Last year, I posted a few extended comments on a footnote that referenced Gordon Clark in chapter 11 of Without Excuse (link). In this post, I plan to focus attention on chapter one. It's the essay I found to be the most interesting, contains the only other mentions of Clark in the book, and can also be read for free (link).
The author, M. Dan Kemp, proposes the following thesis: “…if the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge, attempts to verify the Christian Scriptures are not epistemically profitable” (pg. 1). When I read this for the first time, it sounded like Mr. Kemp was suggesting that a Christian foundationalist who accepts Scripture as his epistemic foundation cannot know his epistemic foundation by inferential reasoning. Therefore, any further attempts made towards that end - knowing the Christian Scriptures are true - would not be profitable.
I would have agreed with Mr. Kemp to the extent that the sort of "human knowledge" in question are true beliefs humans have that are epistemically justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense. That is, in some contexts, while I think "knowledge" might legitimately refer to something other than this (e.g. mere true beliefs; true beliefs that are justified in an externalist sense), there are ways in which internalist and infallibilist "knowledge" is distinctively important. I think the latter knowledge alone can provide grounds for full assurance of salvation or a defense of one's beliefs. With these qualifications in mind - and the importance of these qualification will become more apparent later on - Mr. Kemp's thesis seems sound.
Immediately following this thesis, however, Mr. Kemp says:
This result is particularly acute in readings of Scripture passages that seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God. I argue that the position put forward by Clark, Van Til, and Frame entails a reading of these passages that renders them useless as criteria of verification, even though, on the contrary, the passages present themselves as such. In short, the popular reply to critics of the Clark and Van Til school mentioned above does not succeed. (Without Excuse, pgs. 1-2)
As I initially read this, the first question I had was what Mr. Kemp thinks "verification" means. More on this below.
The second question I had was why Mr. Kemp seems to suggest that Clark, Van Til, and Frame had a singular "position" on this topic. From what follows in the rest of the chapter, Clark would have certainly disagreed with Frame et al. if, as Mr. Kemp thinks, these authors really were "insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means" (pg. 10). By at least the time he wrote "How Firm a Foundation?" in 1943 (also see below), there can be no question about how Clark viewed Scripture for the rest of his life.
Clark did not think exactly as Frame and Van Til did. This fact is actually indicated by the only time Clark is even quoted in the entire chapter (in a section Mr. Kemp entitles, “Justification and Circularity,” no less!):
How do we know if a purported first principle is correct? Consider again the exchange about my birth city. If the Christian Scriptures are the first principle of reason, then it will not do for me to end the conversation by asserting that reliable witnesses, sensory experience, and memory ought to be believed. Even these principles require rational justification. Gordon Clark says,
Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically…Since therefore every philosophy must have its first indemonstrable axiom, the secularist cannot deny the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom. Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures. This is the Reformation principle sola scriptura. (Without Excuse, pg. 7)
Take another example of Clark's thought on this subject:
A recent book on Classical Apologetics tries to prove the divine origin and infallibility of the Bible on the premise that the Bible contains accounts of God’s miracles. This is circular reasoning: How do you know the Bible is God’s Word? Because it contains accounts of God’s miracles. How do you know that the accounts are true? Because they are in God’s inerrant Scripture! If anyone wish to prove that the Bible is a divine revelation, his premise cannot be the Bible itself. One does not prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis that the squares of the other two sides equal the square of the hypotenuse. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pg. 314 [originally published in 1986 in his book, First & Second Thessalonians])
Is it not clear that Clark's position is different from any position which suggests that "first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means"? To my knowledge, there are only a few places one might try to find some indication that Clark approved of circular reasoning. The first comes from an article Clark wrote on "Apologetics" in 1957. In providing his understanding of Van Til's apologetic, Clark wrote:
In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought.
But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.
In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry, it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry.
At least three observations mitigate against interpreting the above as evidence that Clark's accepted the epistemic legitimacy of circular reasoning. Firstly, Clark is expositing Van Til's thought, not expressing his own. As the rest of the article shows, Clark's "grasp" of Van Til of Van Til's thought cannot be equated with his acceptance of Van Til's thought.
Secondly, anyone who believes that the above summary implies some measure of agreement between Clark and Van Til must first acknowledge Clark's own qualifications: axioms "control" theorems, circular reasoning is only "loosely" allowed as a referent to the geometric analogy (in particular), etc. This is not the language of traditional coherentism.
Finally, the above context is not only about Van Til's thought in general, it's specific to Van Til's thought on apologetics. The title of the article itself makes that obvious. This is important, as epistemology (the focus of Mr. Kemp's essay) is a distinct discipline. Apologetics is a discipline which itself presupposes epistemology. An allowance for self-reference or circular reasoning in a context in which one is defending his faith (see below) is entirely different from allowing self-reference or circular reasoning in a context of epistemic justification (see the above quotes from Clark).
So much for this example. The only other location I could find that might afford reason for thinking Clark advocated circular reasoning is from an article he wrote in 1963 entitled, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" He writes:
The first reason for believing the Bible is inspired is that the Bible claims to be inspired. When this reason is offered to an unbeliever, almost always his immediate reaction is derision. To him it is very much like putting a liar on the witness stand and having him swear to tell the truth. But why a liar? Do not honest witnesses also swear to tell the truth? Yet even a Christian with a smattering of logic may object to this procedure because it seems to beg the question. It is circular. We believe the Bible to be inspired because it makes the claim, and we believe the claim because it is inspired and therefore true. This does not seem to be the right way to argue.
It must be granted that not every claim is ipso facto true. There have been false witnesses in court, there have been false Messiahs, and there have been fraudulent so-called revelations. But to ignore the claim of the Bible, or of witnesses generally, is both an oversimplification and a mistake. For example, suppose the Bible actually says that it is not inspired. Or suppose merely that the Bible is completely silent on the subject – that it makes no more claim to divine inspiration than did Churchill. In such a case, if the Christian asserts that the book is inspired, the unbeliever would be sure to reply that he is going far beyond the evidence.This reply is certainly just. There is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible. But because this reply is so just, it follows that the unbeliever’s derision at our first remark was groundless. What the Bible claims is an essential part of the argument. The Christian is well within the boundaries of logic to insist that the first reason for believing in the inspiration of the Bible is that it makes this claim. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 2-3)
It may initially appear as if Clark is admitting as legitimate a circular "procedure." But even here, Clark admits that self-attestation simpliciter does not constitute a proof - as he puts it, "not every claim is ipso facto true." For example, the Bible claims to be God's word and the Quran claims to be God's word. Yet because the Bible contradicts the Quran, both claims cannot be true. An argument regarding the self-attesting nature of a source does not "prove" either is what it claims to be.
But Clark does acknowledge that self-attestation is apologetically legitimate. A Christian can at least begin his defense of his faith by noting that the Bible claims to be God's word. But, for Clark, a "reason for believing the Bible" is not a suggestion that one's belief in the Bible is founded upon some more basic epistemic truth. Anyone who thinks that failed to read the rest of the article, let alone the rest of Clark's works. Clark clarifies:
Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so. But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry. Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21)
Note that for Clark, self-attestation is not purported to be a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Rather, he emphasizes that an objection Christians face regarding circular reasoning can be applied tu quoque to the objectors. Clark agrees with Mr. Kemp that “If Scriptures forms the basis of all knowledge, then all arguments for the trustworthiness of Scripture are circular” (pg. 2) - and then he extends this point to other worldviews with stated first principles. An apologetic which uses circular reasoning (e.g. self-attestation), as a means of converting unbelievers is not deficient; after all, how can anyone who would attempt defend his own, primary, indemonstrable premises do so without first knowing such premises?
Again, apologetics presupposes epistemology. Thus, Clark is not suggesting that one's own, primary, indemonstrable premises are epistemically grounded in or demonstrated by prior reasons. This would be incoherent. For those interested, I've written more on coherentism, foundationalism, and self-attestation here and here.
Bringing the conversation back to Mr. Kemp's article:
however Mr. Kemp responds to Frame et. al., his reply to Clark ought to be
somewhat different. Here is the extent of Mr. Kemp's reply to the first Clark
quote he referenced above:
According to this view, God’s
revelation is the only ultimate principle. This claim has vexed many who hear
it. If God’s revelation is the ultimate basis of all reason and
knowledge, arguing with self-proclaimed nonbelievers becomes very
complicated. On the one hand, the aim is to rationally motivate belief in the
truth of the Christian Scriptures. On the other hand, on this view, reason
presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures.
According to many who have espoused
this view, the necessity of always and everywhere presupposing a proposition
does not preclude the possibility of providing evidence for that proposition.
Advocates of this view often emphatically tell us that evidence can be best,
and indeed only, given for the existence of God when those evidences are put
forth and interpreted according to “theistic standards,” which presuppose the
existence of God. (Without Excuse, pgs. 7-8)
We return to the crux of the issue: apologetics vs. epistemology. One can defend the faith by attacking another's first principles. Does such a procedure proceed from one's own first principles? Yes. And is the presuppositionalist suggesting that reason is only intelligible within the Christian worldview? Yes. But does that make the matter "very complicated," as Mr. Kemp suggests? I think not. It is legitimate and may be persuasive insofar as two people may share beliefs in common through which only one system can provide legitimate justification. I could just say that "the Bible is the basis for all knowledge; therefore, whatever basis you have can't be known." But an apologetic doesn't have to be that.
I've spoken on this before (link, link), but let's ask anyway: "Why not? Can't the Spirit work to convict the minds of
sinners, no matter what? If the root of the problem unbelievers have with
Scripture is an ethical rebellion to it, isn’t proclaiming the simple truth
sufficient opportunity by which the Spirit may work to remove an unbeliever’s rebellious
spirit?" Sure - but the Spirit also works through ordinary means, and such may
also involve removing barriers to belief. Stopping the mouths of unbelievers
might involve explaining why their worldview does not account
for knowledge. This could be persuasive even though it is an apologetic which
proceeds from one's own, unproved first principle. That has uses.
If I ask someone who is blindfolded which picture I've drawn represents a person, they
won’t be able to determine what I am drawing before their blindfold is removed.
On the other hand, a picture must nevertheless be present so that if the
blindfold is removed, they can determine what has been drawn. Now, I might draw
a simple stick figure. If a drawing must be present for the
blindfold to be removed, a simple picture would indeed suffice. The person
whose blindfold is removed might even be able to pick out my drawing of a stick
figure amongst other pictures that are not of persons. On the other hand, it
wouldn’t hurt for me to erase some pictures beforehand so that a person is more
apt to focus on my person picture – simply conceived or more well-drawn – in the case
the blindfold is removed.
The blindfold is ethical rebellion, and only the Spirit can remove it. But the Spirit does so only when the truth is set before someone. It is often the case that the Spirit works when we do and rewards extra effort we put in. Part of this process can include erasing false pictures or worldviews. That removes barriers to aid in focusing on the truth, which has rational motivation and yet does not require an epistemology on which the truth of the Christian Scriptures are known by inference or verification.
Also, apologetics is not just a rational enterprise. There is not only value in a defense of the faith along rational lines. If we are created by God, may we not suppose beauty, behavior, etc. have a role in persuasion (link)? Aesthetics matter - drawing on the above illustration, for example, there are better and worse pictorial representations of persons (and better and worse representations of Christianity), even if all the representations truly are of persons (and Christianity).
While Mr. Kemp may find it vexing that God's revelation ought to be regarded as the "basis" of human reason, Clark simplifies what Mr. Kemp views as a complicated apologetic situation in the following article Clark wrote in 1943, which I quote at length:
But the large majority of people who call themselves Christian in this twentieth century regard the Bible as a very infirm foundation. The appeal today is to experience and reason. It is even stated that it is of no use to talk with those who believe the Bible because talking itself is an appeal to reason. One must choose either reason or authority; one cannot have his Bible and his reason too.
A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision.
The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.
Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority?
The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority.
Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant.
A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason.
This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe. (link, 1943. "How Firm a Foundation?" The Presbyterian Guardian Sep. 10, Vol. 12, No. 16, 252.)
Mr. Kemp's vexation with Clark's presuppositionalism was whether "self-proclaimed nonbelievers" can be "rationally motivate[d to] belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures." Clark's above reply demonstrates that such apologetic persuasion is possible but dependent on the work of the Spirit: properly grounded human reason indeed "presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures," the very thing nonbelievers reject. Yet because the Spirit operates through the witness of believers, a believer may "aim... to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures" while prayerfully relying on the Spirit to remove any kind of barrier to the apologist's rational argumentation.
Does anyone deny that grace is necessary for unbelievers to accept [the premises of] Christianity? I would think Mr. Kemp would also admit this. Neither the presuppositionalist nor Mr, Kemp can ipso facto cause a change of mind by argumentation. To be fair, Mr. Kemp is not the only person who has struggled to understand the importance of the Spirit in Clark's apologetic. Even church historians such as Alan D. Strange have a false understanding:
One might argue that mysticism and pietism emphasize the Spirit without the Word and rationalism and orthodoxism the Word without the Spirit. The OPC has consciously sought to avoid both of these errors, the former in something like the Peniel movement and the latter in something like the Clark case... (Confident of Better Things, pg. 74)
Mr. Strange must be ignorant of articles such as "How Firm a Foundation?" For historians to perpetuate errors such as these illustrates the need for further research about what Clark actually thought.
So rational motivation is possible. Clark thought unbelievers could reason validly insofar as they can accept conclusions which logically follow from certain premises - and they can do this even apart from presupposing the truth of Christian Scriptures. Unbelievers are still images of God, and they can follow valid arguments Christians make, so Christians have a point of contact with unbelievers in that they can show the reasoning of unbelievers to be unsound or false. That is, while unbelievers can reason validly, such reasoning will not be sound and cannot count as knowledge in an internalist, infallibilist sense, for the premises of unbelievers will necessarily either be false or unknowable (given the worldview of the unbeliever).
Again, this all deals in apologetics. We aren't proving Christianity by arguing against others' worldviews, but we are implicitly defending it. Practically speaking (which is what apologetics is concerned with, insofar as the apologetic used is also true), an unbeliever won't have an infinite number of alternative worldviews in mind when you're discussing with him.
Mr. Kemp can't categorize Clark with those who think that Scripture could be epistemically evidenced. All this points to a failure by Mr. Kemp to make good on his statement that Clark's "school" of thought doesn’t “succeed.” In fact, Clark's school of thought is barely engaged!
This ends Mr. Kemp's explicit reference to Clark, but I'll address what other parts of the chapter I think are relevant to his thought - not necessarily in page order - beginning with the question of what Mr. Kemp meant when he suggested that "Scripture passages... seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God."
What Mr. Kemp means may involve an implicit critique of Clark even if we distinguish Clark's view from that of Frame, Van Til, and others. What, then, does Mr. Kemp mean by "verification"? It appears he means something like "infer[ential reasoning]."
First principles are known indemonstrably. They are not known by inference from some other proposition. No argument can be given for first principles, but the Bible seems to assume that arguments for divine revelation can be given. Thus, Frame has not shown us why we should not read Scripture as prima facie evidence against the view that Scripture is the first principle of all knowledge. In fact, he makes matters worse by suggesting we “broaden the circle.” Increasing the distance between, say, “God exists” in the conclusion and “God exists” in the premises only gives the appearance of demonstrative knowledge. But in fact, insofar as such arguments are subjectively persuasive, they present a first principle as if it were something else. This is telling since it does not necessarily count against a belief to be put forward as self-justifying. But they should be asserted in their naked glory so that they can be known by themselves (per se) or their lack of self-evidence acknowledged. This constant inclination to regard Christianity as demonstrable may, I suggest, be the result of the operative but unacknowledged belief that it does not form the basic principle of all knowledge.
Scripture provides examples of God’s Word being tested. Further, these instances of verification are not plausibly explained as broadly circular arguments, that is, circular arguments that incorporate several premises. Broadly circular arguments include premises and sub-arguments that do not provide evidence for the conclusion. They do not make the conclusion more credible than otherwise. Thus, they are not useful as arguments. They are psychologically useful or persuasive, as my argument notes, but this is the very problematic thing about them. Their usefulness is not in any rational element in them, and thus they are deceptive as arguments. It is therefore not flattering to Scripture to understand it as putting forth broadly circular arguments when alternative interpretations are available.
This result prompts us to consider that there may be multiple first principles of knowledge rather than just one. Knowledge is not a system neatly worked out from a single indemonstrable axiom. Rather, there are many sources of knowledge—sensory experience, testimony, memory, conscience, and divine revelation—working together to inform our judgments. I leave the task of working out these various faculties of knowledge for another day. (Without Excuse, pg. 30)
I'll return to "verification" in a moment. Mr. Kemp says he leaves the defense of his own position for another day, so I would normally absent myself from feeling the need to critique his view except where his attacks against my position provide occasion for it. That will largely be the case since I've talked about the topics he mentions in other posts. But Mr. Kemp does provide a few remarks about his own position that I'll address.
One must first question what is Mr. Kemp's working definition of "knowledge." He writes, "A source of knowledge can be without a foundation and fallible" (pg. 6). Firstly, this is not the sort of "knowledge" presuppositionalists like Clark primarily are interested in, so if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that the presuppositionalist's claim that God's word is the basis for "all knowledge" includes "fallible knowledge," his entire chapter sadly rests on an equivocation and false assumption. He has smuggled into the definition of "knowledge" something with which the presuppositionalist is unconcerned. That is, I'm not aware of any presuppositionalist who would suggest that the Bible is the source of all ranges of meaning of "knowledge." Secondly, while Mr. Kemp says his "next few paragraphs will show" that his claim is true, I must be missing where he did that (or else I would have replied). Closest I can find actually is on pg. 4, which comes earlier:
...imagine that you ask me why it is that I believe that I was born in Nuremburg. I reply that my parents told me I was. If you ask me why I believe my parents, I will tell you that they have been generally reliable in the past. Now here you can ask me at least two questions: (a) how I know that my parents have been reliable, and (b) why reliable witnesses ought to be believed. There appears to be no answer to (b), which asks for a reason to believe a self-evidently true proposition. Under normal conditions, and absent defeaters, reliable witnesses ought to be believed. My answer to (a) might be that my senses and memory tell me that many things my parents told me were in fact true. You might then ask me why I ought to trust my senses and why I ought to trust my memory. To that, again, I need not give an answer. I do not draw an inference from some more basic principle to my trust in my senses and memory. I just find myself doing so, and it seems right to do so.
It "seems right"? Is this really enough to "rationally motivate" anyone to accept Mr. Kemp's view? There's a seeming double standard at play. Now, I actually think Mr. Kemp's position could be tweaked to fit within the presuppositionalist system. But if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that he can "know" he was born in Nuremburg apart from a worldview grounded in divine revelation, I think he is mistaken. Clark made the point that children can be switched at birth - unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible. And if Mr. Kemp isn't talking about infallible knowledge, we must again point out to Mr. Kemp that Clark's presuppositionalism (at least) is concerned with full assurance or infallibilist justification. Admitting we could be "defeated" is precisely what we want to avoid when we defend Christianity.
Also, we could discuss what counts as a "reliable witness." Scripture itself is a "reliable" witness - an infallible witness - so there is a sense in which one can agree that "reliable" witnesses ought to be trusted. But short of infallibility, what counts as "reliable"? Now, if Scripture legitimizes certain, fallible witnesses, we have an answer to this question. But this again grounds our worldview in divine revelation, precisely what Mr. Kemp wants to deny. Instead, he doesn’t find anything "more basic" (trustworthy?) than his memory or senses. He says these are all something like conjoint first principles, “ultimate” in that each cannot “be reasonably questioned.” Can’t they? Didn't I just do that in the last few paragraphs?
It is interesting that while Mr. Kemp says he can't find anything more basic that his memory or senses, he advocates for the idea that Scripture is "absolutely ultimate" in that it can "override" anything contradictory and cannot be overridden. So at least Mr. Kemp agrees that Scripture can't be defeated. But that admission concedes that "knowledge" had by divine revelation is in a different category altogether. As I said, Mr. Kemp pushes a multi-source theory of "knowledge" but equivocates on the meaning of the word. This undermines his thesis.
If the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge - as presuppositionalists whom Kemp intends to engage believe - then infinitism is not a live option. If Scripture itself can be known - as Christians should affirm - then neither is positism. I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. I further discuss why I disagree with these proposals regarding the structure of epistemic justification here, here, and here. That leaves foundationalism.
Given the above, let's run through the rest of what Mr. Kemp says: does accepting foundationalism mean "No argument can be given for first principles"? As discussed already, no: apologetic arguments can be given. Is there a "rational" element in this argumentation? Yes: while the argumentation does not increase the epistemic justification for belief in God's word, removing intellectual barriers is rational. Displaying (to what extent is possible for us) the internal consistency of God's word is rational. Drawing better pictures is rational.
But further, is it "deceptive" to make arguments that are non-rational, psychological, or persuasive? How does that follow? I've given the following illustration several times before that shows just how nonsensical is Mr. Kemp's assertion (link):
When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).
How is it deceptive for a mother to identify herself when she thinks such might cause a correction in her child's behavior?
Similarly, experiencing what we already know is valuable. We can have full assurance of our complete salvation while we yet look forward to experiencing our great reward. We can have full assurance that God's word is true without having experienced said truth in certain ways: divine providence, historical confirmations, prayerful effectuality, etc. But when we do experience these things, it isn't deceptive to bring them up to those who would attempt to undermine our foundation.
That ties in to another dimension of our Christian life: to behave like a Christian. Do we not defend our faith to remain faithful in the face of persecution, even to the point of martyrdom? How about when we sacrifice to help others? I suppose Mr. Kemp could reply that such behavioral apologetics are really rational in that we suffer unto glory and are humiliated unto exaltation (like our Savior), but I don't think something like rational anticipation of future reward is often (let alone always) in the minds of believers and unbelievers in these cases.
Arguments for divine revelation can be given, then. No one denies that. The question is whether such are of "epistemic profit." Mr. Kemp thinks so, citing a few Scriptures. He claims, “…no complicated exegesis is required for my argument” (pg. 3). Well, whether that is so or not is irrelevant. What matters is if his exegesis is sound, and I will argue it is not.
The first passage cited is Exodus 4. But when one reads this passage, all that is indicated is that if one sign does not persuade the Israelites, another might. This is language of causation: certain signs might cause them to believe. Nowhere is it suggested that miracles are epistemically more basic than or on par with divine revelation, as if the word of God through Moses was itself insufficient. So if "verification" refers to epistemic inference, it isn’t unintelligible to deny Mr. Kemp's assertion that “Moses’ authority as a speaker of God’s word is verified by miraculous events” (pg. 13). At most, we can say that what is happening is that gracious Yahweh is drawing the Israelites fuller, better pictures. But even this is apologetic, not epistemic.
The second passage Mr. Kemp mentions is Deuteronomy 18. Mr. Kemp says, “Deuteronomy anticipates that some would claim to receive a prophecy from God, and that such claims will need to be tested” (pg. 13). Well, tested, yes. Verified, no; rather, falsified. Read verse 21 closely: "How may we know the word that the Lord has not spoken?"
Now, we could delve into what meaning of "know" might here be in use. The crux, though, is that this passage primarily deal with how to falsify false prophets. In fact, any two people can predict contradictories ("It will rain tomorrow;" "It will not rain tomorrow"), both claim divine prophecy, and one will be falsified. And while the other will be right, does that mean the Mr. Kemp thinks said person has been verified as a divine prophet? I doubt it. As a species of divine revelation, the Bible does not require external, epistemic authentication.
[Side note: our foundational principle ought to be more broad than that Scripture is the sole source or basis of all knowledge (link). Something like, "
To summarize the response to Mr. Kemp's citations, then, the biblical contexts he mentions do not say that inspired revelations “appeal to something other than themselves… in order to be known as Scripture” (pg. 15). In fact, in one context, "knowledge" isn’t even mentioned, and in the other, the only "knowledge" given is of who is not a prophet. Further, Deuteronomy 18 is only applicable if one even thinks to ask the question in the first place.
I'll also offer some pushback against statements like, “God does not deliver the Word and then remain silent, expecting the recipients to take it on a sheer leap of blind faith” (pg. 14). What does Mr. Kemp make of Abraham's ordeal in Genesis 22 (cf. Hebrews 11)? And was Abraham's faith "blind," or did he not have every reason to suppose Isaac would return with him? Either way, God's word was itself sufficient for Abraham to know to obey.
I've been critical of Mr. Kemp throughout this post, but I will end on a positive note. I said earlier that I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. After citing Greg Bahnsen and John Frame on pgs. 9-10, I'll repeat an earlier quote: “The thought pushed by Bahnsen and Frame in these passages departs with this school by insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means” (pg. 10).
Now, I'll leave it to Van Tilian apologists to make their own case on behalf of Bahnsen and Frame. My initial impression is that Mr. Kemp has a point against Frame and makes a good case for it in the rest of his chapter. The Bahnsen citation could instead be a reference to a sort of coherentism that actually is meta-justificatory foundationalism (link). If I'm right, while I would disagree with Bahnsen, I don't know if he can be called a traditional coherentist (i.e. circularist). In any case, Clark cannot be associated with these views, and I hope we see more future engagement with his actual thought from theologians and philosophers.
No comments:
Post a Comment