Tuesday, January 15, 2013

The Precondition of an Omniscient Communicator Revisited

Every so often, I like to revisit my favorite apologetic argument, that [revelation from] an omniscient person or persons is a precondition for knowledge. By working on making it more accessible – without sacrificing key components of the argument, of course – it’s kept fresh in my mind. The following is my latest attempt.

Take any knowledge-claim and any claim about which one is ambivalent or ignorant. For example:

A: [I know that] Christianity is a religion.
B: [I do not know whether or not] Paul wrote Hebrews [is true].

Why is it the case that I can know A, the knowledge claim, without knowing B, the ambivalence claim? Answers may vary, but it is likely that any variation will be roughly equivalent to “because I don’t need to know B in order to know A.” Now, as a Christian, I agree with this. But the point is to provide an account of why this is the case.

Consider the fact that “I don’t need to know B in order to know A” is itself a knowledge-claim. In that case, it is evident that it can be substituted for A as follows:

C: [I know that] I don’t need to know B in order to know A.
B: [I do not know whether or not] Paul wrote Hebrews [is true].

But then it is equally evident that I can repeat the question I asked above: why is it the case that I can know C, the knowledge claim, without knowing B, the ambivalence claim?

It may go against common sense to entertain such questions, but given that philosophy is supposed to question superficial intuitions, this actually presents a pretty little problem. Simplistic answers like the above fall suspect to an infinite regress: “I don’t need to know B in order to know C” is itself a knowledge claim (D) which, upon substitution for C, is in turn subject to the same line of questioning.

Now, suppose one actually does need to know everything in order to know even one thing. Then it’s clear that omniscience is a precondition for knowledge. But is it possible that we don’t need to know everything in order to know something, and, if so, how can we determine what propositions do not, in fact, need to be known? 

If possession of omniscience is not a precondition for knowledge, then it is clear that truths are not related in such a way that a single knowledge-claim entails a[n implicit] claim to knowledge of all others. But therein lies the rub: on what non-arbitrary grounds can we rule out the possibility that possession of omniscience is an epistemic necessity? This is a problem everyone who is not omniscient must face, and of everyone in this group, there emerge two types of relevant worldviews:

1) ones which state either a) that there is no one who is omniscient or b) that while there may be an omniscient person or persons, we cannot know that he or they has or have communicated to us;
2) ones which state that we can know there is an omniscient person or persons who has or have communicated to us.

If the first – i.e. deism, agnosticism, atheism, etc. – then any knowledge-claim will indeed beg the question regarding its relation to ambivalence-claims. For in that case, any knowledge claim could be substituted in place of A, C, or D. This includes knowledge-claims that certain propositions are self-evident (cf. here). The proper reply to these persons who stubbornly insist on their whims is to say that “it is self-evident the Bible is true.” There’s not much else one can do.

If the second – if there is a person or persons who is or are omniscient – then it is possible that he or they know the relationship among truths is such that they can be communicated without requiring that the person[s] to whom such is communicated know all things. This is the true means by which skepticism can be avoided.

5 comments:

MikeD said...

In relation to our other discussion on the Self-Knowledge post, I found this great. I take it that this has something to do with your claim that even axioms need justification. I guess I'm not sure about that but I found this argument fascinating and very clever. Nice!

About the last paragraph: "If the second – if there is a person or persons who is or are omniscient – then it is possible that he or they know the relationship among truths is such that they can be communicated without requiring that the person[s] to whom such is communicated know all things. This is the true means by which skepticism can be avoided."

Would not the devout Jew I made mention of fall into this camp? I suppose that you could take the angle that "their god" knows not the NT, and thus is not-omniscient. And yet since your argument was God-free (by name), I suppose they could say "Amen" to the argument and assert that your God is in error, for He thinks the NT also, and thus, is not omniscient leaving you groundless.

Ryan said...

"Would not the devout Jew I made mention of fall into this camp?"

Perhaps, but the problem is that the argument I mention is merely a necessary condition for knowledge, not a sufficient condition. Notice the argument does not specify the content of the divine revelation other than that the argument itself must be compatible with it. One cannot infer a sufficient condition from a [collection of] necessary condition[s], though what he claims suffices must also be compatible with necessary conditions. I may elaborate on this in a future post, but for now, you will probably find this relevant post interesting.

Phlegon of Tralles said...

"then it is possible that he or they know the relationship among truths is such that they can be communicated without requiring that the person[s] to whom such is communicated know all things."

I think this fails for the same reason as other 'knowledge' fails. How would someone know whether or not this knowledge that is being communicated is from an omniscient being?

If a person can know this, then it appears that not all knowledge reduces down to an infinite regress.

Phlegon of Tralles said...

Essentially you are back at square one - justifying knowledge. It seems that if your argument is true, then the only being that could know anything is the omniscient being.

How would the omniscient being transfer his omniscience to you in order for you to be assured that it's knowledge is actually knowledge? Such a transfer seems to have to take place if your initial argument is correct.

Ryan said...

From the indications on the forum, you seem to have found my post on the precondition of self-authenticity, but for the benefit of other readers, see here).

I will also kindly point out that if you reject this possibility, you are left with skepticism in which case your objection doesn't stand anyway.