Logical Positivism

I encountered a couple internet logical positivists recently. It's unusual that someone will know what "logical positivism" is and still adhere to it, as some of its primary adherents have all but pronounced it dead. It refers to a movement in the 1920s and 30s which emphasized syntax and empiricism. In any case, these particular logical positivists were emphasizing one of the primary tenets of logical positivism: metaphysics is semantically meaningless. It was interesting how quickly these logical positivists were able to get those to whom they were replying to assume with them that some of the more foundational concepts of logical positivism were true, and given that I've been reviewing logical positivism in my philosophy class over the past few weeks, I thought I'd share some thoughts on it so that one can anticipate these subtle tactics and effectively counter them. As the more insightful critiques of a given philosophy usually come from those who used to believe it, for those who wish to skip the text and just listen to the problems inherent in logical positivism, this interview of A. J. Ayer (begin at 6:28) gives a nice, short summary, although Ayer seems a little reluctant to say logical positivism is a wholly unsatisfying philosophy.

Language

Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics all pertain to linguistics. Syntax refers to the rules or structure of a theory of language, semantics refers to the meaning of words, and pragmatics designates that field of study whereby one utilizes the usefulness of language. A development in logical positivism that allowed men in the Vienna Circle (the original logical positivists) such as Carnap to bridge what was thought to be a metaphysical gap between syntax and semantics/pragmatics was the following postulation: “a sentence ‘S’ is true if and only if S.” Meta-language, whose subjects are sentences (“S”), became connected to object-language, whose subjects are real world referents (S). Example: "The snow is white" is true if and only if it is really the case the snow is white.

Problems: an immediately perceivable problem with logical positivism here is that it is basically susceptible to all the problems of empiricism. Examples: the reliability of sensation must be unreasonably presupposed; "snow" and "white" are ostensibly, arbitrarily defined such that knowledge of communication between persons is, as Augustine anticipated some 1600 years prior to logical positivism, impossible - that is to say, empiricism is solipsistic; etc. But as a matter of fact, logical positivism was radically empirical, as shall be seen in the below.

Verificationism and the Verification Criterion of Meaningfulness

Verificationism is the position that a proposition must be able to be determined to be true or false in order to be meaningful. So, for example, propositions in the future tense are apparently not meaningful. The verificationism of logical positivism and its extreme emphasis on empiricism led to the verification criterion of meaningfulness, the principle to which logical positivists (such as the ones I met recently) refer when asked why they believed metaphysics is nonsensical. The verification criterion of meaningfulness refers to the following: propositions which are not analytic (i.e. tautologous) must be empirically verifiable or else they are meaningless. Such being the case, metaphysics would by definition be meaningless.

Problem: the most obvious problem - one which caused Ayer to step back from logical positivism - was that the verification criterion of meaningfulness is a proposition which cannot itself be verified on its own grounds. It's a self-defeating principle. This is, in my estimation, the crushing blow to logical positivism. Popper was another individual who saw this flaw and attempted to replace verificationism with falsificationism as the demarcation criterion of science. This has its own problems, but at least Popper didn't reject metaphysics outright. Even with these problems, one final subject related to logical positivism merits note.

Ethics

Ayer, consistent with verificationism and Positivism, taught that ethical posits are neither true nor false. “Ought” and “should” statements are rather emotive. This is the ethical theory known as emotivism. Stevenson, another logical positivist, contributed to this theory by explaining that emotivism does not preclude a means of ethical dialogue. By distinguishing between beliefs (eg. “this actor is in the movie”) and attributes (eg. “I prefer tennis to movies”), Stevenson made significant strides in an attempt to resolve disagreements of this nature. He noted that increasing one another’s awareness of facts can only stimulate beneficial conversation, although he realized differences in attributes are irresolvable.

Feigl, on the other hand, thought emotivists missed the point. Forwarding the concepts of validation and vindication, analogous to internal and external questions, Feigl believed he came the closest to resolving ethical disputes. Validation refers to the idea that if two disputants share the same belief in a general ethical principle, this shared belief can function as a means by which they can seek to resolve differences on a specific point. And even in there are no shared principles, according to vindication, the persons can nevertheless compare their respective systems in hopes one will persuade the other. It is only when disagreement on this level persists that one can claim there is no means of resolution on Positivistic grounds.

Problem: I would agree that each of these contributions takes Positivism to its logical end. But that's precisely the problem. One can describe ethical beliefs but not account for them. Ethical discourse is possible, although ultimately, it may certainly be the case conflicts are irresolvable. In fact, it seems to me the emotivists frame the issue in a different manner than does Feigl, but they don’t differ significantly in that both agree insofar as ethical statements are unjustifiable and ethical dialogue can only go so far.

Many logical positivists bite the bullet and accept moral nihilism, in which case one can always appeal to one of the plethora of intrinsically insoluble difficulties, some of which are mentioned above, but given that one will usually hear arguments from incredulity from logical positivists regarding the idea metaphysical statements can be meaningful, it doesn't hurt to be able to throw incredulity back in their face when you ask if they can seriously believe there is nothing objectively objectionable about rape, murder, et. al.

Craig/Harris Debate

William Lane Craig and Sam Harris debated yesterday on the topic "Is Good from God?" You can listen to it here. I have a few criticisms of both sides, mostly with respect to Harris' statements.

Craig

Opening Statement

Contrary to Craig, "ought" does not imply "can." Craig uses this an analogy to attempt to show otherwise: "if somebody shoves you into another person, you're not responsible for bumping into him. You had no choice." This presupposes determinism is incompatible with choice. That does not follow. Determinism is incompatible with free will - the ability to choose apart from antecedent, extrinsic causation - but it is compatible with choice. Choice is volitional, but it is an actual exercise of one's will. Hence, it does not imply one's will has the capacity to have been exercised contrarily. One's choice can be volitional yet necessitated. Religious philosophers as far back as Augustine and as recent as Gordon Clark have noted this. Craig has repeated this false dichotomy for a while now, and he even threw in the robot/puppet caricature one will sometimes hear in these contexts. As I have written elsewhere:

//Neither God’s revelation of what is good nor His decree that men are responsible for obeying His precepts is arbitrary, for in the same way God’s declaration of what is good reflects His own eternal nature, God’s declaration that men are responsible for obeying His law reflects their created natures. That God sovereignly made men for His own ends and glory functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates, in Romans, his claim that men are responsible (Romans 9:19-21). In the absence of a Creator-creation distinction, moral dogmatism is irrational. A dictator may desire to heedlessly enforce his ideas, but he can never possess the divine prerogative. Only a sovereign Creator can universalize His moral precepts to those whom He has created for that purpose, and this God has done by the full, sovereign, and authoritative disclosure of His holy nature and law in Scripture...

Advocates of the free will defense may object that man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose. They also sometimes caricature men in a deterministic world-view as puppets. This method of argument is question-begging and poisoning-the-well. There is no self-evident reason that one who has broken a law is excused from law-breaking because he was unable to do otherwise. Additionally, Scripture teaches that men, in relation to God, are pots, axes, and other instruments God may use as He pleases. What, then, besides emotion, could be the underlying objection laced in the puppet analogy? In fact, God is actually much more sovereign over mankind than a puppeteer is over his puppet. God controls everything men do, whereas a puppeteer is confined by strings and joints. God made men as they are: creatures with minds, wills, emotions, intellects, feelings, and other privileges to which puppets are not privy. Even so, men are not “forced” to will, as that would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary. It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose. “For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory forever! Amen” (Romans 11:36).//

To be fair, Craig does add the addendum that compatibilism is a position which avoid his criticism, but given his statement that" ought implies can," something with which Calvinists disagree, it is not clear whether or not he would include Calvinism in this group.

Harris

Opening Statement

Even if it were allowed "good is well-being," as Harris states, Harris seems to miss the point that providing a demarcation of what is good does not explain why one ought to do good. As I point out in a different post, goodness and oughtness are not synonyms. So when Harris says "if we should do anything in this universe, if we ought to do anything, if we have a moral duty to do anything, it's to avoid the worst possible misery for everyone," again, even if this is true, Harris must substantiate the "if." He doesn't show that the "if" is the case. He doesn't show we should or ought to do anything. He doesn't show we have moral duties. He defines good but provides no objective reason we should do good.

Now, it is true Harris appeals to common sense, but if I were to point out that what Harris considers to be common sense can be thought by another - like myself - to be emotive stupidity, what can be his response? Argumentum ad populum? Harris is an unusual Positivist (he strikes me as one, anyways) in that he argues morality is objective. Most Positivists thought ethical discourse was possible (to a certain point) but that ethical claims themselves are unverifiable.

When Harris says one's values can be objectively wrong with respect to deeper values one holds, this is what Feigl would call "validation" and is analogous to an internal question. But Harris forgets to explain how one can verify these deeper values are objective. Feigl at least admitted that if one cannot "vindicate" his ethical system against another - an external question - there remain root disagreements for which there is no recourse for resolution, at least on Positivistic grounds. At this point, it seems Harris wishes to pass off his own system as objective, but that is clearly not the case. To illustrate how unintelligible Harris becomes at this juncture, he says that those who disagree with him are wrong with respect to values they would hold if they were "deeper persons." What does that even mean? How does Harris know counter-factuals?

A still more fundamental criticism of Harris would simply be to attack the idea his naive utilitarianism can be verified. Suppose - and this is quite a stretch, given the above - that Harris' definition of good is true and that one ought to do good. Criticisms nevertheless remain:

//Utilitarianism is an ethical theory which defines good along a spectrum. A choice which causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest good, and a choice which causes the greatest pain to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest evil. This understanding of good and evil leads to arbitrariness and irrationality. As a form of consequentialism, choices made by Utilitarians are, incredibly, prospectively a-moral; since one cannot know the future consequences of his choice, the choice must be made arbitrarily. Possibilities of future consequences also suggest that the moral value of any choice is subject to change at any instant. Even [relatively] simple knowledge of all the ways in which a past choice has affected present reality is itself a problem, because one would need to be omniscient to know his calculations are both accurate and exhaustive. Yet another problem with Utilitarianism is that in order to judge the comparative “goodness” of one’s choice, one would need to know counter-factuals; ironically, such is only possible by divine revelation. There are still more complications when one considers, within a Utilitarian framework, whether or not one individual’s pleasure could qualitatively exceed the sum pleasure of many, whether or not it is proper to state minorities possess rights, and whether or not utilitarianism can escape the demerits of empiricism, inductivism, and subjectivism. Given the extremely relativistic and flawed nature of Utilitarianism, one may well believe the demise of Utilitarianism would maximize the pleasure of those who sincerely desire to be moral.//

1st rebuttal

Harris takes an intellectually lazy route in his argument against the divine command theory when he references the problem of evil. Not much needs to be said in reply to Harris here:

//The problem of evil is purportedly an internal critique of Christianity. If the Christian God does not harmonize with the atheist's arbitrary and subjective moral perception, why should the Christian suppose that to be a problem? Smuggling non-Christian concepts into the argument – concepts which they use to profane God’s character – can lead nothing more than an inept attack on a straw man. Confusion can only be avoided by providing clear definitions of key terms.//

Harris has provided definition of the key term - good - and it does not square with Christianity. Why Harris would think any Christian would find his argument meaningful, then, is mystifying.

Much more amusing is Harris' attempt to analogize the Bible to The Lord of the Rings. He states that to call Scriptural passages evidence for Hell is like stating passages in LOTR which reference Valinor are evidence for Valinor. He makes the same analogy to Hell in the Qur'an later. Well, if Harris thinks he can show that LOTR or Islam can produce a sound, epistemic system, then he is by all means invited to do so. He didn't, however, so this too is another evidence of intellectual laziness.

After listening to Harris' rebuttal, I almost doubt Harris has read the Bible beyond snippets of quotations provided by fellow new atheists. He accuses Christianity of lacking moral accountability, given that a person can live in sin and nevertheless repent and believe in the gospel unto salvation just prior to his death. His argument suggests unfamiliarity with penal substitution and justification, although he in fact alludes to this view (derogatorily) 5 minutes later. Moreover, Harris accuses God of cruel behavior towards innocent people. Has Harris never heard of the doctrine of original sin? Harris never critiques Christianity on its own grounds. He assumes his view is true and projects it onto other world-views in order to disprove them, which is a faulty methodology.

In any case, Harris imperceptibly shifts from attempting to answer "what are the preconditions necessary for sound moral dogmatism?" to "is Christianity moral?" If Craig is right, evil presupposes theism and every attack Harris makes against Christianity would be an admission his own view is inadequate. Harris doesn't seem to understand that.

2nd rebuttal

Harris here attempts to clarify his position, but I think he really only muddied the waters (perhaps unintentionally). It wasn't clear to me whether he was trying to justify moral statements on the basis of science or if he accepted morality as axiomatic such that aim of science is thereby determined. He said in one part of the rebuttal that axioms are necessary and later states one doesn't need to accept anything on faith. Very confusing. He also tried to distinguish between the way in which he and Craig were using the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity," and here again I didn't really follow what he was trying to say. In his closing statement, Craig noted that he had consistently defined objectivity as that which is independent of human opinion since his opening statement.

Needless to say, none of this was relevant to Craig's criticisms. Harris continued to fallaciously equate preferences with oughtness. Instead of answering the fundamental questions like "how do you know utilitarianism is true," Harris would call such questions stupid and his view objective in a thinly veiled attempt to intimidate opponents into silence. I thought Harris was rather disrespectful throughout the debate.

Concluding Statement

Harris compares morality to mathematics and physics and claims that since the latter don't presuppose God, neither does the former. Actually, the latter do presuppose God, and in any case, "ought" is not synonymous with "is." Harris never addressed the is-ought dilemma Craig mentioned several times.

Conclusion

Craig makes similar points to ones I made or might have made with a few mistakes and omissions.

Harris is neither a logician nor a theologian.

Clark's Lectures 1

This first transcription is taken from Clark's lecture entitled Questions and Answers. In it, Clark is a part of a panel comprised of theologians of all shapes and sizes, most of whom express admiration for Clark. It appears that each person on the panel had already given some sort of lecture and that the audience was allowed to ask the panel questions, most of which (in this clip, at least) were directed to or answered by Clark. There was a lively discussion on the image of God and a few questions pertaining to situational ethics, but Clark's most striking quote, in my opinion, was the following, especially given that my professor used a paper by Quine to attack "foundationalism" in my most recent philosophy class:

//Every system of philosophy – whether it’s Platonism or Aristotelianism in antiquity or logical positivism in this century – every system of philosophy must have a first principle. Since it is first it cannot have been deduced from anything prior. In this sense, logical positivism or Aristotelianism is just as fideistic as I am. It means that a person accepts certain axioms from which he deduces conclusions. I accept the truth of the Scripture as my axiom and deduce conclusions from that, and you can call that fideism, which some people think is a nasty term. It certainly means you have faith. The logical positivists place their faith in sensation. You cannot – and I wish to make this clear – you cannot guarantee the accuracy of observation by observation. If you wish to demonstrate the reliability of observation you’d have to have something prior to observation, but there is never anything prior to your first principle.//

A few reflections. I doubt that my professor would be very happy with this quote by Clark. He is a pragmatist rather than a logical positivist, but the positions are similar. He would say, I imagine, that to assert that all philosophical systems must have a first principle is inaccurate. And I imagine this is true, insofar as not all philosophical systems claim to have a first principle. While it should be remembered pragmatists such as my professor define knowledge and truth peculiarly, I think what Clark should have said - and it's easy for me to say this, since I have had time to think whereas Clark had to give an answer on the spot - was that all philosophical systems ought to have a first principle. I think Clark is more correct in Thales to Dewey (pg. 88):

//The demonstration of a proposition, such as any any theorem in geometry, is completed only when it is referred to the axioms. If the axioms in turn required demonstration, the demonstration of the proposition with which we began would remain incomplete, at least until the axioms could be demonstrated. But if the axioms rest on prior principles, and if these too must be demonstrated - on the assumption that every proposition requires demonstration - the proof of our original theorem would never be finished. This means that it would be impossible to demonstrate anything, for all demonstration depends on indemonstrable first principles. Every type of philosophy must make some original assumptions.//

I, like Clark, don't see any other way in which the infinite regression argument can be avoided.

More interesting than this technicality, however, is that Clark admits one's axiom(s) upon which he purports to construct his philosophical system is taken by faith. This perhaps distinguishes Clark from classical foundationalism - Clark does not appear to assert, as did the Rationalists, that first principles or axioms can themselves be indubitably self-evident.

John Robbins wrote that "Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its truth." Does an axiom have an "account of its truth"? Well, axioms can be reduced to absurdity by showing they lead to skepticism or internal inconsistency, but axioms cannot be demonstrated and, as such, apparently cannot be "known," at least not according to the above definition. I don't know whether or not Clark would agree with that. Perhaps epistemological self-attestation is relevant.

In any case, the above observations incline me to believe that Clark's position is a sort of synthesis between foundationalism and coherentism. Clark subscribed to a coherence rather than a correspondence theory of truth; that is, he believed propositions within a philosophical system ought to be internally consistent (cf. Clark and His Critics pgs. 142, 149). However, he believed the system must be grounded.

This may be too speculative, which is why it is stated somewhat tentatively, but for what it's worth, it makes sense to me. Scripturalism is rational because its basis yields epistemological consistency. Scripturalists utilize apagogic arguments rather than transcendental arguments, so a Scripturalists claims with regards to its axioms should be accordingly tempered (cf. here). One cannot prove an axiom, but it does not follow that one cannot be rational for believing an axiom.

Something of an update

Since the beginning of the semester I have tried to stay focused on schoolwork, which is why I haven't blogged very often in 2011. However, since I will seemingly be allowed to write a philosophy paper on the epistemological beliefs of Gordon Clark - yes, I note the irony - I have some justification for dedicating some time to reading about, writing about, and listening to subjects with which I am, shall we say, pleasantly acquainted, at least in contrast to Complex and Real Analysis.

I have also finally taken the time to listen to some of Clark's free online lectures (link). In part in preparation for my research paper and in part because I have enjoyed and believe others might enjoy reading rather than listening to Clark, I have transcribed some of these audio lectures and will be posting them in the coming weeks. The written recordings are by no means extensive, but it will be easier for me to access the parts of the audio I found interesting if I can simply read through 2 pages rather than trying to remember when Clark said them in the course of a 40 minute presentation. For the reader, however, this should be meant as an encouragement to download the lectures and listen to them in a car (or whatnot) rather than as an excuse to not listen; Clark makes worthy points which I have omitted.

In other news, my recent birthday allowed me to pick up some new books which I hope to be able to take a look at soon. I'm very blessed. I received Horton's The Christian Faith (systematic theology), Hamilton's God's Glory in Salvation Through Judgment (biblical theology), and I was able to stretch a $20 gift card to purchase Clark's The Incarnation, Selections From Hellenistic Philosophy, and his Today's evangelism: Counterfeit or genuine?

Improper Romance

I cannot imagine a more difficult task than writing a satisfying piece of romantic fiction. I am too analytic for it. If I tried, I would be disappointed with the result. However, I can admire others’ works when befitting, and to that end, here are some observations:

Proper romance must subsist between two rational, passionate equals. If one is undeserving of another’s regard, I would rather the fact be acknowledged than ignored, as I am inclined to want to think poorly of as few characters as possible. Furthermore, romance without conflict cannot be compelling, yet I have found conflict is usually and ironically the result of a reason for which the loss of a reader’s respect for a given character is warranted. Questionable is the passion of he who believes external circumstances prevent association. Deference to third party opinion or inability to overlook social differences must disappoint a reader’s hopeful expectation for an ideal character: independent, clever, and sage. Worse still are cases in which there is no such obvious, trite impediment, as the character whose resolve would waver at the precipice of desires fulfilled rather bespeaks of irrationality or insanity.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that I find myself preferring what might be called improper romance, by which I mean a subtly coy relationship between persons of the opposite sex, equal or unequal in terms of intelligence and passion, of which the author’s chief object is to instill in the reader’s mind a teleological end other than union. I have not read or seen many works of fiction of this type; in my experience, Kierkegaard’s The Seducer’s Diary is the best example of such a relationship between unequal persons, and the first half of Pride and Prejudice is the best example of such a relationship between equal persons. Both books requite interest by stimulating the mind rather than – or, if you please, unto – the emotions.

Prayer, Evangelism, and Determinism

I was reading a recent thread in which Calvinists and non-Calvinists were accusing each other of holding to positions which logically precluded the meaningfulness of prayers that God should effect certain events which pertain to the wills of men. The arguments, in brief, were these: the non-Calvinists asserted that since the Calvinist believes all things are already determined, his prayer for God to affect men's wills could not have any bearing on what God has determined and, therefore, is nonsensical; the Calvinists asserted that since the non-Calvinist believes men's wills are free, his prayer for God to affect men's wills could not be accomplished because men's wills would then be determined.

I cannot defend a prayers of this sort made by one who believes in free will. However, if God determines all things - and He does - may it not be the case that His determination of a prayer on behalf of an unbeliever (or anyone, for that matter) is teleologically related to His likewise determined movement to do that for which the believer asks? For instance:

Exodus 32:9 “I have seen these people,” the LORD said to Moses, “and they are a stiff-necked people.

10 Now leave me alone so that my anger may burn against them and that I may destroy them. Then I will make you into a great nation.”

11 But Moses sought the favor of the LORD his God. “LORD,” he said, “why should your anger burn against your people, whom you brought out of Egypt with great power and a mighty hand?

12 Why should the Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that he brought them out, to kill them in the mountains and to wipe them off the face of the earth’? Turn from your fierce anger; relent and do not bring disaster on your people.

13 Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom you swore by your own self: ‘I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give your descendants all this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance forever.’”

14 Then the LORD relented and did not bring on his people the disaster he had threatened.

Here Moses intercedes on behalf of Israel. Did Moses do this of His own, allegedly free will, or was his intercession determined? Calvinists believe it was determined. Was God's relent from His threat spontaneous or determined? Calvinists believe it was determined. God eternally decreed that both these things should happen. Why, then, can't the Calvinist suggest that God was determined to relent from His threat by means of His determination of Moses' intercession?

The prayer argument made by the non-Calvinists is really little different from evangelism; if only by God's determination can one be saved, as Calvinists believe, why evangelize? The answer is obvious: man is God's appointed means for the salvation of unbelievers (Romans 10). His determination of one's evangelistic appeals to Scripture is the means by which God purposed to effect regeneration in His elect, and this too is determined. Here we see a teleological correlation between God's determinations or decrees.

So when Calvinists pray that God would affect an individual's will, the prayer is not irrelevant. Perhaps it is the case that God will be moved by the prayer - not spontaneously, but having determined the very prayer. Or perhaps God will not be moved, and so He has determined that the prayer will be answered in the negative. No one knows the extent of God's eternal decree[s]. But whichever the case may be, it is true that foremost in one's thoughts should be recollection that God's sovereign will cannot be thwarted or resisted (Isaiah 14, Romans 9). Hence, accompanied with an entreaty for, say, the salvation of an unbeliever should be the ready acceptance of whichever way events unfold, as they do so according to God's sovereign will, and, more specifically, for the good of those called according to His purpose.

Some notes on Jesus' baptism

Purpose

Against the backdrop of John’s baptism for repentance, it does seem so strange that he should have asked Jesus why He should be baptized by him. I can recall from years ago having been asked why Jesus’ baptism was “the fitting way for [John and Jesus] to fulfill all righteousness,” and unfortunately, my answer was superficial. By wishing little more than to defend the truth that Jesus had nothing of which to repent, I gave what I believed was an answer which sufficiently defended that and in so doing no doubt left the questioner with a feeling of something to be desired. This post and ones which may follow it are products recent study on the subject of baptism and attempt to rectify that deficient answer as well as serve as an indication, for future reference, that baptism is inseparable from [biblical] history.

Comments by Kline

Christ’s baptism is one of those topics in which the problem is too much rather than too little information – to see the significance of Christ’s baptism requires not only a knowledge of redemptive history but also insight as to the way in which it is interwoven. In essence, the problem is knowing where to begin. As much as I dislike quoting authors, since I would rather show that I understand the content of their works by using my own words, in this case, I think I must make an exception. Therefore, I begin by citing Meredith Kline’s By Oath Consigned (pgs. 58-62), wherein he very ably strings together some observations regarding Christ’s baptism and covenant judgment worth mentioning:

//…As covenant Servant, Jesus submitted in symbol to the judgment of the God of the covenant in the waters of baptism. But for Jesus, as the Lamb of God, to submit to the symbol of judgment was to offer himself up to the curse of the covenant. By his baptism Jesus was consecrating himself unto his sacrificial death in the judicial ordeal of the cross. Such an understanding of his baptism is reflected in Jesus’ own reference to his coming passion as a baptism: “I have a baptism to be baptized with” (Lk. 12:50; cf. Mk. 10:38). Jesus’ symbolic baptism unto judgment appropriately concluded with a divine verdict, the verdict of justification expressed by the heavenly voice and sealed by the Spirit’s anointing, Messiah’s earnest of the kingdom inheritance (Matt. 3:16, 17; Mk. 1:10, 11; Lk. 3:22; cf. Jn. 1:32, 33; Ps. 2:7f.). This verdict of sonship was contested by Satan, and that led to the ordeal by combat between Jesus and Satan, beginning with the wilderness temptation immediately after Jesus’ baptism and culminating in the crucifixion and resurrection-vindication of the victorious Christ, the prelude to his reception of all the kingdoms of the world (the issue under dispute in the ordeal; cf. esp. Matt. 4:8ff.; Lk. 4:5ff.).

Further background for Jesus’ conceptualizing of his sufferings as a water ordeal (and at the same time an additional antecedent for John’s introduction of a water rite symbolic of judicial ordeal) is found in those supplicatory Psalms in which the righteous servant pleads for deliverance from overwhelming waters. Of particular interest is Psalm 69, from which the New Testament draws so deeply in its explication of the judicial sufferings of Christ: “I am come into deep waters, where the floods overflow me.... Let not the waterflood overflow me, neither let the deep swallow me up” (vv. 2b, iSa; cf. vv. 1, 2a, 14)... The suppliant Jonah found it possible to make literal use of this terminology of water ordeal in his appeal from the depths, and Jesus saw in Jonah’s trial by water the sign of his own judgment ordeal in the heart of the earth (Jon. 2:2ff. [1ff.]; Matt. 12:39, 40)…

Conclusions: John the Baptist was sent as a messenger of the Old Covenant to its final generation. His concern was not to prepare the world at large for the coming of Christ but to summon Israel unto the Lord to whom they had sworn allegiance at Sinai, ere his wrath broke upon them and the Mosaic kingdom was terminated in the flames of messianic judgment. The demand which John brought to Israel was focused in his call to baptism. This baptism was not an ordinance to be observed by Israel in their generations but a special sign for that terminal generation epitomizing the particular crisis in covenant history represented by the mission of John as messenger of the Lord’s ultimatum.

From the angle of repentance and faith, John’s ultimatum could be seen as a gracious invitation to the marriage feast of the Suzerain’s Son; and John’s baptism, as a seal of the remission of sins. Bright with promise in this regard was Jesus’ submission to John’s baptism. For the passing of Jesus through the divine judgment in the water rite in the Jordan meant to John’s baptism what the passing of Yahweh through the curse of the knife rite of Genesis 15 meant to Abraham’s circumcision. In each case the divine action constituted an invitation to all recipients of these covenant signs of consecration to identify themselves by faith with the Lord himself in their passage through the ordeal. So they might be assured of emerging from the overwhelming curse with a blessing. Jesus’ passage through the water ordeal with the others who were baptized in the Jordan was also one in meaning with the Lord’s presence with Israel in the theophany pillar during the passage through the Red Sea, and in the ark of the covenant during their crossing of the Jordan. And the meaning of all these acts of the Lord of the covenant is expressed in the promise: “But now thus saith the Lord that created thee, 0 Jacob, and he that formed thee, 0 Israel, Fear not: for I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name; thou art mine. When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee: when thou walkest through the fire, thou shalt not be burned; neither shall the flame kindle upon thee. For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour” (Isa. 43:1-3a).

Viewed from a more comprehensive vantage point, John’s baptism was a sign of the ordeal through which Israel must pass to receive a judgment of either curse or blessing…

By his message and baptism John thus proclaimed again to the seed of Abraham the meaning of their circumcision. Circumcision was no guarantee of inviolable privilege. It was a sign of the divine ordeal in which the axe, laid unto the roots of the unfruitful trees cursed by Messiah, would cut them off (Matt. 3:10; Lk. 3:9). John’s baptism was in effect a recircumcising.//

Point of Interest

- John’s choice to baptize in the Jordan River itself has redemptive historical significance, since it is immediately upon crossing it that the Israelites who were baptized through the waters of the Red Sea were required by God to circumcise those who were born in the wilderness wandering, after which God is said to have “rolled away the reproach of Egypt” from them (Joshua 5:1-9). This, I believe, coupled with the facts that Jesus’ death is itself referred to as a baptism and a circumcision (Mark 10:38, Colossians 2:11) and that Christ’s baptism in the Jordan river itself pointed to His crucifixion, as will be shown in what follows, strengthens Kline’s contention that John’s baptism was a re-circumcision.

- Jesus’ death and subsequent resurrection is that to which believers are united by spiritual regeneration, the metonymic reference of baptism and circumcision (Colossians 2:11-12, cf. Deuteronomy 30:6, Romans 6:3-11). A reason Christ’s death is referred to as a baptism and circumcision is that Christ’s baptism was a consecration unto His actual participation in the ordeal, similar to Yahweh’s covenant in Genesis 15 that He would bear the covenant curse (Jeremiah 34:18-20) should He fail to deliver with regards to His promises entailed in the Abrahamic covenant, a covenant ratified in Genesis 17 by the sign of circumcision and confirmed by God’s oath in Genesis 22 (cf. Hebrews 6:13-18).

- One becomes a child of Abraham – not because he has fulfilled the law – but because he has been baptized in Christ’s crucifixion-baptism-circumcision (cf. Galatians 3-4). One is cut off from the covenant community when the sign of the covenant is not applied to him, because to reject that to which the sign refers would require that he bear what Christ bears in the stead of believers: excommunication (Isaiah 53:8, Jeremiah 11:19). One is united to Christ – and, hence, to the rest of the invisible church – in regeneration, so it is only sensible that one is united to the visible church by means of the sign of regeneration – in this period of redemptive history, baptism.

- The crucifixion-baptism of He by whom all things hold together constituted an end of one epoch and the beginning of another. Indeed, one of the realities baptism symbolizes is an epochal shift (cf. 2 Peter 3:5-13) – a new creation, as it were. Such shifts, since the first creation, are accompanied by judgment (e.g. Genesis 9:11, Luke 12:49-51, cf. Psalm 18:4, 16, 42:7, 69:1-2, Isaiah 8:7-8, Jonah 2:3-6) as well as blessing. The signs accompanying these shifts are similar too (Genesis 9:12-17, Ezekiel 1:27-28, Revelation 10:1). The flood-baptism marked the first epochal shift since creation, and was therefore a new creation; the flood cleansed the earth from sin analogous to the way in which God “blots” out one’s iniquities through the washing of regeneration. The fire-baptism marks the last epochal shift, wherein all unbelievers will be burned for their sin as opposed to the sin associated with believers which will be burned, enabling the believer to stand pure and glorified in the midst of the new Eden, the culmination of the new creation. That which ties these epochal shifts together by having ushered in the last days is Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection signified by His baptism.

- Just as Christ received the Holy Spirit in His baptism, He purchased the graces and merits necessary for the salvation of those for whom He died by His crucifixion-baptism, both of which are applied to those people for whom Christ died by the Holy Spirit at the time of the Father’s choosing through regeneration, a signification of our baptism. As such, Christ’s baptism truly pointed to the new creation He would institute upon His resurrection from the death to which He was consecrated by His baptism similar to the way in which an individual’s baptism soterically points to new creation: having been united to Christ through the Spirit, Christ is able to act as our federal head and bear the punishment for our sins and become our righteousness.

- From a previous post:

//Christ’s baptism and allusion to the Holy Spirit as a dove in Luke 4:22 may recall one to the hovering Holy Spirit during creation (Genesis 1:2) and subsequent aerial imagery during typological [re]creations (Genesis 8:11, Exodus 13:21-22, Deuteronomy 32:11). The deluge, which was an undoing of creation, enabled Noah and his family to be saved by water (1 Peter 3:20) as were Moses and the Israelites (1 Corinthians 10:1-2) – that is, by waters which could on the occasion of this destruction effect a completely new creation. Baptism puts to death the old by creating the new, which is seen too in soteriological terms as well (Colossians 2:11-15): being dead in sins, God puts to death the old man by the regenerative grace of the always present Holy Spirit, after which the elect individual is immediately raised with Christ unto faith and righteousness (cf. Romans 6:1-4, Galatians 3:27, Ephesians 2:1-6, 1 Peter 3:21-22). In the same way, Christ’s baptism anticipates that He will put to death the old, Adamic means of attaining righteousness, works, by the creation of new means, grace alone (Romans 8:32), which He will purchase for His people by obeying the covenantal stipulations by His own works.//

I would encourage those who are interested in further exploring baptism and biblical theology to check out Kline's book, Fesko's Word, Water, and Spirit, Horton's Introduction to Covenant Theology, and/or Beale's et. al. Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament.

The sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice

I have elsewhere argued for limited atonement (cf. Reymond; Long et. al.), which has to do with the scope of the design and application of the benefits of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, hereafter referred to as “Christ’s sacrifice.” This post does not pertain to what Christ actually accomplished but rather to what Christ could have accomplished. In other words, it is a brief explanation of what the Calvinist means - or, at least, what I mean - when he speaks of the “sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice,” as well as a comment or two on a possible objection which could be made within the context of a Calvinistic soteriology.

Perhaps some people believe that the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice implies God designed the effects of Christ’s sacrifice to be universal in scope. However, this is not what the Calvinist means when he asserts the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice; Christ didn't intend to save reprobates by His sacrifice, nor can it be said that the fact that living reprobates have yet to be judged implies grace procured through Christ’s sacrifice. What the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice alludes to is the fact that, given His divine dignity and perfect obedience, Christ’s sacrifice was such that He could have acted as penal substitute for any number of sinners, had the Father so desired:

//Limited Atonement: the doctrine that the intention of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection was to secure propitiation for the elect alone. While it is counter-factually true that “if the Father desired to save all men without exception, Christ’s sacrifice was such that all men without exception could have been saved,” it is in fact the case that the Father does not desire to save all men without exception; hence, the atonement is hypothetically sufficient for all, but actually efficient only for the elect.//

Update: I have erased the final three paragraphs to this post because I am no longer persuaded it was accurate to say that there are no sins for which Christ could not make amends.

Van Til's transcendental argument

Introduction

Jamin Hubner, a blog contributor at aomin.org, has posted a brief summary of Van Til’s transcendental argument. In the post, he distinguishes between four types of arguments: abductive, inductive, deductive, and transcendental (or, perhaps, presuppositional). While his remarks on the first three types of arguments are worth consideration - I would especially be curious to know whether or not he believes there is such a thing as an inductive argument which is not "poor" - what he has to say about Van Til’s transcendental argument merits a closer look.

Transcendental arguments

Mr. Hubner explains the criteria of a transcendental argument:

A presupposes B if and only if:

1. if A is true, then B is true.

2. if ~A is true, then B is true.

In other words, "A is said to presuppose B if B is true irrespective of the truth-value of A." Now it seems to me that a transcendental argument is a subspecies of deductive argumentation. The conclusions of a transcendental argument purport to follow from the premise(s); the transcendental argument is logically valid. Specifically, a transcendental argument is an apagogic argument, or an argument which purports that “in the case of A or ~A, B must be true; if B were false, neither A nor ~A could be true, which contradicts the law of excluded middle.”

Van Til’s transcendental argument

In Van Til’s words, the transcendental argument according to which Christianity must be presupposed is as follows:

“The only “proof” of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of proving anything at all.” (Jerusalem and Athens, 21)

Christianity, it is argued, must be true, for if it were not, one would not be able to prove anything. In order to show that a statement is true, one must presuppose Christianity.

Clarification

Before evaluating this argument, it is necessary to know what the Christian position is. Mr. Hubner seems to understand it to be the position which believes in the Scriptures of the Triune God. If the conclusion of Van Til’s transcendental argument is sound, it would be a powerful proof of the logical necessity of Christianity.

The advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument claims that he is able to prove that the Christian world-view alone can function as a sound epistemological presupposition. Given that there are an infinite number of alternative world-views, such must be shown to be the case. It is not enough to shift the burden of proof to the non-Christian, for to do so would be a defense of Christianity rather than a proof of it. It would be inductive reasoning – which is fallacious – to conclude that, given that a finite number of non-Christian world-views are evinced to be unsound, all other non-Christian world-views are likewise unsound. The burden of proof, then, is on the advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument to show that no world-view other than the Christian world-view is able to justify knowledge claims.

In mathematics, a set which contains infinitely many numbers may be contained in another set which also has infinitely many numbers. For instance, the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, …} is a subset of the set of integers {…, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, …} even though there are an infinite number of natural numbers. Why is this relevant? It is indeed possible to conceive of reduction ad absurdum arguments which refute a set of world views infinite in number (cf. link) but do not refute all other possible non-Christian world-views; for instance, while an immutably omniscient being must be epistemologically presupposed - and so the infinite number of possible world-views which do not presuppose an immutably omniscient being are refuted (e.g. the set of natural numbers) - there is more than one possible world-view which purports an immutably omniscient being (e.g. the set of integers which are not natural numbers). Thus, while transcendental arguments in general can be sound as well as valid, the soundness of one transcendental argument does not mean that all alternative world-views to Christianity are or can be evinced to be unsound. The point is that the advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument must show why it is the case that all the characteristics unique to the Christian world-view must be epistemologically presupposed.

Evaluation

It seems to me that this is the point at which Van Til’s transcendental argument fails to deliver the goods. In my admittedly limited experience, the following represent what I have seen from the advocates of Van Til’s transcendental argument:

1. The advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument reverts to repeatedly asserting that logic presupposes Christianity instead of showing why it must presuppose Christianity, as seems to be the case in Mr. Hubner’s article. I recognize the article was only meant to be an introduction to Van Til’s transcendental argument, but an explanation as to why it is that the characteristics unique to Christianity must be presupposed is obviously necessary to the soundness of the argument. There is a distinct difference between asserting that Christianity must be presupposed and showing that Christianity must be presupposed. The aforementioned quote by Van Til, for example, is just an assertion. It is not a demonstration or proof.

2. The advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument forgets the apagogic nature of the argument and instead grounds the proof on the claims of Christian doctrine. For instance, to argue that rationalism, empiricism, et. al. cannot be true solely on the grounds that they are not compatible with Christianity would not satisfy the conditions of Van Til’s transcendental argument. Such is tantamount to an attempt to disprove one (or more) epistemological axiom by means of another, which is question-begging.

3. The advocate of Van Til’s transcendental argument provides a[n alleged] proof whose conclusion is closer to those of classical apologists than to presuppositionalists, insofar as the proof in question does not aim to show that the characteristics particularly unique to the Christian position must be epistemologically presupposed. For instance, as has already been mentioned, the transcendental argument which shows the necessity of an immutably omniscient being does not meet the conditions which must be met in order for Van Til's transcendental argument to be found to be sound [I understand that Mr. Hubner does not think this]. It cannot be too emphasized that for Van Til's transcendental argument to be sound, it must be demonstrated that the characteristics unique to Christianity must be epistemologically presupposed.

Now, it is entirely possible that someone has provided such a demonstration and I have simply missed it. If that is the case, hopefully someone will point me toward the source. It should be kept in mind, however, that the proof for Van Til’s transcendental argument must be compatible with other sound transcendental arguments. So, for instance, if it is the case that the conclusion of Van Til’s transcendental argument cannot be deduced from divine revelation, the knowledge claim would suspect to the transcendental argument mentioned above (here is the link again).

Conclusion

It would be interesting to find that Scripturalism can be synthesized with Van Til’s transcendental argument. Should one presuppose Scripture for no other reason than that it is the self-authenticating word of God the Holy Spirit uses to regenerate an elect individual unto belief by which he understands that God is the source of truth, or should he presuppose Scripture as divine revelation from the Triune God for another – or perhaps a further – reason, viz. that it is demonstrably the only world-view which is able to justify knowledge claims?

The Scripturalist’s belief in God’s word is constantly affirmed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, the logical coherence of Scripture, and the failure of all other world-views. Transcendental arguments can be used, but the function of such arguments is to refute non-Christian world-views rather than to demonstrate the necessity of Christianity in particular. Advocates of Van Til’s transcendental argument perhaps agree with the Scripturalist to a certain extent – although there is diversity even within Van Tillianism – but they also insist that all alternative world-views are able to be critiqued in such a way such that they are all evinced to be unsustainable.

Either way, Christian presuppositionalists all should agree that Scripture is God’s word and ought not to be treated as something profane. Hopefully, both sides keep this in perspective when making hypothetical arguments and whatnot. Both Scripturalists and those who advocate Van Til’s transcendental argument should trust what Scripture states: Christianity is the only world-view able to justify knowledge claims. What is in question is the method by which Christians ought to go about demonstrating this in the realm of apologetics so as to remain faithful to the biblical mandate to defend the faith.

Common grace and God's love

Sometimes I will hear a Calvinist, in response to the question whether or not God loves all men without exception, distinguish between types of God's love. For instance: God has a love for those He has destined to constitute the church, His bride, that He does not have for reprobates.

However, this doesn't answer whether or not God loves reprobates. Indeed, emotional considerations aside (not many people like to talk about God's hatred of sinners &c., I get it), it is not clear as to how one could argue God loves reprobates. We know that God loves some who are as yet unbelievers, but there is a reason God loves them which cannot be ascribed to the reprobate: God sent Christ to die for them. Remember how God's love is demonstrated towards the elect:

Romans 5:8 God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.

1 John 4:10 In this is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins

God didn't send His Son to be a propitiation for all wicked men. He sent Christ to be a propitiation for the wicked elect. In what way, given the limited scope of intention for the atonement, could it be argued that God loves reprobates? Common grace is what one would suspect the answer to be. The idea of common grace is pretty common in Christendom, I think; the idea is that by simply letting one who is guilty of sin live (and not only live, but reap many so-called benefits like health, perceived happiness, etc.) when he deserves to die, God must be being gracious to them.

But what is grace? Unmerited favor. The "common grace advocate," then, is suggesting that God is displaying favor to or gracing the reprobate by allowing him to live &c. But I fail to see how this is favor. In fact, the fact that such alleged benefits will actually bring greater condemnation on the heads of the reprobates indicates precisely the opposite, for to speak of God "favoring" someone who not only will be condemned for the failure to make proper use and give proper thanks for that benefit which is said to evince God's favor but also has been unconditionally predestined by God unto such greater condemnation for having experienced that alleged benefit (also predestined) proves that it is not favor at all; thus, it's not grace at all. It makes no sense to view a temporal [perceived] benefit as an evidence of God's favor, given that such will actually and was predestined to necessarily yield greater condemnation for having experienced and rejected proper use of that benefit.

I could end the post at this point, but it is both instructive and uplifting, I think, to consider the parallel; if God's disposition to the reprobate is conditioned on who He has purposed them to be (condemned by sin), it makes sense that God's disposition to the elect is conditioned on who He has purposed them to be (justified and glorified in Christ).

Why is this important? Consider a generic unbeliever. Does God love him? How would you know? What would it mean for God to love an unbeliever?

I believe the idea that "God works together all things for one's good" (cf. Romans 8:28) is as good a definition as any to describe what is meant by the statement God loves an individual. Now, does God work things together for God for all men without exception? No - the elect alone. Did the demonstration of God's love - Christ's sacrifice - apply to all men without exception? No - the elect alone.

There is a correlation, then, between God's love and God's election or (equivalently) between God's love and who God has purposed the elect to be: justified and glorified in Him. For that reason, the above question - does God love the generic unbeliever? - is too vague. It is wrong to abstract God's love (or lack thereof) for an individual from God's purpose for him. To do so not only makes it impossible to give a coherent answer as to whether or not God loves all unbelievers, but it would be furthermore impossible to give a coherent answer why or how God can even love the elect unbelievers. As I've written elsewhere:

//Only if one accepts that God chose to elect men in Christ before He decreed the Fall does it make sense that a holy God can choose to save a people deserving of wrath: because they, the elect, had already been chosen to be vessels of mercy.//