Trinitarianism and Philosophy

I asked a recent acquaintance of mine who has an interest in Trinitarian metaphysics whether he had come across any contemporary philosophers who attempt to explain how the three members of the Trinity could have or share one numeric will. I was particularly seeking if any such authors also affirm that the three persons of the Trinity are distinguished by having self-consciousness.

My question mainly stemmed from pg. 83 of Clark's Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? Clark writes, "Assent then is an act of will." Of course, Clark is talking about humans, but if Clark is right, and if there is an analogy (!) to be made here - as Clark himself felt free enough to do in discussing Trinitarian minds and thoughts - I wondered how or if contemporary philosophers address the question of whether three distinct persons who assent to three distinct thoughts ("I am the Father" vs. "I am the Son" vs. "I am the Spirit") might not (ex hypothesi) thereby have three distinct wills. 

There are assumptions laden in this question. Of course, if human relationships and the relationship amongst the members of the Trinity are analogous, questioning would then turn to what is relevantly disanalogous such that, say, the Trinity might have distinct thoughts without distinct wills. To merely say there is a difference between humans and the Trinity does no work towards explaining what the differences are - let alone why there are differences - when we expect or intuit otherwise.

With these prefatory remarks out of the way, to my surprise, I was impressed that my acquaintance was quickly able to provide me with this article by Scott M. Williams entitled, "Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity." It was an interesting read, but I found it ultimately unsatisfying. From the article:

If the agent is not the same person as the person referred to in the predicate, then the copula expresses essential numerical sameness without identity. (I am unaware of any creaturely analogue to this. It is the divine persons’ sharing numerically the same nature, numerically the same uses of a mental token, and omniscience, that render this a unique case.) For example, if the Father uses a mental token of “I am God the Father” and in so doing affirms a proposition, then the Father affirms that God the Father is identical to God the Father. If the Son uses the same mental token of “I am God the Father” so as to affirm a proposition and never affirms something false (given omniscience), then relative to the Son, the Son affirms the proposition that the Son is essentially numerically the same divine nature as the Father without being identical to the Father. (pg. 331)

For starters, I have never heard of a theologian who would argue that the Son might utter, "I am God the Father." Now, I understand the author's idea, in context, is that the same token can entail affirmation of different propositions if said token is uttered in different contexts (e.g. by different persons). But unless I misread him, he distinguishes the divine nature from the divine persons by arguing the former is a constituent (i.e. part?) of the latter. 

If we assume he is correct, on what intelligible grounds could the Son's use of a mental token such as "I am God the Father" be in the sense of affirming a proposition such as "the Son is... the... divine nature"? On what intelligible grounds can the Father be considered interchangeable with what the author says is His constituent divine nature? Synecdoche? To put it mildly, would indeed be an "unique" understanding of the token in question as well as tokening in general, especially in the case of concretes (as the author argues the divine nature as well as divine persons are).

I found his explanations of other tokens he thinks all three divine persons can affirm on pg. 332 (“The Son and I are sent, and the Father is not sent”) and pg. 337 (“I shall be one who becomes incarnate”) similarly unpersuasive. Metaphysically speaking, is it not strictly the case that persons are sent or become incarnate? Even if it were or is true that the persons who are sent or become incarnate are numerically united in terms of divinity, I don't see how the tokens he mentions can be stretched to accommodate the sort of meanings he attaches as possible, propositional renderings of said tokens. In short, it looks as if the author attempting to retrofit a theory of tokens to suit a theory of numerical unity but has some difficulty accounting for certain tokens. 

With these disagreements registered, to speak of the project the author undertook in more broad terms, I don't criticize him for his thoughtful effort toward the attempt to put forth a coherent Trinitarian theory. Early church fathers made use of the philosophical language of their day, and even the most "traditional" of Protestants seem inclined to agree that the very best of man-made creeds are subject to scrutiny and, at times, even revision (e.g. link). ["Man-made" is not meant pejoratively, by the way, as we all make confessions, prayers, hear or give sermons, etc. using words other than those found in Scripture.]

I've also spoken positively of the role of speculation in apologetics elsewhere (link). Of course, the secret things belong to the Lord our God (Deuteronomy 29:29). But we cannot default to shutting down difficult questions about faith, for some answers to difficult questions may by good and necessary consequence be deduced from Scripture (WCF 1.6). Further, even if theories to certain, difficult questions are underdetermined by Scriptural testimony, providing these as possible answers may hearten one's assurance, discourage confusion of Christianity with worldviews which are internally contradictory, etc. 

What can be personally challenging is that those who are philosophically inclined (such as myself) can, at times, be so enamored with a possible answer to a difficult question that we confuse it with a thoroughly, exegetically grounded one such as is described by the Westminster divines. This was the case with my tendency towards dogmatism on the monarchy of the Father in the early to middle 2010s, at least in the way I presented myself. Having a sense of coherence (a possible answer) is not the same as having truth (link). 

I use myself as an example so that others exploring difficult questions - as one may - may tread with care so as not to stumble over their own pride as I did. For despite my criticisms of the above author, I do understand reasons why one might favor a "one numeric will" model even if it is difficult to explain, one reason being that will must be "located" in nature rather than hypostasis to avoid monotheletism. I've spoken more to that point here as I continue to try to think through this particular Trinitarian puzzle, although I won't act as if I've found the one and only piece that fits. Sometimes, wisdom simply dictates the need for silent meditation on God's word, patient prayer for grace and spiritual illumination, and respect for God's thrice holy name.

Monkey See, Monkey Don't

I recently talked to someone who observed that Eastern Orthodox apologists have, in the past decade or so, been more apt to try appropriating Reformed apologetics. I've witnessed the same tendency in the likes of Jay Dyer, Joshua Schooping (before he became disillusioned regarding Eastern Orthodoxy), and others I've happened across now and then.

Truth is attractive; hence, many of these Eastern Orthodox apologists once nominally identified as Reformed Christians. As for what reason those who identify as formerly Reformed fall away from the truth, I give some possible reasons here. Regardless, on one level, that such persons retain some truths they learned even after public deconversion is unsurprising. On another level, it is surprising that such apologists have not, by and large, critically self-reflected on whether a fundamentally Reformed apologetic can makes sense within the context of a non-Reformed faith. 

For example, I was recently linked to this article by an Eastern Orthodox philosopher name Erik Sorem. A glaring omission in it - and in Eastern Orthodox apologetics in general - is the connection between apologetics and anthropology. For the Reformed presuppositionalist, one practical purpose for apologetics may be to undermine the false confidence of unbelievers. However, the Reformed Christian acknowledges that man's sinful rebelliousness to God cannot solely be overcome by argumentation. Because of the extent of man's sinfulness, the Holy Spirit must graciously change the mind of the rebellious apart from the help of the rebellious. There is no synergy in regeneration.

By comparison, the author of this article rightly denies the concept of epistemic neutrality but fails to situate the explanation for his denial within the context of a Reformed anthropology, particularly the doctrine of original sin. Thus, the Eastern Orthodox apologist may try to borrow from Reformed apologetics, but their denial of the need for monergistic regeneration both understates man's sinfulness and thereby undercuts any nominal agreement that an "autonomous" epistemology will be false. Gordon Clark didn't write about Eastern Orthodoxy very much, but here's one reference that brings with it a useful reminder:

Eastern orthodoxy stresses the rational nature of man and insists that man remains man after the fall. So far, so good. But the value of this sound position is vitiated by the Eastern churches' failure to recognize the extent of the fall and therefore their inability to see the full need of grace. Some of their theologians toy with a verbally pleasing analogy: as God became man, so man will become God. This is similar to the Gnostic notion that salvation is deification. Partly because of this, some very conservative Protestants have reacted against the identification of the image as reason, believing that this identification implies a superficial view of sin. The implication, however, is fallacious and the reaction extreme. (link)

Speaking of Clark, in my experience, most Eastern Orthodox apologists find their roots in other presuppositionalists such as Bahnsen, Frame, or Van Til (cf. Sorem's article above). Thus, some Eastern Orthodox apologists are unaware that grounding one's justification for belief in the Trinity in Scripture makes more sense than grounding one's justification for belief in Scripture in the Trinity (link; cf. my discussion of transcendental argumentation here and here). 

Of course, there is no question that the Trinity ontologically precede the Scriptures, but I have never witnessed one who takes the Trinity as his epistemic foundation be able to deduce, say, the canon of Scripture. On the other hand, one who takes Scripture as his epistemic foundation may be able to deduce the doctrine of the Trinity. The upshot of this is that presuppositionalism is tied to the doctrines of sola scriptura, perspicuity, self-authenticity, etc. As with the anthropological objection, this epistemic foundations objection is fatal to Eastern Orthodox apologetics and the epistemology its apologists try to defend. 

Such are the general problems with Eastern Orthodox persons who attempt to co-opt presuppositionalism. There are more particular problems I've observed, ones which stem from attempting to follow the Van Tilian brand of presuppositionalism (as all the Eastern Orthodox apologists I have in mind tend to do). 

For instance, I don't know to what extent Eastern Orthodox apologists are familiar with contemporary epistemology - in some cases, self-admittedly not (see Jay Dyer at minute mark 2:03:00 here, for example) - but what I tend to read or hear basic mistakes such as what the meaning of classical foundationalism even is! 

Classical foundationalism is a theory regarding the structure of epistemic justification. In contrast to Sorem's apparent misunderstanding (in which he writes, "Presuppositional apologetics, first and foremost rejected...  classical foundationalism"; see pg. 12ff of his article), foundationalism as such says nothing about whether such justificatory foundations are or must be "autonomous" or "theonomous." Sorem uses the guilt by association fallacy and/or genetic fallacy when he dismisses classical foundationalism seemingly for no other reason than that Aristotle accepted natural theology, that empiricism is flawed, etc. It is painfully apparent Sorem is unaware of theistic foundationalists such as Gordon Clark. 

Ironically, the sort of coherentism Sorem goes on to espouse (see footnote 28) itself collapses into foundationalism, as epistemologists such as Peter Klein have noted: 

The function of the type of reasoning we are considering is to enhance the epistemic status of our belief-states with their propositional contents, and circular reasoning cannot do that. It might appear that some progress has been made when a reason for y, namely x, is offered, but when it turns out that the reason for x is nothing other than y, it is pyrrhic progress.

The second, more plausible form of coherentism - emergent of holistic coherentism - holds that when our reasons have a reciprocal structure they are all at least prima facie justified. The epistemic status of all members of the coherent set is determined by the degree to which the propositions in the set are R-related plus, perhaps, some other properties obtaining. If x and y are members of the coherent set {x, y, ...} and xRy and yRx, it is not x that makes y justified and it is not y that makes x justified, rather what contributes to making each of them justified is that they are members of a coherent set. Being a member of such a set makes them prima facie justified, or, at least contributes significantly to each being prima facie justified (see BonJour 1989). I will not contest that in this paper. What is important to see here is that emergent coherentism, as Ernest Sosa has shown, is a form of foundationalism (Sosa, 1980). The foundational property is being a member of a coherent set of propositions. This form of coherentism is just as much a foundationalist account as, say, an account that takes all believed propositions which represent my conscious mental states as (at least) prima facie justified. Thus, any rapprochement with foundationalism is applicable to emergent coherentism as well." (Klein, Ad Infinitum, pgs. 110-111)

Likewise, Jay Dyer also misunderstands this (see ~minute mark 1:43:00 in the aforementioned video). This is especially inexcusable in that both Dyer and Sorem are aware of and have approvingly cited a paper that makes the same point Klein does above! Both of the apologists recommend Russell Manion's "The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism," in which he writes:

Circularity is also not satisfactory, but it is much more interesting. Advocates of a philosophical position called coherentism think they have beaten the foundation dilemma. They point out that beliefs do not neatly divide into the categories of foundational beliefs and justified beliefs. All our beliefs are related to one another in the form of a coherent web. Some subset of our beliefs may be more important and juridical than other beliefs, but all beliefs hang on all other beliefs, and nothing is foundational. 

But as Michael Depaul in his article “Coherentism” points out, coherentism really doesn’t escape the foundational problem at all. It is simply another “version of foundationalism that holds all beliefs to be foundational.” (link)

Further, Dyer and Sorem also miss the important difference between one's having noninferential knowledge and one's defending said knowledge (link, link, link). The structure of one's knowledge - assuming one has "knowledge" (and here I am speaking of "knowledge" about which one may have infallible assurance) - must be founded on divine revelation. 

Now, any defense of our knowledge will of course presuppose that we do indeed have knowledge, but this just means that our defenses or articulations of of our epistemology will ultimately derive from our said foundation, our belief in which is intrinsically justified and meaningful.

So even if circularity appears in one's apologetic argumentation - as Clark might put it, axioms leads to certain theorems, and theorems can help inform whether an axiom has confirmatory evidence or is disconfirmed (e.g. Clark and His Critics, 2007, pg. 53) - it is nevertheless true that we can know the epistemic foundation of revelation without requiring an argument for it. As I suggested earlier, Eastern Orthodox confusion on these points may stem from that they generally follow Van Tilian presuppositionalism, apologists who have discussed epistemic justification in terms of coherence or circularity (e.g. link). 

A side point: contemporary epistemologists such as Richard Fumerton also make use of what are called "conceptual regress arguments" (which are distinct from justificatory regress arguments) to illustrate that the meaning of terms must be intrinsic:

Consider an analogy. One of the earliest distinctions made in ethics is the distinction between different ways in which something can be good. Some things, like taking blood-pressure medication, are good only as a means to something else that is good (perhaps health of the happiness that comes from being in good health). But, one might argue, it can't be the case the everything that is good is good only as means to something else that is good. While we can (partially) define being good as a means in terms of having good outcomes, we cannot complete our definition of goodness this way. To find, even in thought, the source of goodness, we need to form the thought of something that is good in itself (intrinsically good, good just in virtue of what it is).

The suggestion here is that inferential justification stands to noninferential justification as being good as a means stands to being good in itself. (Foundationalism, Cambridge Elements in Epistemology, pg. 8)

Now, Clark and I might nuance where meaning is to be found (e.g. propositions vs. concepts) - and Fumerton in particular might not quarrel with this - but in any case, anyone who has read Clark's book on John Dewey (1963) will recognize Clark's critique of Instrumentalism to be essentially the same as what Fumerton here states. Fumerton also gives the helpful example on the same page of the above work of what it means to be a "descendant": it is to be a child of someone, or a child of a child of someone, or a child of a child of a child of someone, etc. At some point, the ancestor has to make an appearance for it to be meaningful to call a person a "descendant." Recursion eventually bottoms out in foundations.

I'll add to what Fumerton says against an implicitly infinitist view of meaning. When we ask someone to explain what they mean by something like "goodness," we tend to have the expectation that the definiendum won't occur in any attempted definition. If I ask, "what is free choice?" and an Arminian responds, "the ability to choose" (which happened quite often when I used to dialogue with Arminians), I would have to point out that they are repeating what I am asking for them to define (the definiendum) in their attempted definition. That is, such an Arminian has not made any clearer what they mean by "free choice." Of course, I would not childishly ask them to define "free choice" ad infinitum, but the goal was, at some point, to consider a stated definition as symbolizing an intrinsically meaningful proposition... and this is a strike against a circularist view of meaning which, by analogy, helps argue a case for epistemic foundationalism over against epistemic coherentism.

Finally, suppose an Eastern Orthodox apologist were to attempt to reformulate presuppositionalism to be more in line with Clark's view. If they're willing to copy one Reformed view, why not a better one? If one monkey sees another swinging like an Olympic gymnast from one branch of philosophy, he might think to try to graft that branch onto his own tree. Well, because philosophy is interconnected, the monkey's attempt to graft the good branch onto a rotten tree won't take. How much less successful the subsequent mental gymnastics will be as the monkey tries and fails to swing from that branch!

That is, I've already outlined tensions regarding the anthropology and the doctrine of Scripture of Eastern orthodoxy and its presuppositionalist embezzelment. But an Eastern Orthodox apologist has further problems given their theology proper, some of which I've already outlined here and will continue to build a case against now. For instance, take a look at what Eastern Orthodox apologist Perry Robinson admits:

For my part, I affirm rather that God is more than his revelation to put it in biblical terms. Contrary to the Reformed (and the Lutherans) and Rome, metaphysics applies to everything except God ad intra, which is why for them theology is a science and for us it is about the spiritual life in Christ. (link)

This is quite similar to what Eduard Borysov says in "The Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Pavel Florensky and John Meyendorff: A Critical Examination" (Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 2011):

Palamas's theology of energies, according to Meyendorff, has no philosophical rationale behind it. However, one should not forget that the philosophical notions of hypostasis, nature, and energies played a key role in the Christological controversies and had become the basic principles for Palamas's theology proper as well as his soteriology. God is, by definition, unrelated to and above any essence, hence he is unknown by any essence. (Gregory Palamas, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, § 3.2.24, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), 95)

Borysov extends the logic of Robinson's statement: insofar as metaphysics and epistemology are intertwined, to say that there can be no divine metaphysics means there can be no knowledge of God. Now compare these statements to what Eastern Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky says:

All the Fathers of the Church, both of East and of West, are agreed in seeing a certain co-ordination, a primordial correspondence between the being of man and the being of God in the fact of the creation of man in the image and likeness of God. (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pg. 114)

Robinson and Borysov's statements on metaphysics and epistemology logically extend to anthropology. If metaphysics don't apply to God such that He is unrelated to and above mankind, then there is no "correspondence," "image," or "likeness" of God in man. Considering the emphases Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to put on the early church fathers, it is almost as if the Eastern Orthodox position doesn't cohere at all! Now, where does this finally lead? Palamas says:

...God is not only beyond knowledge, but also beyond unknowing; His revelation itself is also truly a mystery of a most divine and extraordinary kind, since the divine manifestations, even if symbolic, remain unknowable by reason of their transcendence. They appear, in fact, according to a law which is not appropriate to either human or divine nature - being, as it were, for us yet beyond us - so that no name can properly describe them. (The Triads, pg. 32)

Following the logic all the way down, the doctrine of Scripture (and divine revelation) is also destructed. The disharmony of Eastern Orthodoxy leads its apologists to defend they know not what. What one needs for a coherent worldview is not Neo-Orthodoxy or Eastern Orthodoxy but Scriptural orthodoxy:

In reaction against the optimistic modernism of the nineteenth century, contemporary neo-orthodoxy (q.v.) has insisted on the transcendence of God. But it has distorted the biblical concept of transcendence to the degree of making God completely unknowable. Some of their phraseology may be repeated as examples. God has been called the Wholly-Other. Brunner writes, “God can, when he wants to, speak his word even through false doctrine.” Another author denies that a proposition can have the same meaning for man as it does for God. Several theologians collaborated to say that “we dare not maintain that his (God’s) knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point.”

Now, it seems obvious that if a man knows any truth at all, he must know a truth that God knows, for God knows all truths. A sentence must mean to a man who knows its meaning precisely what it means to God; for if the man does not know God’s meaning, he does not know the meaning of the sentence. Hence, if man is to know anything, it cannot be denied that there are points of coincidence between human and divine knowledge. Similarly God cannot be Wholly-Other, for this would deny that man was created in the image of God. (link)

For those interested in further reading, I recommend Steve Hays's interactions with EO apologists; e.g. on the issue of divine transcendence, see here.

Contemporary Thought on Gordon Clark

Since the start of this blog, I've reviewed many books which interact with the thought of Gordon Clark - in the past year or so, see here, here, here, and here. Among contemporary authors, Doug Douma has probably invested more time into original, primary research on Clark's life than any other. Included in Doug's contributions to the field of Clark research include his biography of Clark's life, transcriptions of Clark's correspondence, and transcriptions of Clark's lesser known or available writings (cf. link). He has also been a kind correspondent, patiently answering various, abstruse questions of mine by email.

His latest book, The Grand Old Doc: Articles on the Thought of Gordon H. Clark, is a compilation of articles and addresses. Excepting a comment here or there in his earlier books, several chapters express Doug's first publication which incorporates philosophical and theological evaluation. Other chapters still contain historical discoveries, research, and analyses for which Doug has been known.

I had read some of the chapters in this book before purchasing it (on Doug's blog or TrinityFoundation review archives) and even engaged one of them this past summer: "Gordon Clark and the Philosophy of Occasionalism" (link). Regarding this chapter, I was hoping to see Doug follow-up on a comment he made to another author who has also discussed Clark and occasionalism. But as The Grand Old Doc may have been in the works for a while and as awareness of new material by and on Gordon Clark has rapidly expanded in the past 10 years, perhaps this was too much to hope for.

In any case, I'll plan to review various chapters in Doug's book in the future. There was much with which I found myself in agreement, areas which I might offer an alternative perspective, ideas I had not considered, and still others I wish were explored more. More than anything else, though, as someone who has also spent much time profiting from reading Clark's work, I appreciate Doug's effort and care to advance the thought of Clark vis-a-vis raising awareness regarding its depth, diversity, and potential for development, which has facilitated my own efforts to that same end.

What Can You Do?

Barriers to belief in Christ or barriers to growth in sanctification can be dealt with in different ways. What can you do to help someone overcome those barriers? The question is somewhat difficult to answer because, as phrased, it is nebulous. It's vague and abstract. It's like asking, "would barriers to belief and sanctification exist without sin?" Well, of course not. On the other hand, is it especially helpful to raise that point and offer no further insight to a believer trying to counsel someone? Of course not. 

You wouldn't go to fellow believer for advice and say, "I'm having a problem in dealing with a family member. The problem is they're sinners." Getting advice is excellent and one of the first things a believer should do in a concrete situation. But then they should also express the situation in concrete terms. As such, the rest of this post won't feign to give comprehensive answers, because situations differ. There are many proximate causes of barriers to faith or good works. 

Apologists tend to think in terms of rationality and argumentation. This may be what is called for, but as I've said elsewhere, apologetics is a practical enterprise. It takes some skill and experience to have a sense for what is helpful for people and when it is helpful for them. Not every issue someone experiences is a nail that needs to be hammered. Not every situation in which you are trying to offer counsel requires a syllogistic argument. 

Some people are ready talkers. They raise issues when they realize they have issues - although in some cases, the issues they raise are more so symptoms of underlying issues they don't even realize they have. This is as true in relationships with others as it is with one's relationship to Christ. A fight with a spouse may be triggered by one event but have an underlying cause due to unresolved past events ("Do I trust him or her?"; "Does he or she care about me?"; "Do I have any worth?"). If someone is reaching out to you for assistance, listening is important (to nonverbals as well as verbals; link).  

Other people are avoidant. They don't want to make the first step in reaching out for assistance. In such cases, probing questions may be useful. Have a target goal for your conversation. A goal can be as challenging as bringing up a difficult topic, like inviting an apathetic family member to church - "Hey, have you considered...?"; "I was just thinking, would you be interested in...?" - and then, without being pushy or harping on the issue every time you see them, letting them know every so often that you hope they will be blessed by and be a blessing for others. Or your target in a conversation can be as simple as disarming someone: showing vulnerability; not jumping them for having an area of disagreement; not caving to the pressures of a situation; not ignoring their questions; showing that you enjoyed talking to them; etc. 

Having goals may facilitate others being able to see you in a different light than they did before or view you differently than they view others - approachable yet truthful, honest yet tactful (cf. Colossians 4:6). Facilitating a relationship in this way is not manipulative, by the way. You're supposed to love others and want what is best for them. You're supposed to act Christ-like. You don't know who has been chosen by God to receive grace sufficient to convict them of sin, much less how He has ordained for this to take place in time.

Finally, there are some situations which require more forceful action. The above scenarios presuppose those with whom we interact are not actively antagonistic to the faith. But persecution - in contemporary America, this typically takes the form of religious ridicule - is unavoidable. There is not only one right course of action in these (and other) circumstances. Because apologetic engagement is practical, Christians often have some liberty in how they act - so long as it is in accordance with truth. In some contexts, this may mean removing yourself and those who are with you from a derisive situation. It is not a cowardly suppression of truth to protect others or yourself from aggressors or temptations (cf. destruction of Jerusalem; Joseph and Potiphar's wife; Christ Himself hid at times). In other contexts, your conscience may lead you to stand up for truth without even fearing death (cf. Stephen; Christ's crucifixion). However you respond: what's the goal? What's your hope? Consider these questions in subservience to God's word: having a conscious, godly goal you are aiming toward makes it easier to walk a godly path.

As I said above, we should always keep in mind that we have no control over how others will respond to our engagement with them. And we can't forcibly change one's ethical orientation. Nevertheless, we can always do something. Calvinism is not fatalism, and what we do makes a difference. Thinking about or planning for different situations before they happen helps one to be prepared to actually follow through when it comes time to make good (whether proactive or responsive). The less we reflect, the more apt we may be to hesitate on how to rightly respond when particular opportunities arise for exemplifying particular fruits of the Spirit.

Regardless of how others (or even we) respond, all things Christians experience have been ordained for a reason. The Spirit will use our experience to some end that is good for us, others, or both - even if, in the moment, we don't understand how. I tend to try to live with Romans 8:28 in the back of my mind, and it saves me from anxiety. In fact, my struggle is less with assurance (keeping the big picture in mind) and more with daily application (focusing on immediate needs). I tend to need to set conscious, proximate goals for myself or make little progress. My weakness may be another's strength and vice versa: each of us needs the support of others (Hebrews 10:24-25).

Try THIS On For Size!

Having a worldview is like wearing pants: wearing a pair that fits keeps you from being exposed in front of others. Much of the apologetic of unbelievers - social activists in particular, although there is a trickle-down effect - is to use manipulative tempt-tactics to entice believers to drop their drawers. 

On the one hand, to professing Christians who take a hard stance on the importance of truth, words like "tolerance," "empathy," "understanding," "social justice," etc. are weaponized, redefined so as to either force a capitulating compromise or - if one persists in defending and emphasizing the importance of truth - bad press. 

[By the way, this can be just as true of so-called right-wing activists as left-wing activists. For example, right-wing activists may be just as disposed to use the above subterfuge when abolishing abortion or prosecuting those who facilitate abortion are live options on a legislative table. Hypocrisy may be found in every age. Why would people who say they oppose something turn around and intentionally act in a way which undermines their stated position? Well, people may have motivations ulterior to a defense of truth. 

Ironically, if "social activism" is made an end in itself, then social activists can't have a terminus to their cause without also admitting a terminus to their own purpose or reason for being. This is as true on a global scale as it is on a national or local scale. But a worldview that purports to survive on conflict is, as Christ said, as a house divided: it cannot stand. Resolution, consummation, telos: God's will will be done.]

To Christians who understand the importance of a true worldview, they should know this. As much as one might try to suck in his or her gut and squeeze into a pair of Syncretic Slacks, they won't fit - and even if one might think they do, everyone else can see through them. With compromise off the table, bad press is the least of the persecution Christians ought to expect as they live out the Christological pattern of suffering before glory (cf. Romans 8, 1 Peter). 

On the other hand, to professing Christians who are less educated or less self-conscious about the need for a Christian worldview and the dangers of straying from it, unbelieving activitsts are eager to market their causes as new, fresh, trending, adventurous, etc. "Aren't you curious? Do you really want to miss out on the 'experience' we have to offer? Try THIS on for size!" Such sycophants make nihilistic nudists appear honest by comparison.

This analogy is more fitting when one considers the biblical metaphor of playing the harlot. For whom or what are professing Christians willing to undress themselves before the Lord, exchanging the Christological covering He requires (Exodus 28:42-43) for a fling? Just so, broad-mindedness is not a virtue. The book of Proverbs contains no such adage as, "you'll never know unless you try." To evaluate a worldview, we only have to look at it to know it won't fit.

A professing Christian who does not dress themselves in heavenly attire will not be distinguishable from worldly society (Matthew 7:16ff.). We are blessed that God's word provides a tailor-made remedy to our naked condition. May we teach and clothe our children accordingly.

Colossians 2:8 See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ.