Unapologetica: Are the Senses Trustworthy in Any Sense? (And What Did Gordon Clark Think?)

A sarcastic tweet sparked a conversation I felt worthwhile to preserve. The initial tweet - which was reposted in a public facebook group of which I am a member - was:

It's impossible to trust your sense perception of the world, unless it's your eyes reading words on the pages of the Bible, then your sense perception is infallible somehow.

The idea is the same-old objection to Scripturalism: "Don't you have to read the Bible?" This horse has been beat to death because, as I said in my initial comment replying to this tweet:

This is a conflation of metaphysics (specifically, a question of causation) with epistemology (reasons). Clark actually made the same mistake, I think, which is why he opted for occasionalism (a metaphysical theory of causation) when such wasn't necessary.
Suppose our senses do function as secondary causes of our beliefs. So what? That doesn't mean I have to ground my belief in sensation (in terms of reasoning).

Getting burnt by boiling water might have functioned as a secondary cause according to which I decide to go to the hospital to get help. That doesn't mean my belief in the value of hospitals in helping me heal is grounded in my having been burnt by boiling water. Again, that conflates metaphysics and epistemology.

I've addressed this in old posts (link, link). I mentioned one of these links in reply to someone who asked if I had elaborated on my above comment anywhere else. And this is what kicked off the following, long conversation about whether the senses are trustworthy (in any sense) as well as whether there is evidence Gordon Clark thought the senses are trustworthy (in some sense).

The idea that both answer are yes might sound incredible to readers of Clark. Clark, of course, eviscerated empiricism in his lifetime. Note, though, that the question isn't whether Clark ever accepted empiricism but rather whether there is evidence Gordon Clark thought the senses are trustworthy (in some sense). And there is.

While the group is public, I'll avoid using the real names of my interlocutors. The comments of the first one will be indented, and my responses to him will not. His initial reply to me was:

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So, and just to clarify what imo is the issue being raised, I think (and I may be wrong - I'm not the best at this) is the *trustworthiness* of "senses functioning as secondary causes of our beliefs". And 'trustworthiness' here refers to whether those beliefs so produced are true or not. Is it the case that senses function as secondary causes of *true beliefs* to the extent that senses are trustworthy? If I remember correctly GHC and JR both said that even if senses produced 1 error then it could not be trusted, etc.... could it be that this is why GHC opted for a different explanation for such beliefs (whether he was an occasionalist - I now admit I don't really know). Anyway thanks for considering.

You have the right idea.

"GHC and JR both said that even if senses produced 1 error then it could not be trusted"

What does "produced" mean? We need to distinguish between metaphysical causation of beliefs and epistemological reasons for beliefs.

For example, Clark and Robbins accept that God is the ultimate cause of all things. So now reread your statement in this way: "even if [God] produced 1 error then [He] could not be trusted"

Does God "produce" error? Well, insofar as He is the ultimate cause of all things, He certainly causes erroneous beliefs. But do we conclude that we should not *trust* God? No.

This shows that causation is largely irrelevant to the conversation. This is why I say occasionalism (a theory of causation) was never necessary to resolve what is actually an epistemological question.

That is, we must return to whether sensations function as an epistemological reason for our beliefs. Must we infer our present beliefs in God's word from our beliefs in the reliability of sensation? I say no - this is backwards. Rather, we can infer the general reliability of the senses (i.e. in their being able to generally - although not always - function as secondary causes of true beliefs) from our foundationally justified belief in God's word.

Does that make sense?

So, are the senses as secondary causes of true belief trustworthy? Or to ask it as the pic does, is our sense perception of the world trustworthy?

I think we can generally trust our senses in that we have reason to believe the senses were designed to function as second causes of true beliefs. But note:

1. Our belief in God's word is our foundational reason for having any sense of "trust" in our senses in the first place.

2. Sin inhibits us from absolute trust that our senses function optimally. That is, original sin is such that senses can even sometimes - although not generally, I think - function defectively and cause false beliefs.

3. Even when we are no longer able to sin - even when we no longer have any reason to think that senses might function as second causes of false beliefs - it will still be the case that we must distinguish metaphysical causation from epistemological reasons. That is, even after the last judgment, divine revelation will always have epistemic primacy.

do you think that GHC or JR agrees with you on "we can generally trust our senses in that we have reason to believe the senses were designed to function as second causes of true beliefs." Any citations to that effect?

I haven't made it a point to know much of Robbins' output.

Regarding Clark, despite my suspicion that his late acceptance of occasionalism was a result of succumbing to the pressures of objections such as those raised in the original post, I do have citations that I think suggest he thought (at some point) as I do. The following is from a 1975 unpublished presentation of a brief as the counsel of the Hawleys regarding the session of the First Bible Presbyterian Church of Indianapolis before the Judicial Commission of the RPCES, August 18-19. Note Clark's understanding of Matthew 7 (see the last paragraph) as it relates to the surrounding context of courtroom decisions, especially as "courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document." Clark writes:

//Since now the case has been brought before Synod’s Judicial Commission, there is one phase in the Committee’s tentative draft, an idea doubtless in the minds of others, which needs attention. The Committee said that one of the charges against the Session “can probably not be sustained because they [it is[ are built on the judging of intentions that can only be known to God.” Private correspondence suggests that this consideration had some weight with presbytery. However, the statement could hardly have been made by a man of legal experience, for it is contrary to court procedure. It is also contrary to the Biblical material.

First, as to court procedure, the Committee, since it no doubt would not subscribe to a behavioristic theory of jurisprudence and define intention by observable actions, must have considered intention as a subjective state of mind. This state of mind is further defined as the decision to engage is a course of action with the knowledge or expectation that certain foreseen results will occur. Intention is not motive. An ancient legal example is that of the Russian anarchists who plotted to blow up the Czar’s train. Their motive was to kill the Czar. Their intention was to kill everybody near him. Intention refers to all the foreseen results.

Since the foresight is subjective, it is seldom if ever capable of direct verification. But it can be arrived at by such just and reasonable deduction, from the actions and words proven, as the good judgment of a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily draw from them.

Intention, instead of being something courts of law cannot look into, is a matter that they determine on a regular basis every day. A Latin adage is, Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. In English, An act does not make the agent guilty, unless the mind is guilty. This is one of the nicest maxims of the common law.

Nor is the determination of intent confined to criminal cases. Since conviction for the worst of criminal offenses, premeditated murder, depends on the determination of intent, it is not surprising that less serious cases can also depend on intent. A contract or a will is simply an expression of the intent of the parties or testator. The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.

This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.” Far from teaching that human courts cannot or should not judge the intentions of the heart, the Mosaic Law insists that human courts should judge intent. One must admit that God alone never makes a mistake in judgment. Human courts do in fact err at times. Nevertheless God commands human courts to judge intent. Numbers, chapter 35, sets forth an entirely different course of action for those who kill intentionally as opposed to those who kill unintentionally. Therefore on the basis of the Old Testament we assert that this Commission is authorized to judge intent. If further the New Testament in 1 Corinthians 6:1-8 assigns higher jurisdiction to church courts than to secular courts, the conclusion is justified by the New as well as by the Old.//

"First, sensation or perception is untrustworthy"...etc.... Language and Theology. I think the 1st edition is 1980.

Right. He means they are not absolutely trustworthy, which I already said. The senses should not be the sound basis for one's philosophy. Read one paragraph just prior to your quote:

"In the analyses of Logical Positivism and similar views, some arguments against empiricism have been indicated. The reader should consult the 2500-year history of philosophy. A few samples, if seriously considered, will suffice for the present purpose."

Clark makes no distinction between “absolute trust” and some lesser degree of trust (“general trust”) in reference to sense or perception. Empiricism fails because -firstly (among other samples)- sense or perception is untrustworthy*. Clark then dives into examples – neither does he attribute untrustworthiness to original sin. Clark never answers the question "Don't you (have to) read your Bible?" with something to the effect that "I think we can generally trust our senses in that we have [Scriptural] reason to believe the senses were designed to function as second causes of true beliefs".

*for untrustworthy: “If a witness in a criminal case is shown to have perjured himself, how much credence do you give to the other statements he made. If your eyes deceive you once you can’t believe any of it.” From “What is Apologetics,” The Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics, 1981. Minute 36. See footnote 2 here https://www.douglasdouma.com/.../gordon-clark-on-the.../...

Somehow, I missed that you replied. In any case, please read the entire context of your citation here:
https://gordonhclark.com/audio-transcript-6-what-is.../

Notice that Clark is talking about empirical epistemology. I repeat, nothing I've said or cited from Clark supports an empirical epistemology, so I can only think you misunderstand what I've meant by general trustworthiness and need to reread my posts.

Further, from the above source, specifically read the following exchange:

//[Student On what basis do you say… so if you were a court justice, would just throw out the
whole court system?]

Clark: No, I wouldn’t. I would admit that it is frequently mistaken.

[Student: So are you then saying that sometimes our senses can be mistaken?]

Clark: Yes.

[Student: Or are you saying that they’re totally untrustworthy?]

Clark: If they contradict, one of them may be right, you know. If the two things are contraries, why
then, they can both be wrong. But if they’re contradictories, one must be right. The trouble is you
can’t tell which. You know one is wrong, but you don’t know which one’s wrong.//

Note that Clark does NOT affirm that the senses are "totally untrustworthy," only that IF they [lead to] contradictories, one must be right.

You have not addressed my citation in which Clark was an actual counsel in an actual Presbyterian court case in which he DEFENDS human courts (and even cites Matthew 7:16). And even in your own citation, Clark says he would not throw out human courts just because the senses are fallible (i.e. not absolutely trustworthy, a distinction I have no problem with and already myself made several times now). I repeat, the following are Clark's own words:

"The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.

Does it follow from Clark's NOT explicitly affirming in that portion of the exchange that the senses are "totally untrustworthy" and by putting forth those conditionals, that he means to say the senses are "generally trustworthy" to function as secondary causes of true beliefs? I don't see how. As for context, why is it that just after your citation ends, when the student replies, in effect, as you have, and then asked about reading/hearing the Bible, that Clark said "I shall take up that question, but at present, I wish to show that you can’t trust your senses"? Anyway, I also refer you back to the quote (from Douma). As for your court citation -did it ever dawn on you that if Clark used "occasionalism" (as you alluded to previously) as his explanation for reading the Bible, then maybe just maybe that same "occasionalism" could also explain "examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document"?

Your hypothesis would mean Clark thought we could have had infallible, extrabiblical knowledge, whereas I've already shown in the very quote that he thought human courts could err.

Again, you are not distinguishing contexts in which Clark is attacking an empiricist worldview from one's in which he is not.

Hypothesis? I'm not putting forward any such thing. I'm countering your insistence that Clark taught that the senses are 'generally trustworthy' to produce true belief. Your courtroom citation shows no such thing: "examining" (or reading the Bible for that matter) is just as compatible with what you call Clark's "occasionalism" as it is with your notion that the senses cause true belief. It's not a hypothesis, it's a logical point meant to show that your use of the citation is more innuendo than entailment. Again, I point you to what Clark actually said when discussing the matter of the trustworthiness of the senses. That's all I'm doing. No hypothesis building going on here.

You are avoiding my point: do you think Clark affirmed that God directly illumines/causes our minds to infallibly know extra-biblical information?

Here's what I think. You put forward the notion that Clark's "late acceptance of occasionalism was a result of succumbing to the pressures of objections such as those raised in the original post". Ok. Assuming you are correct (which I have no idea if you are), and since I have not really seen what Clark lays out as to exactly what this 'occasionalism' is or entails, I'd (in a fit of good will) suppose (at least at this moment in time) that late Clark's version of occasionalism (if there be such a thing) would at the very least be compatible with both (1) his definition of knowledge and (2) his account of the untrustworthiness of the senses (summed up as "sense or perception is untrustworthy", and "you cannot believe any of it") and would (3) have an account of human error such that everyday things like reading or examining evidence -replete with the possibility of human error- are as compatible with it as you think those things are compatible with your "general trustworthiness of the senses as secondary causes of true belief" (phraseology Clark never used when discussing the (un)trustworthiness of the senses).

I appreciate the civil response. I've basically been arguing what you have outlined, with the qualification that Clark sometimes uses the same word to mean different things (given different contexts). I'll give an example.

You say that "late Clark's version of occasionalism (if there be such a thing) would at the very least be compatible... with... his definition of knowledge." This is correct, but we must recognize that Clark will use the word "knowledge" to mean different things in different contexts. He even admits this:

//The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. (The Pastoral Epistles, pg. 166).//

Now, Clark's usual use of "knowledge" was the meaning he associated with a "basic epistemology." Knowledge with a Capital K, as he puts it, by which "certainty" is possible (see: Clark and His Critics, pgs. 75-76).

But there are other times he uses the word "knowledge" differently. Take this example:

//Though dim and restricted, this natural knowledge of God is not to be denied. Romans 1:20 may not guarantee the validity of the theistic proofs, but it plainly asserts some knowledge of God derived from “the things that are made.” Romans 2:15 shows a minimal a priori knowledge of moral principles. On such natural knowledge human responsibility depends. When Karl Barth argues that the heathen which Paul has in view are not the heathen generally but only those to whom he had preached the Gospel, so that all the others have no knowledge of God at all, we regret that his exegetical powers failed him (compare Church Dogmatics, II:1:119ff ). Yet this natural knowledge is minimal in extent and practically useless in communicating the way of salvation. Who can deny that the savage tribes of the jungles know very little about God? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 92-93)//

The sort of "natural knowledge" for which Clark advocates is extra-biblical. Clearly, then, it cannot be the same knowledge with a Capital K that he speaks of elsewhere, for this would refute his own advocacy for a revelational epistemology.

Let's make this explicit. Here's how Clark sometimes defines and uses "knowledge":

//"How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology." (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169)//

This isn't "knowledge" with a Capital K. This is just knowledge = true belief.

So - according to one definition of "knowledge," can we "trust" our senses? No. We cannot absolutely (granted, this is my word) trust our senses, meaning we cannot be empiricists who think a worldview can be constructed based on sensation. So, yes, one argument Clark uses is that senses commit "perjury" insofar as we are caused by them to sometimes have contradictory beliefs. Knowledge with a Capital K is not possible.

Does the possibility for error and "perjury" (in the sense communicated given above context) mean that we throw out human court systems? No. For we may have "knowledge" in another (Matthew 7) sense. It must be another sense than the capital K kind unless one wishes to say that Clark affirmed that God directly illumines/causes our minds to *infallibly* know extra-biblical information, one has undermined Clark's own project of advocating for a revelational epistemology.

What I am doing is trying to be as charitable to Clark as possible (harmonization, as you say) without going so far as to agree with his occasionalism. In fact, I want to show how Clark's own thought is capable of resolving what appears to have been a tension within his own mind, the "don't you have to read your Bible?" dilemma; I submit that Clark's own thought to this question was that "if I say yes, I've admitted revelational Knowledge empirical Knowledge" (Capital K), "but if I say no, then I need an account for how the belief I have is caused" (occasionalism). This dilemma is a false one, as I've tried to show in early responses.

I already admitted on my blog could be wrong in my understanding of Clark's reasons for accepting occasionalism, but I do think it best explains the material.

Thanks. Do you think that everyday things like reading or examining evidence -replete with the possibility of human error- are compatible with Clark's occasionalism?

If you're asking about my own perspective, I would reject that a thoroughgoing occasionalism is compatible with a sound epistemology.

That wasn't my question. How about another: Do you think Clark thought his occasionalism was compatible with those everyday things?

I do not think it is consistent to affirm that God directly causes false beliefs. This is the same thing I have already said: late Clark's occasionalism is inconsistent with his epistemology.

Again, that wasn't my question. Anyway, I will end my part in this convo (Thanks btw!) by pointing out that Clark was quite clear that when it comes to the senses, "you cannot believe any of it", but you'd have it that Clark, when it comes to the everyday things (eg reading, examining, etc..), would have us believe some of it. Other than not finding anything in Clark where he lays out what a sensation is and how it can then become a perception to finally result in a true belief (let alone trustworthy in a general sense), it's also curious to me that I have never seen any opponent of Clark jump on such an inconsistency let alone Clark try to clear up that inconsistency in the ways you describe. Too, when Clark was criticized by the likes of Nash et al way back in the 60s and Reymond etc in the 70s and others in the 80s, Clark never admitted that the senses were trustworthy in some aspect, or to use your terms, generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief. Also, when Reymond attempted to extract the trustworthiness of senses from Scriptures (like you recommend), Clark did not follow his -or your - lead in any way. Rather he attacked Reymond's exegesis - you can find that attack in more than one book btw. I'm sorry, but I just don't find your 'evidence' to be at all convincing. Again, Thanks for the convo (none of what I've said is a critique of your attempt to rework Clark's epistemology (others have engaged in that as well - Reymond may be a good example...), my focus was very narrow). Have a Great Weekend.

In order for Clark's epistemology to be "reworked," Clark has to be understood as he speaks in various contexts. While I mean no offense, but I don't think you understand the contexts of what has been cited. You repeatedly confuse contexts in which Clark discussed basic epistemology with contexts in which he is not.

For example, you bring up Reymond, Nash, and so forth. In those conversations, as I've said, Clark's focus was primarily on "knowledge" in terms of formulating a basic epistemology. But I haven't been suggesting that sensations function as reasons or some prior foundation upon which Clark's revelatory epistemology was built. Therefore, when you say such things as,

"Other than not finding anything in Clark where he lays out what a sensation is and how it can then become a perception to finally result in a true belief"

I have no clue what you're talking about. I never said anything like this. Rather, I said I think sensations can function as second causes of beliefs. Do you disagree? Do you think God directly causes false beliefs?

If we are speaking of questions that have not been engaged, you have not answered my question:

//...do you think Clark affirmed that God directly illumines/causes our minds to infallibly know extra-biblical information?//

This is an important question, because it relates to what Clark says about human courts and Matthew 7. Even in your own citations, Clark says he wouldn't throw them out - why not, do you think? If you find my view unconvincing, there's not much I can do about that if you don't respond to my questions.

On the other hand, your question to me was:

"Do you think Clark thought his occasionalism was compatible with those everyday things?"

My reply is no. I further specified why it is not consistent.

In short, then, senses may function as second causes of true and false beliefs. Therefore, they cannot be absolutely trustworthy and cannot be leveraged to make a case for empiricism in conversations about basic epistemology.

On the other hand, in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty (knowledge with a capital K). That is, your statement,

"you'd have it that Clark, when it comes to the everyday things (eg reading, examining, etc..), would have us believe some of it."

is not only all too true - given the context of conversation is NOT a basic epistemology - Clark himself said so:

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.

This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

And:

//Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? When a chess club challenges another to a match, does any suspicion of fallibility impede its action? Cannot this club distinguish the dogma ecclesiastica that there actually is another club from the dogma haeretica that no other club exists? Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 146)//

/"Do you think Clark thought his occasionalism was compatible with those everyday things?"

My reply is no. / Ok then find me a citation where *he* denied it. Not one of your citations shows that, nor do any of them show that Clark thought, as you do, that "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief". You are still operating only at the level of innuendo at this point. Find for me where *Clark* explains, as you would have it, of the senses, viz, "In short, then, senses may function as second causes of true and false beliefs. Therefore, they cannot be absolutely trustworthy and cannot be leveraged to make a case for empiricism in conversations about basic epistemology.

On the other hand, in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty (knowledge with a capital K)." Where does Clark ever teach anything like that? He does not. You want to prove your point? Find *that* citation. Sheesh.

If you want to continue the conversation after all, that's fine by me. But if so, I would recommend not getting frustrated.

Also, manage your expectations. Asking for a word-for-word citation is as unreasonable as expecting the word "Trinity" to show up in the Bible for the concept to be true.

Finally, my guess is that your confusion would be clarified if you answered the following question I've asked multiple times:

//...do you think Clark affirmed that God directly illumines/causes our minds to infallibly know extra-biblical information?//

I do not think you have grasped the implication. The point is, if Clark did not so affirm, then let's revisit the Clark citation I already provided that states:

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.

This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

This must refer to a different sort of knowledge than that whose content is Scripture itself (about which Clark believed we could have knowledge with a capital K):

//Granted, it is unlikely that anyone should go to such extremes to substitute another woman for the wife of an unimportant theologian or philosopher. But how do you know? So long as substitution is possible, certainty is impossible...

The status of common opinion is not fixed until a theory has been accepted. One may admit that a number of propositions commonly believed are true; but no one can deny that many such are false. The problem is to elaborate a method by which the two classes can be distinguished. Plato too granted a place to opinion as distinct from knowledge; he even admitted that in some circumstances opinion was as useful as knowledge with a capital K. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 75-76)//

Now, surely you don't think the intent of litigants is biblical information - and neither does Clark, which is why instead of telling jury members to crack open their Bibles, he says they should examine "his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document." This investigation will involve the senses, will it not? It is precisely the fact Clark then cites Matthew 7 as warrant for this "legal procedure" that my inference about Clark's thought - the idea that "in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty" - finds evidence.

I go forward because you spin. I see you have not been able to provide the requisite explanation from Clark himself. Too bad. Tell me, where does late Clark ever say that "will involve the senses" is enough for him to infer "the senses are generally trustworthy secondary causes of true belief".

The quote I provided comes from August of 1975, within the last 10 years of Clark's life. If you admit that the following refers to intentional use of the senses -

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.//

- then Clark's following conclusion -

//This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

- means that the intentional use of the senses is that by which one shall "know" the intent of the litigants.

I asked for citations from Clark - so, where does Clark say, teach, or define the "intentional use of the senses" and that such use allows him to infer that "the senses are generally trustworthy secondary causes of tb", or to infer the senses are "by which one shall 'know'", further where does he admit that the courtroom scene refers to such "intentional use of the senses" in such a way as to "'know' the intent of the litigants". I see no such citations. We could do this over and over - but it's on you to come up with the requisite citations. Please do.

I'll rephrase what I've already said by yet again repeating the same citation you have yet to seriously engage:

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.//

Do you admit that Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts? If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

Do you think Clark is saying that the courts must use the senses on accident? Do you think Clark is saying that examination of a litigants acts do not require the use of the senses at all? I want you to explicitly state what you think Clark means.

I've already told you what I think about the court citation as far as my focus in this conversation goes. So, and what's very interesting to me, is you can't find a citation in Clark something along the lines of, viz, "In short, then, senses may function as second causes of true and false beliefs. Therefore, they cannot be absolutely trustworthy and cannot be leveraged to make a case for empiricism in conversations about basic epistemology. On the other hand, in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses [add: when used intentionally not accidentally] may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty (knowledge with a capital K)", and to go along with that, a citation to the effect that when using the senses intentionally not accidentally that the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of true belief?

You haven't told me if you think Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

You asked for a Clark citation. I have provided one. If you choose to avoid engagement, that's up to you. But in that case, it's clear you're not operating in good faith.

Not good faith? What you have provided is a single citation that you used to "infer" that Clark thinks as you do. I've already expressed in various ways why I'm not buying that "inference". As for intention and everyday things, doesn't *later* Clark (ie the occasionalist as you'd have it) strongly recommend I read the Bible? To hear, read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the Scriptures? Where does that later Clark say anything to the effect that such intention shows "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb"? And, aside, where does later Clark ever let on that his occasionalism is just not compatible with his strong recommendation concerning such everyday things (hint: you already claimed above that Clark thought his 'occasionalism' was not compatible with such everyday things)? Again, I need better citations than the one you've provided to be in a buying mood.

Yes, you are not acting in good faith. You keep saying you've "already expressed in various ways why I'm not buying that "inference."" But actually, you haven't. You can't cite yourself once as providing an explanation of the citation I've provided. You still have not answered the same question I've asked 3 times, the same question I'm going to repeat until you actually answer it. Do you think

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

You're asking me a bunch of irrelevant questions (see below). This is an attempt to shift the burden of proof. I have already given my explanation of why this quote is relevant:

*****If you admit that the following refers to intentional use of the senses -

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.//

- then Clark's following conclusion -

//This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

- means that the intentional use of the senses is that by which one shall "know" the intent of the litigants.*****

Note: your questions completely miss the fact that in the context of what I cited, Clark explicitly says, "This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”"

Now, as I said, your questions aren't relevant, for Clark isn't talking about reading Scripture to determine litigants' intent. Clark isn't talking about occasionalism here. Clark is talking about extra-biblical information and gathering said information by the intentional use of the senses. He then says that such is what Matthew 7 means when it says, by their fruit, ye shall *know* them.

Please actually respond to my questions. Thank you!

And neither is Clark talking there about "the senses as generally trustworthy secondary causes of tb" anymore than the later Clark-the 'occasionalist' - when encouraging us to read, study, to get to know Hebrew and Greek, the Greek Skeptics, Augustine, and maybe even his own writings or listen to his own lectures, was talking about "the senses as generally trustworthy..etc.." So, you need to show me where Clark ever said or inferred or taught that the intentional use of the senses in gathering extra-biblical information such that one 'knows' them (whether that be litigants, or the doctrines of the Greek Sceptics, or even Clark's thought [as you claim to 'know']) entails "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb".

You have been clear as to what you think Clark cannot mean. No one is asking you to restate your opinion on that. But you still have yet to answer what he does mean. Until you do, you're just begging the question (in multiple ways, actually). I'll repeat, for the fourth time, do you think:

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

Please actually respond to my questions. Thank you!

Last try. I have not given you my opinion concerning what Clark can or cannot mean (nor is that my aim in this conversation). What I have given you is my opinion on your attempt to 'infer' what Clark meant. If you wish me to buy your 'inference' then show me where Clark ever said or inferred or taught that the intentional use of the senses in gathering extra-biblical information such that one 'knows' them (whether that be litigants, or the doctrines of the Greek Sceptics, or even Clark's thought [as you claim to 'know'],etc) entails "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb".

If you are unwilling to answer my questions, it indicates you are unwilling to follow what my reasoning is for my understanding of Clark's thought. If your aim has been to ask what other Clark citations evidence my position, then to be honest, that's not a conversation. So for the fifth time, do you think:

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

Well the floor is yours - show us your reasoning - just how does, say, the later Clark's (the occasionalist) encouraging, say, the reading of the Greek Sceptics (a clear intentional use of the senses on your terms correct?) entail (without you ever having produced any citation to the effect) that *Clark* thought/made the inference that "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb".

Have you been reading my comments at all? I already told you that the quote I provided has nothing to do with occasionalism (I've challenged you to suggest otherwise, in fact). What I did say was:

If you admit that the following refers to intentional use of the senses -

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.//

- then Clark's following conclusion -

//This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

- means that the intentional use of the senses is that by which one shall "know" the intent of the litigants.

At this point, I have to ask whether you do not at all feel a little ridiculous for refusing to answer my questions? Do you just not care? Is it just about appearances for you? For the sixth (!) time, do you think:

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

So, again, the floor is yours. Don't wait on me. Let's see your reasoning. Oh btw - your inference that if I am unwilling to answer your questions indicates that I am unwilling to follow your reasoning is obviously a non-sequitur. If you can't capture my mind by your powers of inference, why ought I trust your powers of inference when it comes to capturing Clark's mind (and you have made such claims - eg Clark's mind was in tension, Clark felt and caved to pressure, Clark thought his own occasionalism was not compatible with everyday things, etc...)?

I already provided my reasoning. For the third time:

If you admit that the following refers to intentional use of the senses -

//The courts must determine the litigants’ intent; and this they do by examining his acts, whether these acts be homicide or phraseology in a document.//

- then Clark's following conclusion -

//This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.”//

- means that the intentional use of the senses is that by which one shall "know" the intent of the litigants.

You haven't responded to this either. Again, you don't deal in good faith. So, the ball is in your court. For the seventh (!) time, do you think:

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

You were supposed to 'reason' that [Clark's conclusion "This legal procedure is entirely in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.] entails [Clark thought that the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb].

Is this a conversation or an interrogation? I'm waiting for you to answer just one of my questions. You don't dictate what I'm "supposed" to do, especially since I am now asking for the eighth (!) time, do you think:

"Clark is saying that courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigants acts. If not, please provide an alternative explanation of what Clark means.

YOU said "It is precisely the fact Clark then cites Matthew 7 as warrant for this "legal procedure" that my inference about Clark's thought - the idea that "in a different sense (i.e. Matthew 7), senses may enable "knowledge" in a sense other than that which enables full assurance or certainty" - finds evidence" with the further notion (supplied by you), that Clark thought (as you claim he did) that "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb". I merely asked for your inference to that conclusion and was surprised that you didn't provide it - so don't take my response as a diktat. My apologies if it came off that way. I didn't intend it that way. I ought to have started that reply with "I thought you were supposed to" sorry.

Further, as it turns out, the citation you rely on may only spell out that the purpose of, as you say, the intentional use of senses to examine evidence, is not to attain true belief. As you say 'knowledge' takes on many different meanings, and in this case, 'knowledge' may be satisfied in attaining what "the good judgment of a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily draw from them." Such a purpose can be attained even if the result is a falsehood. That is to say, the process is not malfunctioning even if a falsehood is arrived at as long as what is arrived at is something to the effect of what "the good judgment.. etc..". There is a correlate to this in Clark. In Clark Speaks from the Grave, in speaking about individuation, and as an application, Clark brings forward the case of accepting a person into Church membership, and although he does not explicitly use Matt 7, the idea is there implicitly. [Referring to Calvinists], "Admittance to membership is on the basis of a credible profession of faith in Christ. What is credible in one case is often not credible in another. The elders must judge, but they never claim to know". "Know' here, in immediate context, is an everyday thing - judging based on extra-biblical acts, etc. The upshot is that they never claim to hold the truth. They don't know. But, to borrow from the foregoing, they 'know' in the sense that they did their duty in coming to what "the good judgment..etc.." For support that such is an everyday thing, see Clark's What do Presbys Believe, Chapter XVI section 3, 2nd paragraph. Again the upshot is that the process has as its purpose the attainment of something to the effect of what "the good judgment..etc.." That such may result in falsehood is not an indication of a malfunction whatsoever. The attainment of a tb is nice, but incidental to the purpose. Understood this way, there is no need to second guess Clark's mind. No need to invent doctrine in Clark's thought that we have no textual evidence for other than an 'inference' that may not even be based on what the citation is actually alluding to. No need to even hold Clark was this way when he wrote it, another way after he succumbed to pressures...etc..

You come sort of close to admitting that the courts must intentionally use the senses to examine a litigant’s acts, so I’ll explain where I think you’ve gone wrong. You say:

“…the citation you rely on may only spell out that the purpose of, as you say, the intentional use of senses to examine evidence, is not to attain true belief. As you say 'knowledge' takes on many different meanings, and in this case, 'knowledge' may be satisfied in attaining what "the good judgment of a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily draw from them."”

Firstly, you have very selectively cited what Clark said. Perhaps that was not intentional on your part. Here is the fuller context of the Clark citation to which you allude:

//…it [a litigant’s intention(s)] can be arrived at by such just and reasonable deduction, from the actions and words proven, as the good judgment of a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily draw from them.//

Note what you cut. In particular, note that the court’s inference as to a litigant’s intention(s) is drawn from just and reasonable deduction *from the actions and words proven.* This shows your suggestion that the intentional use of senses to examine evidence was not to attain true belief is absurd, for Clark is here precisely speaking of the court’s examination a litigant’s acts, a very examination which occurs by their intentional use of the senses. Clark likewise references the same thing two paragraphs later as that by which intention must be determined.

You seem to be focusing on Clark’s phrasing that deals with court judgments regarding the intention(s) of a litigant. Of course, I have no issue with the point that the courts sometimes make false judgments. Indeed, that is a point I have made all along as integral to my case that the senses are only generally (not infallibly or absolutely) trustworthy secondary causes of true belief. But you miss what Clark says regarding that *on the basis of which* court judgments about intentions are made; viz. the examination of a litigants acts; the actions and words *proven.* By the way, how is it that they are “proven,” do you think? By the court’s use of their senses. Regardless, you can’t completely disconnect “good judgment” from an intention to attain true belief.

In fact, your own analogy cuts against you. You cite Clark as saying, “The elders must judge, but they never claim to know." Two points. Firstly, your analogy is actually disanalogous insofar as Clark is saying that not only must courts judge but also that their procedure is in keeping with the Biblical admonition, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.” That is, in your citation, Clark says the elders don’t know. In my citation, Clark says the courts do know.

But let’s now entertain your next point, that the elders actually do “know” in a different sense (which I would actually agree with!). Here’s the problem you now have: you must admit that elders judge membership admittance with an aim to attain a true belief! While they may admit into membership someone who is not a sheep, it would be absurd for you to suggest that Clark thought that elders’ “intentional use of senses to examine evidence, is not to attain true belief.“ On the contrary: elders examine evidence (by the intentional use of their senses) so that they admit into the visible covenant community only those whom they truly believe are sheep. Your analogy actually refutes your own suggestion. Like elders, courts intentionally use their senses to examine evidence to attain true belief.

I have no idea what you are speculating about in your last few sentences, so I’ll skip responding to that.

Clark’s related citation is important because the 'process' (intentional use of the senses to - somehow - gather extra-biblical evidence/premises) holds in both cases (admittance, litigants). BUT that citation shows that the purpose of that process (in obtaining a credible profession) does not entail the obtaining of tb concerning whether or not the applicant is regenerate (sheep), thus it is contrary to your, viz,

“elders examine evidence (by the intentional use of their senses) so that they admit into the visible covenant community only those whom they truly believe are sheep…. Like elders, courts intentionally use their senses to examine evidence to attain true belief”.

If obtaining tb is not the purpose of the process in this case, then neither is it the purpose in the other case.

Perhaps it might help to think of the purpose of the process as contributing a degree of justification (to the degree of 'the good judgment'...), even if the purpose does not entail obtaining tb. This way it is consistent with what Clark wrote (at least as far as the citations go it seems to me), and satisfies your process and criticism: ‘proven’ relates to (valid) deductions made from extra-biblical premises *somehow* gathered by the ‘intentional use of the senses’ – such proofs contribute to justification (to the point of ‘the good judgment…’), but such proofs do not necessarily yield truth (nor are they used for that purpose in this process), etc..

I repeat, it would be absurd for you to suggest that Clark thought that elders’ “intentional use of senses to examine evidence, is not to attain true belief.“ Elders aim to truly weed out wolves from sheep. You know that Clark was an elder, right? You think he didn't aim to have a true belief about who should or shouldn't become members of his church?

Now, no one said it "necessarily yields truth" or "entails" truth, so I don't know why you brought that up. That's a straw man if you think I said anything like that. Rather, the point, as I said, is that in both cases, the aim is true belief. A court should desire to make a true judgment (even if they don't). An elder should desire to make a true judgment (even if they don't). This is common sense.

Again, consider Clark's reference to Matthew 7. *Knowledge* of one by their fruits obviously deals with true belief about said person.

Again, consider Clark's statement that reasonable deduction is "from the actions and words proven." The deduction happens on the basis of "proven" actions/words. That which is "proven" is true (or, at least, truth is one's aim).

See another statement Clark makes in this brief:

//The next step in the history of the case is the letter of apology that the Session wrote to the Hawleys on August 30 1974. Since this letter was tendered more than a month after charges had been filed against the Session – for the apology is dated August 30 and the charges are dated July 8 – since, to repeat, the apology was tendered more than six weeks after the charges were filed, the apology must be considered, in legal terms, a self-serving document. A statement, written or oral, made after litigation has commenced is more likely to be motivated by self-interest than one made long before the institution of the judicial action. Cognizance is taken of this fact in courts of law, and one condition of the admissibility of an unsworn statement is that it have been made ante litem notam.

For this reason and for a second reason the Commission should not consider this document as a valid apology. A true apology should have brought forth fruits meet for repentance. The Session should have assured the Hawleys that they could remain members. This is not found in the proffered apology. Though the letter is thus worthless as an apology, it is important as a statement of the Session’s defense of its actions.//

Clark accuses a session of an insincere apology. Do you think Clark did not truly believe what he said? Do you really think Clark presented his brief before the Judicial Commission of the RPCES without hoping to convince them of its truth? Such ideas are absurd.

Again, to repeat calmly, the correlate in Clark (in which the process is used to achieve a credible profession) is not one in which the purpose of the process is to attain tb (about one's regeneracy/sheep). And, further, you have failed to see the possibility that the process has a different purpose - justification - and such is compatible with the courtroom citation. You cannot therefore 'infer' from the courtoom citation that [Clark thought the process ends in "the senses are generally trustworthy as secondary causes of tb"].

I am going to move on with my life. We disagree. If you want to say more, feel free, but I will not be replying any more.

Ok one last question - do you 'know' you are regenerate?

Yes. That seems to me a much different topic, but see here:

https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/.../scripturalism-and...
https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/.../communication-of...
https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/.../clark-on-self...
https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/.../book-review...

There are just examples. I can cite you other posts of mine if you really want.

And do you ‘know’, like you claim the elders do when judging whether someone is a sheep or not (regenerate or not), by using the ‘process’ (intentional use of the senses, etc..)?

I don't think you read my posts?

I claim to have the strongest possible meaning of human "knowledge" that I am regenerate since I think self-knowledge is epistemically groundable in God's word.

That's why I think this is irrelevant to our discussion. The strongest possible meaning of human "knowledge" has nothing to do with sensation or the kind of "knowledge" elders/courts have.

No I did not read those links - but you've answered - and just so I have this correct - you are able to deduce from Scriptures that you, Ryan, are regenerate? And secondarily, If you can do that why can't the elders do that or at least confirm the deduction, and bypass the lesser process?

You should just read the links. I did the hard work 11+ years ago in thinking through these things. You should spend some time reaping the benefits.

As evidence I've already anticipated your kinds of questions, I'll quote what I wrote in those posts. To your first question: "you are able to deduce from Scriptures that you, Ryan, are regenerate?"

//I never said one’s own individual name can be found in Scripture. But that doesn’t preclude self-knowledge. Knowing “I am regenerate” does not imply I know “Ryan Hedrich is a regenerate.” Remember Sean’s reference to the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why can’t that distinction be applied here? I know I am regenerate. I opine I am Ryan Hedrich. Therefore, I opine Ryan Hedrich is a regenerate. What’s the problem?//

To answer your question about why elders can't confirm my deduction:

//In a recent post, I said:

I can know that I myself am elect without knowing anyone else is. Paul names specific elect individuals in his letters. Why should my knowing that I am elect be any more of a problem than the fact these individuals could know that they were elect even during their own lifetimes?

One objection to this has been that I can’t have deduced self-knowledge from Scripture, for if I had, it would be truth I could “readily communicate to others.” I said in that post that this objection is question-begging. To expand on that, why does philosophic knowledge require that I be able to communicate the account of my knowledge to others?

Given Scripturalism, divine revelation is necessary and sufficient for philosophic knowledge. So suppose that God revealed “[no one] knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person,” allowing for trivial exceptions like God. Now, would I be able to prove to you, reader, that I actually believe this to be divine revelation? Not necessarily. After all, Scripturalism would dictate that your knowledge of my knowledge of what I actually believe must come through divine revelation. Even if you could know things about me, I’m not unquestionably trustworthy. So apart from divine revelation, what I would say I believe isn’t necessarily what I actually believe. You could take what I say I believe for granted, but your belief about what I believe is still opinion, not knowledge. But would an inability on my part to epistemically enlighten you about my reflexive knowledge mean I myself am unable to account for it? Of course not, given a person’s thoughts can be known by his spirit.//

In short, only God and you can "know" that (if) you are regenerate without the possibility of error. Full assurance, as Scripture puts it.

But like I said, self-knowledge is a completely different subject than what we had been discussing.

Actually, in that correlate, in that context, Clark is talking about self knowledge (eg the heart is deceitful, who can know it?). Anyway, how does “[no one] knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person,” give you a 'philosophical' excuse not to share with us how you came to know in the fullest sense "I am elect" especially since you claim to have such an account? And it really doesn't bother me that your infallible account will somehow become fallible once you share it with us - I'd still like to hear it -and without having to plod through your 11 yr old writings - I'm sure by now you can whittle it down to the bare essentials. In other words give it a try - what could go wrong?

//Actually, in that correlate, in that context, Clark is talking about self knowledge (eg the heart is deceitful, who can know it?).//

I didn't even cite Clark quotes in my last comment, so I have no idea what you are talking about.

//Anyway, how does “[no one] knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person,” give you a 'philosophical' excuse not to share with us how you came to know in the fullest sense "I am elect" especially since you claim to have such an account?//

It's not an excuse. That's pejorative, by the way.

You can share what you infallibly know, but that doesn't mean other people can therefore infallibly know the same thing.

And I have shared it with you. In those links. I have no desire to start a new conversation with you. It is enough for me that I explained that self-knowledge has nothing to do with our conversation about courts and Matthew 7:16. If you don't get it by this point, I'm sorry.

This is my final comment.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

And that is the end of the conversation with interlocutor #1. If he replies, I'll include it here.

In short, Clark stated before a Presbyterian Judicial Commission that the court system requires the intentional use of the senses and that Matthew 7:16 is a biblical admonition of this legal procedure. Since sensation is non-propositional and cannot itself be the object of knowledge, it can nevertheless function as a secondary cause of generally trustworthy "knowledge" (in the sense meant by Matthew 7:16). And this explains why Clark disagreed that we should "throw out" the court system.

But as I said at the beginning of this post, this has nothing to do with whether empiricism (or some worldview which would involve sensation as an infallible means of knowledge) is true. Matthew 7:16 isn't about what Clark would call "basic epistemology," e.g. what epistemically grounds one's worldview. Matthew 7:16 is about extra-biblical "knowledge." My interlocutor resisted answering question I asked along these lines, perhaps because he felt the force of the point. I am speculating. It felt like pulling teeth trying to get one straight answer to even one of my questions.

I am fortunate that a third party who had been following our conversation at one point stepped in and offered a few observations and asked a few questions that encouraged me that my point was getting across to someone. I felt like hadn't completely wasted my time. Here is that conversation (following the same pattern as above, interlocutor #2's comments will be indented and my responses will not):

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Maybe the hang up here is the term "true" before "belief"? I have seen [interlocutor #1] argue elsewhere for the distinction between belief and knowledge, and in support of belief in an everyday sense, in so far that a critic once again brought up the perennial complaint of Clark not knowing who his wife is. I "know" (pun intended) [interlocutor #1] has a place for belief within his thinking and makes careful distinctions in regard to this.

There is a difference between belief and knowledge. In fact, that's why I am highlighting why Clark's use of Matthew 7:16 in his defense before the Judicial Commission of the RPCES is an important point (among other ones I've mentioned).

Yep, I can see that. I sense that it's the term "true" that is the issue here in so far that it is being coupled with sensation. I think what you are getting at is something more akin to "as accurate as one can humanly be"? Not, as you say, the capital "K" or "certainty"?

Insofar as accuracy does involve true belief, sure. What you are mentioning is a point of epistemology. Well, all of us agree that the senses do not yield infallible beliefs.

What I am indicating is more of a point of metaphysics. What does "knowledge" mean for Clark in Matthew 7:16, for example? That's a question of metaphysics. He certainly means "true belief" at the very least, so to say that courts (and elders, for that matter) are not aiming for that is absurd. And I don't mean to be impolite, just frank.

Aiming is one thing, able to grasp is another?

Absolutely. Hence why our aim is not infallible. [Interlocutor #1] denies both. I accept the former, and while I deny that we can infallibly do the latter, I do think the quotes I've cited indicates that we can nevertheless place general (not absolute) trust in the senses. That is, the senses cannot be the foundation of our worldview. I think I quoted this in this long thread, but it's probably worth repeating:

Our claim can be false, of course, but we at least act as if it is true (meaning we've aimed at truth in the first place!).

Edit: I should add that I think the aim has to hit more often than not for Clark to cite Matthew 7:16 here.

Here is a fascinating statement Clark makes in an unpublished sermon:

//"I have not filled my sermons with philosophy; nor even with politics, though the Bible can be applied to political questions and even to philosophy. But I have emphasized the message of the Bible itself."
1958. A Sermon on Romans 10 and 11. July 27. PCA Archives.//

He is clearly being somewhat hyperbolic or non-literal for the sake of his flock, but it shows the seriousness with which he took his ecclesiastical duties. He probably means something like "speculations" (which, honestly, late Clark - surprise, when he was not longer an elder! - especially was given to do in non-ecclesiastical circles). But he would insist he was fully serious when he says what he does to the 1975 RPCES Judicial Commission.

It's something I hope to write about more one day if I can find the time to transcribe more of his sermons and other material.

I sense that you and [interlocutor #1] are actually not as far apart as you both may think.

I also agree with you in so far that we ought to act with regard to the sensation of many things. The Scriptures actually call us to act in regard to what we believe to be accurate sensation. So, in this sense, yes, I do believe that Scripture is commanding us to place some trust in the senses. It's the distinctions that you highlighted earlier that become paramount, and are also found within Scripture too.

I also agree with you that Clark was in fact aiming in this direction. Clark's claim was never that all sensation is incorrect or even that it should be discarded all together, never to see the light of a, to use the analogy in play here, court room again, only that it be put in its appropriate place. Which seems to be what you and [Interlocutor #1] are both attempting to do here.
Again, I actually think you are both closer to one another than perhaps you "believe" (pun intended) yourselves to be.

The "general trust" here is bound within the framework of belief and not knowledge.

"Able to teach" as Paul puts it, requires an ability to gauge, through sensation, roughly, at what theological level the people you are teaching are at.

Were that it was so. I think the critical point is what I say here (I cannot find your comment to which I replied):

//[Interlocutor #1] denies both. I accept the former//

I am referring here to your question about whether there is a difference between aiming for a true belief and obtaining it (or something like that).

If we cannot get to agreement there, then we cannot, as I say in an edit to an earlier comment I made that I don't want you to have missed, that:

"I should add that I think the aim has to hit more often than not for Clark to cite Matthew 7:16 here."

"I should add that I think the aim has to hit more often than not for Clark to cite Matthew 7:16 here."

Doesn't that require some sort of reference though? For something to "hit more often than not," wouldn't that require some sort of ability to assess and therefore some sort of standard to assess by? Or are you only assessing through belief again?

That is one question further than Clark answers. Anything I say in response would be speculative. Here is my speculation: you are again bringing up a question of epistemology, and a recursive one at that.

I think that Clark rather is dealing in metaphysics. He does not always use the same terms in the same way. In this case, I guess that by "knowledge" he just means "generally (not absolutely) true beliefs." See here:

"How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology." (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169)

Note the absence of evidence, epistemic justification, etc.

Thus, qualifying this Clark statement to account for that knowledge of one by his fruits will not be infallible, he could be saying that we know one by his fruits in that we generally have true beliefs about him.

Personally, I would use externalism to, I think, strengthen what I think is Clark's view. But I won't go there.

Right, this is important though. The above I think demonstrates the care you are giving to not delve into epistemology, and stay squarely within the realm of metaphysics, and that with regard to Clark.

Personally, I don't see any problems with what you are saying here. In fact, I tend to agree. I had a lengthy disagreement with a Van Tillian here on this forum recently with regard to the need to acknowledge contextual distinctions between terms like "know" within Scripture. [...] and [interlocutor #1] both did a great job of demonstrating this point well actually.

So, I think it's only fair that we allow Clark the same privilege, he was "certainly" (pun intended, or perhaps this highlights the point well) careful enough with his thinking to make such differentials.

I think the challenge here might be one of language. To really get your point across, it may be helpful to try to use terms not commonly associated with epistemology and to try and find other expressions.

The same issue crept into the debate with the Van Tillians mentioned above. "Know" isn't always used in an epistemological sense within Scripture and is used in different senses at times. Context obviously is the key, even with regard to your comments. The problem though is that at times people can hyper fixate on terms.

It's a challenge that I think Clarkians would do well to address because how we speak can be, and often is, misconstrued, either nefariously or in ignorance. It would help a lot to adjust our language toward that metaphysical foundation you refer to here.

Context certainly matters. Of course, even if Clark's focus is metaphysical (and again, I am speculating), there will be epistemic implications - even if left unrealized or unconsidered (for various reasons).

For instance, if Clark's understanding of Matthew 7:16 is one of "generally having true beliefs," because he is also indicating in the courtroom context that these beliefs are intentionally or consciously aimed at, one unrealized or unconsidered epistemic implication would be that Clark's thought entails an internalist epistemology regarding how said generally true beliefs are obtained. Courts are aware that they are examining fruits and drawing conclusions.

This doesn't change anything I've said, just gives more nuance. I've argued Clark was also an internalist in his more basic epistemology, Scripturalism, but I doubt he was even aware of such a distinction.

And what you mention about Van Til connects to this. Van Til was present at the presbytery meeting during which Stonehouse, another complainant, is recorded in a 1945 Presbyterian Guardian article as saying (the " " is a direct quote of Stonehouse):

//He [Stonehouse] also held to be inadequate Dr. Clark's contention that God's knowledge differs from man's because God knows all the implications of any proposition, for it is a fact that even the human mind "cannot know it as a bare proposition, apart from an actual understanding of implications."//

Clark absolutely crushes this foolishness:

https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/.../gordon-clark...

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And that is the end of conversation with interlocutor #2, which I am grateful for especially as it gave me opportunity to clarify my points made during the conversation with interlocutor #1.

Unapologetica

Thursday, December 12, 2024

Are the Senses Trustworthy in Any Sense? (And What Did Gordon Clark Think?)

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