Gordon Clark: Composite Volume – A Review of "Encyclopedia of Morals," edited by Vergilius Ferm (Christianity Today).

1957. Composite Volume – A Review of Encyclopedia of Morals, edited by Vergilius Ferm. Christianity Today. Vol 1. No. 7. Jan. 7 (p. 38).

Composite Volume

Encyclopedia of Morals, edited by Vergilius Ferm. Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. $10.00

Here is another composite volume edited by the indefatigable Vergilius Ferm. The first entry on the Aboriginals of Yirkalla emphasizes the statement in the preface that the material is not only philosophical but also anthropological.

Then when we come to Puritan Morals (12 pages, double columns), we find more descriptions of their allegedly disagreeable conduct than exposition of theory. The articles on Aristotle, Kant, and Sidgwick are well written. The difficulties, particularly in the last two thinkers, are lightly touched on, as may be wise in an Encyclopedia; Aristotle receives more criticism, though the total effect is not so clear. Christian Moral Philosophy (49 columns) dates the Mosaic Law after the prophets and claims that the Pharisees were the legitimate heirs of Ezekiel, but in contrast with this radical view the author recognizes the eschatological theme of the Sermon on the Mount and gives a tolerably good account of Romans. Justification by faith is explained, and the infliction of a penalty on Christ is acknowledged.

As it is impossible to review every article in an encyclopedia, these must suffice as samples.

Gordon H. Clark

Gordon Clark: Honest Criticism - A Review of "The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Bath," by G. C. Berkouwer (Christianity Today)

1956. Honest Criticism - A Review of The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, by G. C. Berkouwer. Christianity Today Vol. 1, No. 2. Oct. 29 (p. 34).

Honest Criticism

The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, by G. C. Berkouwer. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1956. $4.95.

The Triumph of Grace is a readable book, a veritable triumph of clarity in style and thought. Dutch barbarisms—the misplaced “already,” the excessive use of “over against,” the Germanic adjectival phrases, such as “the in Christ historically realized rejection of the chaos” (p. 249)—are infrequent. The thought proceeds without confusion. One always knows precisely what Berkouwer means. The obscurities are all Barth’s.

The theme of the volume opens with the question as to whether or not Barth has seriously altered his earlier theological views. Has there been a break in his thought, or is it continuous? Has he been won to optimism after a period of war-weary pessimism? Has he become more orthodox?

Through several chapters Berkouwer argues that while there have been variations in emphasis, and even one or two retractions of unfortunate phraseology, the triumph of God’s grace is the single and continuous motif.

With chapter eight Berkouwer’s criticism begins. As his exposition is marked with great care, so too his criticism is scrupulously honest and restrained. Barth’s paradoxical and even unintelligible language tempts an author to see contradictions where none may be. Or, possibly the contradictions are really there. But Berkouwer never presses minor difficulties. There are, however, some major questions.

With full acknowledgment of the fact that Barth espouses many biblical themes and is usually a more sober judge of the same than others of the neo-orthodox school, Berkouwer clearly states the general principle that an emphasis on grace does not ipso facto insure a fully Scriptural theology. Marcionism, Romanism, and antinomianism have also spoken of grace. Therefore, with respect to Barth one must ask: What sort of triumph does he proclaim? What is the enemy over which the triumph occurs? What are the means of the triumph? Four chapters are used to answer these questions.

If Barth says that grace triumphs over sin, one must note that for Barth sin is not defined in terms of divine law. Sin is pride or autonomy; it is absurd and inexplicable; it is the “No” which is the reverse side of God’s “Yes.” Sin is a mystery, not because we cannot explain it, but because it is “ontologically impossible.” Sin in the nature of the case cannot be; man cannot be godless; sin is a violation of the inviolable grace of God. When this view is combined with the theme of triumph, a triumph already complete, Berkouwer naturally asks whether Barth has not made the preaching of the Gospel useless and the struggle against sin empty.

Then too, the completeness of the triumph, in the emphatic terms Barth uses, leads to universalism. Yet Barth rejects universalism. At the same time he asserts that every man is both elect and reprobate. But if every man is both, and if all synergism is radically denied, how can universalism be logically avoided? Barth objects to the Remonstrants, who made redemption universal but limited grace’s effectiveness by a human cooperation. Yet, concludes Berkouwer, Barth has adopted a position that differs from the Remonstrants more in words than in thought. Barth, says Berkouwer, stands at the crossroads: either he should accept universalism and the uselessness of the Gospel, or he should reconsider his position on sin and election.

An appendix of 10 pages is added on the “Problem of Interpretation.” It is in effect a criticism of Professor Cornelius Van Til. In the words of Balthasar, Van Til’s interpretation of Barth is “completely grotesque.” Berkouwer adds that Van Til neglects “an elementary requirement of scholarship” with his “unwarranted interpretation.” And worse, Van Til expounds orthodoxy in such a way that “I cannot recognize the features of the real Reformed orthodoxy.” This reviewer shares Berkouwer’s evaluation of Van Til’s critical abilities, but on the points under discussion he cannot see that Van Til’s departures from the Reformed faith are quite so serious as Berkouwer seems to believe.

Gordon H. Clark

Gordon Clark: Emanation (The American People's Encyclopedia)

1948. In American People's Encyclopedia. Chicago: The Spencer Press. Emanation

The name given the process by which lower orders of nature come from the highest principle. It is found in some philosophies that reject the Hebrew-Christian conception of a voluntary act of creation. An illustration is NEOPLATONISM, which compares the world with the rays of light that emanate from the sun without diminishing its energy, Since temporal and spatial characteristics are denied, emanation may mean nothing more than logical structure, and theorems of geometry could be said to emanate from the axioms. In GNOSTICISM the emanations are conceived as 30 angels sprung from the mind of God. The last one, Sophia, is made the mother of Jehovah, and through her, human salvation is eventually effected. 

Gordon H. Clark

Gordon Clark: Where to Find His Works

In the past decade, Doug Douma has done excellent work in making available more of Clark's writings (link, link) and publishing a rather comprehensive bibliography (link). Nevertheless, actually being able to actually find where to read or listen to some of Clark's published or unpublished works can be something of a chore, if not impossible. In time and to the extent possible, I hope to be able to create a easy to use, one-stop post with links to all his works (or, at least, to those which can be found). This post will function as something of a beginning towards that end.

In the early 21st century, the TrinityFoundation (link, link) popularized Gordon Clark. One can also find other, lesser known works by Clark in various places (examples: link, link, link, link, link, link, link, link, link). A few of his books not purchasable through the TrinityFoundation can be bought elsewhere online (including: Readings in Ethics, Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy, and Selections from Early Greek Philosophy). Works I recently found and are not currently available on other websites can be read here, here, and here, with more to come. 

Additionally, in my efforts to systematize my research on Clark (link), I've mostly chronologized Douma's bibliography. In the main, the bibliography is exceptional. One update needed is Clark's Review of Antinomianism in English History was written in 1953, not 1943 (link). Another is that some articles - like "What is Your Goal?" or "Do - Don't - Has Done" - are not dated in the bibliography, but the date when they were written is known (link, link). Several other updates are required. Additionally, a change to Douma's "Appendix" listing Clark's extant letters in this book (which is also well-researched and fascinating) is that Clark wrote to Buswell on December 12, 1938, not vice versa. 

I had also thought that there might be a work or two by Clark that was missing from the bibliography. Perhaps Douma left out "The Answer" to "The Complaint" on purpose, since it was a document not solely authored by Clark, but Clark himself said: "Since I am one of its authors, it obviously represents my views." I believe I've also found another article that doesn't appear in the bibliography (link). Perhaps there are more out there. 

There are still quite a number of items in that bibliography which don't appear accessible or purchasable online (mostly sermons; also a few articles like "Liberalism," which Douma says appears in "Christianity Today" but to which no date appears to correspond to June 18, which is listed in the bibliography: link). I hope that in the coming decades, they will be.

Gordon Clark: Foreword to Carl F. Henry's "Remaking the Modern Mind"

1946. Henry, Carl F. H. Remaking the Modern Mind. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub.

The prevailing philosophy today, whether it be the less deliberate, less self conscious views of the lay mind or the professional and technical theories of the scholars, is the secular philosophy of humanism or naturalism.

This summary judgment may not seem accurate to those who bear in mind the religious tenor of the idealistic schools. The Absolute is often referred to in tones of religious unction, and spiritual values received extensive consideration. None the less, the Absolute is usually nothing other than the world as a whole, transcending each particular part, but not transcending the natural universe. In some writers the identification of the Absolute and the world is not so clear. They will speak of God as creative; they will allow God to have thoughts that are not a part of external nature; and thus they will try to preserve the concept of transcendence. Some of the intricacies of these attempts to maintain a religious philosophy opposed to humanism are examined in the present volume. But by way of introduction this foreword suggests that idealism in both these forms is an unstable position. The latter form may speak of creation, but it can hardly mean creation ex nihilo; its God is a finite God and not God the Father Almighty; and in that case this finite person cannot command man’s worship with divine authority. The first form of idealism, stressing the Absolute as the whole, avoids a finite God at the expense of avoiding God altogether. Is there then any difference between the usual forms of idealism and the secularism of naturalistic philosophy? Whatever difference there may be, it is not one to safeguard the religious aspirations of historic Christianity for personal immortality and communion with the Triune God. Idealism therefore may be considered as a somewhat disguised and somewhat inconsistent form of humanism.

According to this view the supreme values of human life must be found in this world and in this life. Nature, whether conceived as hostile or as merely indifferent to man’s desires, is the only sphere of his activities and the only source of his comforts. Prayer addressed to a supernatural Person is superstition and must be replaced by human cooperation in the harnessing of natural forces. This is the purpose of modern science, and beyond the material and economic benefits of science humanism offers the consolations of morality and art. Whether a naturalistic philosophy, having repudiated a divine lawgiver, can logically justify moral distinctions, and whether, without a divine purpose, it can provide the necessary ingredients for art, are questions not here to be discussed. The point is simply that humanism restricts human values to the science, morality, and art of a secularized civilization. Religion, in the common sense of the word, is excluded.

Now that humanism has come to dominate the temper of the age and is in fact exhibiting an evangelistic fervor to consolidate its gains, some people, though they may never have been known for piety and though they may never have taken an interest in opposing the spread of naturalism, are beginning to wonder whether religion is not an essential factor for the maintenance of a healthy society. That humanism, naturalism, atheism, is not quite satisfactory is evidenced by the increasing demand that public education be supplemented by religious instruction.

This leads to the important and therefore controversial question of what the contents of this religious instruction shall be; or in more explicit terms it is the question of what religion shall be taught.

The largest, or at least the most powerful segment of American Protestantism can roughly be described as modernistic. The leaders of the great denominations have largely abandoned the orthodoxy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and through the influence of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl have developed quite a different type of religion. Undoubtedly these men oppose naturalism. What must be asked, however, is whether their philosophy suffices. Can modernism meet the onslaught of humanism?

This question brings to light a most unfortunate condition that plagues Protestantism. It is this: Although the modernistic churchmen pay some attention to philosophy, their movement is not unified by adherence to a definite philosophical or theological position. Their unity is rather the negative unity of rejecting Biblical Christianity. And for this reason, for the reason that modernism springs from Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl, it must be conceived as a less self-consistent form of the naturalism to which it leads. Because modernism has abandoned the idea of an authoritative revelation, it has changed modern theology from a science of God into a psychology of religious experience. And when experience is substituted for God, the logical outcome is a godless philosophy. Therefore until the modernists reject their fundamental tenet and return to revelation for a knowledge of God, they will aid more than they will obstruct the progress of humanism.

Almost in the last few days the other segment of American Protestantism has begun to show signs of life. To contest the power of the modernistic Federal Council of Churches, there have recently been organized the American Council of Christian Churches and the National Association of Evangelicals. Both of these organizations represent the philosophy of Christian theism. Their acceptance of an authoritative religion is a better defense and offense against atheism than the silent or stammering God of modernism. Yet here more evidently the unfortunate condition of American Protestantism is revealed.

The people who organized these two associations, roughly though justly called fundamentalists, have in the past paid practically no attention to philosophy. These people, it is true, have certain positive bonds of unity and would therefore seem to have an advantage over a negatively united modernism. But their positive unity is still meagre. They have been preaching Biblical sermons and have given themselves to evangelicalism. And this is essential, necessary, indispensable. But they have neglected the philosophical, scientific, social, and political problems that agitate our century. The result is that the thinking world has the choice of going through modernism to communism or of taking the road to Rome. For Romanism has not neglected the pressing problems of humanity. The Romish scholars for years have been producing well written volumes on all the problems that perplex man’s intellect. And the cumulative effect of this body of literature is naturally great.

But is some Protestant college student wants guidance in the subjects he is studying, where is he to look? The textbooks, whether in philosophy, economics, or literature, present a secular non-Christian view. The professors are, some more, some less, antagonistic to Christianity. And the orthodox Christians seem to care nothing about his perplexity. If such a student should ask the more prominent fundamentalist preachers, what is the Christian view of physical law, what is the Christian view of labor problems and natural unity, what are the implications of Christianity for art, or how does Christian philosophy describe the learning process, it is probably not only that no answer would be given, but that the questions themselves would be regarded as trivial or even as unintelligible. And this is one reason why evangelical Christianity has so greatly suffered. A contemporary Christian literature that studies all phases of intellectual interest is the great need of our age, for the fundamentalists have too long neglected their obligations.

The present volume, as it studies one of the crucial problems of philosophy and religion, is a hopeful sign. Perhaps it is a prophecy of conservative works on many subjects; perhaps it foretells the day when Christianity will again make its voice heard throughout the world. At least we find here a determination not to lose the battle by default. This is itself is an improvement over the previous disdain of philosophy. But the present volume shows more than determination. It also shows one of the fatal weaknesses of modern religion. That weakness is the exaggerated opinion of man’s goodness. Modernism bolsters this argument with assertion to popularize its view of man. And this part of modern religion is essential to the whole development. When the philosophy of Schleiermacher exchanged theology for psychology by basing religion on experience instead of on revelation, modernism could do nothing but replace faith in God with faith in man. No wonder humanism is the result. But is man worthy of faith? Is moral progress naturally inevitable? Is human nature fundamentally good? Modern thought, particularly modern religious thought, shows its instability by its increasing disunity; it has modified and has even reversed its earlier positions on these and similar questions to which Christianity gives unambiguous answers. And today, if ever, these questions must be faced.

To these questions World War II have an historical answer written in blood. This book gives a philosophical answer written in ink. Both blood and ink, history and argument, warn against a man-centered religion and a humanistic secularism. Mankind, today as always, needs God.

Gordon H. Clark

Butler University,

Indianapolis, Ind.

Gordon Clark: Democritus (The American People's Encyclopedia)

1948. In American People's Encyclopedia. Chicago: The Spencer Press. Democritus

460-c. 360 B.C., Greek philosopher, the last and most consistent pre-Socratic materialist. His aim, like that of his predecessors, was to explain the universe solely by mechanical principles. Therefore he posits an infinite number of underived, imperishable atoms. The atoms are indivisible, not because they are small but because they are solid. Differing only in size and shape, they lack every nonmechanical quality, as color, flavor, odor, temperature, and degree of hardness. Particular arrangements of atoms in combination produce these qualities. 

Every event, also, is a mechanics of atoms and their compounds. Necessity rules; no mind, providence, or purpose governs nature. Whether it be the inanimate objects of astronomy, the living motions of plants and animals, of human loves and hates, nothing happens without a completely mechanical explanation. In some modern philosophies mechanism may have become more detailed, but nowhere has it been more pure. In addition to the larger questions of cosmology, Democritus also attempted to explain particulars, such as magnetism, thunder and lightning, earthquakes, why some objects float, and why the sea is salt. The inability of atomism to meet Eleatic criticism and Sophistic skepticism brought it into disfavor and contributed to the acceptance of Platonic idealism. See THE AGE OF PERICLES (End Papers, Back, Vol. 2.)

Gordon H. Clark

Gordon Clark: Zeno (Collier's Encyclopedia)

1949. In Collier's Encyclopedia. New York: P.F. Collier and Son. Zeno

ZENO [zi’no] (fl. Late fourth and early third centuries B.C.), Greek philosopher, not to be confused with Zeno the Eleatic, was born in Citium in Cyprus. He cam to Athens about 320 B.C. After studying philosophy under Crates the Cynic, Stilpo the Megarian, and Xenocrates the Academician, he taught philosophy at Athens in the Στοα Ποικιλη, “Painted Stoa” or “Porch,” a piazza the walls of which were decorated with scenes from the Battle of Marathon, and from whose name came the title of Zeno’s followers, the Stoics, and the name of their school, the Porch.

Though he was interested chiefly in ethics, Zeno saw the need of a complete system, including logic and physics, as a foundation for rational conduct. Wisdom, according to Zeno, is the final goal in life, and it is made up of theoretical and practical virtue. The former, which consists in having correct ideas of the nature of things, is subordinate to and exists only to aid the latter, which consists in right living and rational acting. The study of practical ethics, then, caps the philosophy of the Stoics. Zeno was a defender of the propriety of suicide, and he took his life about 260 B.C., leaving a well-established school and an enduring reputation.

G.H.Cl.

Gordon Clark and Phil Fernandes

Having almost completed my review of one recent evaluation of Gordon Clark's apologetic and epistemology (link), I thought I might as well interact with another. In The Fernandes Guide to Apologetic Methodologies (link), Phil Fernandes spends a chapter on Gordon Clark and refers to him in the course of other chapters as well. The book itself has received generally positive reviews and been cited a few times, so I thought I might engage it to correct, as I see it, a few flaws.

Incidental Interaction 

I'll first look at a few statements about Clark sprinkled throughout the book and return to chapter 14 - the chapter devoted entirely to him - below.

1) In chapter 18, Fernandes writes, "Whereas Gordon Clark had argued that there was no common ground between believers and non-believers, Carnell insisted that there was." This is a mistake, and it is due to a persistent pattern throughout the book: a reliance on sources other than Clark to articulate Clark's own thought. In this case, the footnote that attempts to substantiate Fernandes's claim refers to Gordon Lewis's Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, which I have elsewhere mentioned is a book that also inaccurately summarizes Clark (link). 

To the point in question, Clark himself states, "I have maintained that there is a common ground among persons, but not among systems... God’s law is written on the hearts of the heathen (and this is a common ground), they are without excuse. " (1947 Dr. Clark Comments, The Bible Today 42.3, Dec., 67-70.). Indeed, as far back as 1937, when Clark was 34, Clark wrote a letter to Van Til in which he questioned the latter's ability to account for common ground with unbelievers, evidencing that he himself accepted a common ground. And as late as 1968 - in the same book Nash suggested Clark's views had changed in some respect - Clark maintained:

In my debates with some who deny it, I have maintained that Christians and non-Christians have certain “common ground.” That is to say, a regenerate and an unregenerate person may believe the same proposition. But this by no means implies that a given proposition can be deduced indifferently from Christian and from secular presuppositions. But this by no means implies that a given proposition can be deduced indifferently from Christian and from secular presuppositions. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 205-206)

2) Another statement in chapter 18 in need of qualification is the following: "unlike Clark and Van Til, Carnell was willing to submit his starting point to testing." Clark was not opposed to the idea testing an axiom:

...that revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axioms, whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way... by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 53)

One can "test" whether an axiom is consistent with its resultant theorems. If it is not, then the axiom is self-defeating. Clark falsified other axioms - that of a logical positivist, for example - by using the this "test" in this way. 

On the other hand, in the case of Scripture, the nature of this "test" is apologetic, not epistemic (link). That is, the axiom of revelation is consistent with that which can be deduced from it, but such a point is an apologetic defense or confirmation, not a circular method of epistemic justification. That one can "test" the claim that Scripture is God's word by examining the consistency of that axiom with any deductions from it does not mean the axiom is capable of being falsified:

Carnell also says: “Since their systems [the systems of thought of finite minds] are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability.” But if this is true, it itself is not true but only probable. And if this is true, the propositions in the Bible, such as David killed Goliath and Christ died for our sins, are only probable – they may be false. And to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37)

3) I found some of Fernandes's language to be "charged". It is somewhat confusing to read him, for instance, describe Clark (in chapter 29) as being "very rationalistic in his thought" or say that Clark "exalted man's use of reason." It is confusing because, in chapter 14, Fernandes (correctly) argues that "Clark rejected the idea that unaided human reason could arrive at truths about God" as well as that "Clark listed several problems with rationalism in his writings." One might therefore say that Fernandes qualifies the statements from chapter 29 in the course of the book, but I would regard the language as misleading, even if that were not the author's intention. A few further examples will be noted below.

4) Also in chapter 29, we read Fernandes write that Clark "believed that only that which could be rationally deduced qualified as knowledge." This is incorrect. Clark believed that one could know his axiom as well as that which could be deduced from it (see the above quote from God's Hammer and also point 5 in this link). While it is good that contemporary authors are less inclined to mistake Clark as a coherentist, there has been a tendency to mistake him as a positist rather than a foundationalist. It's probable that the mistake is unintentional, but it is an important distinction.

5) In one final remark from chapter 29, Fernandes believes Clark's views developed over time such that he "held the view that truth can only be found in the Bible and whatever can be deuced (sic) from the Bible." This depends on what Fernandes means by "found." Clark thought that the Bible (and that which is deducible from it) is the propositional content we can [currently] "know" (in a specific sense, at that), but he did not believe that all extra-scriptural statements were untrue (link). Moreover, Clark's views did indeed to develop over time, although whether they were developed in way in which Fernandes describes it is debatable (see below). 

Chapter 14: The Primary Interaction

1) Some of what is said in this chapter is accurate: Clark rejected Aquinas' cosmological argument, empiricism, rationalism, and irrationalism. He argued for the necessity of first principles, that logic is tied to God's nature, and that human responsibility does not presuppose libertarian free will. While the focus of this post is on what I believe Fernandes gets wrong, I would not want to understate what Fernandes gets right.

At the same time, we find more charged language: apparently, Clark "deplored the utilization of historical evidences in defense of Christianity." No citation is provided for this. Clark may have subordinated the role of "evidential apologetics," but at no time did he indicate that he considered archaeological evidence useless, let alone deplorable, in defending the faith:

Let us use as much archaeological evidence as we can find. Let us go into great detail on J, E, D, and P. We shall discuss the presence of camels in Egypt in 2000 B.C., and the hypothetical council of Jamnia. But our arguments will be entirely ad hominem. We shall show that the principles our opponents use destroy their own conclusions; that their critical procedures on Genesis cannot be applied to Homer’s Iliad; that their historiography ruins Caesar’s Gallic Wars. The argument is ad hominem and elenctic. When finally the opponent is reduced to silence and we can get in a word edgewise, we present the word of God and pray that God cause him to believe. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 239-240)

Thus, when Fernandes says in Chapter 14 that a weakness of Clark's philosophy is "His downplaying of historical evidences for the Christian Faith" (again, an assertion made without citation), one wonders to what extent he has read Clark and to what extent his understanding of Clark has been colored by second-hand information. 

2) Another example of charged language is Fernandes's reference to Clark as a "hyper-Calvinist" for believing that "one really cannot convince another of the truth of Christianity, for God alone sovereignly bestows faith upon an individual." It appears that the author does not believe God is the decisive factor by whose grace alone one man is enabled to accept the gospel (1 Corinthians 15:10). Even so, to label those who disagree as hyper-Calvinists indicates a poor understanding of Reformed history. Clark never dismissed the need to evangelize:

The immediate question, however, is whether the Scriptures command or prohibit the preaching of the gospel to the non-elect. The answer to this question is that such a prohibition is denied in Scripture and would be impossible in practice. It would be impossible to follow because no one knows who is and who is not elect. At a certain early date Saul of Tarsus was breathing out threatenings against believers; but nonetheless he was elect from all eternity. Many congregations must have certain persons who are elect, but not as yet believers. Reversely there are probably some communicant members of good reputation who are not elect. Hence the hyper-calvinistic principle cannot be applied. 

Moreover, the principle is denied in Scripture. Aside from the historical fact that Paul in Ephesus and Corinth preached to everyone who would listen, he also wrote in Romans 10:14-17, “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher … So then faith comes by hearing …” 

Perhaps more emphatic is the great commission: “Go ye therefore and teach all nations.” 

In Iconium Paul preached both to the Jews and Greeks (Acts 14:1). A great multitude believed, but not all, for some sought to stone Paul and Barnabas; from which one must conclude that the two missionaries had preached to the non-elect. (link)

3) Continuing through the chapter, in the course of reviewing the strengths of Clark's philosophy (many of which are true enough), Fernandes writes:

He is right to seek confirmation for his Christian presuppositions. Many presuppositionalists are content in merely assuming the truth of Christianity. But Clark realizes that, after presupposing biblical truth, one must still seek justification for this assumption. Clark does this by showing that Christianity does what all secular philosophies have failed to do. They failed to give meaning to life, justify moral values, and find truth.

This paragraph is wrong on several accounts. Firstly, Clark did not seek to epistemically justify first principles. Confirmation that one's first principle is true - by, for example, examining it for internal consistency - is not the same as epistemically justifying it:

Spinoza does it another way. He formulates definitions of substance, attribute, God, and some others; then he posits seven axioms (e.g., That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself; and, If a thing can be conceived as non-existent, its essence does not involve existence), from which, after the fashion of geometry, he infers that God exists. This actual existence in the conclusion presumably justifies the truth of the definitions and axiom. Whatever validly implies existence, it may be said, must be true. Yet, on the other hand, this justification of axioms seems to be the fallacy of asserting the consequent. If Alexander was killed at the battle of Thebes, Alexander died young; Alexander died young, therefore he was killed in the battle of Thebes. Spinoza then must somehow refute this charge of invalidity. Otherwise his assumptions do not depend on logic alone. Rationalism therefore faces some embarrassment with respect to its first premises. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 24-25)

This quote, by the way, is found in Reason, Religion, and Revelation (1961), the very book Fernandes mentions as that in which Clark's Dogmatism is found (Three Types of Religious Philosophy also mentions "Dogmatism" but was written over a decade later). So this is not a change in Clark's thought over time.

Additionally, there are numerous instances that Clark said that first principles cannot be proved, demonstrate, derived, justified, etc. I could reference scores of such passages. Thus, the following argument by Fernandes rests on a false premise:

No Christian can show that every non-Christian system of thought is inconsistent. Clark claims that since every non-Christian philosophy has failed, people should presuppose the truth of the Christian world view. However, it is impossible for Clark, or any other person, to thoroughly examine every non-Christian system of thought. Even if it were possible for Clark to expose the contradictions in every non-Christian world view today, there is no guarantee that a totally consistent non-Christian world view will not be produced in the future.  

Once again, no citation is provided for the assertions in this paragraph by Fernandes aside from references to Gordon Lewis's book. This particular paragraph is flawed because it assumes that Clark has made such a claim when, in fact, he said the very opposite:

I do not deny a that secular philosophies often attain a degree of consistency. Bertrand Russell was certainly consistent in deducing despair from his cold, dead, purposeless world. But Bertrand Russell is a very poor example if one wishes to mention a fully consistent secular philosopher. He has contradicted himself more often than Ayer and Wittgenstein. Even beyond this, I admit that there might be a secular system so carefully constructed that I could not discover the inconsistency. This in no way proves that error is consistent or that truth is inconsistent. How could my limitations imply that consistency is not the test of truth? And, I may add, my critic has not shown, nor even tried to show, that a given secular system is completely consistent. Only if he did would he have a basis for his criticism. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 291)

Now, Fernandes, following Ronald Nash, thinks Clark's views changed over time. Fernandes says Clark's earlier view of "Dogmatism" differed from his later view of "Scripturalism." So perhaps he would argue that Clark changed his mind over time on this issue. But consider the following quote from 1952:

...suppose there still remain two or more fairly self-consistent but mutually incompatible systems of thought. This is likely to be the case even if the coherence theory of truth is correct, for the coherence theory cannot be applied with final satisfaction unless one is omniscient. Since life is short and since the implications of various propositions have not been exhausted, there may remain false propositions whose absurd conclusions have not yet been deduced... 

No philosopher is perfect and no system can give man omniscience. But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent whole others are self-contradictory, who can deny us, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 26-29) 

This should suffice to show Clark consistently understood that he may not have been able - as someone who isn't omniscient - to discover, in practice, given inconsistencies in non-Christian worldviews. Nevertheless, as Clark points out, no one has "shown, nor even tried to show, that a given secular system is completely consistent." Hence, the Christian apologist has the high ground. 

To conclude this point: Fernandes mentions a so-called "strength" of Clark's presuppositionalism... which he ironically believes relies on what he considers to be a weakness of Clark's presuppositionalism. But because he has misunderstood Clark in the first place - since he wrongly relies on Gordon Lewis's second-hand account of Clark's philosophy - the whole discussion is misguided. 

4) Did Clark's views actually develop over time? Certainly. I think there is much that can be written on this point, and it is one reason I am refining my research on Clark. But Clark used the label "Dogmatism" for his philosophy in both 1961 and 1973. By 1968, Nash had already said that he thought Clark's thought had changed. So unless Fernandes thinks Clark meant something by his philosophy of "Dogmatism" in 1973 (in Three Types of Religious Philosophy) that he didn't mean in 1961 (when he used the same word to describe his philosophy in Reason, Religion, and Revelation), then in the absence of evidence, we should view Clark's thought as relatively consistent over this span of time. 

That is, the assumption should be that Clark thought the same in 1961 ("Dogmatic" presuppositionalism as characterized by Fernandes) as he did in 1973 (by which time he must have affirmed, according to Fernandes - who follows Nash - so-called "Scripturalism") until contrary evidence is presented.

This leads me to remark that Fernandez often references Norman Geisler, Gordon Lewis, Ronald Nash, etc. for summary evaluations on Clark's philosophy. Others have, in turn, cited Fernandes in their own attempts to summarize Clark. I won't discuss every quote I have in mind, because such would be beside the point.

The point is that rather than say something like, as Fernandes does, "Assuming that Ronald Nash is correct in his assessment of Gordon Clark..." - in fact, rather than assuming any author correctly assesses any other author - I think it is best practice to summarize an author in his own words. Fernandes actually does this better than most. As I said, I don't want to understate that in much of his book, Fernandes does accurately summarize Clark. 

Nevertheless, he is not (as evidenced by above examples) immune to this criticism. A primary reason Clark's views are so often mischaracterized is because Clark's views are not stated in his own words. This is an issue Clark faced in his own lifetime:

It is amazing that these men continue to circulate these false statements after I have so many times denied them, I denied them in the examination (cf. Transcript, 31:9-10). I denied them in The Answer (pages 20-21), I denied them in speeches in two Assemblies and in countless conversations. The report of the committee to the thirteenth General Assembly denied them for me (page 3, next to the bottom Paragraph). And in spite of all this, the committee for the complainants has neither seen nor heard these denials, and continue to make the same false statements. Truly, this is incomprehensible. (link)

While other authors may sometimes represent Clark correctly, this is one reason I am continuing to update my research project on Clark (link). It is my hope that such research will make it less difficult to let Clark speak from the grave... especially when he wrote a book with that very title in which he critiqued some of the same men through whom his philosophy is now being wrongly filtered!

5) Speaking of Scripturalism, Fernandes provides a very cursory examination of it, mostly relying on statements and arguments by Ronald Nash. The summary of Scripturalism as an epistemology is mostly fine, if lacking in nuance. Fernandes mentions a few criticisms of Scripturalism, including: 

Is self-knowledge possible for Scripturalists? Can one know the contents of the Bible without using his senses? Can Scripturalists avoid fideism, i.e. blind faith? Does a Scripturalist have an apologetic against others who might claim to possess divine revelation, like Muslims?

However, Fernandes does not also reference Clark's answers to these criticisms, so the treatment is unsympathetic, to say the least. I myself have addressed each of these criticisms elsewhere. In short, I would argue that a Scripturalist can consistently affirm self-knowledge, that sensations may be secondary causes by which one forms his axiomatic beliefs (and, hence, said beliefs can count as "knowledge" in a certain sense), can defend his faith, and point out inconsistencies in the systems of others, like Muslims, who claim to possess divine revelation. 

Clark agreed with some of what I would argue, had alternative answers to others, and, indeed, even changed his mind over time (e.g. on the possibility of self-knowledge). But his writings engage each of these questions, at least. To fail to mention any of this doesn't seem to do his philosophy justice.

6) Lastly, I'll examine several of what Fernandes considers to be remaining weaknesses of Clark's "Dogmatic" presuppositionalism that have not yet been covered (largely ignoring whether Fernandes is correct about whether or how consistent Clark was in holding these views over time).

Weakness #1: "His denial of the basic reliability of sense perception." Again, Fernandes ought to have mentioned and interacted with Clark's affirmation of occasionalism and reasons for rejecting sense perception as a means of knowledge in this context.

At the same time, I myself tend to side with Fernandez that eyewitness testimony, for example, is given biblical credence by which one can, in a sense other than that in which I think Clark was interested (i.e. a more strict, internalist-infallibilist variety), be said to "know" what he sees.

Weakness #2: "His denial of Thomistic first principles." In this paragraph, Fernandes refers to the idea of principles which cannot be denied without absurdity much in the same way Mr. Lazar, in a different book, refers to what he calls performative contradictions. Fernandes asserts one cannot deny the principle of "causality" ("every effect has an adequate cause") or "finality" without contradiction, citing Aristotle and Aquinas as proponents of this view. 

I'm no Aristotelian scholar, but I do recall an article by Clark (Spontaneity and Monstrosity in Aristotle, 1934, The New Scholasticism) in which he interpreted Aristotle as thinking, "Spontaneity exists where there is a final but no efficient cause, monstrosities when there is an efficient by no final cause." How that fits in this context, I'm not sure, because Fernandes does not expand on what is meant by an "adequate" cause or the concepts of "causality" and "finality."

I also don't understand in what sense these concepts and their alleged undeniability would "deal Clark's entire system a lethal blow" or how "This would eliminate presuppositional apologetics as the only way for a Christian to defend his faith." As we saw above in regards to archaeological evidence, Clark was open to use of such so long as it was situated in an appropriate context - evidence used by a presuppositionalist and as a reductio ad absurdem. 

Supposing, then, that causality and finality - whatever those mean - are "undeniable" after all (and one would wish Fernandes elaborated on this, since he later says "If one accepts the principle of causality..." as if one could deny it after all), all this would mean is that they, like logic, must be situated in the context of the axiom of revelation.

Weakness #3: "He gives no credit to probability arguments." In this section, Fernandes says that, like those first principles of non-Christian philosophies, "Clark's own first principles are also not based on certainty; they too must be presupposed." Here, it sounds as if Fernandes regards a first principle as something one merely hypothesizes could be true. This is not how Clark regarded first principles:

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 46) 

And again, Clark believed his own first principle was self-authenticating:

Nothing in Paul suggests that the word of “cooperative investigation” (1:20) is more certain or reliable than the wisdom of God. Is it not strange that for any evangelical, for whom sola Scriptura is the formal principle of theology, should try to base the truth of Scripture on the conclusions of Dr. Albright and Miss Kenyon? For Paul revelation is self-authenticating. Athens, Oxford, and American universities have nothing in common with Jerusalem. (First Corinthians, 1991, pg. 58)

See other quotes already mentioned in this post, such as "to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation." Divine revelation, as Clark's epistemic axiom, was his foundation for knowledge and itself could be known. Does Fernandes think that we cannot be certain the Bible is God's word? 

So then, Clark does treat his first principle differently than the first principles of others... precisely because those are not his own first principle and, therefore, must be judged as false by his own. Others may disagree with Clark, but this is not epistemically relevant. 

Now, it may be relevant in the context of apologetics, wherein one person attempts to persuade another. In such a situation, stating the truth and praying God convicts the other person is one method of approach, as Clark sometimes mentions. It is also legitimate, as Clark also mentions, to examine the other person's worldview itself for internal consistency and, again, to pray God uses that as a means by which the other person is convicted of the truth. But in no case, as I understand it, is Clark allowing that the Bible may not be God's word, is not self-authenticating, or may not be true. 

This also dispenses of Fernandes's later insinuation that Clark could not have refuted Islam, given his philosophy. That Clark may not have specifically demonstrated internal consistencies of Islamists (or Hare Krishnas, Satanists, etc.), for example, does not mean he could not have done so.

Apologetically, then, there are multiple legitimate choices one can make in a given scenario. Presenting a Muslim with the gospel and praying for God to convert him is as much a defense of one's faith as is a reductio ad absurdem, even if we allow that doing both is sometimes (or even often) wise. On the other hand, 1 Peter 3:15 does not mean we have to answer the questions of interlocutors ad infinitum. At some point, we can only pray over a matter and leave the rest in God's hands. 

Finally, regarding probability, since Fernandes does not explain what he means by the term or how something is established as "probable" or "improbable," here is one sample (among many from which I could have chosen) of what Clark has to say on this subject:

The skeptics wish to act on what is probable; but if “probable” means only what seems good to a person at the moment, a man might commit the worst crime without blame, provided he thought it was probably good. But probability may mean something more. It may mean “approximating the truth.” The skeptics call propositions false, doubtful, probable, and plausible. Their basic principle, however, does not in consistency permit them to use any of these terms. A false proposition is one opposite to the truth. How then can one say that a proposition is false, unless one knows the truth? A doubtful proposition is one that might possibly be true; a probable or plausible proposition resembles or approximates the truth. But it is impossible to apply these terms without knowing the truth by which they are determined. One might well ask, Is it true that a foredoomed search for truth is wisdom? The skeptic would have to reply that he did not know. Is it probable that such a search is wisdom? Or with respect to everyday living, is it probable or doubtful that eating lunch today is wise? Again the skeptic could not know. A theory of probability must itself be based on truth, for if the method of determining the probable wisdom of eating lunch is false, the conclusion that it is safe to eat lunch could not be known to be probable. Without the possession of the truth, therefore, it is impossible to act rationally even in the most ordinary situations. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pg. 178-179)

Weakness #4: "His proposed solution to the problem of evil." Fernandes adds, "Since Clark denied human free will (man could not choose to do otherwise), Clark made God the ultimate cause of evil... A free will theodicy... is a much more plausible solution to the problem of evil than the solution Clark proposed" (emphasis mine). 

The above paragraph by Clark from Thales to Dewey seems to serve as an appropriate response to this criticism. Perhaps Fernandes's free will theodicy merely "seems good to [him] at the moment." It is hard to tell, because Fernandes doesn't given any reason for thinking his solution is more "plausible" than Clark's. Clark himself, by way of contrast, provided reasons for his theodicy. One example: 

If man has free will, and things can be different, God cannot be omniscient. Some Arminians have admitted this and have denied omniscience, but this puts them obviously at offs with Biblical Christianity. There is also another difficulty. If the Arminian or Romanist wishes to retain divine omniscience and at the same time assert that foreknowledge has no causal efficacy, he is put to it to explain how the collision was made a certain hundred years, an eternity, before the drivers were born. If God did not arrange the universe this way, who did? (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 254-255)

One might quibble with the semantics of Clark's use of "free will" vs. "free agency," but his reasoning itself, given his understanding of the terms in question (i.e. for Clark, "free will" = "libertarian free will"), is sound. Clark was, properly understood, a compatibilist: while a theological determinist, he nevertheless believed "man is still a “free agent” for that merely means, as Hodge says, that man has the power to make a decision" (Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1992, pgs. 47-48). Clark believed man is responsible for his decisions he makes, decisions which were determined by God. Responsibility does not presuppose libertarian free will, and one must muster more than an appeal to "plausibility" to persuade an unconvinced reader to the contrary.

A stronger argument against Clark in regard to ethics, by the way, might have been to highlight Clark's seeming ethical voluntarism. Clark very strongly argued that whatever God "does is just, for this very reason, because He does it." He bit a particular end of the bullet of Euthyphro's dilemma and, it seems, was happy to do so. 

In fact, in order to be consistent, one might argue that Clark must have also held to alethic voluntarism. There is actually some evidence this might have - at some point - been the case: Clark once said, in reference to Hebrews 6, that "Truth is defined in terms of God’s pronouncements" (link). Does this mean that Clark thought God freely willed His own self-knowledge? Could He have made a different "pronouncement"? If so, are there undesirable metaphysical implications that could be drawn from this? If not, why not? 

Such would seem to have a corresponding bearing on ethical voluntarism. There is exploration of Clark's thought that can be had along these lines, but such would require a thorough understanding of whether or how Clark's own views changed over the course of his life. I myself have a few thoughts on all of this but will leave them for another time.

Weakness #5: "He does not allow for the use of secular material during evangelism." This criticism stems from an particular understanding of Clark's statement that "in evangelistic work there can be no appeal to secular, non-Christian material." What Clark means, however (or at least, so I would argue), is that the system, worldview, or first principle of the non-Christian and that of the Christian do not (or should not) overlap. How is this relevant, and is this even the case?

To answer the latter question first, in the same context in which he makes the above statement, Clark denies that we should use a "fallacious argument from a non-existent common ground." Did Clark deny that there is any common ground between believer and unbeliever? As we saw earlier, no. Also in the same context, he says that a Muslim and a Christian may hold a common proposition, but it is not "logically common," for there are "two systems" at play. 

In other words, I think Clark is opposing an evangelistic position on which we would appeal to a false system, worldview, or first principle - "a non-existent common ground." If we trace back agreement on a proposition far enough, we will find that we do (or should, since our system, worldview, and first principles should be different) believe said proposition for different reasons than does a Muslim or a secularist - the proposition is not "logically common" or, again, it should not be, for we should not be appealing to secular, non-Christian "material" (read: systems, worldviews, or first principles).

Thus, what do we do in such a case? Once the genus of our beliefs have been located, how is it that the Muslim or secularist can convert? Can the evangelist argue him into the kingdom? No. No amount of apologetic effort, of itself, can convert unbelievers. Even though we water, the believer must pray that God causes growth (1 Corinthians 3). To change one's system, worldview, or first principle ultimately takes an act of God. While this is not to diminish our role in presenting the gospel and providing the opportunity for the Spirit to work such a change, our role is an insufficient condition to that end.

A separate point: one might also point out, in reply to this alleged "weakness" of Clark's philosophy, that Clark appealed to secular "material" (in a certain sense) all the time. Why, he does it in the very book (Three Types of Religious Philosophy) from which Fernandes found the quote with which he took issue! 

To the extent that one views Clark's book as an apologetic work, as Fernandes apparently does, how does he interpret Clark's mention of Brand Blanshard, a "brilliant, non-theological philosopher" whose work to which Clark makes "appeal" as he argues against empiricism (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 58-63)? Does Fernandes think Clark unintentionally contradicts himself in the same book? I think the alternative interpretation provided above is more "plausible."

Weakness #6: "His attacks on traditional apologetics." In some respects, I sympathize with Fernandes insofar as I do see a way in which one can utilize "classical apologetics" even as a Scripturalist. As just mentioned above, Clark is correct that given two different systems, agreement on the truth of a given proposition must be due to different reasoning. The agreement is a common ground, and one method of apologetics is working backwards to the discovery of the point of disagreement in reasoning whereby one's acceptance of the given proposition is demonstrated to be invalid or unsound. Whose first principle and worldview really stands up under scrutiny? Who is really justified in believing the proposition in question? This is a fine method of procedure.

Instead of this, though, picture again two people who agree on a given proposition. They may not only work backwards. Although this is, in my experience, how presuppositionalists - especially those who admire Clark - tend to operate, an apologist can also work forwards, taking agreement in a proposition as a starting point in a given conversation by which he can show where a belief ought to lead. 

Clark said as much when he spoke of archaeology - he might as well have applied that to teleology, cosmology, contingency, etc. I could be wrong on this, but I do get the sense that Fernandes is right that Clark was, later in his life, skeptical of "traditional" arguments for God's existence. I think that is due, in part, to the unwillingness of some (e.g. Van Til) to explicitly outline said arguments to Clark's satisfaction. Perhaps, though, Fernandes is right in that Clark was not immune to misrepresenting others (like Augustine or Aquinas). I'm no historical theologian, so I will leave this criticism aside. 

I do, however, find myself agreeing with Clark insofar as a certain understanding of divine simplicity - like that of Aquinas - would seem to prevent the possibility of our knowledge ever being identical with God's. It is not clear, from Fernandes's exposition, whether he thinks Aquinas believed that our knowledge of a given proposition is the same as God's knowledge of the same proposition. If God is identical with what He knows (Aquinas's position?), I don't see how this could be the case.

Nonetheless, while in some respects Clark's philosophy is capable of improvement - as is anyone's, for no one but God is omniscient - I do hope that this post illustrates that many people need to better understand his philosophy before they attempt to improve it.

Theistic Conceptual Realism, Absolute Creationism, and Plotinus

I often think and write about epistemology. Recently, though, I have been trying to focus more on metaphysics. As a point of departure, I've been reading about God and abstract objects (link), and one position on the relationship between the two (assuming there is one) is that of Greg Welty and James Anderson, a position alternatively labeled as Theistic Conceptual Realism or Divine Conceptualism (link, link, link, link).

There are some objections or areas of critical engagement with this position (link, link) that seem to imply it is (at least) in need of some refinement, but my remarks in this post will have more to say about how strikingly similar the position seems to be, in some respects, to that of Plotinus. Consider the following statement by Anderson (emphases his): 

But here’s the key point: none of this requires that divine thoughts have content distinct from those thoughts. The considerations that drive us to distinguish human thoughts from their propositional content simply do not apply to God’s thoughts (although presumably they would apply to other creaturely thoughts, e.g., angelic thoughts). Indeed, in the case of God’s thoughts, we deny that there is any such distinction, because we argue for identity between propositions and divine thoughts. In other words, the propositions that serve as the content of human thoughts (such as the proposition that 2+2=4) just are divine thoughts, precisely because only divine thoughts would have the kind of features (objectivity, necessity, intrinsic intentionality, and so forth) that propositions must have in order to play the roles that we take them to play. (link)

Compare this to a summary of Plotinus' philosophy by Gordon Clark (emphases mine):

The potential never becomes actual by chance; there must always precede an effective principle to induce actualization. Therefore, above soul one must posit the Divine Mind or, what is the same thing, the world of Ideas. To appreciate the identification of the mind and the objects of thought is difficult for the untutored in any age; to those who are tutored in modern idealism it may be confusing. One should particularly guard against using one’s own mind as an illustration of the Divine Mind and a sense object as an illustration of an object of thought. In Neo-Platonism the objects of mind are not sense objects but concepts, and since the essence of mind is thought, since the Divine Mind is always actual, there cannot be, as in the case of a human mind and a sense object, any separation of the mind from the objects which completely characterize it. Or conversely, suppose that the mind and its objects were not the same, and that the essence of the mind were separable from its thought. On such a supposition the mind would be only potentially intellectual, while in itself it would be unintellectual. Therefore the Divine Mind and its objects, the Ideas, are inseparable. In modern idealism the mind alone is ultimate and its ideas are its creations. But Plotinus writes, “Not by its thinking movement does movement arise. Hence it is an error to call the Ideas intellections in the sense that, upon an intellectual act in this principle one such Idea or another is made to exist.” It is true that the thoughts of the mind are Ideas, but it is untrue that the Ideas exist because the mind thinks them. (Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy, 1940, pg. 228)

A few points: 

1) The part is bold seems to be similarly motivated as Theistic Conceptual Realism... with the ironic twist that looks as though Plotinus has "concepts" as the objects of the divine mind, not Anderson and Welty. Perhaps rebranding the position of the latter would be too little, too late - but labelling their view as Theistic Propositional Realism or Divine Propositionalism would be, I think, more appropriate. 

2) Can one categorize Anderson's and Welty's position "an Anti-Platonist Alternative" as, for example, Craig does (link)? Is agreement with a Neo-Platonist "Anti-Platonic"? In response to this sort of question, one point is that the Theistic Conceptual Realist has resources (assuming the view itself is coherent and otherwise consistent with Christian theism) to defend a particular view of divine aseity that a strict follower of Plato simpliciter does not. Another point would be that it is not as though Anderson and Welty have the same view of the relationship between God and abstract objects as Plotinus does - their views about God are completely different, as the continuation of Clark's exposition of Plotinus proceeded to demonstrate. For instance, Welty and Anderson would not, I think, identify God with His own mind.

3) Finally, I italicized the last several sentences to show that Plotinus not only anticipates Theistic Conceptual Realism; he also anticipates (and then argues against) Absolute Creationism, a position which holds that God creates abstract objects (such as His own thoughts, link). Plotinus' argument is aimed against TCR as well.

It is interesting that just as Plotinus seemingly formulated his views with this opposing position in mind, so too did Welty formulate "Theistic Conceptual Realism" as a response to "Absolute Creationism." Only, I gather that Welty and Anderson stop short of Plotinus' identification of the divine mind and divine thoughts. Either way, one may hope too that this contemporary reprise of historico-philosophical progression gives leads to another, better Augustine.