Unapologetica

There is a part of me that has considered this blog as primarily a medium through which I can work out my own thoughts. But I do recognize that other people read it from time to time. I hope what I write strengthens those readers. 

Every so often, I try to remind myself why I gave this blog its title: while I frequently reflect on apologetic matters, 2 Corinthians 12:19 intimates that defenses I offer are not supposed to be of myself per se. So if - as a husband, father, son, brother, friend, or stranger - I've lost sight that my speech ought to be consciously performed in the sight of God as a Christian being conformed to Christ, the sort of apologetic in which I'm engaging is a failure that will build neither myself nor others up. This happens all too frequently. What can help?

Concrete imagery can ground us. We are meant to be the light of the world (Matthew 5:14-16). This is only possible because the Word is the redeeming light in whose image Christians are progressively conformed (Hebrews 1:3, John 1:9ff., 2 Corinthians 4:5-6, Romans 8:29, Ephesians 1:8-9). The word of the Word is a lamp unto our feet and light unto our path (Psalm 119:105). To the extent that we live our lives according to God's word, we ourselves are enlightened (Ephesians 1:17-18, 5:8-17). Thinking of light should almost trigger an automatic response of that on which we are already disposed to meditate. The same can be said of other imagery (link, link, link, link). The following passage is rich in wisdom:

2 Corinthians 2:17-3:5 ...we are not, like so many, peddlers of God's word, but as men of sincerity, as commissioned by God, in the sight of God we speak in Christ. Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? Or do we need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you, or from you? You yourselves are our letter of recommendation, written on our hearts, to be known and read by all. And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts. Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. Not that we are sufficient in ourselves to claim anything as coming from us, but our sufficiency is from God.

There is a clear connection to 2 Corinthians 12:19 here. Paul, speaking against in the sight of God as those in Christ, wishes to redirect focus from justifying himself to his love for God and His people. To do that, he uses an illustration in which he calls the Corinthians letters whose writ has been engraved in their hearts by the same Spirit working through Paul. In claiming not to peddle God's word, one might say that Paul indirectly objects to peddling the Corinthians themselves. He wishes for the words of God to be known and read by all that the sufficiency of the Author might be made manifest. Paul's writing etches a picture of the etching of the Spirit they share - indeed, the Spirit who initially worked through the word of God Paul preached to them. Do we consider ourselves to be letters of recommendation for our fellow Christians (not that we divine new truths or revelations but that we manifest, testify, and witness to God's sufficient word, as a mirror reflects light)?

Internalizing certain Scriptures also can keep us oriented in certain ways. For example, Romans 8:28 has kept me rooted in the knowledge of the goodness and power of God. If I ever even begin to doubt or experience a trial of the moment, this verse reminds me of the good telos God has planned for me and works on my behalf. That's an example which pertains more to individual assurance, but the same principle applies to internalizing the second (and first, of course) greatest commandment(s). The question is: are we trying to correctly orient ourselves in these ways?

Finally, there is also some measure of comfort we can take in God's word when it seems all our efforts to help others go unrecognized or do not bear fruit. We know that just as we have been etched by the Spirit, we too etch our markings in history. What goes unnoticed for a time doesn't always remain that way. A proper perspective of history should keep up from impatience and despair (link, cf. 1 Corinthians 1:27-29).

A Review of "The Bible, Verification, and First Principles of Reason" (Without Excuse)

Last year, I posted a few extended comments on a footnote that referenced Gordon Clark in chapter 11 of Without Excuse (link). In this post, I plan to focus attention on chapter one. It's the essay I found to be the most interesting, contains the only other mentions of Clark in the book, and can also be read for free (link).

The author, M. Dan Kemp, proposes the following thesis: “…if the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge, attempts to verify the Christian Scriptures are not epistemically profitable” (pg. 1). When I read this for the first time, it sounded like Mr. Kemp was suggesting that a Christian foundationalist who accepts Scripture as his epistemic foundation cannot know his epistemic foundation by inferential reasoning. Therefore, any further attempts made towards that end - knowing the Christian Scriptures are true - would not be profitable. 

I would have agreed with Mr. Kemp to the extent that the sort of "human knowledge" in question are true beliefs humans have that are epistemically justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense. That is, in some contexts, while I think "knowledge" might legitimately refer to something other than this (e.g. mere true beliefs; true beliefs that are justified in an externalist sense), there are ways in which internalist and infallibilist "knowledge" is distinctively important. I think the latter knowledge alone can provide grounds for full assurance of salvation or a defense of one's beliefs. With these qualifications in mind - and the importance of these qualification will become more apparent later on - Mr. Kemp's thesis seems sound.

Immediately following this thesis, however, Mr. Kemp says:

This result is particularly acute in readings of Scripture passages that seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God. I argue that the position put forward by Clark, Van Til, and Frame entails a reading of these passages that renders them useless as criteria of verification, even though, on the contrary, the passages present themselves as such. In short, the popular reply to critics of the Clark and Van Til school mentioned above does not succeed. (Without Excuse, pgs. 1-2)

As I initially read this, the first question I had was what Mr. Kemp thinks "verification" means. More on this below.

The second question I had was why Mr. Kemp seems to suggest that Clark, Van Til, and Frame had a singular "position" on this topic. From what follows in the rest of the chapter, Clark would have certainly disagreed with Frame et al. if, as Mr. Kemp thinks, these authors really were "insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means" (pg. 10). By at least the time he wrote "How Firm a Foundation?" in 1943 (also see below), there can be no question about how Clark viewed Scripture for the rest of his life. 

Clark did not think exactly as Frame and Van Til did. This fact is actually indicated by the only time Clark is even quoted in the entire chapter (in a section Mr. Kemp entitles, “Justification and Circularity,” no less!):

How do we know if a purported first principle is correct? Consider again the exchange about my birth city. If the Christian Scriptures are the first principle of reason, then it will not do for me to end the conversation by asserting that reliable witnesses, sensory experience, and memory ought to be believed. Even these principles require rational justification. Gordon Clark says,

Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically…Since therefore every philosophy must have its first indemonstrable axiom, the secularist cannot deny the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom. Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures. This is the Reformation principle sola scriptura. (Without Excuse, pg. 7)

Take another example of Clark's thought on this subject:

A recent book on Classical Apologetics tries to prove the divine origin and infallibility of the Bible on the premise that the Bible contains accounts of God’s miracles. This is circular reasoning: How do you know the Bible is God’s Word? Because it contains accounts of God’s miracles. How do you know that the accounts are true? Because they are in God’s inerrant Scripture! If anyone wish to prove that the Bible is a divine revelation, his premise cannot be the Bible itself. One does not prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis that the squares of the other two sides equal the square of the hypotenuse. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pg. 314 [originally published in 1986 in his book, First & Second Thessalonians])

Is it not clear that Clark's position is different from any position which suggests that "first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means"? To my knowledge, there are only a few places one might try to find some indication that Clark approved of circular reasoning. The first comes from an article Clark wrote on "Apologetics" in 1957. In providing his understanding of Van Til's apologetic, Clark wrote:

In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought. 

But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.

In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry, it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry. 

At least three observations mitigate against interpreting the above as evidence that Clark's accepted the epistemic legitimacy of circular reasoning. Firstly, Clark is expositing Van Til's thought, not expressing his own. As the rest of the article shows, Clark's "grasp" of Van Til of Van Til's thought cannot be equated with his acceptance of Van Til's thought. 

Secondly, anyone who believes that the above summary implies some measure of agreement between Clark and Van Til must first acknowledge Clark's own qualifications: axioms "control" theorems, circular reasoning is only "loosely" allowed as a referent to the geometric analogy (in particular), etc. This is not the language of traditional coherentism.

Finally, the above context is not only about Van Til's thought in general, it's specific to Van Til's thought on apologetics. The title of the article itself makes that obvious. This is important, as epistemology (the focus of Mr. Kemp's essay) is a distinct discipline. Apologetics is a discipline which itself presupposes epistemology. An allowance for self-reference or circular reasoning in a context in which one is defending his faith (see below) is entirely different from allowing self-reference or circular reasoning in a context of epistemic justification (see the above quotes from Clark). 

So much for this example. The only other location I could find that might afford reason for thinking Clark advocated circular reasoning is from an article he wrote in 1963 entitled, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" He writes:

The first reason for believing the Bible is inspired is that the Bible claims to be inspired. When this reason is offered to an unbeliever, almost always his immediate reaction is derision. To him it is very much like putting a liar on the witness stand and having him swear to tell the truth. But why a liar? Do not honest witnesses also swear to tell the truth? Yet even a Christian with a smattering of logic may object to this procedure because it seems to beg the question. It is circular. We believe the Bible to be inspired because it makes the claim, and we believe the claim because it is inspired and therefore true. This does not seem to be the right way to argue.

It must be granted that not every claim is ipso facto true. There have been false witnesses in court, there have been false Messiahs, and there have been fraudulent so-called revelations. But to ignore the claim of the Bible, or of witnesses generally, is both an oversimplification and a mistake. For example, suppose the Bible actually says that it is not inspired. Or suppose merely that the Bible is completely silent on the subject – that it makes no more claim to divine inspiration than did Churchill. In such a case, if the Christian asserts that the book is inspired, the unbeliever would be sure to reply that he is going far beyond the evidence.

This reply is certainly just. There is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible. But because this reply is so just, it follows that the unbeliever’s derision at our first remark was groundless. What the Bible claims is an essential part of the argument. The Christian is well within the boundaries of logic to insist that the first reason for believing in the inspiration of the Bible is that it makes this claim. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 2-3)

It may initially appear as if Clark is admitting as legitimate a circular "procedure." But even here, Clark admits that self-attestation simpliciter does not constitute a proof - as he puts it, "not every claim is ipso facto true." For example, the Bible claims to be God's word and the Quran claims to be God's word. Yet because the Bible contradicts the Quran, both claims cannot be true. An argument regarding the self-attesting nature of a source does not "prove" either is what it claims to be. 

But Clark does acknowledge that self-attestation is apologetically legitimate. A Christian can at least begin his defense of his faith by noting that the Bible claims to be God's word. But, for Clark, a "reason for believing the Bible" is not a suggestion that one's belief in the Bible is founded upon some more basic epistemic truth. Anyone who thinks that failed to read the rest of the article, let alone the rest of Clark's works. Clark clarifies:

Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so. But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry. Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21)

Note that for Clark, self-attestation is not purported to be a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Rather, he emphasizes that an objection Christians face regarding circular reasoning can be applied tu quoque to the objectors. Clark agrees with Mr. Kemp that “If Scriptures forms the basis of all knowledge, then all arguments for the trustworthiness of Scripture are circular” (pg. 2) - and then he extends this point to other worldviews with stated first principles. An apologetic which uses circular reasoning (e.g. self-attestation), as a means of converting unbelievers is not deficient; after all, how can anyone who would attempt defend his own, primary, indemonstrable premises do so without first knowing such premises? 

Again, apologetics presupposes epistemology. Thus, Clark is not suggesting that one's own, primary, indemonstrable premises are epistemically grounded in or demonstrated by prior reasons. This would be incoherent. For those interested, I've written more on coherentism, foundationalism, and self-attestation here and here.

Bringing the conversation back to Mr. Kemp's article: however Mr. Kemp responds to Frame et. al., his reply to Clark ought to be somewhat different. Here is the extent of Mr. Kemp's reply to the first Clark quote he referenced above:

According to this view, God’s revelation is the only ultimate principle. This claim has vexed many who hear it. If God’s revelation is the ultimate basis of all reason and knowledge, arguing with self-proclaimed nonbelievers becomes very complicated. On the one hand, the aim is to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures. On the other hand, on this view, reason presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures.

According to many who have espoused this view, the necessity of always and everywhere presupposing a proposition does not preclude the possibility of providing evidence for that proposition. Advocates of this view often emphatically tell us that evidence can be best, and indeed only, given for the existence of God when those evidences are put forth and interpreted according to “theistic standards,” which presuppose the existence of God. (Without Excuse, pgs. 7-8) 

We return to the crux of the issue: apologetics vs. epistemology. One can defend the faith by attacking another's first principles. Does such a procedure proceed from one's own first principles? Yes. And is the presuppositionalist suggesting that reason is only intelligible within the Christian worldview? Yes. But does that make the matter "very complicated," as Mr. Kemp suggests? I think not. It is legitimate and may be persuasive insofar as two people may share beliefs in common through which only one system can provide legitimate justification. I could just say that "the Bible is the basis for all knowledge; therefore, whatever basis you have can't be known." But an apologetic doesn't have to be that. 

I've spoken on this before (link, link), but let's ask anyway: "Why not? Can't the Spirit work to convict the minds of sinners, no matter what? If the root of the problem unbelievers have with Scripture is an ethical rebellion to it, isn’t proclaiming the simple truth sufficient opportunity by which the Spirit may work to remove an unbeliever’s rebellious spirit?" Sure - but the Spirit also works through ordinary means, and such may also involve removing barriers to belief. Stopping the mouths of unbelievers might involve explaining why their worldview does not account for knowledge. This could be persuasive even though it is an apologetic which proceeds from one's own, unproved first principle. That has uses.

If I ask someone who is blindfolded which picture I've drawn represents a person, they won’t be able to determine what I am drawing before their blindfold is removed. On the other hand, a picture must nevertheless be present so that if the blindfold is removed, they can determine what has been drawn. Now, I might draw a simple stick figure. If a drawing must be present for the blindfold to be removed, a simple picture would indeed suffice. The person whose blindfold is removed might even be able to pick out my drawing of a stick figure amongst other pictures that are not of persons. On the other hand, it wouldn’t hurt for me to erase some pictures beforehand so that a person is more apt to focus on my person picture – simply conceived or more well-drawn – in the case the blindfold is removed.

The blindfold is ethical rebellion, and only the Spirit can remove it. But the Spirit does so only when the truth is set before someone. It is often the case that the Spirit works when we do and rewards extra effort we put in. Part of this process can include erasing false pictures or worldviews. That removes barriers to aid in focusing on the truth, which has rational motivation and yet does not require an epistemology on which the truth of the Christian Scriptures are known by inference or verification. 

Also, apologetics is not just a rational enterprise. There is not only value in a defense of the faith along rational lines. If we are created by God, may we not suppose beauty, behavior, etc. have a role in persuasion (link)? Aesthetics matter - drawing on the above illustration, for example, there are better and worse pictorial representations of persons (and better and worse representations of Christianity), even if all the representations truly are of persons (and Christianity). 

While Mr. Kemp may find it vexing that God's revelation ought to be regarded as the "basis" of human reason, Clark simplifies what Mr. Kemp views as a complicated apologetic situation in the following article Clark wrote in 1943, which I quote at length: 

But the large majority of people who call themselves Christian in this twentieth century regard the Bible as a very infirm foundation. The appeal today is to experience and reason. It is even stated that it is of no use to talk with those who believe the Bible because talking itself is an appeal to reason. One must choose either reason or authority; one cannot have his Bible and his reason too.

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision.

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority?

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority.

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant.

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason.

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe. (link, 1943. "How Firm a Foundation?" The Presbyterian Guardian Sep. 10, Vol. 12, No. 16, 252.)

Mr. Kemp's vexation with Clark's presuppositionalism was whether "self-proclaimed nonbelievers" can be "rationally motivate[d to] belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures." Clark's above reply demonstrates that such apologetic persuasion is possible but dependent on the work of the Spirit: properly grounded human reason indeed "presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures," the very thing nonbelievers reject. Yet because the Spirit operates through the witness of believers, a believer may "aim... to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures" while prayerfully relying on the Spirit to remove any kind of barrier to the apologist's rational argumentation.

Does anyone deny that grace is necessary for unbelievers to accept [the premises of] Christianity? I would think Mr. Kemp would also admit this. Neither the presuppositionalist nor Mr, Kemp can ipso facto cause a change of mind by argumentation. To be fair, Mr. Kemp is not the only person who has struggled to understand the importance of the Spirit in Clark's apologetic. Even church historians such as Alan D. Strange have a false understanding:

One might argue that mysticism and pietism emphasize the Spirit without the Word and rationalism and orthodoxism the Word without the Spirit. The OPC has consciously sought to avoid both of these errors, the former in something like the Peniel movement and the latter in something like the Clark case... (Confident of Better Things, pg. 74)

Mr. Strange must be ignorant of articles such as "How Firm a Foundation?" For historians to perpetuate errors such as these illustrates the need for further research about what Clark actually thought. 

So rational motivation is possible. Clark thought unbelievers could reason validly insofar as they can accept conclusions which logically follow from certain premises - and they can do this even apart from presupposing the truth of Christian Scriptures. Unbelievers are still images of God, and they can follow valid arguments Christians make, so Christians have a point of contact with unbelievers in that they can show the reasoning of unbelievers to be unsound or false. That is, while unbelievers can reason validly, such reasoning will not be sound and cannot count as knowledge in an internalist, infallibilist sense, for the premises of unbelievers will necessarily either be false or unknowable (given the worldview of the unbeliever). 

Again, this all deals in apologetics. We aren't proving Christianity by arguing against others' worldviews, but we are implicitly defending it. Practically speaking (which is what apologetics is concerned with, insofar as the apologetic used is also true), an unbeliever won't have an infinite number of alternative worldviews in mind when you're discussing with him. 

Mr. Kemp can't categorize Clark with those who think that Scripture could be epistemically evidenced. All this points to a failure by Mr. Kemp to make good on his statement that Clark's "school" of thought doesn’t “succeed.” In fact, Clark's school of thought is barely engaged!

This ends Mr. Kemp's explicit reference to Clark, but I'll address what other parts of the chapter I think are relevant to his thought - not necessarily in page order - beginning with the question of what Mr. Kemp meant when he suggested that "Scripture passages... seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God." 

What Mr. Kemp means may involve an implicit critique of Clark even if we distinguish Clark's view from that of Frame, Van Til, and others. What, then, does Mr. Kemp mean by "verification"? It appears he means something like "infer[ential reasoning]." 

First principles are known indemonstrably. They are not known by inference from some other proposition. No argument can be given for first principles, but the Bible seems to assume that arguments for divine revelation can be given. Thus, Frame has not shown us why we should not read Scripture as prima facie evidence against the view that Scripture is the first principle of all knowledge. In fact, he makes matters worse by suggesting we “broaden the circle.” Increasing the distance between, say, “God exists” in the conclusion and “God exists” in the premises only gives the appearance of demonstrative knowledge. But in fact, insofar as such arguments are subjectively persuasive, they present a first principle as if it were something else. This is telling since it does not necessarily count against a belief to be put forward as self-justifying. But they should be asserted in their naked glory so that they can be known by themselves (per se) or their lack of self-evidence acknowledged. This constant inclination to regard Christianity as demonstrable may, I suggest, be the result of the operative but unacknowledged belief that it does not form the basic principle of all knowledge. 

Scripture provides examples of God’s Word being tested. Further, these instances of verification are not plausibly explained as broadly circular arguments, that is, circular arguments that incorporate several premises. Broadly circular arguments include premises and sub-arguments that do not provide evidence for the conclusion. They do not make the conclusion more credible than otherwise. Thus, they are not useful as arguments. They are psychologically useful or persuasive, as my argument notes, but this is the very problematic thing about them. Their usefulness is not in any rational element in them, and thus they are deceptive as arguments. It is therefore not flattering to Scripture to understand it as putting forth broadly circular arguments when alternative interpretations are available.  

This result prompts us to consider that there may be multiple first principles of knowledge rather than just one. Knowledge is not a system neatly worked out from a single indemonstrable axiom. Rather, there are many sources of knowledge—sensory experience, testimony, memory, conscience, and divine revelation—working together to inform our judgments. I leave the task of working out these various faculties of knowledge for another day. (Without Excuse, pg. 30) 

I'll return to "verification" in a moment. Mr. Kemp says he leaves the defense of his own position for another day, so I would normally absent myself from feeling the need to critique his view except where his attacks against my position provide occasion for it. That will largely be the case since I've talked about the topics he mentions in other posts. But Mr. Kemp does provide a few remarks about his own position that I'll address. 

One must first question what is Mr. Kemp's working definition of "knowledge." He writes, "A source of knowledge can be without a foundation and fallible" (pg. 6). Firstly, this is not the sort of "knowledge" presuppositionalists like Clark primarily are interested in, so if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that the presuppositionalist's claim that God's word is the basis for "all knowledge" includes "fallible knowledge," his entire chapter sadly rests on an equivocation and false assumption. He has smuggled into the definition of "knowledge" something with which the presuppositionalist is unconcerned. That is, I'm not aware of any presuppositionalist who would suggest that the Bible is the source of all ranges of meaning of "knowledge." Secondly, while Mr. Kemp says his "next few paragraphs will show" that his claim is true, I must be missing where he did that (or else I would have replied). Closest I can find actually is on pg. 4, which comes earlier: 

...imagine that you ask me why it is that I believe that I was born in Nuremburg. I reply that my parents told me I was. If you ask me why I believe my parents, I will tell you that they have been generally reliable in the past. Now here you can ask me at least two questions: (a) how I know that my parents have been reliable, and (b) why reliable witnesses ought to be believed. There appears to be no answer to (b), which asks for a reason to believe a self-evidently true proposition. Under normal conditions, and absent defeaters, reliable witnesses ought to be believed. My answer to (a) might be that my senses and memory tell me that many things my parents told me were in fact true. You might then ask me why I ought to trust my senses and why I ought to trust my memory. To that, again, I need not give an answer. I do not draw an inference from some more basic principle to my trust in my senses and memory. I just find myself doing so, and it seems right to do so.

It "seems right"? Is this really enough to "rationally motivate" anyone to accept Mr. Kemp's view? There's a seeming double standard at play. Now, I actually think Mr. Kemp's position could be tweaked to fit within the presuppositionalist system. But if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that he can "know" he was born in Nuremburg apart from a worldview grounded in divine revelation, I think he is mistaken. Clark made the point that children can be switched at birth - unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible. And if Mr. Kemp isn't talking about infallible knowledge, we must again point out to Mr. Kemp that Clark's presuppositionalism (at least) is concerned with full assurance or infallibilist justification. Admitting we could be "defeated" is precisely what we want to avoid when we defend Christianity.

Also, we could discuss what counts as a "reliable witness." Scripture itself is a "reliable" witness - an infallible witness - so there is a sense in which one can agree that "reliable" witnesses ought to be trusted. But short of infallibility, what counts as "reliable"? Now, if Scripture legitimizes certain, fallible witnesses, we have an answer to this question. But this again grounds our worldview in divine revelation, precisely what Mr. Kemp wants to deny. Instead, he doesn’t find anything "more basic" (trustworthy?) than his memory or senses. He says these are all something like conjoint first principles, “ultimate” in that each cannot “be reasonably questioned.” Can’t they? Didn't I just do that in the last few paragraphs?  

It is interesting that while Mr. Kemp says he can't find anything more basic that his memory or senses, he advocates for the idea that Scripture is "absolutely ultimate" in that it can "override" anything contradictory and cannot be overridden. So at least Mr. Kemp agrees that Scripture can't be defeated. But that admission concedes that "knowledge" had by divine revelation is in a different category altogether. As I said, Mr. Kemp pushes a multi-source theory of "knowledge" but equivocates on the meaning of the word. This undermines his thesis.

Returning to Mr. Kemp's comments on pg. 30 (see above), an attempt to epistemically "verify” (or "infer") that something is true would seem to fall into one of four different structural proposals by which a person might try to justify his beliefs: 1) an infinite chain of verification/justification (infinitism), 2) circular verification/justification (traditional coherentism), 3) verification/justification from a basis that is itself unjustified (positism), or 4) verification/justification from a basis that is itself justified (foundationalism).

If the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge - as presuppositionalists whom Kemp intends to engage believe - then infinitism is not a live option. If Scripture itself can be known - as Christians should affirm - then neither is positism. I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. I further discuss why I disagree with these proposals regarding the structure of epistemic justification here, here, and here. That leaves foundationalism. 

Given the above, let's run through the rest of what Mr. Kemp says: does accepting foundationalism mean "No argument can be given for first principles"? As discussed already, no: apologetic arguments can be given. Is there a "rational" element in this argumentation? Yes: while the argumentation does not increase the epistemic justification for belief in God's word, removing intellectual barriers is rational. Displaying (to what extent is possible for us) the internal consistency of God's word is rational. Drawing better pictures is rational.

But further, is it "deceptive" to make arguments that are non-rational, psychological, or persuasive? How does that follow? I've given the following illustration several times before that shows just how nonsensical is Mr. Kemp's assertion (link): 

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

How is it deceptive for a mother to identify herself when she thinks such might cause a correction in her child's behavior? 

Similarly, experiencing what we already know is valuable. We can have full assurance of our complete salvation while we yet look forward to experiencing our great reward. We can have full assurance that God's word is true without having experienced said truth in certain ways: divine providence, historical confirmations, prayerful effectuality, etc. But when we do experience these things, it isn't deceptive to bring them up to those who would attempt to undermine our foundation. 

That ties in to another dimension of our Christian life: to behave like a Christian. Do we not defend our faith to remain faithful in the face of persecution, even to the point of martyrdom? How about when we sacrifice to help others? I suppose Mr. Kemp could reply that such behavioral apologetics are really rational in that we suffer unto glory and are humiliated unto exaltation (like our Savior), but I don't think something like rational anticipation of future reward is often (let alone always) in the minds of believers and unbelievers in these cases.

Arguments for divine revelation can be given, then. No one denies that. The question is whether such are of "epistemic profit." Mr. Kemp thinks so, citing a few Scriptures. He claims, “…no complicated exegesis is required for my argument” (pg. 3). Well, whether that is so or not is irrelevant. What matters is if his exegesis is sound, and I will argue it is not. 

The first passage cited is Exodus 4. But when one reads this passage, all that is indicated is that if one sign does not persuade the Israelites, another might. This is language of causation: certain signs might cause them to believe. Nowhere is it suggested that miracles are epistemically more basic than or on par with divine revelation, as if the word of God through Moses was itself insufficient. So if "verification" refers to epistemic inference, it isn’t unintelligible to deny Mr. Kemp's assertion that “Moses’ authority as a speaker of God’s word is verified by miraculous events” (pg. 13). At most, we can say that what is happening is that gracious Yahweh is drawing the Israelites fuller, better pictures. But even this is apologetic, not epistemic.

The second passage Mr. Kemp mentions is Deuteronomy 18. Mr. Kemp says, “Deuteronomy anticipates that some would claim to receive a prophecy from God, and that such claims will need to be tested” (pg. 13). Well, tested, yes. Verified, no; rather, falsified. Read verse 21 closely: "How may we know the word that the Lord has not spoken?"

Now, we could delve into what meaning of "know" might here be in use. The crux, though, is that this passage primarily deal with how to falsify false prophets. In fact, any two people can predict contradictories ("It will rain tomorrow;" "It will not rain tomorrow"), both claim divine prophecy, and one will be falsified. And while the other will be right, does that mean the Mr. Kemp thinks said person has been verified as a divine prophet? I doubt it. As a species of divine revelation, the Bible does not require external, epistemic authentication. 

[Side note: our foundational principle ought to be more broad than that Scripture is the sole source or basis of all knowledge (link). Something like, "special divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in the Scriptures - is the premise with which one must begin in order to intentionally defend his beliefs with full assurance." This indicates acceptance of infallible, internalist, and propositional knowledge and takes God's word to be the sufficient condition (which accounts for all subsidiary, necessary conditions for knowledge, cf. link) for said knowledge.]

To summarize the response to Mr. Kemp's citations, then, the biblical contexts he mentions do not say that inspired revelations “appeal to something other than themselves… in order to be known as Scripture” (pg. 15). In fact, in one context, "knowledge" isn’t even mentioned, and in the other, the only "knowledge" given is of who is not a prophet. Further, Deuteronomy 18 is only applicable if one even thinks to ask the question in the first place. 

I'll also offer some pushback against statements like, “God does not deliver the Word and then remain silent, expecting the recipients to take it on a sheer leap of blind faith” (pg. 14). What does Mr. Kemp make of Abraham's ordeal in Genesis 22 (cf. Hebrews 11)? And was Abraham's faith "blind," or did he not have every reason to suppose Isaac would return with him? Either way, God's word was itself sufficient for Abraham to know to obey.

I've been critical of Mr. Kemp throughout this post, but I will end on a positive note. I said earlier that I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. After citing Greg Bahnsen and John Frame on pgs. 9-10, I'll repeat an earlier quote: “The thought pushed by Bahnsen and Frame in these passages departs with this school by insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means” (pg. 10).

Now, I'll leave it to Van Tilian apologists to make their own case on behalf of Bahnsen and Frame. My initial impression is that Mr. Kemp has a point against Frame and makes a good case for it in the rest of his chapter. The Bahnsen citation could instead be a reference to a sort of coherentism that actually is meta-justificatory foundationalism (link). If I'm right, while I would disagree with Bahnsen, I don't know if he can be called a traditional coherentist (i.e. circularist). In any case, Clark cannot be associated with these views, and I hope we see more future engagement with his actual thought from theologians and philosophers.

Divine Determinism: Engaging Eastern Orthodox Criticisms

In a few posts, I've mentioned Eastern Orthodox apologist Russ Manion. Since numerous Eastern Orthodox apologists and philosophers seem to have been influenced by his [rather scantily available] work, I've found it useful to read him myself. Elsewhere, I've outlined how he borrowed from Reformed presuppositionalists in ways current Eastern Orthodox apologists have either failed to grasp or follow (link, link). 

I've also acknowledged that it is of course the case that I would find areas of disagreement with him. I'm not Eastern Orthodox, after all. This post will engage one such area. In the course of an hypothetical dialog on metaphysical naturalism, Manion writes (link):

“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature?” I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was reasoning with him, wasn’t I? I answered, “of course it is. As you have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I would not be a naturalist.” “Then they must all be determined, aren’t they?” He affirmed. And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct. There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I wasn’t about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to make it. “So, they are determined.” I said. “What has that to do with reason?” “I would think that is quite clear.” He began. “If all your beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn’t it?” “Now you’re stating the obvious.” I replied. “You’re taking awfully small steps aren’t you?” “Would you prefer I skip a step?” he countered smiling, “Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not.”

Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, “What if the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn’t it be the case then that we are caused to believe something because it is true?” He didn’t even flinch. He simply responded, “That makes no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but every notion, justification, and thought you have. “The second problem has to do with the fact that there are those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your naturalistic belief is. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is not the case that all beliefs are true.”

Note again that the context of this dialog is between a metaphysical naturalist and a Socratic figure - the latter of whom also turns out to be a metaphysical naturalist (albeit a more "consistent" one in that he follows their premises to the absurd entailments). As we will see below, by the end of the conversation, the roles reverse, and the former protagonist for metaphysical naturalism will turn the tables on his Socratic interlocutor by abandoning the position.

Now, what I've highlighted above must be disambiguated from this context in order to assess whether the stated problem with the determinism of the protagonist is 1) in virtue of his "metaphysical naturalism" or 2) is a problem with determinism as such. I think Manion just has the former in mind - here, at least. If so, perhaps I wouldn't disagree with Manion after all. 

In fact, a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion's points if he indeed restricts the problem to the domain of "metaphysical naturalism," the definition of which can be hard to pin down (link) but seems to be associated by Perry Robinson - the author of the Eastern Orthodox blog in which this conversation was posted - with some form of materialism. In his final comment on the post, Robinson writes:

As for logic and the universe, the reason why the naturalist has a hard time with this is manifold. Presumably the laws of logic aren’t material things or reducible to material things.

If logic is immaterial and "good reason" presupposes logic, then it would indeed be impossible for a materialist to have determined beliefs which are held "on the basis of good reason."

A further reason a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion here is that unlike the metaphysical naturalists in his dialog, a Reformed Christian would say that effects are always determined by the "antecedent state of the universe." After all, unlike the metaphysical naturalist, the Reformed Christian will regard the "universe" itself is an effect - of God's free, non-necessitated choice. Just so, God's free choice may effect our beliefs by supernatural means (as well as by ordinary, second causes). An obvious example would be that Reformed Christians argue regeneration leads to belief in the gospel. I'll speak more on this below.

Another reason to think he only has metaphysical naturalism in mind is that his following statement seems to entail fatalism or necessitarianism, which a Reformed Christian is quite capable of denying (link, link, link): 

If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.

To spell out a reply in a little more detail, while the Reformed Christian does indeed believe our positions are determined, we might not have held them were God to have decreed otherwise. Indeed, I think this argument in italics is quite weak, as the very next line concedes that "the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify." That being the case, it cannot be that even a metaphysical naturalist would hold a position "regardless of the reasons given" except insofar as naturalism is incompatible with logic (in which case my response would be the same as what I mentioned earlier) or is necessitarian (unlike Reformed theology). On the contrary, one's position is held precisely because of the reasons given - in other words, only certain means lead to certain ends, which is anti-fatalistic. 

Further, if one is determined to offer invalid reasons for a position, does that mean it is impossible for anyone whose discernments are determined to discern said invalid reasoning? Not for a Reformed Christian. God can determine that people hold [right] beliefs for right reasons or to discern when people (or, upon self-reflection, even oneself) hold beliefs for wrong reasons. Again, then, a charitable understanding of Manion would be that he is specifically arguing against metaphysical naturalism. The context of the above quote and later ones like it seem to confirm this interpretation: 

I sat around for weeks in an epistemic frump. I spent my time flipping through magazines and popularized treatments on modern physics. You know, Schrodinger cat stuff. Every once in a while I would get a surge of confidence and blurt, “Of course I know some things.” Then I would remember that as the chemical tide of my brain ebbs and flows, I would think such things whether they are true or not. Tide in, “I believe such and such to be the case because I have good reason to believe it.” Tide out, “I believe the universe is acting out in me the belief that such and such is the case and that I have good reasons to believe it, whether or not such and such is true.”

Now, it is often true that one might mistakenly believe that he has good reasons for a position. But this is true irrespective of whether one's belief [as well as his reasons] are determined. The point, then, is that apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminianism, et al. cannot misapply these arguments to the context of Reformed theology. 

A while later in Manion's dialog, we read:

"...Would it be fair to say I believe nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?” “Yes I think that would be an accurate statement,” I replied. “I don’t think it’s accurate at all.” He surprised me. “The language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all phenomena of nature haven’t you?” I thought a moment, “Sure,” I said. He continued, “It would follow then, that we do not do anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is an idea that nature has in me. The “idea” is an event in nature that occurs in association with the event in nature called “me.” Do you agree with this?"

“I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend nature.” I answered. “But this is in keeping with my robot paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive. Obviously, they knew something the others didn’t.” He countered, “The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don’t, don’t. Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the way? Does water that finds its’ way to the ocean know something that other water doesn’t? You see, water simply does what nature would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature.”

“OK,” I said. “I already agreed everything is determined, and I’ll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism.” “Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural world?” he asked. “Certainly,” I answered, “No one would question that.” “Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you than it does for me?” he asked. “No, of course not,” I replied. “Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that causes my beliefs?” he asked. “No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. Please stop trying to lead me,” I responded. “Then,” he asked, “how is it that you and I disagree?” I believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spatial and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism.”

I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn’t have much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still had. “How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in naturalism and reason.” “I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise.”

There is quite a lot here to untangle. Once again, it seems as though Manion targets a specific kind of determinism: one in which our actions do not "transcend nature," in which our actions are "of nature," "naturalistic," etc. Does nihilism follow from this sort of determinism? Yes. If "nature" is all that is, then "nature" itself is meaningless; there are neither communicable, shareable, immaterial propositions nor corresponding metaphysical realities. 

Essential persistence and contingent change presuppose metaphysical grounding for a distinction between the two. If nature is all that is, there can be no distinction and you either have hyper-necessity or hyper-contingency. Eleatic monism is unintelligible due to its reductivity, and that which is unintelligible is meaningless; Hyper-Heraclitianism - on which the "man" changes as much as the "river" - is unintelligible for the opposite extreme of rejecting any commonalities. Hope for "meaning" utterly impossible, for "hope" is impersistent! There is no other option for the metaphysical naturalist, though, so nihilism follows. 

But Reformed theology is not subject to these criticisms (link). Man in particular transcends the rest of creation in being images of God. But our freedom is analogical to that of God. We will never be as God Himself is, so we don't function as the final, decisive factors who determine between contingent alternatives. God already did that according to His wisdom and good pleasure. Now, our freedom is genuine - we genuinely are free to desire, feel, think, choose. These have been determined - our freedom is a freedom "to," not a freedom "from" (especially not freedom "from" God's sovereign and eternal decree) - but these determinations could have been otherwise, and there is no resistance from us to that which we already [are determined to] want, do, believe, think, feel, etc. 

Criticisms such as that man must have an indeterministic freedom for it to be genuine really intend to suggest we must conceive of man's freedom as equivalent to God's freedom. Man is put too on par with God. It's idolatry. And raising man to equivalency with God will always, by the same token, lower God to the position of man. In this case, such is evident in that if man's freedom is indeterministic, God cannot be eternally omniscient. His knowledge would (per impossibile) depend on the temporal decisions of men. 

Men have all sorts of inventive ways to try to circumvent this inconvenient, simple truth. As I recall, in this case, Robinson's own preference is to advocate for what is called "suppositionalism," a pedantic position defended by philosopher Jonathan Kvanvig, particularly in chapter 8 of his Destiny and Deliberation. I read this chapter with all the sense of a man (who has realized his former position of Molinism is no good) trying to do his best to push and keep together two repelling magnets. I do not recommend anyone waste his or her time on the book. Bruce Langstry has given a good summary and then critique of Kvanvig here, the latter of which I quote:

Does the theory fulfill its restrained but important aims? Suppose that in the actual world God constructs, at some time t0, a complete suppositional story that specifies the occurrence, at time t10, of such-and-such undetermined events including free human actions. Suppose that God then, at time t1, resolves to bring about all and only the states of affairs that the complete suppositional story says he directly brings about, and that at time t2 he starts implementing his resolution. There is no room in the story for anything to occur which defeats the suppositional justification either for the chronicle of events or for the epistemic conditionals which undergird it. But even assuming that God in fact strongly actualizes all the states of affairs which the story says he strongly actualizes, there is room in the actual world for events to occur which defeat the justification God has at t2 for believing that what in fact happens will not deviate from the story.

Bearing this point in mind, consider the propositions (P) The specified undetermined events will occur at t10 and (Q) There will be no defeaters for the justification of (P). Assume that at t2 God has adequate reasons for believing P. These very same reasons also constitute adequate reasons for his then also believing Q. But neither the truth of Q nor God’s having adequate reasons for believing it establishes that God’s adequate reasons for believing P are indefeasible. According to Kvanvig, ‘grounds are defeasible when it is possible for these grounds to fully justify a given belief and yet that justification be overturned by further learning’ (p.157); presumably he means epistemically possible. For any agent who is aware that adequate reasons for belief are sometimes defeated, the mere possession of adequate reasons for a specific belief does not exclude the epistemic possibility that the belief is false. I can see no way that Kvanvig can rule out its being epistemically possible, relative to the adequate reasons God has at t2 for believing Q, that P is false and that God will, at least by t10 and afterwards, have learned that P is false.

It might be replied: If, in the circumstances under discussion, God’s belief P is false, God has at t2 no way of obtaining evidence that this is so; but this contradicts Kvanvig’s general premise that no truths are inscrutable, a premise which implies that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can in principle become aware and which would thereby undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth.

The reply is mistaken. The general premise does not imply that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can here and now in principle become aware and whose use as a premise would undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth. After all, if scientists are currently justified in believing that no humans will exist 10 billion years from now, and their belief is in fact false, then defeaters for their current reasoning might not become cognitively available in principle until a million years from now. Hence if in the circumstances under discussion, God’s beliefs P and Q are false, the general premise is compatible with the proposition that God at t2 has no way obtaining evidence that P and Q are false.

In short, the moment one starts talking about the possibility of God having false beliefs (and how could this not be possible if God has prior beliefs about man's future, indeterministic decisions?), one has abandoned the sovereignty of God.

Certain statements made in what Manion says above might have been intended only to apply in the context of metaphysical naturalism. But if an analogy by parity of reasoning might be attempted, let's look at the result. Take the following statement from the dialog: "I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid." 

Now change "nature" to "God" and ask yourself if Manion might have made the same argument to a theological determinist. If not, well and good. If so, the desire to get "behind" God - as if! - is the same idolatry I mention above. And if what Manion says in here might have been analogized by him (or might be by other EOs) to the context of theological determinism, Manion's (or their) epistemology is flawed. To say that neither of two contradicting determinists could "know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given" presupposes that indeterministic freedom is a necessary criterion for knowledge. But what possible relevance could being able to indeterministically choose to have bad beliefs or reasons have to being able to know that one's current beliefs or reasons are true? 

In fact, we can't always "compare" beliefs and "evaluate" reasons. Everyone has to make an assumption for reasoning to even get off the ground. I've argued for foundationalism elsewhere numerous times. One can have immediate, non-inferential justification for at least one belief. So if I don't need indeterministic freedom there - if I don't need to "get behind" anything to compare the foundational belief to x, y, or z in order to know it - then why would I need it anywhere else?

I can imagine one final analogization from Manion's foregoing dialog: "“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature? ...We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature." Again, for the sake of argument, exchange "God" for "nature." 

Obviously, a Reformed Christian will hold to a Creator-creature distinction and deny that we are a part of God. As I said above, we have our own thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions. That these are caused does not make them any less ours. When God created the earth, His causing its existence does not imply that the earth was a part of God.  

Nor are we passive creations, mere vessels or repositories. We move. It's just that our movement is not by way of self-origination. Sometimes, only God moves, such as when He first gives us the regenerative grace necessary and sufficient for us to only then have the possibility - indeed, it determines us - to move back toward God. To use an illustration opposite to one I mentioned earlier, in regeneration, God, as He brings Himself near to us, changes our magnetic pole to such that we become drawn and move to Him. God is the originator of His and our movement, yet it is still we who move. And in our movement back to God, we are shown why indeterministic freedom is not needed to explain how co-operation or synergy with God is possible. 

Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:

What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us? 

Now, these reflections leave off the table the possibility that supernaturalism and some form of determinism are compatible. This is short-sighted unless Manion really does think - contrary to the way in which I have tried to charitably interpret his arguments thus far - that all forms of determinism are problematic.

Before I address what seem to be Manion's counters to all varieties of determinism, notice that he alludes to an "eternal being" with a "character" and "attributes." This cannot be the god of Eastern Orthodoxy, though: the god of Eastern Orthodoxy is supposed to utterly transcend metaphysics and epistemology (cf. here, here, Robinson's comment 181 here). Revealed religion indeed!

Manion's two arguments against all varieties determinism seem to be as follows: 1) we ought to say that "something is true for reasons rather than causes," and determinism doesn't allow for that; 2) "freedom make[s] us morally accountable," and determinism doesn't allow for that. 

To the first argument: why can't a determinist say something is true for reasons? Reasons can be caused and causes. Manion seems to have conflated epistemology with metaphysics and presented us with a false dilemma. I also already discussed earlier why our reasons being caused by God is unproblematic.

The answer to the second argument is particularly simple, one which I was able to answer in my early 20s (link). 

Manion's criticisms of determinism are as weak as any other I've read. His criticisms of metaphysical naturalism and the like are well-founded only to the extent they agree with the 20th century Reformed theologians and determinists whose thoughts on worldview formation and critique he consciously borrowed.

Before concluding this post, there are two other points I wish to make since they often make the rounds in EO apologetics (of which I'm aware). The first is Christological: if that which the Trinity has decided is not necessitated (although grounded in the divine nature such that certain, imaginings - like that God could have made a world in which He lies - are impossible), then must the Son also be indeterministically free in his humanity? This does not follow, no. 

It's not much different than asking, "could or would Christ have ever sinned in His humanity?" The answer is no. Is it not obvious why this is the case? Christ is the singular subject of His divine and human wills. For the same reason, the Son sent could and would never have abandoned his mission to save humanity - not even in the garden of Gethsemene can we say this was a possibility. Christ is and was not schizophrenic, and Nestorianism is false.

This is admitted by Robinson (link): "The cardinal text is Christ is Gesthemane. “Not my will but thy will be done.” Could Christ have botched it and disobeyed the Father? Obviously not. But how then being God and it being impossible for him to sin can he have free will?" 

Note that Robinson has just admitted what I said earlier: determinism is compatible with genuine, human willing. Christ genuinely chose to obey His Father, even if He could not do otherwise. Robinson goes on to say that He thinks Christ can be indeterministically free because there are a plurality of goods - while Christ is not free, He can still, then, indeterministically choose from among these goods. 

The problem with this is that the death of Christ was necessary for salvation from sin. Since it was the good pleasure of God for man to be saved from sin, Christ's human will must have necessarily acted in co-operation with His divine will to accomplish the single end (man's salvation) by the single means to that end (His own death). Synergy between God and men, then, does not presuppose indeterministic freedom. This disarms a few EO objections against determinism.

Robinson continues to say that "“Not my will but Your will” expresses that Christ initially wills two good things." These are said to be self preservation and the salvation of humanity. But he fails to be clear: was Christ's preservation of Himself a "genuine alternative possibilit[y]" (as Robinson puts it)? Would not Christ's choosing to preserve Himself from death meant He "botched it"? This is supposed to be a "good" Christ could have chosen? The very idea is self-refuting (note Robinson does not really answer JohnD in the comments on just this point here). This closes comments on the first point I wished to make.

The last point I wish to make concerns an argument regarding the alleged "dialectic" of Augustine, the person many EOs take as the forerunner of determinism. The argument comes from Joseph Farrell's Chapter 9 (and the rest of the book) here as well as his God, History, and Dialectic. 

One might introduce the argument with a question: in the eschaton, are there multiple goods from which we can choose? If not, then how can we have indeterministic, free will? Indeterministic, free will would seem to instead be a dialectic of oppositions: a choice between good and evil. EOs use the doctrine of divine energies to get around this: we can participate in one of any number of "good" divine energies, so indeterministic, free choice in the eschaton is possible after all. But those who hold to a certain, strong view of divine simplicity (e.g. Augustine, Aquinas), have hamstrung themselves - since they don't have access to a doctrine of divine energies, their predestinarian theologies are driven by a dialectic of opposition. Origen and Plotinus are other key figures.

Farrell is a creative thinker. One unfamiliar with his reasoning will need to read him to process his arguments. Nevertheless, he is not above criticism, as I've shown here, and his criticisms mentioned above has the following shortcoming: they will only go so far as one is fully Augustinian (or an Origenist or a Plotinist or so forth). One can accept determinism without also accepting certain lines in the thought of Augustine et al. that give rise to the dialectic Farrell mentions. Further, it is an EO assumption that Reformed Christians implicitly (if not explicitly) depend on Augustine rather than divine revelation for their views on determinism. The framing is biased from the outset and can only be convincing to those who are already EO, not those who aren't.

Now, I don't accept something like Thomistic divine simplicity but rather that the divine attributes are formally distinct (see here and Richard Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3, pgs. 284ff. for more). I lean away from acceptance of the filioque. And I don't have an issue with distinguishing between God's necessary character or attributes (for which EOs cannot account) and His indeterministically free operations or actions or energies, the latter with which we can co-operate or act in synergy. I believe there are multiple goods from which we can choose even in this life (e.g. what to eat in the morning). These truths are indeed contingent, not necessitated. Yet this does not entail indeterministic, free will, and EOs will have to do better in their future apologetics.