God foreknows nothing by contingency. He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His immutable, eternal, and infallible will. By this thunderbolt free will is thrown prostrate and utterly dashed to pieces. Are you not the person, friend Erasmus, who just now asserted that God is by nature just and by nature most merciful? If this be true, does it not follow that He is immutably just and merciful? That as his nature is not changed to all eternity, so neither his justice nor his mercy? And what is said concerning his justice and mercy, must be said also concerning his knowledge, his wisdom, his goodness, his will, and his other attributes. If therefore these things are asserted religiously, piously, and wholesomely concerning God, as you say yourself, what has come to you that, contrary to your own self, you now assert that it is irreligious, curious, and vain to say that God foreknows of necessity? Do you believe that He foreknows against His will, or that He wills in ignorance? From which it follows unalterably that all things which we do, although they may appear to us to be done mutably and contingently, and even may be done contingently by us, are yet in reality done necessarily and immutably with respect to the will of God. For the will of God is effective and cannot be hindered. (pp. 38-39)
As to that other paradox you mention - that "Whatever is done by us is not done by free will but from mere necessity." [This was Erasmus's objection to Luther.] Here then I observe that if it be proved that our salvation is apart from our own strength and counsel and depends on the working of God alone,... does it not evidently follow that when God is not present with us to work in us, everything that we do is evil and that we of necessity do those things which are of no avoid unto salvation? But of necessity I do not mean compulsion, but, as they term it, the necessity of immutability not of compulsion: that is, a man void of the Spirit of God does not evil against his will as by violence, or as if he were taken by the neck and forced to it in the same way that a thief or a cut-throat is dragged to punishment against his will; but he does it spontaneously and with a desirous willingness. And this willingness and desire of doing evil he cannot by his own power leave off, restrain, or change; but it still does on desiring and craving. And even if he should be compelled by force to anything [good] outwardly to the contrary, yet the craving will [to evil] within remains averse to and rises in indignation against that which forces or resists it. This is what we mean by the necessity of immutability - that the will cannot change itself, nor give itself another bent... This would not be the case if it were free (pp. 72-73).
The third passage [which Erasmus uses against Luther] is from Moses, Deuteronomy 30:19, "I have set before thy face life and death, choose what is good."
"What words," says the Diatribe, "can be more plain? It leaves a man the liberty of choosing." I answer, What is more plan that that you are blind? How, I pray, does it leave the liberty of choosing? Is it by the expression "choose"? Therefore as Moses saith "choose," does it immediately come to pass that they do choose? Then there is no need of the Spirit... [Erasmus says] "It would be ridiculous to say to a man standing in a place where two ways meet, Thou seest two roads, go by which thou wilt; when only one was open." This, as I [Luther] have observed before, is from the arguments of human reason, which thinks that a man is mocked by a command impossible: whereas I say that the man by this means is admonished and roused to see his own impotency. True it is that we are in a place where two ways meet, and that one of them only is open, year rather neither of them is open. But by the law it is shown how impossible the one [way] is, that is, to good, unless God freely give us His Spirit, and how wide and easy the other [way] is, if God leaves us to ourselves... Wherefore the words of the law are spoken, not that they might assert the power of the will, but that they might illuminate the blindness of reason, that it might see that its own light is nothing and that the power of the will is nothing... Man by the words of the law is admonished and taught what he ought to do, not what he can do; that is, that he is brought to know his sin, but not to believe that he has any strength in himself (pp. 153-154).
The Diatribe is perpetually setting before us such a man who neither can do what is commanded, or at least knows that he cannot do it. Whereas no such man is to be found. If there were such an one, then indeed either impossibilities would be ridiculously commanded, or the Spirit of Christ would be in vain. The Scripture, however, sets forth such a man, who is not only bound, miserable, captive, sick, and dead, but who, by the operation of his lord, Satan, to his other miseries, adds that of blindness: so that he believes he is free, happy, at liberty, powerful, whole, and alive. For Satan well knows that if men knew their own misery he could retain no one of them in his kingdom... But the work of Moses the legislator is the contrary, even that by the law he might discover to man his misery... Therefore, the office of the law is not ridiculous, but above all things serious and necessary (p. 159).
Look then, first, at that of Jeremiah and Malachi, “If thou wilt turn, then will I turn thee;” and “turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you.” Does it then follow from “turn ye” therefore, ye are able to turn? Does it follow also from “Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart” therefore, thou art able to love with all the heart? If these arguments stand good, what do they conclude, but that free-will needs not the grace of God, but can do all things of its own power? (p. 162).
So much then for Luther. His complete argument may be read in his excellent book, The Bondage of the Will. These quotations are merely a witness to what he preached.
No one will be surprised to learn that Calvin rejected the theory of free will. The following confirmation is not a verbatim and consecutive quotation: While largely in Calvin's words, it is only a broken summary of part of his Institutes.
The early fathers extolled human power, part from fear of incurring the derision of the philosophers, but principally to avoid encouraging slothfulness. Chrysostom said, "God has placed good and evil things in our power; he has give us freedom of choice, and he does not constrain the unwilling, but embraces the willing... God has given us naturally a free will and imposes no necessity upon us... but permits the event to depend entirely on the mind of the patient." Succeeding writers, ambitious of fame, fell into opinions still more erroneous. The Latins have always retained the term free will, as though man still remained in his primitive integrity. The Greeks use an expression much more arrogant autexousion, denoting that man possesses sovereign power over himself (II, ii, 4).
When writers tread of free will, their first inquiry respects its power to obey the divine law (II, ii, 5).
Who, when they hear free will attributed to man, do not immediately conceive that he has sovereignty over his own mind and will and is able by his innate power to incline himself to whatever he pleases? (II, ii, 7).
The will, therefore, is so bound by the slavery of sin that it cannot excite itself, much less devote itself to any thing good. If a necessity of doing well does not impair the liberty of the divine will, and if the devil, who cannot but do evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily, who will assert that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a necessity of sinning? (II, iii, 5).
I deny, then, that sin is the less criminal because it is necessary; I also deny that it is avoidable because it is voluntary. Similarly the wills of the elect angels, though they cannot swerve from good, are still wills. Those who defend free will make an improper transition from what is voluntary to what is free. These two are not the same (II, v, 1).
Through these chapters Calvin continues with long analyses of the fallacious arguments of his opponents and with frequent exegesis of the Scripture.
Jerome Zanchius was born in Italy on February 2, 1516, just a year before Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church door at Wittenberg. Left an orphan at twelve, he became a monk. It was largely the work of Peter Martyr that turned Zanchius's attention to the evangelical faith. While teaching in Strasbourg (1553-1562), he wrote his treatise on Absolute Predestination, from which the following quotations are taken. After some five years in the pastorate, he became Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, a stronghold of the Reformed faith. There he published some books in the Trinity. After ten years he resigned his professorship and became pastor at Neustadt for seven years. Old age then forced him into retirement, and he died November 19, 1590. The pagination of the following quotations is that of the edition of the Sovereign Grace Book Club.
This made Augustine say, "Evil men do many things contrary to God's revealed will, but so great is His wisdom and so inviolable His truth that He directs all things into those channels which He foreknew." And again, "No free will of the creature can resist the will of God, for man cannot so will or nill as to obstruct the Divine determination or overcome the Divine power." Once more, "It cannot be questioned but God does all things, and ever did, according to His own purpose: the human will cannot resist Him so as to make Him do more or less than it is His pleasure to do, since He does what He pleases even with the wills of men." (p. 29)
After quoting Luther, Zanchius adds:
Exactly consonant to all which are those words of Luther's friend and fellow-labourer, Melancthon: "All things turn out according to Divine predestination, not only the works we do outwardly, but even the thoughts we think inwardly," adding in the same place, "There is no such thing as chance or fortune, nor is there a readier way to gain the fear of God and to put our whole trust in Him, than to be thoroughly versed in the doctrine of predestination" (pp. 36-37).We assert that the decrees of God are not only immutable as to himself, it being inconsistent with His nature to alter in His purposes or change His mind; but that they are immutable likewise with respect to the objects of those decrees, so that whatsoever God hath determined, concerning every individual person or thing shall surely and infallibly be accomplished in and upon them. Hence we find that He actually showeth mercy on whom He decreed to show mercy and hardeneth whom He resolved to harden (Romans 9:18); "For His counsel shall stand, and He will do all His pleasure" (Isaiah 46:10). Consequently, His eternal predestination of men and things must be immutable as Himself, and so far from being reversible, can never admit of the least variation. (p. 41)
Predestination is to be preached because the grace of God (which stands opposed to all human worthiness) cannot be maintained without it... Thus argued St. Augustine against the Pelagians, who taught that grace is offered to all men alike, that God for His part equally wills the salvation of all, and that it is in the power of man's free-will to accept or reject the grace and salvation so offered. Which string of errors do, as Augustine justly observes, center in this grand point: that God's grace is not free but the fruit of man's desert. Now the doctrine of predestination batters down this delusive Babel of free-will and merit. It teaches us that, if we do indeed will and desire to lay hold on Christ and salvation by Him, this will and desire are the effect of God's secret purpose and effectual operation, for he it is who worketh in us both to will and to do of His own good pleasure, that he that glorieth should glory in the Lord. There neither is nor can be any medium between predestinating grace and salvation by human merit (pp. 117-118).
It is said that our opinion differs very little, and in things only of little moment, from the stoical fate; and lies obnoxious to the same absurdities which the philosophers and Christians did object against it.
To which I reply; that of all the sects of the ancient philosophers, the stoics come nearest to the Christian religion has been observed by many; and that not only with respect to their strict regard to moral virtue, but also on the account of principles and doctrines; in so much as Jerome affirms that in most things they agree with us... Certain it is that several of the first Christian writers were either of this sect, or much inclined to it, and greatly favored it, as Pantaenus, Clemens Alexdrinus, Tertullian, Arnobius, and others... And should it appear that we agree with them in the doctrine of God's decrees, I know of no other consequence that will follow upon it but this, that our doctrine is consonant with the light of nature and far from being repugnant to the natural reason of mankind... It must be allowed that there are some things said by them which have an affinity with some tenets of ours, asWhen they says that fate is God himself, to whom all things are subject and by whom they are all determined, ordered and directed as he pleases... And, says Seneca, who was one of the best writers among them, "If you call God fate, you will not be mistaken, since fate is nothing else but an implicated series of causes, and he is the first cause of all on which the rest depends." ... Now, setting aside the language in which these things are expressed (for some pagan gods had been mentioned) there is nothing but what is agreeable to our sentiments, namely, that God is who has fixed and determined all things, in their own order, place and time, according to his good will and pleasure; and that God's decree is God himself decreeing: and therefore we also agree with them, when
They represent fate as no other than the will, purpose, and decree of God... To this nothing can be excepted, but the use of the word fate... And so the great Augustine allows the same thing though he denies the name: "human governments are entirely constituted by Divine Providence," says he, "which if therefore any one will ascribe to fate, because he call the will or power of God by that name, let him hold his opinion, but correct his language."
Some of them were very careful to preserve the natural liberty of the will of man, as we are. Chrysippus, one of the principle among them, was of the opinion that "the mind was free from the necessity of motion." ... We deny any such influence of the stars which works by a necessity of nature upon the wills and actions of men.
God is a most free agent, and liberty in him is in its utmost perfection, and yet does not lie in indifference to good and evil; he cannot lie, or deny himself; his will is determined only to that which is good; he can do no other; he is the author of all good, and of that only; and what he does, he does freely, and yet necessarily... The human nature of Christ, or the man Christ Jesus, who, as he was born without sin, and lived without it all his days on earth, so was impeccable, could not sin. He lay under some kind of necessity, from the purpose of God... to fulfil all righteousness, and yet he did it most freely and voluntarily... The devils and damned spirits have no inclination to nor capacity of doing that which is good, but are wholly determined to that which is evil, and yet do all they do freely and voluntarily... The liberty of the will of man, in evey state he has been, is, or shall be, lies not in an indifference to good and evil. In his state of innocence, as he was made after the image and in the likeness of God, so the bias of his soul was only to that which is good, which he performed willingly in obedience to the will of God... In his regenerate state, there is, indeed, an inclination both to good and evil; but this arises from two different principles in the regenerate man. The new man, or principle of grace, is inclined, bent, and determined to that which is good only; and yet freely serves the law of sin. In the state of glorification, the saints will be impeccable, cannot sin, can only do that which is good;... whence it follows, that the liberty of man's will does not lie in an indifference or indetermination to good or evil; but is consistent with some kind of necessity, and a determination to one.
If liberty is not consistent with necessity in any sense, then it is not consistent with the decrees of God, nor even with the foreknowledge of God... For if there is not a necessity of things coming to pass, which are foreknown and decreed by God, then his foreknowledge is uncertain, and is but mere supposition and conjecture, and his decrees must be frustrable and precarious. It is said that this was of old the chief argument of the fatalists, espoused of late by Mr. Hobbes, and is still made the refuge of the predestinarians. Be it so; if the fatalists and Mr. Hobbes meant no more by necessity than we do, namely, a necessity of the immutability and the unfrustrableness of God's foreknowledge and decrees, and not of coaction or force upon the will of man; we have no reason to be ashamed of the argument they made use of; and instead of making it a refuge or mere shift, shall think ourselves obliged to defend it, and abide by it.
I was lately introduced to the acquaintance of a very learned and sensible Arminian, whose political writings and whose social virtues entitle him to no small share of public and domestic esteem. This worthy gentleman has sagacity to perceive and integrity to acknowledge the prodigious lengths to which the free will scheme if carried as far as it naturally leads, must inevitably push its votaries. He sees its consequences clearly; he swallows them without difficulty; and he avows them very honestly. “God does all he possibly can” - these were the gentleman’s own words to me, in conversation - “God does all he possibly can to hinder moral and natural evil, but he cannot prevail. Man will not permit God to have his wish.” – Then, said I, the Deity must certainly be a very unhappy Being. – “Not unhappy in the least,” replied the ready philosopher: “God knows that in consequence of the free will with which he has endued his rational creatures, he himself must be disappointed of his wishes and defeated of his ends, and that there is no help for it, unless he had made us mere machines. He, therefore, submits to necessity and does not make himself uneasy about it.” See on what tremendous shoals free willers, when honest, run themselves aground! Is their god the Bible God? Certainly not. Their god “submits” to difficulties which he “cannot help” himself out of, and endeavors to make himself “easy” under millions and millions of inextricable embarrassments, uncomfortable disappointments, and mortifying defeats. Whereas, concerning the God of the Bible, it is affirmed that he hath done, and will always continue to do, whatsoever he pleaseth.
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