Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's ninth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.
The Bible and Other Sources of Knowledge
To briefly reiterate a point made in my last review, "sense knowledge" - by which I gather Mr. Lazar means a propositional belief that is epistemically justified, in accordance with externalism, in virtue of the manner in which the belief was caused (e.g. a divinely ordained and "reliable" process of which we are not consciously aware) - is not "a Biblical axiom." It would a biblical inference: from certain passages of Scripture, one infers that people can or have acquired some "knowledge" due, in part, to their senses or sense organs instead of special, divine revelation; therefore, "sense knowledge" is possible. No proposition of Scripture overtly references "sense knowledge" or the like - at least that I am aware of - so "sense knowledge" must be an inference or deduction one makes from Scripture.
Further, Scripture is not used to infer or deduce particular instances of sense knowledge that we have. From all appearances, Mr. Lazar would not argue that we can know when we have sense knowledge, only that it is hypothetically possible that we have such knowledge given that there are biblical examples of persons who have had it whether they themselves were aware such beliefs counted as knowledge (in some sense) or not. Because it is only possible that we have such knowledge, one might alternatively hypothesize that whatever external justificatory factor that must be present for sense knowledge has never been present in any of our sensory experiences. Perhaps we don't have sense knowledge after all, even if others, like those in the Bible, do.
To argue we indeed can be aware that we have sense knowledge seems to assume we can be aware of when we have had sense knowledge. But for us to be aware of when we have sense knowledge would be to suggest that the are no external justificatory factors on which us having sense knowledge would depend. In turn, that would be to affirm an internalist understanding of sense knowledge, a proposal of a sort of empirical epistemology that Mr. Lazar has assured us is not on offer and would invite all the objections to empiricism that Clark wrote in his numerous publications (objections with which Mr. Lazar says he accepts). Thus, I have argued that when it comes to a basic epistemology, sense knowledge (or other kinds of "knowledge" that are justified in an externalist sense) may be important - and it may be that we have it without being aware of the fact - but ought to be regarded as subordinate in fundamentality to knowledge that is justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense, knowledge of which we can be aware.
To also reiterate points I've made in other reviews (link), Scripture is not the only source of truth, nor do many Scripturalists claim that it is - including Clark. Rather, it "is in the Scripture alone we find truth" (link). Scripture is one's epistemic source of "knowledge" in a certain sense (cf. link). We may talk of other "sources" of "knowledge," and this is indeed the focus of Mr. Lazar's ninth [and tenth] chapter[s], but it must not be forgotten throughout this discussion that divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in Scripture - is the foundation, first principle, axiom, or presupposition of our basic epistemology, from which all other propositional "knowledge" of the fundamental kind mentioned above is deduced.
Memory
The first "extra-biblical" source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is memory. Mr. Lazar begins this section by stating, "the Bible assumes people have memories." This is true, and Clark would have agreed:
These objects of knowledge are not trivialities such as blues and sweets. They are truths or propositions. An example, one of these realities, a constituent of the noumenal world, is the proposition that God justified sinners on the basis of Christ’s imputed righteousness. This is not only a thought to which I may return time and time again. It is also a thought you and I can have simultaneously. Thus communication as well as memory is possible. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 91)
Clark no more denied that people have memories than he denied that people experienced sensation. One's "ability to remember," then, is not at issue. Instead, the question, as outlined by Mr. Lazar himself, ought to be whether the "Biblical evidence" indicates that memories are sources of "extra-Biblical knowledge" [of a certain kind].
None of the verses Mr. Lazar mentions or evidences a scenario in which the people who experienced memories knew them to be true. A problem that runs throughout this chapter is that Mr. Lazar's examples of allegedly extra-biblical knowledge in this chapter assume the point in question, conflate "knowledge" with useful opinions (link) or do not specify, let alone defend, what sort of "knowledge" Mr. Lazar has in mind.
Moreover, even if persons could know things they remember, that doesn't mean that memory itself is the source of knowledge. Let's say that I both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God." Does that make my memory qua memory the source of knowledge? Could it not be that I remember something that I had already come to know, and that I know my memory on the same basis by which I originally came to know? I may both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God," but my knowledge could - or perhaps even must be, if it is "knowledge" of the sort in which Clark was interested - be due to Scriptural inference, not the mere fact that it is a memory of a proposition I had previously known, believed, or thought.
My own thinking is that we can know some memories. I have argued elsewhere:
...how is it that our reasoning and memory could be, in every case, fallible? I can see how we could have two different sense experiences, or how we could have a different sense experience from someone else, which yield contradictory beliefs and therefore leave us unable to ascertain which of the two beliefs is true.
But I don’t see how this could apply to reason or memory across the board. If any beliefs we have are in some sense memorial insofar as our thoughts either reference memories or themselves occur over a span of time rather than an instant, and if our thoughts in every case depend on our implicitly, if not explicitly, following certain logical structures, then I think there is a path to internally and infallibly justified beliefs which isn’t logically founded on sense knowledge. (link)
The above was an argument intended to parallel Clark's reference to an Augustinian critique of empiricism. Compare the bold in the quote to the line of reasoning that follows:
… one should note that no one can ever hear a piece of music or a line of poetry. Our opponents, who insist on sensation as the origin of knowledge, cannot well object to an instance taken from experience. Augustine pointed out that to “hear” music or poetry, one must at least “perceive” the rhythm. But there is no rhythm in a single sensation. Even beyond perception it is necessary to have memory before a line of poetry can be recognized as poetry. A single sound has no rhythm or meter. The first sounds of a line must be remembered until the last sound occurs; note also that the first sound longer exists when the last sound sounds. Therefore no one ever senses music or poetry. This Augustinian remark should satisfy any empiricist; but it is not exegesis. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, Pg. 270)
If music and poetry presuppose memory, so too - it seems to me - does [propositional] thought, for there is no meaning in a single concept... it is necessary to have memory before a proposition can be recognized as subject-verb-object. A single concept has no meaning. The first concept in a proposition must be remembered until the last concept is thought. This would appeal to Augustine's and Clark's theory of time as to why memory is critical to the possibility of knowledge.
Perhaps one might counterargue that a proposition can be thought of in an instant or without temporal duration - in other words, in the causal chain of events which establish temporal sequence, perhaps I am able to think about the whole of propositional content without an intervening event. Now, this hypothesis would be difficult for me to accept - even regarding a short proposition such as "Jesus wept," it seems the thought occurs over a span of time, with intervening events in the objective causal chain of events (e.g. a movement my body makes) occurring as I begin the consideration of the proposition with the concept of "Jesus" and end it with the concept of "wept." If a known thought like that must occur over time, memory must be presupposed.
However, even if it were possible for men to think propositions instantaneously, I would further argue memorial knowledge seems implicitly presupposed insofar as when I think "Jesus wept" or "Jesus is the Son of God," I am thinking about a specific Jesus of whom I must have memory. In other words, concepts appear to tag propositions similar to the manner in which words do (link). As Clark says:
One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 66)
So, regarding memorial "knowledge," apologists could certainly refine defense of its reality, constraints (i.e. what is the scope of our memorial "knowledge," what is axiomatically deducible), and necessity (i.e. man is a temporal and limited creature, cf. mode of knowledge or background or tacit knowledge). But I do think the above establishes a beginning for that within a Scripturalist framework. I think certain instances of memorial knowledge can be argued to be preconditions for the sort of "knowledge" in which Clark was interested and, thus, would, like the laws of logic, not be "extra-biblical" but rather subsidiary to our sufficient condition for knowledge (link). More could, should, and hopefully will be said on this point another time.
Dreams
Another extra-biblical source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is dreams. But the examples he mentions are dreams that function as mediums through which divine revelation is communicated. The "Lord said" or "an angel of the Lord... said" or God "warned" or God "revealed to Pharaoh" all refer to times during which the canon of special divine revelation was open. The question of the mode of communication (dreams, visions, etc.) is actually just a subset of whether there are any new sources of special divine revelation. Clark doesn't deny that God spoke to individuals in history apart from what was revealed in Scripture. Adam was not given a Bible in the garden. The real question is whether Mr. Lazar believes it is possible that God still speaks to us [in dreams] today.
That itself would suffice as a reply, but another worthy point is that it appears some, if not all, of these and other biblical dreams did not ipso facto communicate knowledge. In the examples of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, for example, both required their dreams to be interpreted by prophets of the Lord, Joseph and Daniel to even understand what they meant. Other magicians or wise men around these kings admitted they could not interpret the dreams even after being told about it. Take the first example Mr. Lazar mentions: Pharaoh's dream. Joseph himself corrects Pharaoh that “It is not in me; God will give Pharaoh a favorable answer” (Genesis 41:16). That is, the epistemic as well as metaphysical source of [the interpretation of] the dream is God, not Joseph.
Any dreams that involved symbolism in need of interpretation were dreams whose interpretations themselves relied on further divine revelation (cf. Daniel 2:18ff.). This follows along the lines of my argument that "Scripturalists ought to regard our epistemic foundation, not as a physical and non-propositional texts, but rather as the [propositional] contents which the texts codify." (link). Knowledge of that to which images or symbols refer presupposes propositional communication, for literal knowledge is propositional.
Now, God uses the physical writ of Scripture, dreams, etc. as causal means by which He communicates propositional content. In one sense, then, we can regard these as "sources" of knowledge, and Mr. Lazar's next chapter does seem to intend to address the "epistemic status" of beliefs derived from such sources. He might have been better doing so in this chapter, in my opinion, but I gather that he intends here to demonstrate that there is "knowledge" from other sources than the Bible and later elaborate on what kind of "knowledge" this is. If that is the case, then as already mentioned, neither Clark nor subsequent Scripturalists would have an issue with a distinction between contexts in which "knowledge" means something other than that in which he was interested, so perhaps Mr. Lazar's "Neo"-Scripturalism largely resolves - allowing certain (maybe even useful) emphases - into ordinary Scripturalism.
Regardless, I will note that causation is fundamentally a metaphysical category. It is an epistemic category only insofar as one might argue certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. of the externalist variety) depend on whether causation has metaphysically taken place in a particular way. As has already been argued in the introductory remarks, this is not the kind of knowledge which is epistemically fundamental. So as I see it, in what sense dreams et al. are regarded as "sources" of extra-biblical knowledge stands in need of some clarification.
Self-Knowledge
Mr. Lazar argues that self-knowledge is biblically affirmed. While I agree, I think the references to the gospel of John were ill-chosen. Those passages he cites speak of belief, not knowledge. 1 Corinthians 2:11 makes for a much better argument, as I too have argued elsewhere on this blog (link). In a previous review, I also alluded to why I believe a denial of self-knowledge to be inconsistent with [Clark's] revelational epistemology, and I have pointed out that Clark accepted self-knowledge at certain points in his life while rejecting it at others (link; follow the links in that review for more thorough analysis).
In short, I think Mr. Lazar needed to say much more to establish that self-knowledge qualifies as "extra-biblical" knowledge. As with memorial knowledge, is self-knowledge really "extra-biblical" if understood as a precondition for knowledge? This is a line of argument Mr. Lazar does not attempt or dispute, so it is hard to tell how he would respond, but so long as it is kept in mind that divine revelation is the necessary and sufficient precondition for knowledge which accounts for these and other necessary, subsidiary conditions, I think not. I would at least need to see an argument to the contrary before feeling the need to say much more.
Natural Theology and Moral Law
Two final and interrelated sources of extra-biblical knowledge Mr. Lazar believes the Bible itself mentions are knowledge due to natural theology and the moral law. I'll treat these together, as Mr. Lazar only quotes a few verses from Romans 1-2 as the basis for his arguments. That being the case, I wish Mr. Lazar had interacted with Clark's exegesis or thoughts on those passages (and on any of the other subjects in this chapter). Because he did not, I will. While this will make my response to this section of Mr. Lazar's chapter disproportionately long, I think it is will be helpful to readers who may be confused how Scripturalists can affirm "natural knowledge." Clark's answer is one possibility, and it does not depend on an externalist theory of epistemic justification (which is another possibility worthy of consideration in its own right).
Romans 1-2 is an oft-cited passage in Clark's publications, so much so that I had trouble deciding what to include and what not to include in this review. This article is Clark's longest exegetical reflection on Romans 1 of which I am aware. In it, he provides at least two possible arguments against natural theology, one of which will also apply to Romans 2 and moral knowledge, as we shall see below. The following highlights the first argument against the idea that Romans 1 teaches natural theology:
That which is known of God, later referred to as his eternal power and deity, includes his wrath, for verse 18 says so; and Nygren is correct, I believe, in making the last clause in verse 20 a purpose clause. God revealed himself for the purpose of making men inexcusable. Power and deity therefore include wrath. This wrath is revealed from heaven, but we must ask, what form of wrath and what form of revelation?
...Now,
if the wrath of God is revealed because it is known – its being known is the
proof of its having been revealed – what is known is evident because God made
it evident to them. And how do we know that God made it evident? The reason is
that God’s invisible attributes, eternal power and deity, are clearly seen and
understood by man’s observation [?] of created objects, in order that men may
be held inexcusable.
The
text does not explicitly attribute this knowledge to all mankind. At the
minimum infants are excluded. What would be the maximum permitted by the text?
Could it be that all who have not heard the gospel are excluded? Do Paul’s
words apply only to those who have heard the proclamation? In verse 17 the
righteousness of God is said to be revealed in the gospel. Of course it does
not follow by the strict laws of validity that God’s righteousness is not revealed
elsewhere also. The reign of Pericles is revealed in Grote’s History of Greece
but this does not prevent Bury from mentioning it also. Cannot righteousness be
revealed both in the gospel and in nature? Nevertheless the Bible as a whole
teaches that the righteousness here envisaged is revealed only in the gospel.
Hence no one ignorant of the gospel – and the “gospel” includes the book of
Habakkuk – can have learned about this righteousness. If now this is true of
righteousness, it may also be true of wrath. That is to say, Paul is addressing
the Roman Christians, who had already heard the gospel. Other Romans had heard
the gospel, had received the revelation, from the mouth of Peter or other
disciples, and had clearly understood the preaching, for God made it clear to
them; but they refused to believe and so continued in the sins described in the
remainder of the chapter. This would successfully exclude all notions of
natural theology from this passage, for on this view Paul has in mind only
people who have heard the gospel. Let it be clearly admitted that this
interpretation is not a necessary conclusion from the text. But is its falsity
a necessary conclusion? Is it not a possibility to be considered?
Note that Clark only mentions this as an exegetical possibility. A few paragraphs later, he refers back to this interpretation as "possible though suspicious." In 1963, Clark summarized and criticized Barth's position on Romans 1, which was substantially the same as the above:
…[the heathen's] refusal to accept this knowledge, their suppression of it in unrighteousness, must therefore have occurred after and not before the ministry of the Apostle. The idolatry and immorality described in the chapter can therefore be only that of the first century of our era, and only that of the people to whom Paul himself preached. No doubt the heathen had always so lived, but Barth implies that the sin intended in the chapter is only sin A.D., and no reference to sin B.C. is intended. This is an unusual exegesis…
The main thought is prima facie improbable. Paul’s words rather clearly suggest a statement about the heathen as such and a revelation which they possess. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 118)
He outright rejected Barth's exegesis in 1969, but notice that he also, in the same breath, affirms "natural knowledge":
Though dim and restricted, this natural knowledge of God is not to be denied. Romans 1:20 may not guarantee the validity of the theistic proofs, but it plainly asserts some knowledge of God derived from “the things that are made.” Romans 2:15 shows a minimal a priori knowledge of moral principles. On such natural knowledge human responsibility depends. When Karl Barth argues that the heathen which Paul has in view are not the heathen generally but only those to whom he had preached the Gospel, so that all the others have no knowledge of God at all, we regret that his exegetical powers failed him (compare Church Dogmatics, II:1:119ff ). Yet this natural knowledge is minimal in extent and practically useless in communicating the way of salvation. Who can deny that the savage tribes of the jungles know very little about God? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 92-93)
There is a refreshing honesty in reading a theologian who can see the attractiveness of an interpretation of Scripture - in that it would fit well with his other beliefs - yet reject it if he does not find it to do justice to the real meaning of God's word. But such honesty does beg certain questions for those who hold to a Scripturalist theory of knowledge.
As mentioned in a previous review and in my foregoing remarks on this chapter by Mr. Lazar, what counts as "knowledge" is a question determined by the context in which the concept is found. While Clark does indeed affirm "natural knowledge," he qualifies his affirmation in the long article (referenced above) on Romans 1:
“whether or not [Paul] speaks of such a natural knowledge of God” is a question that ought to be answered, yes or no. There need be no “misunderstanding of Paul, whether the answer be yes or no.” What is needed are clear cut definitions. If Thomas’ definition of natural theology is used, the present writer would answer, No. But if a vague religious sense be meant, if natural religion were conceived as a set of rites and beliefs impressed by the customs of the tribe, or something else still more vague, the answer would be a vague yes. (link)
"Clear cut definitions" are needed. This quote is also a rare instance in Clark's thought in which he entertains the possibility of a sort of natural theology that can be affirmed: one which, as Clark does, affirms "natural knowledge" while also distancing itself from wrong methods of accounting for that "knowledge" (wrong methods I think he usually has in mind when referring to "natural theology"). For there is no question that Clark is consistent in his rejection of empirical knowledge even when he affirms natural knowledge:
Again,
the Hebrew-Christian view that “the heavens declare the glory of God” does not,
in my opinion, mean that the existence of God can be formally deduced from an
empirical examination of the universe. If on some other grounds we believe in
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, we can see that the heavens declare his
glory; but this is not to say that a person who did not believe in God could
demonstrate his existence from nature. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pg. 66)
In what sense, then, is "natural knowledge" possible on a Scripturalist epistemology? As already mentioned, there is a second argument against natural theology in the long discussion of Romans 1-2 in "Nooumena Kathoratai." In this argument, Clark pivots from a dismissal of Barth's position and critique of an empirical understanding of Romans 1 to an alternative idea of how the "knowledge" of heathens in Romans 1 coincides with or is similar to the "knowledge" of Gentiles without the law in Romans 2:
One must compare interpretation with interpretation. There are numerous verses and passages whose exact meaning is difficult to determine. Before rejecting, the above out of hand, let us examine a more widely held view. It is that all men – we shall not press the case of infants – by observing stars and stones have a clear understanding of God’s wrath, omnipotence, and deity. There is a modification of this view that better survives analysis, but one may take this form first. This first form means that an observation of stones gives us knowledge of divine omnipotence, and an observation of the lamentable results of drug addiction gives us a knowledge of God’s wrath. But no one has ever shown how this could be possible. ‘Stones are heavy, therefore God will punish sin’ is already an invalid inference.
The second form of appeal to the ‘things that are made’ makes a normative conclusion more plausible. The expressions mostly used up to this point have designated visible objects, stones, and stars, as examples of the things that are made. Many commentaries take this for granted. But Godet, and with greater clarity Shedd, mention an internal as well as an external revelation. That is to say, the human mind is one of the things that God made; and while Godet and Shedd do not quite say so, this mind may turn out to be of such greater importance that stars and stones can be disregarded. Godet mentions man’s “conscience and understanding,” even though he puts the emphasis on physical nature; and Shedd speaks of “conscience … consciousness … rational not sensuous perception, intuitive and not deductive.” Perhaps if we submerge the empirical elements these commentators retain, their more or less defective apriorism may lead to a better understanding of Paul’s meaning...
In other words, we discover the divine attributes by introspection of the constitution of the mind. The a priori forms of logic presuppose the power, wrath, and deity of their maker...
In conformity with this, one may note that nobody can recognize a flower as God’s handiwork, unless he has a prior knowledge of God. As Calvin said, the knowledge of God is the first knowledge a person has. It is innate; not derived from experience.
Hence the passage in Romans should be taken as similar to those phrases in the Psalms, such as, the heavens declare the glory of God. There is no valid argument. Only his works are visible. (link)
The third paragraph is key, and we will return to it momentarily. As already pointed out, Clark rejects: 1) the "Barthian" restriction of "natural knowledge" only to heathens who have heard the gospel as well as 2) an empirical interpretation of heathen "knowledge." The heavens may declare and function as a witness to God's handiwork, but one who has not been converted by the gospel will not "recognize" such as God's handiwork. Unregenerate men suppress the truth rather than confess it. On the other hand, any attempt to suppress truth cannot "altogether succeed" in its desired effect:
Wrath, guilt, and liability to punishment are appropriate because men know the truth and yet suppress it. What is known of God has been made clear to them (Acts 14:17). The eternal attributes of omnipotence and deity, though invisible, are clearly seen in the created universe, rendering it inexcusable for a man not to worship God. The race, refusing to glorify and thank God, became stupid, so stupid as to fall to the level of idolatry. They worshipped birds, beasts, and even reptiles.
...All sorts of evils followed: maliciousness, murder, deceit, backbiting, cruelty, and so forth. Yet, though they wish to exclude all knowledge of God from their minds, they could not altogether succeed. They still knew that just judgment of God, namely, that people who practice such things are worthy of death; nonetheless they continued in their wicked way and entirely approved of those who did such things. (link)
How can unregenerate men who suppress truth nevertheless know the "just judgment of God"? Their own conscience will accuse them, for the [Mosaic] law is written in their hearts. Romans 1 and Romans 2 dovetail:
In addition to particular cases, general statements occur in Luke 12:45-48 and John 15:22; but particularly in Romans 1:32, “Knowing the ordinance of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but approve of those that do them.”
This last reference meets the objection that the heathen are not responsible because they have never heard the gospel. They are responsible because they know the law. “When the Gentiles, who do not have the [Mosaic] law, act lawfully by nature, they are, without the [Mosaic] law, a law to [or for] themselves: They show the work of the law written in their hearts” (Romans 2:14-15). Thus responsibility is both established and limited by knowledge. (Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1992, pg. 181)
[Parenthetical: as a self-professing traducian and realist, I think Clark would have done well, in such contexts as these, to mention our real unity with and participation in Adam's sin as the basis for our responsibility to God's law (particularly, our culpability in having broken God's law). This is a subject which merits a separate post, although I will briefly return to it below.]
That is, I believe the crux of Clark's argument is that anthropology matters. Man is the image of God, so God's law is written is written in his heart (i.e. mind). Man's mind itself is a reflection of his Creator's mind. Instead of rejecting "natural knowledge" altogether, then, for those whose minds are developed to the extent that "introspection" is possible, Clark references "a priori forms" as a means by which we can understand how the conscience or mind that God created enables man to "discover the divine attributes." Clark similarly argues elsewhere:
Various Christian philosophers
believe that one can see philosophical principles presupposed by the text. The
Thomists, for example, think that Romans 1:20 requires empiricism and justifies
the cosmological argument. Calvinists have historically made the knowledge of
God—not the knowledge of sensory objects—basic, and hold that Genesis 1:26 and
Romans 2:15 presuppose innate ideas, or a priori forms. (link)
When Clark says there are philosophical principles presupposed by the text, he is not arguing that Scripture ought not to be considered one's first principle. Rather, it seems that he is getting at an argument I made in an earlier review regarding ontological preconditions for knowledge and their relationship to sufficient condition epistemic while Scripture:
I want to reflect more upon the idea the the necessary preconditions for knowledge I describe above and the various tests that Mr. Lazar, Clark, and I have mention are perhaps better labelled ontological preconditions for knowledge.
This seems right and, with further elaboration, would communicate what I am trying to get at more clearly: they characterize what the knower, knowledge, known, etc. must ontologically be or [possibly] possess in order for knowledge to occur. This is how the knower can know his first principle or sufficient condition for knowledge without necessarily knowing necessary, subsidiary preconditions that his worldview must have, in principle, the power to explain.
Scripture is the sufficient and foundational epistemic justification for what ontologically must be the case to even know Scripture. Ontologically, man must be like God to possess knowledge, and this Scripture affirms. Nevertheless, knowledge of God through the revelation of Himself is epistemologically "basic":
In spite of the RC claim that Paul the apostle put his stamp of approval on Aristotle and Aquinas in Romans 1:19-20, it is clear that the Bible offers no argument to prove God’s existence. The heavens indeed display the glory of God; but a modern scientist who had no prior conviction of God could see there only a display of nuclear energy.
It is noteworthy that Luther (an Occamist) and Calvin, who seems to have held both Plato and Aristotle in low esteem, had no natural theology. Calvin at the beginning of his Institutes denied that we first know ourselves and secondly infer God’s existence. God for Calvin is the first object of knowledge, and this knowledge comes, not from nature, but by revelation. When the zeal of Protestantism began to cool in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, natural theology revived. This was particularly true with the Lutherans, but it is also true of the Reformed Church. Is there ground for hope that the late twentieth century will see a renaissance of Calvinism, a rejection of natural theology, and an adherence to Scriptural revelation? (link)
Thus, the "discovery" of the divine attributes by introspection, reflection on ontological presuppositions of the text, etc. do not imply Clark subscribed to a rationalist epistemology. But then how, for example, can heathen who reject divine revelation nevertheless be said to "know" the law? Yes, their being images of God means that they are ontologically capable of "knowledge." It also explains why their consciences might be pricked to consider divine truths such as are mentioned in Romans 1 and 2. But in particular, what is the "epistemic status" (as Mr. Lazar might put it) of heathen "knowledge," since they suppress divine revelation? In a return to Barth, I think Clark addresses both ontology and natural knowledge in what follows before segueing into an answer:
In
Reformed theology the defaced but not annihilated image of God is sinful man
was never conceived as being an axiom common to two systems of thought. The
image is a psychological, mental, ontological reality. It is an existing part
of human nature. Let us assure Barth that from this element an unregenerate man
cannot somehow manufacture faith. The present criticism proceeds always along
the line that Barth’s most cherished theses can be maintained, and maintained
more thoroughly than he himself maintains them. Here he is worried by a
non-existent danger. Without falling into modernism or into Romanism one may
hold that there is a sense in which man has a capacity for faith not shared by
a tree or stone. When God gives the gift of faith, he is not miraculously
raising up sons to Abraham out of the stones on the roadway. Faith is a mental
activity and by definition presupposes a rational subject. Reason therefore can
be considered to be an element common to believer and unbeliever; and if
“apprehension” of the Word of God is the understanding of a divine message,
then the image of God preserved from creation and the fall is a prerequisite
thereto.
Note that, to this point, that Clark has emphasized the ontological prerequisite or presupposition: man is God's image, someone with whom one can reason. Clark immediately continues to address the epistemic status of the "knowledge" of heathens with whom a believer might reason:
Man’s
logical capacity is not the only constituent of God’s image. In addition there
are a few simple theological and moral beliefs. In the section last quoted (I, 1, 272)
Barth wishes to do justice to these facts; “peccator
non capax” must bow to actual faith. But there are other facts also. Unless
everybody is to be included as a believer in the church, we must admit the
existence of unbelievers who actually even if inconsistently believe a few
divine truths. Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge.
Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in
common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living
people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are
inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it
is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a
given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of
contact for the Gospel. What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of
exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans.
Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge
may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of
heathen responsibility.
Now,
because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact,
and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the
self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now
stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth;
and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency
with the additional truths of revelation. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 117-118)
That Christianity and heathenism have no epistemic overlap as contradictory worldviews does not thereby entail that a Christian and a heathen have no epistemic overlap, for persons can be inconsistent. The epistemic overlap here is not one in which two people in God's image begin with the same epistemic foundation and [reason to] possess[ion of] the same "knowledge." That kind of "knowledge" would be the ideal, the sort in which Clark is interested in apologetically defending (notice too the connection and distinction between apologetics and epistemology that I have emphasized as fundamental to understanding Scripturalism, link).
Rather, heathen "knowledge" is their "accepting... a divine truth." They can "actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths." They "agree on a given proposition" with a believer. But this belief, acceptance, or agreement is not systematically derived. If it were, it would have to derive from divine revelation, the only epistemic source which allows for consistency. No, the epistemic status of "knowledge" in view here is not so rigid as it is in other works by Clark, as can be seen in how Clark defined knowledge in the same book:
"How
can knowledge, i.e., belief in or
acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This
is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology." (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169)
Now, no Scripturalist would deny that unbelievers can believe or accept a true proposition. Typically, they will just apologetically argue that the unbeliever is inconsistent in doing so. Likewise, a Scripturalist might reason with a believer who endorses a Thomistic or empirical epistemology that they are using a wrong method for accounting for a right, divine truth they both believe. If that is the sense of "natural knowledge" Clark is promoting, there is no issue, and one can agree with Clark when he concludes:
Now Paul indeed bases responsibility on knowledge, but he asserts that the heathen had knowledge, some knowledge at any rate; they tried to suppress it, but could not quite succeed. And even if it were Paul who “awakened” this knowledge in them, the implication would be that some remnant or potential knowledge had been lying dormant in their minds to be awakened. And, finally, to repeat, it is indubitable that the heathen and the unbeliever have this knowledge in common. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 120)
[Parenthetical: while the reference to "remnant or potential knowledge" "lying dormant in their minds" is probably a reference to Barth's thought that only heathen to whom the gospel was preached had "knowledge," Clark's a fortiori response can be applied to infants who, Clark elsewhere argues, have the "innate idea of God" due to possessing the same "a priori equipment" as adults:
The Logos is the rational light that lights every man. Since man was created in the image of God, he has an innate idea of God. It is not necessary, indeed it is not possible, for a blank mind to abstract a concept of God from sensory experience or to lift sensory language by its bootstraps to a spiritual level. The theories of Empiricism, of Aristotle, of Aquinas, of Locke, are to be rejected.
The positing of innate ideas or a priori equipment does not entail the absurdity of infants’ discoursing learnedly on God and logic. To all appearances their minds are blank, but the blankness is similar to that of a paper with a message written in invisible ink. When the heat of experience is applied, the message becomes visible. Whatever else be added, the important words refer to non-sensuous realities. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 203)
Whether coincidental or intentional, the "invisible ink" analogy nicely ties into the writing of God's law on their minds. With experience, infants will become able to introspectively examine the message inscribed in their ontological makeup: an image of God who have already sinned in Adam. That this knowledge is dormant, so to speak, until the infant has enough cognitive development for introspection is little different than an adult whose knowledge of the same is dormant while he sleeps. At this point, however, I could be somewhat deviating from exposition of Clark's thought to development of it.]
So: on the one hand, Clark can affirm "natural knowledge" and that heathens can "know" divine truths in the sense that they - inconsistent with whatever non-revelatory epistemic axiom to which they [implicitly] hold - believe them. On the other hand, Clark can say, in a different context and [clearly] with a different conception of "knowledge" in mind:
First, Moses said that revelation was the greatest event that ever happened. Second, there is no knowledge of God apart from revelation, and therefore no knowledge of how a church and its activities should be conducted except in the Scriptures. Now, third, and a point that needs emphasis, God's revelation is clear, objective, and intelligible. And it is authoritative, whether or not we accept it. (April, 1959, Reformed Presbyterian Advocate, Volume 93, Number 4)
To conclude my reflections on this chapter, I think a definition or discussion of "source" or "knowledge" (like what I provided in an earlier review) would have helped clarify in what particular respect Mr. Lazar believed his epistemology is in contrast with Clark's and would have helped the reader evaluate Mr. Lazar's chapter, for Mr. Lazar may have found himself to be in larger agreement with Clark than he realized. In particular, mention of whether different kinds of "knowledge" are under discussion would have framed Mr. Lazar's argument in a clearer way. To this end, interaction with Clark's writings on these subjects would have been helpful.
In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 10, which Mr. Lazar calls The Epistemic Status of Extra-Biblical Beliefs.
