In a few posts, I've mentioned Eastern Orthodox apologist Russ Manion. Since numerous Eastern Orthodox apologists and philosophers seem to have been influenced by his [rather scantily available] work, I've found it useful to read him myself. Elsewhere, I've outlined how he borrowed from Reformed presuppositionalists in ways current Eastern Orthodox apologists have either failed to grasp or follow (link, link).
I've also acknowledged that it is of course the case that I would find areas of disagreement with him. I'm not Eastern Orthodox, after all. This post will engage one such area. In the course of an hypothetical dialog on metaphysical naturalism, Manion writes (link):
“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature?” I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was reasoning with him, wasn’t I? I answered, “of course it is. As you have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I would not be a naturalist.” “Then they must all be determined, aren’t they?” He affirmed. And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct. There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I wasn’t about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to make it. “So, they are determined.” I said. “What has that to do with reason?” “I would think that is quite clear.” He began. “If all your beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn’t it?” “Now you’re stating the obvious.” I replied. “You’re taking awfully small steps aren’t you?” “Would you prefer I skip a step?” he countered smiling, “Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not.”
Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, “What if the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn’t it be the case then that we are caused to believe something because it is true?” He didn’t even flinch. He simply responded, “That makes no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but every notion, justification, and thought you have. “The second problem has to do with the fact that there are those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your naturalistic belief is. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is not the case that all beliefs are true.”
Note again that the context of this dialog is between a metaphysical naturalist and a Socratic figure - the latter of whom also turns out to be a metaphysical naturalist (albeit a more "consistent" one in that he follows their premises to the absurd entailments). As we will see below, by the end of the conversation, the roles reverse, and the former protagonist for metaphysical naturalism will turn the tables on his Socratic interlocutor by abandoning the position.
Now, what I've highlighted above must be disambiguated from this context in order to assess whether the stated problem with the determinism of the protagonist is 1) in virtue of his "metaphysical naturalism" or 2) is a problem with determinism as such. I think Manion just has the former in mind - here, at least. If so, perhaps I wouldn't disagree with Manion after all.
In fact, a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion's points if he indeed restricts the problem to the domain of "metaphysical naturalism," the definition of which can be hard to pin down (link) but seems to be associated by Perry Robinson - the author of the Eastern Orthodox blog in which this conversation was posted - with some form of materialism. In his final comment on the post, Robinson writes:
As for logic and the universe, the reason why the naturalist has a hard time with this is manifold. Presumably the laws of logic aren’t material things or reducible to material things.
If logic is immaterial and "good reason" presupposes logic, then it would indeed be impossible for a materialist to have determined beliefs which are held "on the basis of good reason."
A further reason a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion here is that unlike the metaphysical naturalists in his dialog, a Reformed Christian would say that effects are always determined by the "antecedent state of the universe." After all, unlike the metaphysical naturalist, the Reformed Christian will regard the "universe" itself is an effect - of God's free, non-necessitated choice. Just so, God's free choice may effect our beliefs by supernatural means (as well as by ordinary, second causes). An obvious example would be that Reformed Christians argue regeneration leads to belief in the gospel. I'll speak more on this below.
Another reason to think he only has metaphysical naturalism in mind is that his following statement seems to entail fatalism or necessitarianism, which a Reformed Christian is quite capable of denying (link, link, link):
If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.
To spell out a reply in a little more detail, while the Reformed Christian does indeed believe our positions are determined, we might not have held them were God to have decreed otherwise. Indeed, I think this argument in italics is quite weak, as the very next line concedes that "the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify." That being the case, it cannot be that even a metaphysical naturalist would hold a position "regardless of the reasons given" except insofar as naturalism is incompatible with logic (in which case my response would be the same as what I mentioned earlier) or is necessitarian (unlike Reformed theology). On the contrary, one's position is held precisely because of the reasons given - in other words, only certain means lead to certain ends, which is anti-fatalistic.
Further, if one is determined to offer invalid reasons for a position, does that mean it is impossible for anyone whose discernments are determined to discern said invalid reasoning? Not for a Reformed Christian. God can determine that people hold [right] beliefs for right reasons or to discern when people (or, upon self-reflection, even oneself) hold beliefs for wrong reasons. Again, then, a charitable understanding of Manion would be that he is specifically arguing against metaphysical naturalism. The context of the above quote and later ones like it seem to confirm this interpretation:
I sat around for weeks in an epistemic frump. I spent my time flipping through magazines and popularized treatments on modern physics. You know, Schrodinger cat stuff. Every once in a while I would get a surge of confidence and blurt, “Of course I know some things.” Then I would remember that as the chemical tide of my brain ebbs and flows, I would think such things whether they are true or not. Tide in, “I believe such and such to be the case because I have good reason to believe it.” Tide out, “I believe the universe is acting out in me the belief that such and such is the case and that I have good reasons to believe it, whether or not such and such is true.”
Now, it is often true that one might mistakenly believe that he has good reasons for a position. But this is true irrespective of whether one's belief [as well as his reasons] are determined. The point, then, is that apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminianism, et al. cannot misapply these arguments to the context of Reformed theology.
A while later in Manion's dialog, we read:
"...Would it be fair to say I believe nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?” “Yes I think that would be an accurate statement,” I replied. “I don’t think it’s accurate at all.” He surprised me. “The language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all phenomena of nature haven’t you?” I thought a moment, “Sure,” I said. He continued, “It would follow then, that we do not do anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is an idea that nature has in me. The “idea” is an event in nature that occurs in association with the event in nature called “me.” Do you agree with this?"
“I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend nature.” I answered. “But this is in keeping with my robot paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive. Obviously, they knew something the others didn’t.” He countered, “The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don’t, don’t. Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the way? Does water that finds its’ way to the ocean know something that other water doesn’t? You see, water simply does what nature would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature.”
“OK,” I said. “I already agreed everything is determined, and I’ll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism.” “Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural world?” he asked. “Certainly,” I answered, “No one would question that.” “Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you than it does for me?” he asked. “No, of course not,” I replied. “Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that causes my beliefs?” he asked. “No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. Please stop trying to lead me,” I responded. “Then,” he asked, “how is it that you and I disagree?” I believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spatial and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism.”
I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn’t have much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still had. “How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in naturalism and reason.” “I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise.”
There is quite a lot here to untangle. Once again, it seems as though Manion targets a specific kind of determinism: one in which our actions do not "transcend nature," in which our actions are "of nature," "naturalistic," etc. Does nihilism follow from this sort of determinism? Yes. If "nature" is all that is, then "nature" itself is meaningless; there are neither communicable, shareable, immaterial propositions nor corresponding metaphysical realities.
Essential persistence and contingent change presuppose metaphysical grounding for a distinction between the two. If nature is all that is, there can be no distinction and you either have hyper-necessity or hyper-contingency. Eleatic monism is unintelligible due to its reductivity, and that which is unintelligible is meaningless; Hyper-Heraclitianism - on which the "man" changes as much as the "river" - is unintelligible for the opposite extreme of rejecting any commonalities. Hope for "meaning" utterly impossible, for "hope" is impersistent! There is no other option for the metaphysical naturalist, though, so nihilism follows.
But Reformed theology is not subject to these criticisms (link). Man in particular transcends the rest of creation in being images of God. But our freedom is analogical to that of God. We will never be as God Himself is, so we don't function as the final, decisive factors who determine between contingent alternatives. God already did that according to His wisdom and good pleasure. Now, our freedom is genuine - we genuinely are free to desire, feel, think, choose. These have been determined - our freedom is a freedom "to," not a freedom "from" (especially not freedom "from" God's sovereign and eternal decree) - but these determinations could have been otherwise, and there is no resistance from us to that which we already [are determined to] want, do, believe, think, feel, etc.
Criticisms such as that man must have an indeterministic freedom for it to be genuine really intend to suggest we must conceive of man's freedom as equivalent to God's freedom. Man is put too on par with God. It's idolatry. And raising man to equivalency with God will always, by the same token, lower God to the position of man. In this case, such is evident in that if man's freedom is indeterministic, God cannot be eternally omniscient. His knowledge would (per impossibile) depend on the temporal decisions of men.
Does the theory fulfill its restrained but important aims? Suppose that in the actual world God constructs, at some time t0, a complete suppositional story that specifies the occurrence, at time t10, of such-and-such undetermined events including free human actions. Suppose that God then, at time t1, resolves to bring about all and only the states of affairs that the complete suppositional story says he directly brings about, and that at time t2 he starts implementing his resolution. There is no room in the story for anything to occur which defeats the suppositional justification either for the chronicle of events or for the epistemic conditionals which undergird it. But even assuming that God in fact strongly actualizes all the states of affairs which the story says he strongly actualizes, there is room in the actual world for events to occur which defeat the justification God has at t2 for believing that what in fact happens will not deviate from the story.
Bearing this point in mind, consider the propositions (P) The specified undetermined events will occur at t10 and (Q) There will be no defeaters for the justification of (P). Assume that at t2 God has adequate reasons for believing P. These very same reasons also constitute adequate reasons for his then also believing Q. But neither the truth of Q nor God’s having adequate reasons for believing it establishes that God’s adequate reasons for believing P are indefeasible. According to Kvanvig, ‘grounds are defeasible when it is possible for these grounds to fully justify a given belief and yet that justification be overturned by further learning’ (p.157); presumably he means epistemically possible. For any agent who is aware that adequate reasons for belief are sometimes defeated, the mere possession of adequate reasons for a specific belief does not exclude the epistemic possibility that the belief is false. I can see no way that Kvanvig can rule out its being epistemically possible, relative to the adequate reasons God has at t2 for believing Q, that P is false and that God will, at least by t10 and afterwards, have learned that P is false.
It might be replied: If, in the circumstances under discussion, God’s belief P is false, God has at t2 no way of obtaining evidence that this is so; but this contradicts Kvanvig’s general premise that no truths are inscrutable, a premise which implies that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can in principle become aware and which would thereby undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth.
The reply is mistaken. The general premise does not imply that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can here and now in principle become aware and whose use as a premise would undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth. After all, if scientists are currently justified in believing that no humans will exist 10 billion years from now, and their belief is in fact false, then defeaters for their current reasoning might not become cognitively available in principle until a million years from now. Hence if in the circumstances under discussion, God’s beliefs P and Q are false, the general premise is compatible with the proposition that God at t2 has no way obtaining evidence that P and Q are false.
In short, the moment one starts talking about the possibility of God having false beliefs (and how could this not be possible if God has prior beliefs about man's future, indeterministic decisions?), one has abandoned the sovereignty of God.
Certain statements made in what Manion says above might have been intended only to apply in the context of metaphysical naturalism. But if an analogy by parity of reasoning might be attempted, let's look at the result. Take the following statement from the dialog: "I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid."
Now change "nature" to "God" and ask yourself if Manion might have made the same argument to a theological determinist. If not, well and good. If so, the desire to get "behind" God - as if! - is the same idolatry I mention above. And if what Manion says in here might have been analogized by him (or might be by other EOs) to the context of theological determinism, Manion's (or their) epistemology is flawed. To say that neither of two contradicting determinists could "know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given" presupposes that indeterministic freedom is a necessary criterion for knowledge. But what possible relevance could being able to indeterministically choose to have bad beliefs or reasons have to being able to know that one's current beliefs or reasons are true?
In fact, we can't always "compare" beliefs and "evaluate" reasons. Everyone has to make an assumption for reasoning to even get off the ground. I've argued for foundationalism elsewhere numerous times. One can have immediate, non-inferential justification for at least one belief. So if I don't need indeterministic freedom there - if I don't need to "get behind" anything to compare the foundational belief to x, y, or z in order to know it - then why would I need it anywhere else?
I can imagine one final analogization from Manion's foregoing dialog: "“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature? ...We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature." Again, for the sake of argument, exchange "God" for "nature."
Obviously, a Reformed Christian will hold to a Creator-creature distinction and deny that we are a part of God. As I said above, we have our own thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions. That these are caused does not make them any less ours. When God created the earth, His causing its existence does not imply that the earth was a part of God.
Nor are we passive creations, mere vessels or repositories. We move. It's just that our movement is not by way of self-origination. Sometimes, only God moves, such as when He first gives us the regenerative grace necessary and sufficient for us to only then have the possibility - indeed, it determines us - to move back toward God. To use an illustration opposite to one I mentioned earlier, in regeneration, God, as He brings Himself near to us, changes our magnetic pole to such that we become drawn and move to Him. God is the originator of His and our movement, yet it is still we who move. And in our movement back to God, we are shown why indeterministic freedom is not needed to explain how co-operation or synergy with God is possible.
Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:
What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us?
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