Gordon Clark, Alvin Plantinga, and Van Tilians

An upcoming review of Scripturalism and the Senses (link) will involve responding to Greg Bahnsen's critiques of Gordon Clark. Coincidentally, a friend today asked me about a Van Til quote from his An Introduction to Systematic Theology - a quote also found, I believe, in Greg Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic (pg. 299) - and in which Van Til took issue with an anti-atheistic argument provided by Clark. The quote was as follows:

That even Reformed philosophers and theologians do not always make full use of the riches found in Calvin's Institutes may be briefly pointed out by a reference to the work of Gordon H. Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education. He says that the position of the atheist and pantheist in actually or virtually denying that there is a creator is untenable. If a discoverer of an uninhabited island were to search its confines for a particular form of animal life he might fail to find it. "He could not be sure, however, that the particular animal had never lived on the island, because, even though the search had been diligent, still tomorrow the remains might be discovered. Similarly, it is clear that no finite amount of searching could rationally lead one to deny the existence of God. During the time of the atheist's investigation of this earth, it just might be that God was hiding on the other side of the moon, and if some rocket should take the atheist to the moon, there is no reason to hold that God might not go over to Jupiter - for the express purpose of inconveniencing the atheist" (p. 44). But a God who can thus escape to the moon or to Jupiter is not inconveniencing the atheist at all. On the contrary, he shows himself to be so finite, so insignificant, that the atheist can cover the whole earth without being confronted by him. This is the exact reverse of the teaching of Calvin, based on Paul, that God is divinity and power, being always and everywhere so obviously present that he who says there is no God is a fool. The foolishness of the denial of the Creator lies precisely in the fact that this Creator confronts man in every fact so that no fact has any meaning for man except it be seen as God's creation. 

Emphasis mine. The above gives me opportunity to not only make some preliminary remarks but also tie in a few things I mentioned in this review, which included interaction with Plantinga's thought. A few points.

I see nothing wrong with Clark's point in the citation. In fact, what Clark is doing is something which Plantinga often does... only reverse: Plantinga often responds to de jure objections against Christianity, whereas Clark is here offering a de jure objection against atheism (not a de facto objection). That is, he is questioning the rationality of the atheist, not the truth of his belief. 

Now, Clark is not admitting that it is possible God does not exist, God is actively hiding, etc. Van Til doesn't seem to understand that Clark is not arguing that God does not confront the atheist in fact (link); rather, Clark is arguing that even if God didn't confront the atheist, atheism is irrational. Clark does think God confronts the atheists, but even so, Clark gives context to this confrontation:

The Scripture speaks of the law of God as written on the hearts of men; it teaches that man was made in God’s image and has an innate knowledge that right is different from wrong and that God punishes wrong. But the Scripture also teaches that man suppresses this knowledge by his wickedness, that he does not wish to retain God in his knowledge, and that God has given him over to a reprobate mind. (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 96)

Speaking of Paul, whom Van Til mentions in the aforementioned quote, is Clark's de jure method of argumentation so different that the hypothetical argument Paul makes in 1 Corinthians 15:16-19? Did Paul actually think Christ was not raised from the dead? In context, obviously not. Likewise (and, again, in context), Clark is not admitting the possibility that God does not exist:

When now the theist speaks of theism as a practical postulate, he is not indulging in any “as-if” philosophy. He means that God exists and that one should conduct his daily life by that belief. It is called a postulate because it is an indemonstrable first principle and not a theorem derived from more ultimate premises. (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pgs. 42-43)

So much for Van Til's criticism. Regarding atheism, Clark made other points in the same book of which Van Til and Bahnsen should have taken notice before suggesting Clark was not in step with Calvin or Paul. But I will leave that aside for now. 

The main point I wish to make in this post is that Clark originally wrote A Christian Philosophy of Education in 1946. Scripturalists who are now recommending Plantinga or other Reformed Epistemologists as supplements to Clark (and Mr. Lazar is not the only one) would do well to recognize, if they don't already, that much of what they are recommending are arguments that Clark himself already made over 75 years ago. For example, while the label of "de jure" argumentation in the context of apologetics may have been recently popularized, the application of the concept is not new. 

Or consider "Plantinga's" EAAN ("Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism"), an apologetic argument Mr. Lazar mentions in his book and of which he credits Arthur Balfour and C. S. Lewis as being forerunners. He may has well have credited Clark himself as a forerunner, for even before C. S. Lewis published his book on miracles or argued with Elizabeth Anscombe, Clark wrote (again, in the very same book from which we have been reading thus far!):

This nontheistic, naturalistic view is difficult to accept because it implies that the mind, too (as well as the body) is an evolutionary product rather than a divine image. Instead of using eternal principles of logic, the mind operates with the practical results of biological adaptation. Concepts and propositions neither reach the truth nor even aim at it. Our equipment has evolved through a struggle to survive. Reason is simply the human method of handling things. It is a simplifying and therefore falsifying device. There is no evidence that our categories correspond to reality. Even if they did, a most unlikely accident, no one could know it; for to know that the laws of logic are adequate to the existent real, it is requisite to observe the real prior to using the laws. But if this ever happened with subhuman organisms, it never happens with the present species man. If now the intellect is naturally produced, different types of intellect could equally well be produced by slightly different evolutionary processes. Maybe such minds have been produced, but are now extinct like the dinosaurs and dodos. This means, however, that the concepts or intuitions of space and time-the law of contradiction, the rules of inference-are not fixed and universal criteria of truth, but that other races thought in other terms. Perhaps future races will also think in different terms. John Dewey insisted that logic has already changed and will continue to change. If now this be the case, our traditional logic is but a passing evolutionary moment; our theories-dependent on this logic-are temporary reactions, parochial social habits, and Freudian rationalizations; and therefore the evolutionary theory, produced by these biological urges, cannot be true.

The difference between naturalism and theism-between the latest scientific opinions on evolution and creation; between the Freudian animal and the image of God; between belief in God and atheism-is based on their two different epistemologies. Naturalism professes to learn by observation and analysis of experience; the theistic view depends on Biblical revelation. No amount of observation and analysis can prove the theistic position. Of course, no amount of observation and analysis can prove evolution or any other theory. The secular philosophies all result in total skepticism. In contrast, theism bases its knowledge on divinely revealed propositions. They may not give us all truth; they may even give us very little truth; but there is no truth at all otherwise. So much for the secular alternative. (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pgs. 137-139)

Clark clearly anticipated any EAAN. To conclude: I don't think Clark's epistemology is as much in need of Plantinga's apologetics as Plantinga's apologetics is in need of Clark's epistemology.

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 12)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's eleventh chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

"Neo"-Scripturalism and Worldview Tests

As perhaps the shortest chapter in Mr. Lazar's book, I suppose previous chapters are meant to bear the brunt of the apologetic load on making good on the claims herein. As I have covered previous chapters in previous reviews, where appropriate, I will simply forward the reader back to the arguments made in those reviews to substantiate my responses here:

Test of reason: since the formulations of Scripturalism with which Mr. Lazar took issue were never one's written or state by Clark himself (link), for him to state that Clark’s Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent is premature, at the very least.

Test of Skepticism: as I pointed out in my last review (link), among others, "Neo"-Scripturalists are in no position to be aware of the presence of external, epistemic justificatory factors which Mr. Lazar would say are needed to "warrant" any given belief in any given scenario about one's having a wife... or, for that matter, about one's self-existence. On this latter subject, I'm not sure what external justificatory factors Mr. Lazar could possibly have in mind which would be needed to "warrant" self-knowledge. 

On the contrary, one who accepts Clark’s understanding of Scripturalism could deduce that extra-biblical knowledge is possible, even if 1) Clark himself never made such a deduction and 2) one wouldn't be self-aware regarding when an externally justified belief (in particular) occurs. Extra-biblical knowledge is, however, a defensible possibility when grounded in a fundamentally internalist theory of knowledge, whereas it would not be so on a purely externalist theory of knowledge (since even one could not be aware that his deduction was accompanied by the requisite external justificatory factor). If, then, "Neo"-Scripturalism holds that the epistemic justification for all knowledge-claims will depend on an external factor, I would conclude that it does fail the test of skepticism insofar as no one can have "full assurance of... knowledge" (link). 

So, to reiterate another earlier review (link), Clark was not interested in the limitations of knowledge so much as he was interested in having a certain kind of knowledge. His "basic epistemology" bears out one's ability to have (and be aware that one has) the sort of robust "knowledge" needed to defend any other, supplemental definitions of "knowledge" one might wish to apply in certain contexts. 

Explanatory power: out of all the tests he mentions, Mr. Lazar is reticent to say he passed the test of explanatory power. That’s because, as I mentioned in an earlier review, this test is mostly relative in the first place (link). The key question - which Clark saw and answered - is that the some knowledge we can have on Scripturalism is absolutely better than the none we have without it.

One comment I didn't quite understand was the following: 

I don't think there's very much that can be directly deduced from the Bible when it comes to the rest of human inquiry. You'll not be able to deduce a study of Van Gogh's The Starry Night, the cure for cancer, the history of bluegrass music, the plans for a more efficient diesel engine, or the existence of a habitable planet in a faraway solar system. Neo-Scripturalism cannot explain those things, because the Bible does not. Those are subjects you'll have to discover apart from the Bible, according to the norms and standards of those different domains of inquiry.

In what sense do extra-biblical subject have "norms" and "standards"? Is one obligated to discover extra-biblical subjects through these norms and standards and, if so, why? Mr. Lazar did link to a few books, but just as he exposited Plantinga's thought in an earlier chapter, I would have been interested in how the books he cited might have answered some of these questions, or at least an example using one of the extra-biblical subjects he mentioned in the same paragraph.

Test of hardcore common sense: Mr. Lazar refers to the "presuppositions of argumentation" as "extra-Biblical." But any valid examples of performative contradictions - and the concept itself - are just instances of logical consistency being applied to one's claims, thoughts, and practice (link). Insofar as Scripture is logical or reasonable, calls us to be reasonable, and is itself the necessary and sufficient precondition for knowledge (of the "robust" kind, link), Scripturalism is not only compatible with the "test of hardcore common sense," it is, as with any other apologetic test, the epistemic ground for it.

Separately, Mr. Lazar is right to suggest that a denial of self-knowledge is a performative contradiction (link). At one point in his life, Clark would have agreed too (link). But I do think other alleged cases of performative self-contradictions - like regarding the "existence... of other people" - are avoided if 1) one is content to remain agnostic about knowing what is true and 2) one instead acts as if his opinions are true.

Conclusion: Mr. Lazar concludes by giving his epistemology a pass after "an initial evaluation." I've said enough about how I think Neo-Scripturalism is not a significant "reformulation" of Clark's Scripturalism (link).

The most striking statement in this chapter, though, is that Mr. Lazar asks the reader to "remember what Clark’s tests were meant to establish - they weren’t meant to demonstrate that a first principle is true...” –  I find this remarkable... because it is true! Clark's tests are apologetic, and epistemology grounds apologetics, not vice versa. 

But this is precisely a conflation Mr. Lazar made in earlier chapters (link). He even cited Gordon R. Lewis's criticisms of Clark, which wrongly assumed Clark's apologetic tests grounded his epistemology rather than the reverse (link; see, particularly, point 5 under the subheading, "Miscellaneous Comments: An Intermezzo). 

If Mr. Lazar had applied what he requests in this chapter to his evaluation of Clark in earlier chapters, then he might have realized that Clark did not fail the test of skepticism et al. after all.

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 12, which Mr. Lazar calls Better Answers

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 11)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's tenth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

Speculative Apologetics

Mr. Lazar follows his last chapter about extra-biblical knowledge (reviewed here) with an effort to "explore how Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology can help Neo-Scripturalism account for the [epistemic] status of extra-Biblical beliefs" (emphasis mine). Whatever critiques I have offered about Mr. Lazar's choice of chapter placement for such exploration or whether such exploration requires a "Neo"-Scripturalism, Mr. Lazar's intention is well-worth pursuing. As much as I have tried to advocate that Scripturalists refine Clark's epistemology, it seems Mr. Lazar and I are of the same mind (link), which is to provide a useful though speculative answer as to how extra-biblical knowledge is possible or what extra-biblical knowledge means (e.g. Mark 6:38, 13:28, 15:44-45):

I do think that there is a place for speculation in apologetics, such as when providing a defense - which, given available information, we neither know to be true or false - against allegations of internal contradictions. In these cases, the point is to shift the burden of proof to the accuser. But care must be taken to keep in mind the fact that the defense is just a speculation, not fact, and to make sure that it is actually the case that the speculation is compatible with what is currently knowable. (link)

Clark offered a definition of "natural knowledge" he thought heathens could have, the context of which would be consistent with Scripturalism (link). So, too, Mr. Lazar, Plantinga, etc. can propose a definition of "knowledge," as long as the meaning intended by the word is possibly that which God's word intends (in given, relevant passages in which the word is used). Such a proposal might well supplement the Scripturalist in enabling him to provide a possible explanation for how people could [have] "know[n]" things in certain contexts. 

The proposed explanation might even be better than that which Clark himself offered in being able to offer some sort of justification for a colloquial application of "knowledge" to everyday beliefs. As I mentioned in an earlier review, "I would find it implausible" if Clark were to have argued that the aforementioned passages in Mark are instances of "knowledge" as mere "belief in or acceptance of a true proposition." Perhaps what Plantinga and Mr. Lazar have on offer is relatively better.

On the other hand, at minimum, I would have to see an exegetical case that "knowledge" couldn't be construed in Clark's [or others'] way[s] of thinking for Plantinga's or Mr. Lazar's definition of "knowledge" to become, in my mind, necessary. After reading through this chapter, I did not find a logical or exegetical defense of the necessity of construing "knowledge" in the particular way Plantinga or Mr. Lazar do (in contrast, say, to the case I made for the necessity of internalist knowledge in an earlier review). Perhaps one exists - if so, I should like to read it.

Thus, the thrust of this chapter seems to be about a useful though speculative apologetic for one interpretation of extra-biblical knowledge. Like I said, that is a goal worth pursuing, and, for all we "know," Plantinga's and Mr. Lazar's view might be more useful as a live possibility than or in opposition to Clark's view (at least, in some Scriptural contexts). One might even be right to conclude so.

However, the lack of argumentation in Mr. Lazar's chapter to this effect regarding the necessity of such a conclusion - in fact, the seeming impossibility to, on externalism, [construct an argument by which one could] be aware of one's justification for his belief that his interpretation is true (link) - must be kept in mind when one reads Mr. Lazar say:

Reformed Epistemology provides Neo-Scripturalism with a better definition of knowledge. As you may remember, Nash criticized Clark for having an idiosyncratic definition of knowledge, that it was too narrow, reducing most of what we know (or claim to know) to skepticism, such as beliefs that we are married we children. With the help of Reformed Epistemology, Neo-Scripturalism can better account for what is popularly taken as knowledge.

More accurate might have been a statement that in some contexts, Reformed Epistemology might provide a "better definition of knowledge" than Clark did. The reader may also take note of the word "idiosyncratic." One might ask Mr. Lazar or Nash how they "know" that Clark's definition is idiosyncratic. An appeal to what is "popular" likewise begs the question as to how one "knows" what is popular. Are such things "knowable" and, if so, how? Would such things be knowable on Clark's definition of knowledge? If not, does it not beg the question against Clark's understanding of "knowledge" to dismiss it solely on the basis of being "idiosyncratic"? 

Moreover, even if it is granted that Clark's definition is idiosyncratic, why does that ipso facto imply his definition of knowledge is not better? This line of thought would, if we pursued it, take us a bit far afield of the present topic, but it is one I address elsewhere in a discussion of "the Problem of the Criterion" (link). Here, I only reiterate that without extended argumentation for or comparison between definitions and whether or how each may fit into important contexts, one isn't forced to accept one definition over against another.

[Parenthetical: there is nothing inconsistent about being a Scripturalist and believing oneself to be married "with" (as I believe Mr. Lazar meant to write) children. In fact, I find it quite funny that on some purely externalist views of what counts as knowledge, one could legitimately say that it was possible Clark actually did "know" his wife and just was not aware of it. Obviously, this would not be Clark's view of "knowledge" - for Clark was not an externalist - but would a Scripturalist be wrong to use "knowledge" in such a sense in some contexts? I think not. After all, the word can bear different meanings in different contexts, as Clark well "knew."]

Reformed Epistemology: Limitations

As this was one of Mr. Lazar's longer chapters, I had some difficulty deciding what to address and in what order to address it. After some thought, I decided to begin with a look at the conclusion:

So what's the epistemic status of our extra-Biblical beliefs? Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology can be used to show how they're properly basic, justified, and have warrant because, as we've deduced from our master axiom, God designed our cognitive faculties to produce true beliefs.

I take it that this is the goal by which the success or failure of Mr. Lazar's understanding of Reformed Epistemology is to be measured. As such, a few explanations of key terms are in order, and we can thank Mr. Lazar for doing the legwork in providing them throughout the chapter:

Properly basic: beliefs in which one is "rational... whether you have... arguments or not... Taking a belief as basic doesn't mean believing in it no matter what. You can have defeaters for your belief."

Justified: "...justification for a belief can either have an internalist strategy or an externalist one... Plantinga offered an externalist defense of beliefs... If your cognitive faculties are properly functioning in an environment for which they were designed, then the beliefs formed by them are rational... your belief is justified."

Warrant: "According to Plantinga, warrant is the property that transforms true belief into knowledge. Under the right conditions, the Christian is not only within his rights to believe that God exists without evidence, but he can also know that God exists. How? Kenneth Boyce summarizes Plantinga's view:

(1) The belief in question is formed by way of cognitive faculties that are properly functioning.

(2) The cognitive faculties in question are aimed at the production of true beliefs.

(3) The design plan is a good one. That is, when a belief is formed by way of truth-aimed cognitive proper function in the sort of environment for which the cognitive faculties in question were designed, there is a high objective probability that the resulting belief is true.(4) The belief is formed in the sort of environment for which the cognitive faculties in question were designed."

Thus, Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology is a species of externalism and fallibilism. I have already focused on limitations of externalism in the past several reviews. At the risk of overkill, I'm going to continue highlighting its limitations by first focusing on the concept of warrant. 

As "warrant is the property that transforms true belief into knowledge," a warranted belief would entail that it is true. But this is problematic for Mr. Lazar's conclusion, stated above, that "Reformed Epistemology can be used to show how [extra-biblical beliefs...] have warrant." Can one show that a belief is warranted - is "true" - given that what is encompassed in "warrant" includes "proper function," an externalist view of epistemic justification? 

I have already argued in other reviews that such is not possible - for by definition, we cannot be aware whether an justificatory feature that is "external" to our awareness (but integral to epistemic justification) is actually present in a given case. Mention of one good contemporary epistemologist (Plantinga) calls for rejoinders from a few others: 

...if an epistemologist claims that a certain belief or set of beliefs, whether his own or someone else’s, has been arrived at in a reliable way, but says this on the basis of cognitive processes of his own whose reliability is for him merely an external fact to which he has no first-person, internalist access, then the proper conclusion is merely that the belief or beliefs originally in question are reliably arrived at (and perhaps thereby are justified or constitute knowledge in externalist senses) if the epistemologist’s own cognitive processes are reliable in the way that he believes them to be. Of course there might be a whole series of hypothetical results of this sort: cognitive process A is reliable if cognitive process B is reliable, cognitive process B is reliable if cognitive process C is reliable, and so forth. But the only apparent way to arrive at a result that is not ultimately hypothetical in this way is for the reliability of at least some processes to be establishable on the basis of what the epistemologist can know directly or immediately from his first-person, internalist epistemic perspective... 

(Bonjour, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues)

On externalism, we are always left with hypothetical knowledge. We know something only if the environment in which we find ourselves is conducive to knowledge, and this leaves the very possibility of externalist knowledge entirely at the mercy of an ever-external environment in which we find ourselves. 

Indeed, Mr. Lazar himself seems to admit this early on in the chapter: "Reformed Epistemology doesn't show that God exists (or that being such as the Great Pumpkin exist); it only shows that if God exists, belief in Him can be properly basic..." If God doesn't exist - and it seems that this is a live possibility on Reformed Epistemology - then what of the epistemic status of any of our beliefs?

Don't we want more than a mere possibility of knowledge? Don't we want, as Mr. Lazar intimated, to show we have knowledge? How is this possible unless we accept an internalist view of epistemology? As framed by another contemporary epistemologist:

An explanation of how knowledge or justification is possible has to do more than show that knowledge or justification is logically possible: that there is a way of thinking about knowledge that does not involve a contradiction. Externalists can surely manage this. They can sketch a consistent picture of the world in which we credit ourselves with reliable faculties and so, by externalist lights, with epistemically appropriate beliefs. But are we justified in believing that our faculties are reliable? Is that belief epistemically appropriate? If not, then for all we know, we have no justified beliefs. This is a significant concession to skepticism. We want a reply not just to the claim that we know nothing, but also to the meta-skeptical claim that for all we know we know nothing. We want to know that we know. This too pushes us towards internalism. (Williams, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pgs. 207-208)

These points are all the more serious when we consider whether the "deduction from our master axiom" to which Mr. Lazar refers is itself sufficient for "knowledge" or whether the person performing the deduction must not also have external justificatory factors of the sort Plantinga requires be present. Mr. Lazar seems to affirm the latter in his Conclusion to the book:

The Neo-Scripturalist can argue that, given the right conditions, his extra-Biblical beliefs are not only properly basic but also have warrant. The same strategy can be used to explain the status of beliefs deduced from the master axiom itself - they have warrant, too. (pg. 156 in Kindle, the final chapter before the Appendix)

It certainly sounds as though Mr. Lazar advocates a thoroughly externalist theory of epistemic justification. But if external justificatory factors must be present for any formed belief to be epistemically justified such that we can "know" (have "warrant" for) it, then, as Bonjour points out, we can only ever hypothesize that our beliefs were formed under "the right conditions," not show that they were so formed. Such hypothetical knowledge can perhaps supplement Scripturalism, but it cannot supplant it (link). 

What Mr. Lazar proposes in this chapter is not entirely new. A synthesis of Scripturalism with beliefs which are externally justified is something I proposed a little more than 7 years ago (link). But one ought to seriously reflect on whether an internalist or externalist theory ought to be applied to the case of one's axiom and beliefs deducible from it. Beliefs justified on internalist terms must ground beliefs justified on externalist terms (if such there be). In my experience, it has, thus far, been a losing battle in efforts to convince fellow Scripturalists of the necessity of internalism. I trust that it is not a lost war.

Turning briefly to the issue of fallibilism, Mr. Lazar mentions the possibility of having "defeaters" for beliefs. Now, there may be a place for defending beliefs about which one is not certain regarding their truth-values. I have no worked out theory about this, except to say that any such possibility must be defended on the grounds of beliefs about which one cannot be mistaken. Otherwise, the very concept of "justification" is itself open to question or revision. If any belief can go, then anything goes. 

For example, if properly basic beliefs can be defeated, is belief in the Bible able to be defeated? Can warranted beliefs be defeated? If there are not "undefeatable" beliefs, isn't the very concept of "defeatability" able to be defeated? Or if there can be undefeatable beliefs, what better candidates are there than divine revelation? If not divine revelation, is it "more legitimate to evaluate a creator by His creation than creation by a creator"? "Are any... options really more plausible than a self-authenticating revelation?" (link). I will leave it to the reader to consider these questions.

Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology: Following the Logic

I own a couple of books by Plantinga, but since I've only skimmed them, Mr. Lazar's summary was a helpful introduction. What follows cannot be considered a critical engagement with Plantinga - since I am really only interacting with his statements as represented through an interlocutor - but I'll mention a few questions and thoughts I had during a linear read-through of the chapter. 

Probably the one, overarching question I had hoped Mr. Lazar would somewhere answer is at what points his own views varied from those of Plantinga, if at all. At some points, I read ways in which Mr. Lazar believed Plantinga's views could be developed, but there was no mention of whether every disagreed with something Plantinga has said. There could be, but if so, I would have liked to know it.

Regardless, in the first subsection, Mr. Lazar introduces Plantinga's distinction between de facto and de jure objections to Christianity. The latter are the kind of objections in which Plantinga is interested and "concern the rationality of holding Christian beliefs, irrespective of their truth." One must be careful to understand what is meant here. An important point Clark made is that one can't fully divorce rationality from truth. Sin always entails belief in a falsehood: 

…all sinning is the result of fallacious thinking. Sometimes the fallacy does not lie on the surface. Evil men can run through a long series of valid syllogisms. But away back somewhere they have had a wrong thought. (The Pastoral Epistles, 1983, pg. 208)

I don't think Plantinga or Mr. Lazar would necessarily disagree. Rather, the idea is that Christians have to field objections regarding the very method by which they allegedly know God, objections which have little to do with whether a given belief about God are true and more to do with whether the method by which they claim to know about God is a method which can yield knowledge. 

For instance, Mr. Lazar mentions that a coin flip would be an irrational method on which to base a belief that "Canada is north of Mexico." Whether or not the belief is true, the method by which one arrived at the belief is said to be "irrational," "unreliable." De jure objections to Christianity here considered, then, do have to do with truth, but more-so about the truth or falsity of the method of belief-formation than a belief itself.

Thereby, Mr. Lazar set up the following question well: "what is the de jure objection to Christian belief?" He attempts to answer this in the next subsections, in which he cites Plantinga's critique of "classical foundationalism," adherents of which allegedly argue that because foundational belief must be "self-evident" or "incorrigible" - and since Christian beliefs are neither - Christianity is irrational. Ironically, I have addressed this very idea before:

Thirdly: “Take the current debate between foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, and positism. No matter which of these positions you believe is correct, you won't be able to trace this philosophical belief back to properly basic beliefs” (pg. 151). Engel cites Plantinga in his footnote to this comment, further adding that this would make foundationalism self-refuting. But why Engel thinks, for instance, that the belief “divine revelation is self-authenticating” cannot be basic, I don't know. I think that belief could put one in a position to make the regress argument for foundationalism. If Engel's flat denial is due to people disagreeing about things regarding God, I don't see how that is relevant. People can disagree about everything. Does that imply there can be no incorrigible beliefs? No. Here again the importance of discussing infallibilism is demonstrated. (link)

Plantinga or Mr. Lazar may disagree that classic foundationalism itself isn't an incorrigible belief, but if we deny that, what else is there? Must all beliefs be corrigible? If that is the idea, we face the same questions about fallibilism already discussed above. Or can incorrigible beliefs be had by another method than foundationalism, such as infinitism or coherentism? I think not (link, link). 

Further, in this subsection we see the beginnings of another argument: "Plantinga points out that foundationalism also tends to skepticism." Mr. Lazar mentions beliefs in backyard tress and the past as tests which classic foundationalists fail. The objection here is reminiscent of the "don't you know your wife?" objection. 

Leaving aside that one could conceivably construct an argument about knowledge of the past by an argument from memory as a precondition for knowledge (link), the beliefs Mr. Lazar mentions are not "reduced to skepticism" merely because we can't "know" such (in a certain sense) on Scripturalism. That is, it is not as if the Scripturalist has control over what is and isn't "knowable." Whatever follows from a sound worldview is knowable, and whatever doesn't is not. 

The Scripturalist is not at fault if it isn't possible to "know" (in a certain sense) that one is married with children or that trees are in his backyard, and his worldview is no worse for wear if what we might otherwise like to count as "knowledge" ends up not passing muster, so long as we are able to have any knowledge at all (especially if we cannot have it - in its most basic and important sense - on any other foundation). 

Mr. Lazar thinks Plantinga's view makes more sense because on it, "you can believe your wife or husband has a mind without having to be a professional epistemologist first." But no Scripturalist - certainly not Clark - would have had a problem with that. Having generic beliefs is not incompatible with even the strictest epistemic standards.

It is when one attempts to ascribe an epistemic status to said beliefs that we must carefully ascertain what status they have and the implications of it. For example, let us review the status of a so-called "properly basic belief." Such beliefs are not, according to Plantinga, incorrigible. They are open to scrutiny and capable of defeat. This apparently includes belief in God, as Plantinga's response to voodoo epistemologists et al. (who attempt to copy his approach) is to say that "basic beliefs can be challenged" and mentions "defeaters" as ways to avoid "absolute relativism." I gather that this is intended to suggest Christian beliefs are the cream will rise to the top, and voodoo epistemologists et al. will be defeated.

But I find this difficult to reconcile with Mr. Lazar's statement on the same page that "the Christian community will have its own criteria for properly basic beliefs that will exclude beliefs such as belief in the Great Pumpkin." Okay - will not voodoo epistemologists have their own criteria too, then? Again, if any belief is always and in every context capable of defeat (fallibilism), this just does appear to be absolute relativism, for anyone could start anywhere and with any criteria - even about the concept of "defeaters" itself - and no absolute, incorrigible knowledge of truth could be established.

Mr. Lazar himself seems to feel the force of this point, for he starts his next subsection with, "Admittedly, proper basicality is a low threshold for rationality. Ideally, you want to be more than merely rational in what you belief - you'll want to be justified." This initially sounds like we are headed in the right direction towards providing answers to the above problems. 

It might sound that way, but not so fast: "justification of belief" is explained by Plantinga in terms of "proper functioning," which is when one is in "the kind of environment your cognitive faculties were designed to function in." When this happens, "your belief is justified." 

However, if "your cognitive faculties... malfunction," then "your belief... would be irrational." How, then, can one ensure such malfunction is or has not taken place? There doesn't appear to be an answer! 

I can understand why. To attempt one would be to constrain oneself to an internalist understanding of "knowledge." Mr. Lazar is explicit here that "Internalists maintain that what makes a belief rational is another belief - one to which you have internal access - such as beliefs that are either self-evident or incorrigible... By contrast, Plantinga offered an externalist defense of beliefs." For Plantinga, whether one is or is not rational is not solely about what and how one thinks. One's rationality depends on factors external to the person and about which he cannot be aware by definition. We can never, then, be aware that we are or are not being rational, are or are not justified, do or don't have warrant... much less show it.

At this point in the chapter, Mr. Lazar turns to the concept of "warrant," which I have already addressed above along similar lines. Mr. Lazar concludes by asking, "when it comes to belief in God, is there a faculty that meets these criteria, and which forms beliefs about God?" He explains Plantinga's argument about a sensus divinitatis, allegedly forwarded by Aquinas and Calvin, is such a faculty which triggers warranted belief in Him. But how might a pure externalist answer questions about whether his cognitive faculties have malfunctioned in his understanding of Plantinga, in Plantinga's understanding of Aquinas and Calvin, or in Aquinas' and Calvin's understanding of a "sense of divinity"? I do not believe an answer is readily available.

Nor does the alteration Mr. Lazar attempts to apply to this view seem to help. Mr. Lazar mentions William Lane Craig as writing, "Our beliefs about God are not formed by way of a special sense organ designed to produce such beliefs, but are formed using our normal cognitive faculties that respond to the Spirit's testimony about God." Mr. Lazar goes on to say "An even better model is to clarify that the Holy Spirit often use (sic) God's Word to form our beliefs about God (cf. Rom 10:17)." 

These points could be true - actually, I think they are! - but at the risk of continually fatiguing the reader, the crux of the matter is whether or not epistemic justification has an external component. God's word is something to which we can have internal access. We can reflect on it, be aware of it, meditate on it. I would agree, as Mr. Lazar says, "the Bible teaches that God created us with cognitive faculties aimed at truth." But the Bible also teaches that sin prevents us from accepting spiritual truths (1 Corinthians 2:14, Romans 8:7) apart from divine intervention. 

Additionally, sin has introduced all sorts of maladies which can inhibit "proper functioning" of our cognitive faculties. To what extent these inhibitions extend in normal, everyday affairs is uncertain, and precisely for that reason we can't be sure that cognitive malfunction has not or is not occurring in a given situation. 

Mr. Lazar's summarizes his exposition by asking whether "the epistemic status of our extra-Biblical beliefs... amount to mere opinion or something more? Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology suggests an answer." It does, but if such epistemologists cannot ever be aware of when their cognitive faculties malfunction - if a purely externalist theory of knowledge is being discussed - then I don't agree those who think the position amounts to more than mere opinion. 

The most ironic example of this is when Mr. Lazar says, "unlike Clark, who didn't know if he was married, the Neo-Scripturalist has warrant for that belief." Mr. Lazar is begging the question that the Neo-Scripturalists beliefs were formed by each of his faculties "functioning in an environment for which it was designed." The most that can be shown, on an externalist theory of epistemic justification, is that it is possible one "knows" his wife. 

That this is a possibility rather than impossibility is not irrelevant, but I will argue that is also not the makings of a basic epistemology. For a Christian should not merely argue for the possibility of assurance or possibility of a correct understanding of God's word. A Christian can have both, but only assuming he is able to [internally] reflect on all factors which contribute to his epistemic justification for being assured or having a correct understanding of God's word. 

Hence, while the Holy Spirit, whom we need for salvation, is external to us, His efficient, gracious, causal work in us to believe the word of truth is not, as I have argued elsewhere, an epistemic justificatory feature of said beliefs - at least not in the most basic sense of epistemology. 

Miscellaneous Comments

I had a few other thoughts while reading this chapter that didn't seem to fit elsewhere, so I will mention them here: 

Firstly, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism is a fine reductio ad absurdem that Scripturalists can use against naturalists who subscribe to an externalist epistemology, whether or not the Scripturalist agrees with Plantinga's epistemic at large. Indeed, "natural selection doesn't select for beliefs that are true so much as for beliefs that lead to behavior that is more conducive to survival or reproduction." This is an excellent point that should undermines any psychological confidence naturalists with an externalist epistemology might otherwise have. Mr. Lazar is right to think that such an argument can be synthesized with the Clark's anti-empirical arguments geared towards undermining naturalists with an internalist epistemology. 

Secondly, Mr. Lazar mentions that Plantinga denies doxastic voluntarism. It is hard to tell to what extent this is true, but Plantinga clearly thinks at leas some beliefs are "involuntary" such that "moral categories - duty and obligations, etc. - don't really apply to beliefs." It is after this that Mr. Lazar uses the concept of "proper functioning" to answer how it is that beliefs can be "considered rational or irrational" if "the rationality of a belief doesn't depend on choosing rightly, or fulfilling your epistemic duties (because you don't choose your beliefs at all)." 

To these statements, I would point out that sinners are commanded to believe the gospel. Is it intelligible to command something to do something that is involuntary? Or rather, doesn't a command imply ability to obey the command? And doesn't obedience imply choice? Clark thought so, at least: "A command requires voluntary obedience" (Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 21). 

On a side note, the mention of obligations and "epistemic duties" led me to wonder whether a pure externalist would admit that one could fulfill any and all "epistemic duties" required of him yet nevertheless be "irrational." After all, Mr. Lazar has said that in the case "your cognitive faculties... malfunction... your belief... would be irrational," and on doxastic involuntarism, one's cognitive faculties malfunctioning would not be within the purview of one's epistemic duties. 

This then led me to wonder how "rationality" is defined on a purely externalist theory of knowledge. I would think the "popular" (!) understanding of rationality just has to do with reason and logic, which are features to which one would have internal, reflective access.

Lastly - and I wanted to end on this note - perhaps the Bible allows for the possibility of "warranted," extra-biblical, "properly basic beliefs." I don't want this review to come off as if I absolutely reject the notion. I only mean to emphasize what seems - from conversations that I've had with Scripturalists over the years - to need emphasis: such a possibility would not only call for, as Mr. Lazar calls it, "an external model of justification." An external model of justification must be grounded in an internal model of justification to be defensible.

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 11, which Mr. Lazar calls Does Neo-Scripturalism Pass the Tests?

The Problem of the Criterion

In the process of reviewing Shawn Lazar's book, Scripturalism and the Senses, I came across the following statement:

Reformed Epistemology provides Neo-Scripturalism with a better definition of knowledge. As you may remember, Nash criticized Clark for having an idiosyncratic definition of knowledge, that it was too narrow, reducing most of what we know (or claim to know) to skepticism, such as beliefs that we are married we children. With the help of Reformed Epistemology, Neo-Scripturalism can better account for what is popularly taken as knowledge.

Whether a definition of "knowledge" Plantinga et al. have provided actually is "better" than what Clark proposed is something I will address elsewhere. My primary interest is Mr. Lazar's justification for his conclusion. He thinks the definition he outlines in his book "can better account for what is popularly taken as knowledge."

Why this interests me is that it reminds me of the "Problem of the Criterion." I first remember reading about the Problem of the Criterion in a paper by Richard Fumerton (link), my introduction to present day epistemological discussions. So this was one of the first issues that caught my attention and led to me considering Scripturalism in contemporary contexts. It has been a long time, but if I recall correctly, it was also from this paper that I was inspired to think about necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge (link, link).

At any rate, there seems to be a hidden assumption implicit in the above quote. After all, why should one care "what is popularly taken as knowledge"? Are Mr. Lazar and Nash prepared to dismiss any views that are generally unpopular... like Reformed theology itself? I doubt it. It seems to me (and I think Mr. Lazar and Nash would agree) that the important questions in the field of epistemology have little to do with adjusting a definition of "knowledge" to fit what the majority think is true.

So what did Mr. Lazar really mean? If I have misunderstood Mr. Lazar, Nash, and others, they are free to correct me on what criticism of Clark's definition is really intended. But even if that is the case, the following considerations are worthy in their own right. Assuming I am correct, I believe that what may drive Mr. Lazar, Nash, and others away from Clark on this point is the hidden assumption of epistemic particularism. Epistemic particularism is one answer to the Problem of the Criterion:

...perhaps the best way to formulate the Problem of the Criterion in its most general form is with the following pair of questions (Cling (1994) and McCain and Rowley (2014)):

(1) Which propositions are true?

(2) How can we tell which propositions are true? 

...These are not questions about the nature of truth itself. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning which propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false. It is possible that one could have answers to these questions without possessing any particular theory of truth, or even taking a stand at all as to the correct theory of truth. Additionally, it is possible to have a well-developed theory of the nature of truth without having an answer to either (1) or (2). So, the issue at the heart of the Problem of the Criterion is how to start our epistemological theorizing in the correct way, not how to discover a theory of the nature of truth.

...The problem yielded by the Problem of the Criterion arises because one might plausibly think that we cannot answer (1) until we have an answer to (2), but we cannot answer (2) until we have an answer to (1). So, at least initially, consideration of the Problem of the Criterion makes it seem that we cannot get our theorizing started at all. This seems to land us in a pretty extreme form of skepticism—we cannot even begin the project of trying to determine which propositions to accept as true... 

According to Chisholm, there are only three responses to the Problem of the Criterion: particularism, methodism, and skepticism. The particularist assumes an answer to (1) and then uses that to answer (2), whereas the methodist assumes an answer to (2) and then uses that to answer (1). The skeptic claims that you cannot answer (1) without first having an answer to (2) and you cannot answer (2) without first having an answer to (1), and so you cannot answer either. Chisholm claims that, unfortunately, regardless of which of these responses to the Problem of the Criterion we adopt we are forced to beg the question... (link)

I will deal with Chisholm's claim that all responses are question-begging a little later. For now, the point is that Mr. Lazar's, Nash's, and others' aversion to (or, in some cases, derision of) Clark's definition of "knowledge" seems to stem, at least in part, from Clark being unable to say that he "knew" his wife. The various arguments seems to run as follows: people intuitively find [and should very much like to think] that they "know" their wives, and so any definition of knowledge which rules such out is "too narrow" (i.e. worse than one which does not rule such out). Others likewise have such intuitions, which is why such knowledge-claims about the subject are popular. All of this sounds like epistemic particularism:

Particularism: Assume an answer to (1) (accept some set of propositions as true) that does not depend on an answer to (2) and use the answer to (1) to answer (2).

That is, one begins with what counts as "knowledge" (1) and then attempts to formulate an understanding of how he "knows" such (2). That is, since we "know" our wives (1), let's talk about how we can tell that we "know" them (2). Here is the main problem epistemic particularists must face:

...The problem with particularism is that the particularist’s starting point is an unfounded assumption. Particularism starts with a set of particular propositions and works from there. If the particularist goes beyond that set of particular propositions to provide reasons for accepting them, she abandons that particularist response and either picks a new set of particular propositions to assume (a new particularist response) or picks something other than simply a new set of only particular propositions to assume and ceases to be a particularist.

In other words, if one begins his theorizing by saying "I know my wife," one can't very well provide reasons to justify the claim. For any such attempt to justify this claim would be theory-laden, grounded in the very particularist claim about being able to know his wife in the first place. 

Thus, I could say "I know you don't have a wife" and construct a theory of "knowledge" on the basis of that [and perhaps other] particularist claim[s]. I would then be a particularist whose propositional content is in direct conflict particularists like Mr. Lazar and Nash. Since neither claim would seem to be in a better position than the other - precisely because both conflicting claims were themselves the starting points for any further theorizing about how one can tell what "knowledge" even is - it doesn't appear possible for a third party adjudicate between the conflicting claims without first appealing to a methodology.

Before deciding whether or not this argument against particularism is a strong one, let us turn to methodism, for Chisholm also describes the methodist answer to the Problem of the Criterion as question-begging:

Methodism: Assume an answer to (2) (accept some criterion to be a correct criterion of truth – one that successfully discriminates true propositions from false ones) that does not depend on an answer to (1) and use the answer to (2) to answer (1).

Since methodism begins by assuming that some criterion is a correct criterion of truth without providing any epistemic reason to prefer this response to the alternatives, it begs the question against particularism and skepticism.

The methodist would propose a criterion by which one could determine whether or not one is married. This avoids the above dilemma that conflicting particularists may face. However, does it not run into an analogous problem? What if one proposes a different criterion for knowing truth than another? How can such a conflict be any more resolvable than epistemic particularism? 

Again, before attempting to answer any of these questions, I think it is worth noting that Clark affirmed methodism:

Physicists used to say that light consisted of ether waves. Today it is generally agreed that the methods used were defective, and that light is something else (they don’t quite know what). Hence even if botany or theology is written first, it cannot be accepted by a scholar until the crucial question is answered: How do you know? In a systematic treatment, the methodology ought to come first. Instead of asking, What is a cactus? or What is light? someone asks, What is God? How can one go about answering that question? Do we consult the Koran or the Vedas? Do we study the stars? Do we send a questionnaire to a thousand college professors? A method must be chosen (or used unwittingly) before any answer is forthcoming. Henry’s method is to consult the Bible and from it deduce that God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, unchangeable. We cannot start with God; we must start with the Bible. Why not say so first and then proceed to the theology the Bible teaches. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pg. 178)

But to return to the main subject: What one learns first from the Bible and what he learns second and third varies from man to man. One person begins with Genesis; another begins with Matthew. Similarly, a man may learn several propositions about God without reflecting on the method by which he learned them. Musicians and painters usually produce good works of art before they understand the theory. Hence in temporal psychology a knowledge of God precedes a knowledge of method. But to explain this process an apologist ought to start with the methodology. For while the unreflective reader may be unaware of the methodology – he may not realize how he does what he does – he nonetheless uses the method. And for Clark and Henry the method is Scriptural. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pg. 179, 184-186)

[As an aside, Clark's statement that "a knowledge of God precedes a knowledge of method" is interesting. It seems that in this context, Clark is affirming doxastic justification as parasitic on propositional justification (link). As will be seen in a below quote, Clark is concerned 1) that a learner is made aware, by the apologist, that he has a method as well as 2) that the learner is using the "right method." 

I am tempted to relate this to my recent reflections on Clark's view of "natural knowledge" (link) in that while Clark argued that heathens could possess such - at least, on a definition of "knowledge" as "true belief" - the apologist's job is to ensure that one begins to reflect on what "knowledge of God" they have (a la Acts 17). When this is accomplished and the learner is brought to acceptance of the right method of Scripture as his rule of faith and known, by grace through the work of the Holy Spirit, one's "knowledge" can be elevated to an epistemic status that allows for full assurance. Perhaps that oversteps a historical characterization of Clark's own thought, but if so, it would be how I personally would develop Clark's epistemology.]

I imagine Clark would identify "intuition" as the implicit method of epistemic particularists. Regardless, this would also help to account for why some's concerns for being able to know their wives were of no concern to Clark:

Granted, it is unlikely that anyone should go to such extremes to substitute another woman for the wife of an unimportant theologian or philosopher. But how do you know? So long as substitution is possible, certainty is impossible. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 75)

What, then, can we say to all the worries of question-begging? My own view of the entire situation is best answered after mentioning the "last" option to the Problem of the Criterion:

Skepticism: Assume that (i) there is no independent answer to (1) or (2), and (ii) if (1) and (2) cannot be answered independently, they cannot be answered at all.

Now, recall earlier Chisholm's claim that "unfortunately, regardless of which of these responses to the Problem of the Criterion we adopt we are forced to beg the question." The careful reader will notice that out of the three options stated thus far - particularism, methodism, and skepticism - one more option has been left out. Reread the above skeptical response without (ii). 

Perhaps there is no independent answer to (1) or (2). Even so, such does not need to be viewed as problematic, because to answer (1) and (2) simultaneously is indeed, contra skepticism (which, I think, is itself a self-referentially incoherent position to take on the question), an answer.

Thus, do we construct a definition of knowledge to capture experiences that intuitively seem to belong together (particularism)? Or do we begin with a definition by which we categorize particular experiences (methodism)? This is a false dilemma. Why? Because a methodological criterion for knowledge can itself be [particularly] known. Is it not question-begging to assume otherwise?

I can imagine a few objections to this, most of which spiral out of discussing the Problem of the Criterion itself. The most relevant criticism might be if one argued that what I am proposing is little different than those who identify solely as epistemic particularists or methodists. 

In response, obvious differences between must be highlighted. Stating that "I am married" is an instance of "knowledge," not a method for arriving at other other knowledge-claims. Thus, there is no counter-apologetic available to solely epistemic particularists who encounter other solely epistemic particularists who conflictingly claim "you are not married" as an instance of "knowledge." In contrast, Scripturalists who synthesize particularism and methodism do have counter-apologetics available against copy-cat opponents, as will be demonstrated below. Similarly, starting with a method for knowing things is not to say that one knows the method itself is true. Thus, there is as big a difference between solely epistemic methodists and those who synthesize particularism and methodism as there is between epistemic positism and foundationalism. These are important distinctions that should not be overlooked.

Another, more tangential criticism might be that even with the above distinctions in mind, someone else might attempt to likewise synthesize particularism and methodism by providing a different "methodological criterion for knowledge they claim that can itself be [particularly] known by the method itself." Does affirmation of one not beg the question against the other?

A few things ought to be stated in response. Firstly, the idea of question-begging is itself a concept that depends on a particular theory of knowledge. Solomon wrote, "of many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh." (Ecc. 12:12). He might as well have written, "of many questions there is no end, and much answering is a weariness of the flesh." A fool can ask more questions than a wise man can answer. But can the fool himself answer what right he has to ask questions? Let any skeptics who ask questions designed to undermine the possibility of knowledge practice their inconsistency in silence.

To add to this point, if one interprets the Problem of the Criterion as an attack on foundationalism, he must be prepared to offer a non-skeptical alternative. By definition, infinitists would never be able to offer a complete answer to the Problem of the Criterion. And traditional, circular coherentists (for other versions of coherentism are foundationalism in disguise) no less beg the question than foundationalists and also have the problem of explaining how, if a belief cannot be self-justifying (as foundationalists can hold), reasoning in a circle "back" to a belief with which one "started" in a given conversation or thought-process adds or contributes to the justification of that belief.

Aside from these rebuttals, though, a more direct response to the question of how to adjudicate between two people who take particular, contradictory methods of knowledge as foundational for knowledge turns on the difference between epistemology and apologetics (and causation, for one cannot be argued into knowing truth by brute logic).

Let's say I claim that the criterion for knowledge is divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in or deducible from the Bible - a criterion itself knowable as such. I do, and Clark likewise made these claims:

But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine, 1990, pg. 113)

How then may we know that the Bible is true? The Confession answers, “Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority [of the Scripture] is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit.”

Faith is a gift or work of God. It is God who causes us to believe: “Blessed is the man whom thou choosest and causest to approach unto thee” (Psa. 65:4).

Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe? 1985, pg. 18)

Suppose another claims the same thing about the Quran. What to do? Well, one difference between this scenario - in which particularism and methodism have been synthesized - and the others mentioned above is that my foundation may also prescribe apologetic methods for refuting others, including showing that their own foundation is internally inconsistent. Indeed, this is again what Clark himself suggests: 

...if apologetics has the task of discussing secular systems, is not the apagogic method the best – the method of reductio ad absurdum? 

...apologetics must be derived from revelation. At the same time what seemed to be a lack of consistency or resoluteness led to certain proposals for improving and extending his apologetic method. The proposals submitted stressed apagogic apologetics, the unity of truth and axiomatization as the most consistent denial of a common platform with unbelief. 

...the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 96, 113, 118)

In fact, Clark does an excellent job of extending meta-epistemic considerations along these lines to a defense of a unified, methodological foundationalism: 

This is one reason why methodology must be carefully considered. Is it the right method to begin with sensory experience, or with a mystic trance, and conclude with the type of God that later appears? In particular, will anything at all appear later concerning sin, atonement, resurrection, and so on? The Christian needs a method that arrives at all this. He needs a single method. Two methods produce a bifurcation that cannot be unified. Theology then would be schizophrenic. A theory of knowledge must cover all knowledge. If it does not, and if a person uses two methods he cannot answer the question, Where should the one be used, and where the other? He cannot use theory number one to define the place of theory number two, nor conversely, and hence he has no ground for choosing one rather than the other at any point. This means that he really has no theory of knowledge at all...

The method used in this book and the theology that necessarily results are Biblical. The principle is to take the Bible as a revelation from God. (link)

That being said, apologetics does have limitations. As Clark notes, "One who believes in the unity of truth may still believe that the false system entails contradictions; but to prove this is the work of omniscience" (Historiography: Secular and Religious, 1971, pg. 370). We are not omniscient. Has the Problem of the Criterion, then, remained a problem after all?

No, for fortunately, God is omniscient, God has revealed Himself to us, and His revelation is self-authenticating. While we cannot necessarily show contradictions that stem from others' foundations, then, that apologetic limitation does not prevent us from knowing they exist. Additionally, even in such situations, we can, nevertheless argue against other foundations. As Ron DiGiacomo notes:

The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion God exists.

Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
Q.E.D.

...So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be deduced by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction. (link)

Yes, a Muslim or others might try to copy this transcendental line of reasoning - and that is why reductio ad absurdem argumentation Clark recommends is an excellent apologetic tool that can, in certain contexts, be more persuasive than transcendental reasoning - but one who is worried about what hypothetical scenarios in which we can't perform a certain apologetic says about our ability to know the Bible is God's word rather than the Quran (or whatnot) ought to keep in mind that apologetics is subordinate to epistemology in the first place (link). What we know dictates how we argue and defend what we know, not vice versa. Those who find these apologetic defenses to be "question-begging" ought to re-examine whether they have rightly understood and distinguished the structure of epistemic justification from apologetic methods of defending of one's position (as well as the relationship between the two).