Thursday, January 5, 2023

Gordon Clark: Values (Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics)

1973. In Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Carl F.H. Henry, ed. Washington D.C.: Canon Press. [Reprinted in 1988 by Baker Book House.] Values

VALUES. Value theory or axiology is a general theory based on the assumption that aesthetic value, moral value, political value, and (consistently) physical value or health, are all species of one genus.

A distinction must be made. The criteria for judging a work of art, the criteria of good health, and the criteria of moral action are not plausibly species of one genus. How often have we heard the aesthetics decry moral norms in art! On the other hand, a combination of health, wealth, morality, and art may define the good life. In this sense Aristotle’s ethics is axiology, for his good life has the proper proportion of each. However, this is not axiology in the modern sense of making every value a species of an inclusive genus.

As a distinct modern movement axiology first came to notice in the non-realist school of Brentano and Meinong. Values as well as chairs and tables exist independently of consciousness. Green exists in a chair; good exists in a proposition. Whether or not minds exist or bodies exist, the proposition “a diseased appendix ought to be removed” is a good proposition. But one wonders whether a proposition can exist without a mind or an appendix without a body.

Meinong was followed by Scheler and Husserl. In America axiology was popularized by Ralph Barton Perry, John Dewey (though not a realist), S. C. Pepper, and others. C. I. Lewis uses the term value in a narrow sense and approximates Aristotle by subsuming axiology under ethics; but most make ethics a subdivision of axiology. In some cases a good amount (or is it a bad amount) of pedantic linguistics is mixed in.

Neo-realism seems to imply a theory of valuation that is both cognitive and empirical. Absolute idealism and Calvinism are both cognitive, but not empirical. The emotive theories of A. J. Ayer, Charles L. Stevenson, et al, are empirical, but non-cognitive. These latter make valuation arbitrary and irrational, and remove it from the sphere of discussion. Ayer and Satre are good examples.

The great difficulty with the cognitive, empirical view is its empiricism. Appendectomies, lies, and wars are as natural as plants and planets. None of them comes with a tag saying, “I am valuable.” And example is the war in Viet Nam from 1962. The American effort was widely denounced as immoral and bad. But the denouncers think that riot, arson, murder, and treason are moral and good. Anti-communists hold a different view. The difficulty is how to determine by empirical observation which view is right.

The same difficulty occurs in music. Some people value Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms; but others prefer ear-drum-splitting rock.

Empiricism is incapable of establishing norms. Perry may say that “any object, whatever is may be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it.” But this may make heroin as valuable as, or even more valuable than chocolate ice cream. To avoid this embarrassment, Perry tries to show how one value is better than another. The better value is the one that harmonizes many interests. But though this definition complicates the observation, it is of no help to empiricism. There could be several harmonies, each of ten different values. How then shall we choose one from among them? Or, again, one harmonious combination might integrate five values, while a second includes twenty. But could not a life of five values be better than a life of twenty? The example of drug addiction prevents the theory from advocating a highest value that includes all. Therefore observation cannot decide among combinations; empiricism justifies no ought.

Various empiricists have tried to defend their theory against this charge. But there can be no value in their arguments because it is always and everywhere fallacious to insert into the conclusion a concept that nowhere appears in the premises. The observational statement, X values rock, does not imply that X ought to value rock, that Y and Z should value rock, or that Back and Brahms are disvalues. If the rock example is not convincing, try heroin.

Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness, London, 1961; John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1959; R. B. Perry, Realms of Value, Cambridge, Mass. 1954, Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1968.

Gordon H. Clark

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