Reply To The Metaphorical Dr. Macky
Gordon H. Clark*
Doubtless every author feels some elation when his
publications are given book reviews, and more so when they elicit critical
articles. Some authors may echo the politician who said, “I don’t
care what they write about me so long as they mention my name.” Gordon R. Lewis
in his Testing Christianity’s Truth Claims almost perfectly
describes my position, even though his negative criticism concerns something
not mentioned in his summary. Ronald Nash made only one mistake, but
unfortunately used it as an essential part of his rebuttal. Another critic,
after quoting from a certain page in one of my books, attributed to me a
position that I had explicitly denied on the very page from which he quoted.
Peter W. Macky is not so stupid as the latter, nor is he quite so perfect as
the first.
If Macky’s repeated, chiding references to geometry were
used only to gain the support of students who do not like the subject, it would
not bother me much. But his own dislike for the subject is so strong that he
stumbles into falsity. For example, “Clark in adopting geometry promotes the
logical coherence of a system as the sole standard” (JETS 24/3
[1981] 240). Then too, “Clark’s theory follows coherently from his initial [italics
mine] assumption that geometry is the standard by which all thought
is to be measured” (p. 243). He also says, “Clark essentially excludes all human
thought except geometry from the realm of truth” (p. 248). These statements are
just plain false.
In the first place I use geometry only as an example of
logical thinking. There are many other examples, but geometry is one of the
best and should be well known. If anyone objects to the procedures of
geometry—the deduction of theorems from axioms—he is in reality objecting to
logical thought as such and is justifying fallacious argumentation. But this,
though devastating to anyone who does so, is not what makes the assertions
reprehensible.
Now if a critic should miss some obscure point in two dozen
books, or if he failed to understand some subordinate idea, it would not much
matter. But it seems inexplicable to me that anyone with an IQ above 80 can fail
to note that my axioms are the Bible’s and not Euclid’s. The Trinity Foundation
has collected a dozen or more of my tractates on inerrancy and is now in
process of publishing them in book form. Besides these, can anyone have read
my Three Types of Religious Philosophy without noticing that I
do not “exclude all human thought except geometry from the realm of truth”?
Consider also The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark (I did not
choose the title) where on page 591 say, “Revelation should be accepted as our
axiom.” Or on page 62: “The more serious reply to the charge that the axiom of
revelation begs all questions is… Obviously a first principle or set of axioms
covers all that follows… The first principle will give us all the teaching of
Scripture.” And even: “This exhibition of the logic embedded in Scripture
explains why Scripture rather than the law of contradiction is selected as the
axiom” (pg. 71). But the evidence of the falsity of Macky’s statements is not
to much detached sentences – though they are conclusive by themselves – as the
full mass of all my publications. The discussion of metaphorical language is
important but derivative. On this subject Macky uses more assertions than
reasoned conclusions. He seems to think – seems because it looks as if he is inconsistent
– that the Bible is entirely metaphorical and that literal language has been
imposed on it by later theologians. For example, in reporting my views he says,
“The metaphor of the lamb is not what God was communicating. Instead it was… a
surrogate for the real meaning, which Clark believes he can state literally and
precisely. Thus a certain theological tradition is the truth… while the Bible’s
metaphors are only pointers to the truth” (pp. 241, 242). This gives me the
impression that the literal statements of Biblical truth have come only in a
later theological tradition. On the contrary, the metaphor of the lamb is
explained literally by Paul in Romans and elsewhere. It is also based on the
literal directions of the Levitical Law. And it could not be correctly
understood without them.
Christ is like a lamb – in some respects, of course. They
both have a head, two ears, and two eyes. Christ remained speechless, as a lamb
is dumb when being shorn. There are always dozens of similarities in any
metaphor, simile or analogy. The figure of speech does not of itself indicate
which similarity is intended. Without Romans and Leviticus we would have no
basis for understanding what John the Baptist meant. And our basis is not a
later theological tradition but the Bible itself.
As for Macky’s further remarks on metaphor, it seems to me
that he relies on bare assertions without giving reasons for accepting them.
Possibly reasons are too geometrical. At any rate, I just do not believe that “poetic
speech, however, is the best way to share human experience.” Poetry, frequently
what some people call the best poetry, is often vague and unintelligible.
Contrariwise, intelligibility does not necessitate poetry.
The Alexandrine lines “Quan on ne peut changer le fond d’un
caractere / Il faudrait beaucoup mieux, Nerisse, de se taire” are intelligible
good advice, and they have rhythm and rhyme. But the greatness of Corneille’s Le
Cid does not depend on its poetic form. Moliere’s Tartuffe is
overwhelming evidence against Macky’s dependency on poetry for “sharing” human
experience. As for Shakespeare’s Hamlet, I doubt that more than one
person in a thousand who view it would realize that it is poetry, unless so
informed beforehand. From another angle, the rondeau of Charles d’ Orleans, “Le
temps a laisse son manteau,” which compete for the honor of being the most
beautiful poem ever written, is completely intelligible – and utterly trivial.
Keats is insufferably boring, and the last two lines of his “Grecian Ode” are
totally moronic. How fortunate Descartes and Kant were to have lived before they
might have had to share this monstrosity!
Besides, I do not believe that human experience can be “shared,”
poetically or otherwise. Two persons may understand the same proposition, but
the subject accompaniments – the proposition may make one person happy and another
sad – cannot be common. No one can feel my toothache, and fortunately I cannot
feel yours.
Nor do I believe that “it is of the very nature of thought
and language to represent what is immaterial in picturable terms” (p. 244). In
fact, I believe that statement is false. I do not merely assert that it is
false – I have reasons for saying so: (1) I never do myself, and yet I
think - at least I think that I think. (2)
I challenge anyone to try to represent the general conic or the square root of
minus one by a picture. I do not say that it cannot be done. But it will not be
a picture of the reality, nor can algebra, geometry, or calculus ever be
developed from such images. (3) Long ago Francis Galton produced the evidence
that many well-educated persons never have any such images, and from this we
conclude that pictorial representation cannot be “the very nature of thought.”
(4) Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought, pp. 257-281) describes the
images people have and by doing so demolishes the theory. But Macky does not
even try to meet these arguments, nor does he give any reasons of his own. He
simply asserts that the Bible is a “tasting of the reality of God.” Does God
taste like chocolate or salt? Tasting is a metaphor, but what is it a metaphor
of? Except in the Roman Catholic mass and Luther’s consubstantiation, no one
chews God with his teeth.
Of course the Bible uses figurative language, but Macky
fails to note one can reason why Jesus did so. The reason was not that it is
more clear and informative. In fact, the people and the disciples too were
constantly baffled and confused by it. Jesus used it for this very purpose. He
wanted to obscure his meaning, and parables are effective means of disguising
one’s thoughts.
Another statement – which I do not believe in the least, and
for which Macky gives no reason – is: “we know another person intimately and
adequately by means of metaphors” (p. 250). I just do not see how any
intelligent person can believe this. To my mind it is utterly ridiculous.
This leads to a final point. Macky at least seems to hold
that the term “justice,” as used in the doctrine of the atonement, is
metaphorical also (p. 249), and he at least comes close to concluding that all
words are metaphorical. He even criticizes me as inconsistently using the
phrase “clear thinking.” Perhaps I should have used the phrase “intelligible
thinking” or “correct thinking.” Are the words “intelligible,” “correct” and “thinking”
metaphorical? Indeed several language philosophers in the recent past have
maintained that all words are metaphorical. This view is suicidal because if
all words are metaphors, there could be no metaphors. The term “metaphorical”
has a meaning only in relation to the term “literal.” Neither is intelligible
without the other – otherwise the dispute could not begin. Therefore if all of
Macky’s words a metaphorical, no one can have the least idea of what he is
talking about because the word “metaphorical” is metaphorical.
In addition to this final point, and as a sort of appendix –
which is still an argument and not an unsupported assertion – I take the
liberty of noting that anyone who belittles geometry must hold automotive
mechanics, the stupendous advances in modern medicine, atomic bombs and trips
to the moon in equally low esteem. Mathematics is not my forte either, but it
is far more beautiful than poetry. It is surpassed only by systematic theology.
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