A Short Point on Morality and Politics

If one points out to a moral relativist that on his view, totalitarianism as a political goal or voting according to personal religious beliefs - especially beliefs which conflict with the moral relativist's opinions - are both legitimate options, not infrequently he will quickly appeal to political "rights." When asked why one should respect his "rights" if morality is relative, he will quickly leave. Moral relativism means political relativism.

Clark's Lectures 4

Continuing with select citations from Clark's lectures and works, here are a few interesting quotes from his book Karl Barth’s Theological Method:

Operationalism

Page 66: “Let us not claim unanimity for the new outlook, but a fair number of philosophers and scientists have adopted the theory of operationalism. This type of thought denies that the laws of science describe the processes of the real world. Scientific concepts, instead of being transcripts of “antecedent being,” are merely plans for future laboratory procedure. They are directions for the use of apparatus in the production of some desired result.”

Axioms and Apologetics

Page 92: “…a Christian presupposition, first principle, or axiom produces logical consistency, while a secular presupposition can apagogically be shown to result in inconsistency.”

Page 95: “Axiomatization is simply the perfecting and exhibiting of the logical consistency of a system of thought. In view of Calvinism’s well known reputation for consistency, axiomatization and Calvinism should get along well together. The many theorems derived from the smallest possible number of axioms… And since the axioms, if there be several, depend for their meaning on their interrelationships, axiomatization would rule out the possibility of even a single axiom in common.”

Page 96: “There are two parts to the process [of the reductio]. First the apologete must show that the axioms of secularism result in self-contradiction… Then, second, the apologete must exhibit the internal consistency of the Christian system. When these two points have been made clear, the Christian will urge the unbeliever to repudiate the axioms of secularism and accept God’s revelation. That is, the unbeliever will be asked to change his mind completely, to repent.”

Page 97:“The initial implausibility of a thorough-going, all comprehensive system of axioms and theorems does not lie in the fact that it is a hitherto unrealized ideal. The implausibility rests on the contrast between the common opinion that the secular sciences are true, at least largely true, and the implication of Christian axiomatization that they are all completely false… the present point is simply that God is the origin of all truth. Then all truth is one and self-consistent. But if so, non-Christian systems of thought must be false...”

The Image of God and Apologetics

Page 100: “…Reformed theology, while denying a common epistemological ground, has always asserted a common psychological or ontological ground. Believer and unbeliever alike, though their philosophic axioms and theorems are totally incompatible, bear in their persons the image of God from creation. This image consists of or at least includes their ordinary rational ability as human beings and as an exercise of this rationality certain minimal theological and moral principles. These beliefs, dimly and inconsistently held, often submerged and repressed, can be thought of as a point of contact for the Gospel.”

Pages 102-103“In Reformed theology the defaced but not annihilated image of God is sinful man was never conceived as being an axiom common to two systems of thought. The image is a psychological, mental, ontological reality. It is an existing part of human nature…Faith is a mental activity and by definition presupposes a rational subject. Reason therefore can be considered to be an element common to believer and unbeliever; and if “apprehension” of the Word of God is the understanding of a divine message, then the image of God preserved from creation and the fall is a prerequisite thereto.

Man’s logical capacity is not the only constituent of God’s image. In addition there are a few simple theological and moral beliefs… we must admit the existence of unbelievers who actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths. Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge. Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of contact for the Gospel. What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans. Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of heathen responsibility.

Now, because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation.”

Innate Knowledge

Pages 104-105: “…the Gentiles in the first chapter of Romans were unbelievers. Even if they had heard Paul preach, they were still unbelievers, idolaters, and gross sinners. Yet it is of such people that Paul says, “Knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same but have pleasure in them that do them.” Therefore even on Barth’s exegesis the Pauline unbeliever has a belief in common with the man of faith… Now Paul indeed bases responsibility on knowledge, but he asserts that the heathen had knowledge, some knowledge at any rate; they tried to suppress it, but could not quite succeed. And even if it were Paul who “awakened” this knowledge in them, the implication would be that some remnant or potential knowledge had been lying dormant in their minds to be awakened. And, finally, to repeat, it is indubitable that the heathen and the unbeliever have this knowledge in common.”

People and Truth

Page 113: “If we can contradict ourselves at one point, cannot we do so at any and all points?”

Page 127: “Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? … Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? ”

Knowledge as Propositional

Page 130: “Knowledge and meaning always have the form of a proposition – or if significance is sometimes conveyed in an exclamation or a gesture, like shorthand, it may with little trouble be put into the ordinary sentence structure of a proposition. To prove that he knows botany, a student must make certain statements, often on an examination sheet, such as, “apples grow on trees and belong to the Rosaceae.” If he cannot make any such statements, he flunks and everyone concludes that he knows nothing about botany. It is no different when persons are the objects of knowledge… the distinction between a man and his work is an impossible abstraction; when one praises or condemns a work, he praises or condemns a man at the same time. This knowledge is obviously propositional… Knowledge consists of propositions, of predicates related to subjects, i.e., of truths. The meaning which the words designate is the object of knowledge. To talk of a different inner meaning, not itself a proposition, never proclaimed or thought, is a trait of irrationalism.”

Page 150: “In opposition to subjective idealism Plato made the point, a good point too, that if we think, we must think something, and something that exists. But when this existing object of thought is imagined to be like a physical object, instead of being a truth or proposition, the theory becomes impossible.”

Christianity and Rationality

Page 115: “…Christianity rightly so-called is a rational and intelligible religion. Whatever of zeal, devotion, volition, or even emotion it may have, it is fundamentally intellectual. It brings information. Otherwise it would not meet human need, human need of salvation from sin. Irrationalism is a travesty on human nature, on communion between God and man, and on God himself.”

Pages 174-175: “Two things are equally essential to Christianity: certain historical events and their correct theological explanation. If Jesus did not visibly die on the cross at a definite time and place, Christianity is false; but also Christianity is equally false if that event is not to be interpreted as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice. Historical event and theological explanation are equally essential.”

Page 224: “Christianity is rational because the God who made the Bible his revelation declares that he is a rational Being of wisdom and understanding. He created man in his own rational image; and these two rationalities, if they are to communicate at all, must because of their nature communicate intelligible. Undoubtedly there exist religions of emotion and mysticism, non-Christian religions they are; but let them remain silent, for they have nothing to say, and any noise they make conveys no message. There are also devout but confused minds who, combining elements of different sorts, are inconsistent in their beliefs. Such minds, however refined and agreeable they may be personally, should either hate the one and love the other, or else hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and unintelligibility.

Christianity is rational and rationality requires verbal inspiration. When God, the rational God, speaks to his rational creatures, he must, we insist, speak the truth. His word cannot be false… To insist that God’s words cannot be false, even to the jot and tittle, gives man no control over God; it is merely the expression of God’s nature and man’s need. No rational ground whatever can support the proposition that God speaks falsities. Of course, a man of the Enlightenment, denying that God spoke the Bible, might construct a religion of human invention; but the Bible claims that its words are God’s truth words, so that no theologian can be both Biblical and rational if he rejects verbal inspiration.”

Clark's Lectures 3

Here are a few quotes I found to be interesting from Clark's Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? Though some of the points are particularly well argued, because I don't necessarily agree with everything written, so I've refrained from commenting on anything.

Commands, Emotions, Faith, and Volition

Pages 20-21: “Does the Bible indicate that God is subject to sudden, involuntary, non-intellectual upheavals in his usually calm state of mind? Well, hardly. The Westminster Confession, the best summary of the contents of the Bible, says that God is without parts or passions. Parts refers to bodily organs. Bodies have parts, minds do not. But God is also without passions. The word passion, in more modern terminology affection, is wider than the term emotion but includes the latter. A passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force. A dog is affected by a whipping; a student is affected, sometimes, by the possibility of a good grade. There are modern psychology books written about “the affective consciousness.” But God is not affected by anything. Of, in another translation of the Greek term, God does not “suffer” anything.

On the contrary, not only the Westminster Confession, but all or nearly all the historic creeds says that God is immutable. He does not change. Emotion, however, is a sudden, involuntary change. To have emotions would be inconsistent with God’s eternal state of blessedness.

Now, someone may say that God loves and that love is an emotion. But with respect to love, two points must be made. First, God’s love is eternal, therefore not a sudden change, therefore not an emotion. Second, God commands us to love him. A command requires voluntary obedience. Therefore the love God commands is volitional, not emotional. Doubtless God commands the impossible. He commands us to keep his law perfectly. This we cannot do because of sin. The impossibility arises from us; it does not arise from any irrationality in the commands. God commands the impossible, but he does not command the absurd.”

The Trinity and Absolute Divine Simplicity

Page 28: “The doctrine of the Trinity is found only in the Biblical revelation. No one would ever have thought of it, no one ever did think of it, apart from the Bible. True, some philosophers had three-fold sets of principles. Plato had the world of Ideas, the Demiurge, and chaotic Space. But this is not a tri-personal divine being. Plotinus has something similar. He spoke of the One, the Ideas, and the Soul. But he also had a Logos and a lower world. The whole was continuous. There is no tri-personal supreme being. Plotinus’s One does not think and cannot know. Neo-Platonism is not at all similar to Trinitarian Christianity.”

Propitiation

Pages 49-50: “Even the covenant with Noah, which the dispensationalists try to reduce to politics, and in which they see no reference to the Atonement, speaks of placating an angry God. This idea is obscured in the King James version, and the American version as well. These translations say that God smelled a sweet odor. But the Koehler-Baumgartner lexicon (the latest lexicon at this writing) gives just one meaning to the Hebrew word transliterated niychoach: appeasement (Beschwichtigung). The “smell of appeasement” then means the placating odor. See also the verbal usage in Ezekiel 5:13, “I will appease my anger.” Hence the correct translation of Genesis 8:20-21 is, “And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord… and offered burnt offerings on the altar. And the Lord smelled the placating odor.” Thus anticipations of Christ’s sacrifice in the Old Testament and explanations of his sacrifice in the New agree that he was the propitiation for our sins. He turned aside God’s wrath and anger which we deserved.”

Scripture and Inerrancy, Science and Operationalism

Pages 57-58: “It seems to me that a misunderstanding of science at this point has led the author into a misunderstanding of the Bible. If the Bible contradicts itself, as clearly as the wave theory contradicts the corpuscular theory, we will be forced to abandon the Bible. No one in his right mind can believe contradictions. In fact, if the antinomy is as he says it is, God himself is faced with an insoluble puzzle. And if something is insoluble for God, then God cannot be trusted. Packer tells us that God has given us this antinomy and if he has given it to us, is that not enough? Cannot we trust God? The answer is that we cannot trust contradictions and insoluble antinomies, no matter who gives them to us. If someone told me to believe that the number two was both even and odd, I would conclude that this someone was not God. God, anyone I could not think of as God, does not talk nonsense, and insoluble antinomies are nonsense. They are just as much nonsense as it would be to say that the path of a point equidistant from a given point has three right angles along it.

But if we see what modern science can do with its two theories of light, and if we pay just a little attention to sovereignty and responsibility, these unfortunate consequences never arise. The laws of science should not be considered as intended descriptions of natural motions. They should not be considered as directions for operating in a physics laboratory. They are methods for producing desired results. This in brief is The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God. It is always possible to use either of two mutually exclusive methods for producing the same desired result. To cure milk fever in cows, one may use the antiseptic lugol, or one may use compressed air. Both work satisfactorily. Hence, in manipulating light, a physicist may use either one; or if for a particular purpose the two are not equally satisfactory, for lugol cannot do everything compressed air can do and vice versa, the physicist can use for one purpose and the other for another.”

Language and Internal Relations

Page 66: “There are many who in that day will say to Christ, Lord, Lord. And he will profess, I never knew you. Thus, clearly, a verbal profession of Lord is not saving faith. One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell.”

The Cause of Faith

Page 77: “How God gives a man faith is very easily explained. God gives a dead sinner faith just the way Jesus made dead Lazarus come out of the tomb. Just as God said, Let there be light, and there was light. That is all the how there is. It is an act of omnipotence: the exceeding greatness of his might power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.”

The Nature of Faith:

Choice and Assent; Volitional, Decisional, Obedient

Page 76: “Faith certainly involves an act of will. It is the decision to believe what one understands.”

Page 79:”But often evidence, witnesses, and historical documents are mistaken. Shall I believe them in this case? The evidence does not compel belief, but I may choose to believe, or I may choose not to believe.”

Page 81: “What is needed for saving faith is God’s gracious act of giving him the power to will. When God gives him this power, he will assent, believe, and exercise faith. Faith indubitably is the gift of God. It is the gift of voluntary assent. That an unregenerate man cannot believe does not contradict any of this.”

Page 83: “I regret Calvin, a giant among pygmies, said that assent comes from the heart and not the head. This distinction is unscriptural; the Bible nowhere opposes heart to head, for it does not mention this “head.” Naturally assent comes from the heart because all psychological actions of a person come from the heart. There is nothing else for them to come from.

Aside from this unfortunate slip, Calvin proceeds to say that assent is the obedience of faith. Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will. No pious additions are necessary, for the assent itself is already pious.”

Page 85: “Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. The person who does not assent to the Gospel, the persecutor Saul for example, must assent to propositions regarding the Hebrew or Greek usage of the word Lord, if he is to understand “Jesus is Lord,” and react with a persecutor’s zeal.”

Page 86: “Hodge, however, continues, “But if the question be, What is the act or state of mind which is required in the Gospel, when we are commanded to believe, the answer is very difficult.”

How can it be very different? If faith generically is intelligent assent, every species of faith must be also.”

Assurance

Page 91: “Just because a person believes that he is saved is an insufficient reason for thinking that he is saved. It may be suggested for sober consideration whether or not those who are most easily assured of salvation are least likely to be saved.

Nevertheless, in spite of all hypocrisy and self-deception, it is possible to have assurance.”

Page 94: “Without minimizing the other items in this list, it is well to emphasize knowledge. If one wishes assurance, he will try to increase his knowledge. Knowledge is mentioned trice in the section. Therefore, if one wishes assurance that he is regenerated, let him ask himself, Do I study the Scripture? How much of it do I know? Some people know so very little; some people believe so very little; some evangelists must have so very little assurance.”

The Mode of Baptism

Page 106: “In Daniel 4:33, i.e, LXX 4:30, one of the Greek words used to say that Nebuchadnezzar was wet with dew is baptizo. I can hardly think that this was immersion. Mark 7:4 says that couches were baptized. It seems to me that this means they were washed. In Hebrews 9:10, 13, 19, 21, the several baptisms (King James, washings) were done by sprinkling. In I Corinthians 10:2 the Israelites were baptized, but the Egyptians were immersed. Similarly in I Peter 3:21, Noah was baptized, but the wicked were immersed.”

Transmission

Page 108: “A scribe might make a few mistakes in copying the Word of God, but we would still have substantially the Word of God. The difference is between a correct copy of error and a slightly incorrect copy of truth. I cannot agree that the latter is useless.”

The Theological Necessity of A Priori Divine Revelation

Page 108: “I begin with a question, the basic question. Is there a God? If there is, can I know Him? My answer to this question, If there is a God, I cannot know it unless He tells me about Himself. I can study His doing, Nature; but what shall my conclusion about God be? That He is kind and benevolent? Or that Nature is vicious and careless? I think it is obvious that whatever I see in Nature, and whichever I emphasize, will be for reasons of personal experience and inclination.”

Pages 111-112: “It would seem from several things you say that there are a number of statements in the Bible that contradict your world-view. In fact, you immediately suggest that you would not accept this or that if it contradicted your total experience. Hence, in answer to my question in my last letter, How do you decide to accept some of the Bible’s statements and reject others? You answer that you test the Bible by your experience; you do not accept something as true, just because the Bible says it. But you develop a criterion from experience and measure the Bible by that criterion.

In your total experience you are reading the Bible. You say, “It tells me there is a God… It tells me God revealed himself… It tells me of a Resurrection.” But if you do not accept the truth of propositions on the basis of the Bible’s assertion, you cannot accept these points without confirmation from experience.”

Recognition of the Scope of the Canon

Page 113: “But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth.”

Various Essays

I've placed 2nd in the 2011 Trinity Foundation essay contest. It covers material related to Gordon Clark's Wheaton Lectures. You can read the essay here.

Those who are interested in similar papers can read: my '09 essay on Clark's book God's Hammer, for which I placed 3rd, here; my entry into last year's contest on Religion, Reason, and Revelation here; a research paper I submitted to one of my philosophy professors here, with my responses to his criticisms of it here.

Clark's Lectures 2... kind of

A half a year ago, I began a series in which I transcribed some points from Clark's audio lectures available here. I dropped that in part because I realized that what else I had been copying was already available in print. That realization was a little annoying.

However, the audio of what I had been transcribing was so excellent that I purchased the book itself, Clark's Language and Theology. The last chapter in the book can be listened to here (part 1) and here (part 2). The rest of the book I consider to be a well-written supplement to the course in logical positivism and pragmatism I took last semester, notes on which I've posted elsewhere on this blog.

Instead of typing points made from Clark's audio lectures, I have here decided to post both some particular points Clark made in the first 130 pages of Language and Theology which were of interest to me and, where I found it necessary for my benefit, some summaries and reminders in brackets:

Classes

Page 18: “The answer to this, so it seems to the present writer, is that every class is a member of itself. Were this not so, logic would be impossible. In fact, Russell himelf says so. The symbolic logic he desires to substitute for ordinary language depends on the axiom, a < a. All the a’s area’s. One is included in one, and zero is included in zero. Anything else, as Parmenides said, “completely destroys the possibility of argumentation.””

[The law of identity requires that even individuals are classes. Whether or not classes can be subordinated is a matter of distinguishing, if possible, between the essential and accidental or particular attributes of a given subject. The class of “Socrates,” for example, can be subordinated under the class of “Men,” though not vice versa. Apply this idea to 1) the "Third Man" argument against Platonism and 2) the fact that knowledge is propositional.]

The Adequacy of “Ordinary” Language

Page 19: “It is much easier to write a short line of symbols instead of two or three lines of English. But the philosophic point is that not only can the equation be expressed in English, but that without ordinary English the equation could never have been understood. Plus, exponent, multiplication, equality has to begin in ordinary language. And even today a small amount of English appears here and there to indicate what some part of a formula means.”

[To understand a mathematical formula, for example, one must understand that meaning to which the symbols in the formula refer by “ordinary language.”]

Internal Relations

Pages 19-20: “Now, first the brief intellectual history at the beginning noted that Russell early renounced Hegelianism and became an empiricist. This change started with an attack on Bradley’s, and Hegel’s, theory of internal relations and the substitution of an atomic theory of external relations. The former, holding that everything is implicated in everything, results is an absolute monism. The definition of cat for example, is part of the definition of dog, and also of Betelgeuse. For Russell relations are external to the objects related. These relations, though it seems strange to say so, are grasped by immediate sense perception. This seems strange because it is hard to see what color above and to the left of are, or to hear what noises uncle and is greater than give off. However, such are the atoms of Russell’s world.

In conformity with this, propositions are true in isolation. A proposition is true if it corresponds to an atomic fact or a combination of them. “The car is in the garage” is true if we see a car, a garage, and an in. Thus, language consists of words, each of which designates a sensory individual.

To be fair to Russell, one must acknowledge that he later modified such an absurdity. He came to doubt the reality of is and the, if not in. These nonrealities he then explained as the logical positivists did later, as parts of a logical framework without objective referents. This framework became his symbolic logic.”

Page 21: “If there were no sense of sight, there would be no sense of hearing. If there were nothing hard, there would be nothing soft. If there were no animals, there could be no plants. The reason is that each of these terms expresses a distinction from its opposites. Sight is a form of nonhearing. Were they the same, we might have the term sensation, but we would not have two terms of different meaning. The terms “plant” and “animal” would not apply to different objects, if there were no different objects. There might be “living beings,” but no plants and animals. Similarly, there would be no living beings, if there were no nonliving beings. This should be sufficient to dispose of logical atomism.”

Page 27: “The great absolute idealist held that the simplest object implicitly contains the universe. If it were different in any way, every other thing in the universe would be different. It would be a completely different universe.”

[The thesis-antithesis distinction means that any and every concept will entail knowledge of what a subject is not as well as what it is. Applying this to the true objects of knowledge – propositions – implies the necessity of an eternally omniscient source of knowledge, i.e. the argument from the contingency of knowledge. Further apply this to the coherency of philosophical systems.]

Logic and Conventionalism

Page 48: “But when when Ayer says that there is no absolute standard of rationality, his words go beyond the positive laws of science; they include the law of contradiction, for this law has traditionally been considered to be the basic test of rationality. Ayer, of course, insists that present logic is a convention that may well be replaced in the future. But if I believed now that next year, or next century, inconsistency and self-contradiction would be rational, it would have a tremendously destructive bearing on my belief that these laws are rational now.”

[Denying an absolute standard of rationality leads to self-contradiction.]

Christianity and Dualism

Page 74: “Christianity reunites the resurrected body with the soul in the eschatological future, indicating also that the soul enjoys the presence of God in the interim.”

[The mind is separable from the physical body, as is the case during, for example, the period of time between death and the resurrection.]

Nominalism

Page 91: “Scholastic nominalism, he asserts, is inconsistent because it still retained the reality of individuals. Neo-nominalism abolishes all substantives: All is flux and names distort reality. If universals are unreal, individuals are too, for the mere naming of a thing is a minimal universal. Neo-nominalism therefore has no things, but only “events.” But this makes nonsense of (1) perceptual meanings; (2) value meanings; and (3) descriptions; then (4) because it makes nonsense of metaphysics, it makes nonsense of all empirical meaning, for the former conditions the latter…”

[Nominalism is opposed to realism. Universals and individuals are both “real” because they are propositions in God’s mind or thoughts; “reality” is propositional truth).]

Theories of Truth

Page 91: “Sometimes Urban is not only perceptive, but witty as well. The several theories of truth, he says – correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic – cannot be shown to correspond to truth. Coherence coheres with nothing. And the pragmatic theory does not work. Therefore the neo-positivists conclude that the meaning of truth is a meaningless question, for if meaning is always reference to a sensory object, truth can have no meaning because it refers to no object: The truth of the criteria is truth only of interpretation.”

[A theory of truth must be as consistent with its own principle as that which is said to follow from it.]

Knowledge as Propositional

Pages 97-98: “A noun all by itself is neither true nor false. Knowledge (and is not knowledge the possession of a truth?) always comes in propositions. Otherwise language could not express a truth. Therefore the intellect does not grasp individual material things. It is also impossible to know mental “things,” if there are such. Is the concept of two an individual thing? Whether or not, the concept of two, all by itself, is unknowable. “One plus one equals two” can be known, and we assert it as a truth; but the number two, alone, like the oak tree, is neither true nor false. The content of knowledge is always propositional. This view allows the intellect to do something else besides drawing conclusions. It can know the premises as well as conclusions. Call it simplex intuitus, or contemplation, or understanding, it is different from drawing an implication. Axioms can never be conclusions. But all truth comes in propositions. One can somewhat anticipate how this view of truth can apply to a theory of language.”

[A proposition is either true or false. Knowledge of the truth of a proposition is to know its contradictory is false. A propositions is true if it is one of God’s thoughts.]

Meaning and Symbols

Page 89: “It is implausible because without the “intuition” of an object, there would be no stimulus to expression. Why or how could anyone invent a word, other than a nonsense syllable, if he had nothing to express? The meaning must come first and its symbol second.”

Page 123: “Moreover, before a man constructs a symbol, he must have something in mind to symbolize.”

[Symbolism presupposes meaning.]

Pages 102-103: “The letters d-o-g and the letters H-u-n-d and the letters c-h-i-e-n are all adequate to represent a certain type of animal. Symbols are always adequate, just because they are symbols. It seems useless to question the adequacy of theological language. If theological thought can be defended, the language will take care of itself. A person may indeed think of cat or God at the wrong time; and he may say chien when he means chat, but this is no defect in language as such. Therefore if one has an idea of the shapeless number that solves the question x²+1=0, any symbol will do.”

[Symbols are arbitrary tags of thoughts.]

Miscellaneous Problems with Empiricism

Pages 20-21: “Uneducated people talk about the five senses, and touch is one of the five. But Aristotle knew that what we call touch is three different senses. He explained the common misapprehension on the ground that the skin is not the sense organ, but a medium that serves three different organs underneath. Now, if the air, continues Aristotle, were a part of the body, enveloping the face as the skin does the fingers, we would suppose that smell, taste, hearing, and sight are all one. Even as it is, though Aristotle does not mention it, we cannot be sure that sight is a single sense. Maybe there are as many senses as there are rods and cones in the retina. The difficulty here is in identifying an atomic sense.”

[The ambiguity of sensation means that it is possible man may possess more or less than the five commonly attributed to him. Furthermore, a man may not possess certain sensations others possess, and given that this could be true for all men in relation to, say, animals, the precision of what “sensation(s)” man does possess is questionable.]

Pages 28-31: “The standard forms of empiricism, surely Wittgenstein’s, depend on a theory of images; and they usually add an Aristotelian process of abstraction in order to get concepts…

Since this pictorial view is inherent in all empiricism, excepting only Berkeleyan subjective idealism and pyrrhonian skepticism, it deserves the most careful consideration. Important as the theme is in philosophy, there is nothing more important for religious theories of language and knowledge, for it underlies the possibility of any and every theological sentence.

Other minor criticisms may surface on later pages, but here two fundamental objections demand attention: one has to do with the idea of picture, and a second with the idea of representation or correspondence. This second point, the “correspondence theory of knowledge,” faces the insuperable objection that it disallows any knowledge of reality at all. Whatever reality may be, whether individuals like trees and rocks, or Platonic Ideas, or whatever, this theory provides us only with pictures of them. The object of knowledge is therefore a representation and not the reality itself. Since the mind contains only the picture and never the “thing,” there is no possibility of knowing whether or not the representation is similar to the object or not. To recognize a similarity between two things, they must be compared, and hence both must be in the mind. But if the reality is in the mind, the picture with its similarity is useless. If the reality is not in the mind, the picture, so far as we know, is a picture of nothing. There is hardly any objection to empiricism more fundamental than this one…

The other point, previously mentioned, has to do with the idea of images and their special arrangements…

At best it is an induction from questions asked of and answers received from a large sample of “ordinary uneducated persons.” This is an induction; and the validity of induction is an indispensable element in scientific positivism. But induction, unless it be complete induction which is never the case in science, is always invalid…

But second, and conclusively, induction, if it proves anything, proves the falsity of the empirical principle.”

[1. Correspondence: Given that one cannot completely penetrate a physical object due to his limited perspective, what he senses can only correspond to or represent the object, which, if such is how the propositions one believes about a subject are allegedly justified, leads to skepticism. 2. Pictures: Not everyone possesses visual images, and the subjectivity of sensation leads to relativism.]

Page 41: “Now, finally, a note on protocol sentences and their ostensive sources. The beginning of meaning lies in pointing with the finger at a visible object. Only after pointing can language come into play. But if we can point at a cat or dog or tree, how can the meaning of in, for, quickly,greater be seen with the eyes? Not to mention the square root of minus one?”

[Protocol sentences are the empirically fundamental and ostensively justified propositions whose subjects refer to sensations. Since not all subjects are physical, however, sensation cannot be the sole means of knowledge.]

Page 103: “Bushnell seems to oscillate between language and the thought it symbolizes, for he explains that logic – not the choice of symbols – developed from grammar and grammar came from physical relations in nature.

This is a basic and fatal flaw in all empiricism. Even Aristotle failed to give Aristotelian logic an acceptable basis. The reason is that the laws of logic are universal. The syllogism Barbara is always, everywhere, and without exception valid. But experience is never universal. One may observe a thousand black crows, but this is of no value in supporting the proposition, All crows are black. The next crow may be an albino. Hence physical relations in nature, if indeed they could produce grammar, would still never arrive at any principle of logic, mathematics, or theology.”

[Abstracting universal laws from experience is question-begging.]

Canonicity

Pages 113-114: “In the recent past several writers have said that the purpose of the Bible is to present salvation in Christ. But since Kings and Chronicles do not clearly do so, these books are not the Word of God. No doubt most of John’s Gospel is the Word of God, but very little of Chronicles. It is right here that the pointed question must be put. What criterion is used to distinguish religious literature from non-religious? What criterion is used to determine that the purpose of the Bible precludes historical books from being the Word of God? Most of the authors who make these distinctions offer no criterion at all. If they did, a Moslem or Hindu would reply, “that may be your idea of religion, but it is not mine”; and a Christian would reply, “that is your notion of what is excluded from salvation in Christ, but it is not mine.”

There is indeed a way for these people to avoid logical difficulties, paradoxes, and analogy. To quote one of them: “It is possible to lead a religious life without discussing it or verbalizing very much about it.” If a persons never says anything, he obviously does not flounder in fallacious implications. No one can refute him, for he says nothing to refute. What one can truly say of him, however, is that he is not a Christian, for Christ commanded his followers to make disciples, “Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever that I have commanded you” (Matthew 28:20). Christians must “verbalize” (to use contemporary gobbledygook).”

[One's choice of criterion for canonicity must be examined for internal consistency, as a philosophical system stands or falls on the merits (or lack thereof) of its own axiom(s).]

Analogical and Univocal or Literal Truth

Page 88: “Unless the analogy is based on a literal and univocal similarity, there could be no analogy at all.”

Page 99: “The second example is that of some “Protestant controversialists” who have trouble with the epistle to the Hebrews. They argue that Christ relinquished his office of priest because after his ascension he sat down on the right hand of the heavenly majesty. Priests stand; kings are seated. No one can be both seated and standing at the same time. Therefore Hebrews is inconsistent because it describes him as sitting and also argues as a priest. Mascall, to defend the consistency of the epistle, argues that analogies are not to be taken literally. Analogies literally understood may conflict, but yet convey consistent meanings. To some extent this is true, if analogies convey enough meaning. But would it not be better to end this puzzle before it begins? Sometimes priests sit down and sometimes kings stand in their chariots as they ride into battle.”

Page 100: “If the doctrine of the atonement were clearly known, a preacher might use a pleasing analogy or illustration that might attract his congregation and help fix the meaning in their minds. But suppose none of them has the least literal notion of what doctrine X means. This might not be the case with some well instructed congregations, but it was certainly true on many foreign mission fields in the ninth or nineteenth century. Now, then, says the missionary, I want to explain to you doctrine X. None of them had even heard the word X before. So the missionary says, X is like the dawning of the morning. One of his audience thinks, X an event that happens approximately every twenty-four hours. Another in the audience thinks, X is something reddish-orange. A third guesses that X is a work of art, though not necessarily reddish-orange. A fourth supposes that X is a method of locating east. But since none of them has any knowledge of the literal meaning of X, they have no way of determining in what respects X is like the dawn and in what respects it is not. Analogies require but do not furnish information.”

Page 106: “Bushnell and Gilkey apparently use the term vaguely to denote any kind of similarity. These men do not seem to consider that the statement of similarity must be literal, not analogical; and that without the literal basis no analogy is possible.”

Page 127: “Of course there are figures of speech, metaphors, anthropomorphisms, and the like. But these would be meaningless if there were no literal statements to give them meaning. For example, II Chronicles 16:9, “The eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth,” is ludicrously ridiculous if taken literally: little eyeballs rolling over the dusty ground. But unless the statement, God is omniscient, is literal, the figure has nothing to signify.”

[Analogies presuppose univocal knowledge, literal truth.]

Mysteries and Understandability

Pages 129-130: “But mysteries are not necessarily impossible or even difficult to understand. In the New Testament mystery does not refer to something we call mysterious in English. For example, 1 Corinthians 15:51 states a mystery: it may be hard for some people to believe, but there is no difficulty in understanding it.

Then, too, it is false to say that “the kingdom of heaven cannot be brought down to earth for our inspection.” Christ did just that. Also the kingdom remains with us, and we inspect it daily.

But once more, if “the comparison is no more than a comparison,” or, better, if it is as much as a comparison, the particular truth illustrated by the comparison must be understandable, for otherwise the parable’s language would not reveal the truth to us.”

[Scriptural mysteries can be known. That is, in fact, the purpose of their having been revealed.]

God and Language

Pages v-vi: “The Bible, written in human language, has a great deal to say about language. God speaks and the world appears. God creates a man who speaks and listens to him. God created many languages at the Tower of Babel. God speaks through his prophets; he puts his words in their mouths. God the Son himself speaks, in person, and in Aramaic, apparently. He causes the apostles and prophets to write down his own words. One implication of all this is that not only is language completely adequate and, properly used, meaningful, but its origin is God himself. One of the primary purposes of language is to discuss theology, and any philosophy that attempts to drive a wedge between language and theology is false. Human language is a totally adequate tool to express truth, including divine truth.” (Robbins)

Page 125: “Then second, the idea that if God speaks in words, he is somehow “bound” by an alien force, it a thoroughgoing misrepresentation. The words themselves are mere signs or symbols. They designate ideas or truths. If God cannot use symbols to express his truth, he is indeed bound and limited. A God who cannot speak is not omnipotent. In fact in such a case God would be more limited than man, for a man can speak.”

Pages 125-126: “The phraseology here is again propaganda, for the important question is not whether some people misread the Bible, but whether the words and sentences of the Bible are authoritative statements because they are true, because they are the words of God. It is obviously poor thinking to attack a theory of the inspiration and truth of the Scriptures on the ground that some people do not understand the words. Must one take a textbook on calculus as mythological, poetic, or parabolic and not literally true, because some high school students cannot understand it?”

Page 130: “Surely language, as God’s gift to Adam, has as its purpose, not only communication among men, but communication between man and God. God spoke words to Adam and Adam spoke words to God. Since this is the divine intention, words or language is adequate. To be sure, on occasion, even on frequent occasions, sinful man cannot find the right words to express his thought: but this is a defect of man, not an inadequacy of language. The Bible does not countenance a theory that originates language in pagan mythology with the result that divine truth is unintelligible.”

[The sufficiency, authority, and perspicuity of the adequate language of Scripture does not hinge on whether or not such is understood.]

Behind the Curve

Early yesterday, I left a comment on this article:

Here are some edited comments by one of our members posted in our private discussion group concerning the Calvinist claim that the Arminian view of faith makes faith a work created by man:

When they make that charge, they conflate the faith/works debate and the free-will/determinism debate into a single issue. This approach has textual problems, because when the Bible discussion faith-vs-works, it does so in a specific context that is not obviously related to predestination [cf. Rom. 4:4-5; Eph. 2:8-9]. It also has a logic problem, because from a Calvinist perspective, we have to wonder what was the point of the faith/works distinction in the first place. In other words, if we cannot boast in our faith because it is predestined by God, then we also cannot boast in our works because they are predestined by God. But the Bible specifically says that salvation is by faith rather than works, lest any man should boast. Paul's explanation is not very meaningful if free-will, not works, is what gives us a reason to boast.

Some Calvinists try to resolve the issue by saying that neither faith nor works has anything at all to do with our salvation. But that also strips Paul's words of their meaningfulness. Why emphasize faith if we are to regard it as such a small thing?

But a straightforward reading avoids these questions. If we just set aside the obsessive free-will/predestination focus, the text makes sense. God has not given us a way to earn forgiveness; instead, he just calls us to trust in what Christ has done for us. That trust is important, but by definition it means relying on God instead of ourselves. Thus, we do not boast.

Here's the rub (allegedly): it is a common Calvinist argument that Arminians, among others, cannot consistently believe in salvation by grace alone, for if grace is an insufficient (albeit necessary) condition for salvation, then by definition grace alone cannot lead to one's salvation. For faith to be contingent on the exercise of one's supposedly libertarian free will would, in effect, make faith a work, for the application of redemption would hinge on man's cooperation in salvation contrary to Jonah 2:9, 1 Corinthians 15:10, etc.. I, a Calvinist, have indeed used some form of this argument (cf. my third cross-ex question here).

Rather than reply to this argument, the Arminian in the above article seeks to go on the offensive. Essentially, the author points out that from a Calvinist's perspective, both faith and good works are predestined, yet the Calvinist does not believe that faith can be a ground for boasting; therefore, why should the Calvinist believe good works are a ground for boasting? After all, both are predestined. On the other hand, if the Calvinist should reply that good works would not be a ground for boasting, this would suggest that Paul is worried about nothing when writes that salvation is not of works, lest any man should boast.

That writing a blog is useful can be demonstrated after reading articles such as the above. There are few things I find as satisfying as having anticipated an argument. For example, in the last year, I wrote one post distinguishing between faith and good works (link; cf. here) and another post explaining why [predestined] good works are indeed praiseworthy (link). Briefly:

Intentions refer to why or for what reason we will or choose.

A necessary precondition for discerning whether or not a work is good hinges on an understanding of one’s intentions (1 Corinthians 10:31). E.g. one may refuse to steal, but if he refuses for some selfish reason or, generally, any reason other than that such refusal is right obedience to God’s authoritative law which thereby shows right respect for God’s glory, such an intention connotes a work which is sinful rather than good.

Contrarily, one cannot “intend” to understand or assent to a proposition as true; he either does or does not. Both understanding and assent, then, do not hinge on the exercise of one’s own will...

There seems, therefore, to be at least one way in which saving faith differs from a good work: both may be caused by God's grace, but only works proceed from our [determined] purposes.

A work is intentional or purposive. A work is praiseworthy if it is good. A work is good if done in submission to God for His glory. However, works are not that by which one is saved - not efficiently, instrumentally, or meritoriously. It is true that faith is the instrumental cause of justification, but faith as not a work, the Arminian's article misses the mark and fails to provide a counter-argument to the Calvinist's allegation that they cannot believe in salvation by grace alone.

Impossible Worlds, Absolute Necessity

Almost a year ago, I wrote a post which, for me, was unique in that I prefaced the thoughts stated therein with a bit of hesitation. Recent reading and a guest post on Molinism have caused me to reconsider those thoughts.

In that post, I was trying to provide a Reformed reply to the following question put forward by Carl Henry: "Does the very notion of "events which could have been otherwise" violate divine omnipotence and omniscience?" Notwithstanding my attempt to answer in the negative, even a few weeks after writing the post, I frustratingly wrote to a friend:

I cannot say that I am quite satisfied with it. For instance: why did God choose to effect this possible world? Presumably because it pleased Him. Why did it please Him? Presumably the answer has something to do with His nature. But it seems to me such an answer implies that God must have effected this possible world, since God's nature is not itself effected but rather that by which all other things are effected. God's nature is determinative. That in turn implies this is the only possible world, in which case the problem reasserts itself: how does God know counter-factuals if this is the only possible world? Vexing...

It wasn't until recently I discovered that there is precedent in the history of Reformed theology for rejecting the concept of counter-factual knowledge (cf. Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics pgs. 428-432). I may write a separate post on this. Here, however, I will only be concerned with explaining why I have come to think - in contrast to an assumption of the aforementioned blog post - that this is the only possible world. In so doing, I will be providing an alternative Reformed defense of the biblical doctrine of divine omniscience.

At the same time, I do not wish to imply that I think everything I wrote in my post from a year ago is wrong. I still believe God's righteousness and the manifestation of His glory are correlated in that God's righteousness is demonstrated in what John Piper would call His unswerving commitment always to preserve the honor of his name and display his glory. I still believe God's decree must be non-arbitrary. I still believe that:

God's decree to effect this possible world implies that this possible world is entailed in God's decree to maximally manifest His glory; that is, given God's purpose to maximally manifest His glory, God necessarily must have decreed to effect this possible world.

What I have reconsidered is whether or not there could be "possible worlds" - worlds God could have instantiated - other than this actual world. There are several reasons for this:

1. As my remarks to a friend indicated, I believe there is reason for everything God has decreed. That would include the teleological end of all things, God's glory. Ironically, I wrote a post 3 years ago (republished here) in which I made a statement very much in line with what I think now:

For God to act in a manner which would not bring Himself maximal glory… would constitute a contravention of the divine nature, and since God cannot deny Himself, God’s actions too are determined [by His own, immutable nature].

Why did God decree to maximally manifest His glory? I don't see any other possible conclusion than something similar to this or what I said to my friend. In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one?

2. Let us suppose God had actualized a different possible world; after all, if God's actualization of this world wasn't absolutely necessary, He could have chosen to actualize a different possible world. But this means God's knowledge is not eternal, since His knowledge [of what is the actual world] would not be necessary.

God knows that this is the actual world. But if God has a libertarian free will, it cannot be denied He could have chosen to instantiate (and therefore could have known as actual) a completely different possible world. Making God's knowledge contingent on a "free" choice - even His own - requires a succession of ideas in His mind (knowledge of possible worlds -> choice -> knowledge of the actual world), and that destroys His eternal omniscience. Not only is God's instantiation of this world non-arbitrary, but God also didn't compare multiple possible worlds in order to come to a decision as to which to put into effect.

This is a most important objection because it cuts across all [Christian] systems which believe in an eternally omniscient God.

3. Suggesting God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability.

Conclusion: God knows who He is because of who He is. He knows this world is possible both because He has the power to effect it and because effecting it would not contradict who He is. He necessarily effected this possible world because no other world fits this criteria. This is not to say God's will is under any external compulsion; rather, His works are intrinsically determined by His nature.

Guest Blogging on Molinism

I have written a post on Molinism as a guest blogger here. Some time in the next few days I will write a follow-up post on the - or at least a (!) - Reformed position regarding God's "types" of knowledge.

Justified by Faith Alone, but not a Faith that is Alone

I was listening to a debate on justification between a Reformed Protestant and Roman Catholic, and in the course of the debate the question was asked what an often repeated Reformed phrase - "men are saved (justified) by faith alone, but not a faith that is alone" - actually means. The Roman Catholic was having some problems understanding how this statement is compatible with the doctrine of sola fide (justification by faith alone).

Protestants believe [saving] faith is that alone which accesses us to Christ by whom we are justified (declared righteous). This is why it is called the instrumental cause of justification. When a Protestant says faith alone justifies, then, does he mean men don't need grace? No, because grace is rather the efficient cause of justification insofar as it alone produces, for instance, the faith within an individual by which he is instrumentally justified. Similarly, when a Protestant says Christ alone justifies, does he mean men don't need grace or faith? Again, no, because Christ is rather the sole ground of justification, i.e. He by whom the righteousness is merited according to which God declares the believer righteous. These "solas" all refer to different functions of one event: justification.

Now, when the Protestant says faith alone justifies, but not a faith that is alone, one must distinguish between the function of the faith and the nature of the faith. The function of the faith has already been explained: it accesses men to Christ. It consummates union to Him such that the believer may be said to be in Him and He in the believer. Faith alone is how one has recourse to the ground of justification.

But what is this faith? What is the nature of this saving faith which is alone that by which we are [instrumentally] justified? Is it a mere profession? Is it simply understanding the gospel? No. It is understanding and assent to or, equivalently, belief in the gospel. Why is this important?

As was pointed out, the reason anyone understands and assents to the gospel is by grace alone, the efficient cause of faith and, in turn, justification. By God's grace one receives a new nature in regeneration which causes justificatory belief in Christ (Romans 8:7-9, 1 John 5:1). But moreover, this new nature will, subsequent to belief and justification, incline one to practice righteousness (1 John 2:29-3:9). Both saving faith and good works follow from grace (Ephesians 2:8-10). One can't produce good works without a new nature, and one can't come to Christ without a new nature. Or, at least, so says the Reformed Protestant. Expressing the Reformed motto logically is simple. For example:

1. If you have saving faith, then you will do good works.
2. You do not do good works.
3. Therefore, you do not have saving faith.

Or:

1. If one has saving faith, he will have received it immediately upon being given a new nature.
2. If one has been given a new nature, he will yield good fruit.
3. If one has saving faith, he will yield good fruit.

The main point is good works don't justify in any sense. They merely serve as indicators or evidences to men. What do they indicate to men? Whether or not one who professes to have saving faith actually has saving faith or if they are just lying. Whether or not one possesses that faith alone by which men are instrumentally justified correlates with whether or not he does the good works which follow from a faith which justifies.

It may be asked what if one does not show forth good fruit because he is backsliding. Of course, since works don't save, a temporary absence of them does not automatically mean one isn't saved. What it does mean is that another who has not seen a person's good works has no reason to think the person has saving faith. Nevertheless, a new nature "naturally" (!) yields good works, so such backsliding should not be or remain the case if one truly believes in Christ.

There is always room for nuance. If a person dies immediately after believing so that no one can have seen him do a good work, he will be saved. If I have just introduced myself to you and you identify yourself as a Christian, it may take some time for me to evaluate your profession of faith. Etc. The above syllogisms, therefore, may be restated for the practical benefit of men:

1. If you have saving faith, then you will do good works.
2. I have not seen you do good works.
3. Therefore, I have no reason to suppose you have saving faith [other than, perhaps, your own profession].

Paradox, Contradiction, and Justified Beliefs

A paradox is a seeming contradiction, i.e. when one believes two statements which may superficially appear to conflict but, in the last analysis, can be shown to be compatible. A contradiction occurs when one believes two mutually exclusive statements are both true.

One might think it obvious that there must be a process one must follow in order to differentiate between paradoxes and contradictions, but in practice, laymen - and, unfortunately, "experts" too - will sometimes attempt to excuse themselves from explaining how their beliefs which at least are paradoxical are not actually contradictory. One common theological example is the tension between the doctrines of divine sovereignty and human freedom. Both are common beliefs which at least seem to conflict. Yet sometimes a pastor will, after alluding to this tension, simply encourage his flock to have faith that these are both true and trust that God has it all figured out.

The most obvious problem with this lax approach is that it gives heretics room enough to justify belief in anything. Paul might as well have said, "if Christianity is unreasonable, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain." A faith which cannot be defended is a faith not worth defending. This isn't to suggest that a Christian ought to know everything. What it does suggest is that to justifiably believe any two doctrines which appear to conflict, the Christian must at least be able to present a speculative resolution compatible with Scripture.