism) objection about which he wrote in that article. I will read that a little more closely and look to shoot you an email over the next couple days. Thanks.
Ryan,
Well, what do you consider a proof to be? If by proof you mean a deductive argument whereby the premises are true and the conclusion is true and follows necessarily from the premises, I'm not sure how you could have missed it. If you mean something else, what do you mean?
Joshua, that is a well-stated definition of proof. The problem I perceive is that I've questioned the [implicit] premise(s) of the TAG by asking what is the uniquely Christian characteristic necessary to presuppose and why is it necessary to presuppose it, and in return I have received no relevant reply... at least, not in this comment box. You both have forwarded me to Ron's blog, so I will peruse his posts to see if my questions are answered there.
TAG is uniquely Christian because there are only two possible worldviews: the Christian worldview, which is true, and the denial of the Christian worldview, which is false. All variations of non-Christian views reduce to autonomy, or the denial of God's sovereign authority.
God remains true, though all men be liars. The grass withers and the flower fades, but the Word of the Lord remains forever.
I hesitate to write this because I'm seeing a need for you to wrestle more than for me to answer questions... Mike doesn't claim in that article that the Trinity is the unique doctrine that must be presupposed. He does speak of some docrtrines, but as part of an entire system. He points out that one can try to ape Christianity and in doing try to justify intelligible experience, but only (at best) by standing on borrowed capital, the Christian's presuppostion of Scripture. If such a person wants to posit a quadrinity, then of course (and as Mike points out) we must learn more about the facts of the case. If the facts are consistent, which remains to be seen, then all the person would be doing is aping Christianity and simply speaking counterfactually about certain things yet the heart of the proof would be, again, based upon borrowed capital - a revelational epistemology. Moreover, I can't refute in detail what is not before me in detail, but in principle we can refute a non-revelational epistemology. The uniquely Christian characteristic that must be presupposed to make true sense of "men and things" is that knowledge cannot be received apart from God's revelation (even general revelation), and knowledge cannot be justified, which is quite another matter, apart from special revelation. Try it sometime...
Why is it necessary to have a revelational epistemology you ask? How, being finite, can you know anything without revelation? Given that you don't have universal experience, you couldn't know that there isn't a contradiction to the law of contradiction. Even your use of the law of contradiction would be based at best upon induction, yet even induction presupposes uniformity, which would be the very thing you'd have no claim upon apart from a revelation of creation, providence and a common creator who stands behind your mind and the raw stuff out there.
I'm turning in folks, but let me say it's either arbitrariness and inconsistency or a truly Reformed, revelational epistemology.
Ron
As I wrote earlier:
"To say that one must presuppose Christianity in order to justify knowledge of intelligible reality intelligibly seems to commit the fallacy of induction, as there are infinitely many first principles (not strictly a believer) one can posit.
If the [above] TAG can avoid the fallacy of induction, it must provide an answer to the following question: "what unique characteristic of Christianity must be presupposed such that without it, one cannot justify knowledge of intelligible reality?" If there is no unique characteristic, there is no way to set up the argument as a dichotomy between A and ~A (Christianity and ~Christianity). What, then, is that uniquely Christian doctrine that must be presupposed?"
I am aware you are making a distinction between Christianity and ~Christianity. I am attempting to understand on what grounds you draw the distinction, and why acceptance of such grounds is necessary in order to "justify knowledge of intelligible reality." If the uniquely Christian characteristic one allegedly must presuppose to justify knowledge is that "God [is] sovereign[ly] authorit[ative]," why must one presuppose this? And why specifically the Christian God? This seems to be bare assertion.
Ron, I think a better argument for an epistemic system grounded in revelation is the one Robert Reymond mentioned in his Justification of Knowledge and which I have reproduced (to my own preferences) here. I have no argument with you here.
But how do you jump from that to the idea any revelation epistemology besides Christian revelation is simply an "aping" of Christianity? If you could justify that, the TAG would be formidable, but like I said, one can posit even an infinite number of revelation epistemologies. One must, then, purport a uniquely Christian doctrine (or doctrines) necessary to be presupposed and, just as importantly, show why it is necessary to presuppose it (them). Mr. Butler says he needs more particulars before he can refute the "quadrinitarian." A judicious reply, but one that undercuts the idea Christian presuppositions are necessary - after all, he could simply refute the quadrinitarian without even using a reductio, if indeed Christian presuppositions are necessary. But that's the point in question. Are they, which doctrine(s), and why?
Ryan,
If truth concerning God isn't necessary, how then is God necessary?
The truth of Christianity is necessary because it is universal and invariant, grounded in God. To argue that there are an infinite number of revelational epistemologies is to argue that there are an infinite ways of positing what is false. It is a trivial claim, and doesn't prevent the necessity of the truth.
How does any Christian come to an assurance of the truth about God? How is that any unbeliever is prevented from assenting to the truth about God? It isn't a matter of demonstration, but of transformation.
The demonstration of the truth, whether TAG, or whether it is a simple syllogism is not invalidated by an infinite number of false alternatives. It is not as though the Christian must grope for the truth, for it has already been impressed upon him by the Spirit of God.
Ryan, I see obvious flaws in your reasoning but if we're to continue we'll have to do it on my terms. Contact me if you would like to talk.
Best,
Ron
Do either of you have any recommended resources for me?
Ryan,
Given the exchange and what you've admitted concerning the definition of proof and the difference between proof and persuasion, I don't think anything will clear things up better than the articles on Ron's blog.
TAG isn't inductive, and it doesn't replace the need for the reductio, but it is nonetheless a sound proof for God that has the additional benefit of pushing the challenge to the unbeliever.
Given the presupposition of Scripture, you know that Christianity is the only revelational epistemology that is true. Therefore, every other revelational epistemology that could be posited is simply borrowing capital from the one, true revelational epistemology.
"Therefore, every other revelational epistemology that could be posited is simply borrowing capital from the one, true revelational epistemology."
Joshua, while that is true insofar as it is deducible from my first principle, I have yet to understand how using this as an argument against Islam, Judaism, &c. would not be an instance in which I would be fallaciously censuring another first principle on the basis of my own.
I suppose I will simply have to read Ron's articles to learn what is or are the precise and uniquely Christian doctrines which must be presupposed in order to justify knowledge - and, as importantly, why they must be presuppose.
I imagine this dialogue must be frustrating, so thanks for staying patient with me.
Ryan,
I know I've frustrated others before with far worse attempts than you have been making, so I haven't room to complain.
I'm not sure why you think you would be censuring someone else's first principle. After all, you already know that their position is false, because the testimony of Scripture and the Spirit testifying with your spirit assure you that Christianity is true.
In the apologetic exchange, you wouldn't need to begin with TAG (as I said earlier, I actually prefer Clark's approach), but rather by showing the inconsistencies of some other view--since no two systems can be commensurate and universal, Christianity must prevail over any other revelational epistemology. Part of your labor could include how Christianity contains the revelational epistemology of the opposing view, while being free from the inconsistencies you discover.
The hypothetical possibility of a coherent revelational epistemology apart from Christianity is simply that, a hypothetical possibility. There is only One True God, therefore than can be only one true revelation of Himself.
Read Ron's posts, but do so with a broader lens that simply seeking some uniquely Christian doctrine. The very import of the system is that every Christian doctrine is unique, regardless of what any individual may wish to posit that mimics Christianity. To use a crude analogy, it is as though God published His advertisement to the world, and other counterfeiters have been stealing portions of it for their own gain ever since.
"...you already know that their position is false, because the testimony of Scripture and the Spirit testifying with your spirit assure you that Christianity is true"
In this case, I would be using my first principle to invalidate another's first principle. Isn't that fallacious? If so, the only other tool I have is the reductio, but the reductio must either be utilized on a case by case basis or to invalidate whole systems with something fallacious in common. If we're drawing a distinction between Christianity and ~Christianity such that the reductio is being used to invalidate ~Christianity, then one must show that all systems under the ~Christianity category have something in common - i.e. a lack of [a] uniquely Christian doctrine(s).
That is as best as I can summarize my side of this. Now, to move on to your other statements:
"The hypothetical possibility of a coherent revelational epistemology apart from Christianity is simply that, a hypothetical possibility."
If you admit the hypothetical possibility, how do you reject the actuality apart from your first principle? Or if you are using your first principle, how do you know that a means of invalidating your first principle could not be that one of these hypothetical possibilities are true? This is the danger of using one first principle to invalidate another, no?
"The very import of the system is that every Christian doctrine is unique, regardless of what any individual may wish to posit that mimics Christianity."
This does seem to be the case, as I was reading through Butler's article and he showed that a quadrinity affects one's perspective of salvation &c., but I am more interested in how you justify that any Christian doctrine is necessary apart from a contrapositive induction ("finitely man ~Christian world-views fail without uniquely Christian doctrine x, therefore all fail").
Ryan,
It isn't fallacious for your first principle to invalidate another, because your first principle is true, or otherwise God could not, or has not revealed that truth to you. It isn't an intellectual exercise, and your first principle doesn't spring from finite human reason.
The only unique Christian doctrine you need is God's(not any god, but the One True God) revelation. All others are counterfeits, and therefore not unique. The Bible provides the justification for this premise.
I know that my first principle is true and that all other hypothetical possibilities are false because God has revealed it to my mind through His Word. It is the Holy Spirit's assurance of the truth that ensures my understanding is knowledge.
If you are looking for a logical reason that prevents someone from denying the truth, it doesn't exist. The reason doesn't come by logic, but by direct imposition of truth upon the mind by God Himself--regeneration.
Ryan,
Another example of how TAG works is seen in Bahnsen's debate with Stein, which you can listen to on YouTube, or download a transcript of by googling "Bahnsen-Stein Debate."
I've listened to it before. It was my introduction to presuppositionalism, actually.
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