Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 3)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's second chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

The Test of Reason

I agreed with most if not all of what I read in the first three sub-sections of this chapter ("Introduction," "Examples of Self-Refuting Claims," and "Axioms and Presuppositions"). One test of first principles for which Clark advocated was the test of reason. I would say that the test of reason is a good apologetic tool because it remarks upon the nature of truth: truths are mutually consistent, not mutually inconsistent. This is a characteristic of what truth is, and to defend one's worldview on such grounds is reasonable. 

As Mr. Lazar notes, "self-contradiction is a sure sign of error." If the first principle of a worldview is self-contradictory, then it is "self-referentially incoherent" and "refutes itself." It is false. So long as one views this test as an apologetic test rather than an epistemic one (and that epistemology grounds apologetics, not vice versa), I would have little more to add. I was particularly pleased that Mr. Lazar pointed out that archaeological "evidence" has a role within Clark's apologetic, even though "ad hominem" and "elenctic" (link). 

However, as I mentioned in my last review, I do believe that Mr. Lazar views the test of reason as an epistemic test, at least for the Scripturalist. Not only does he view Scripturalism as falsifiable, but he thinks Scripturalism actually "fails the test of reason." As a presuppositionalist, Clark did "assume" the truth of Christianity - but he did not thereby imply that Christianity could be false: "Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems" (What Do Presbyterians Believe? 1985, pg. 18). As Clark said, "my skepticism ends where divine revelation begins" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 258). Likewise, I point out, for example, here (emphasis added):

...I think special divine revelation - the extant extent of which is concretely codified in the Scriptures - is the premise with which one must begin in order to intentionally defend his beliefs with full assurance. This is not to say that my arguments are reasons for this foundational belief, but as Gordon Clark put it, by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. If an axiom doesn't produce a sufficiently coherent system, can't account for certain worldview necessities, isn't sufficiently explanatory - however you want to phrase it - the axiom itself fails to give us knowledge of the infallibilist and internalist variety. Of course, one may object that we need any such knowledge, which is itself another discussion, one about needs. One can also be mistaken in his judgment, and the "tests" - for the present lack of a better term - do not imply that the falsifiability of an axiom is a live possibility. Yet there is practical use for these tests, and apologists ought to be in the business of being practical whenever possible.

I wrote the above years before Mr. Lazar's book was published. What I am arguing about Clark and Scripturalism is not ad hoc. I truly think an understanding of the epistemology-apologetics distinction I mentioned in my previous review is fundamental to grasping why some of Mr. Lazar's criticisms miss the mark. 

For Clark, the test of reason is not a test by which to epistemically justify the truth of his axiom. "This justification of axioms" would be "the fallacy of asserting the consequent," as Clark suspects Spinoza or other rationalists did (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 24-25). Now, Mr. Lazar may not believe that Clark's Scripturalism accurately reflects divine revelation, so he can attempt a critique along those lines; my only point here is how Clark would have regarded his own position.

Having already covered that ground in my last post, I think it would be more useful to spend time evaluating Mr. Lazar's thoughts on the relationship and distinction between Clark's epistemic source of knowledge and his means of knowing the content of that source. 

Epistemic Sources and Means of Knowledge

The arguments in Mr. Lazar's second chapter seem neatly divisible into two categories: against certain phrasings of the epistemic axiom of Scripturalism – one's epistemic "source" of knowledge – and against certain Scripturalist's account of one's epistemic "means" of knowledge. The distinction between one's source[s] of knowledge and means of knowing is one I have written about elsewhere (link):

A source of knowledge is something from which we acquire knowledge. Means of knowledge outline the process or processes by which we acquire knowledge from sources of knowledge.

If a person is to know what are the means by which he obtains knowledge, it is fairly obvious this must be accounted for by his sources of knowledge. The primary question, then, is what is or are one’s source[s] of knowledge. Whether this or these sources account for the alleged means of obtaining knowledge is only answerable after this primary question has been answered. It may turn out that whether a source or sources are able to account for the means of obtaining knowledge can help us sort through which of the various proposed sources of knowledge are viable, but first things first.

In other words, when examining a worldview, you have to start with the alleged source[s] of knowledge. What one claims as his source[s] of knowledge functions as his stated sufficient condition for knowledge (link).

Our ability to test such source[s] is limited to examining whether or not they are “self-consistent,” which encompasses multiple evaluative procedures that an apologist can undertake, including but not limited to answering if the source self-attesting, if it provides a theory of knowledge, language, metaphysics, and ethics, and if any of the answers it provides mutually exclusive.

The discussion that follows below takes for granted that the reader has read this post. In it, I discuss in what meta-epistemic context one's epistemic sources and means of knowledge are, for Gordon Clark, seemingly meant to function (with a few additional thoughts of my own). With this context in mind, I turn to the evaluation of the remainder of Mr. Lazar's chapter on "The Test of Reason."

Source[s] of Knowledge

In the first few paragraphs of a subheading entitled, "Clark's Unclear Axiom," Mr. Lazar quotes several isolated statements by Clark in which different words are used to express his epistemic axiom. Mr. Lazar believes these statements could mean different things. I'm not so sure that is true, since we can't seriously think, for example, that Clark would have used the word "revelation" as Muslim would have. That is, context matters. 

I will return to the question of "vagueness" later to provide some thoughts of my own, but that context matters is a point Clark himself made to Mavrodes long ago. The words used to express the axiom are not words "without content" or "empty." Clark's words intentionally referred to certain meanings. Thus, my initial reaction was the same as one Mr. Lazar himself anticipates: "You might think I'm being uncharitable to Clark, and that if you put those statements together, the general idea is clear enough: the Scripturalist takes the Bible as his axiom." If he had stopped on this note, Mr. Lazar's point thus far could have been well-taken: in our own explanation of our beliefs, we really ought to try to be as clear as possible. 

Instead, Mr. Lazar continues in his criticism to say that the above "general idea" is "not what Clark meant (not exactly). Instead, what Clark meant was that Scripturalism takes the Bible as the only source of truth." Thus, the first argument against "Scripturalism" that Mr. Lazar makes is as follows: "The Scripturalist axiom states the Bible is our only source of truth, however, that is not a Biblical claim... Therefore, the axiom refutes itself, making it self-referentially incoherent. Scripturalism fails the test of reason..." 

Here's the problem: Mr. Lazar does not produce any statement by Clark in support of the above, and I don't believe he can. What we instead find are quotes from other authors. I seem to recall that one of these authors does not even profess to be a Scripturalist (Cheung). While Mr. Lazar says that he will "leave [whether Clark had developed a new theory of knowledge] for the historians to debate," I was left with the feeling that a bait and switch had occurred. I had thought that what was going to be analyzed was what, as Mr. Lazar himself says, "Clark meant" - not what later Scripturalists either wrongly inferred or haphazardly phrased. 

To be fair, readers should agree that Mr. Lazar is correct in his criticism of W. G. Crampton: the Bible does not have "a systematic monopoly on truth." God Himself clearly knows things that He hasn’t revealed in the Bible, such as when the Lord will come (Matthew 24:42). Jesus performed and communicated more to his disciples than what was written (John 20:30), and unless Jesus was mute until adulthood, we can say the same about things He told His earthly family as a child. Instead, God – or, rather, the Trinity – possess a monopoly on truth: therefore, what they reveal to us is the extent of what we can know. The Bible just is the extent of what has been revealed, so it is the extent of what we can know (again, keeping in mind that "knowledge" means something definitive and along the lines of what I argue in the aforementioned, linked post on meta-epistemology).

But to call Crampton's expression of Scripturalism "Clark's later formulation" is misleading. The only piece of evidence to support Mr. Lazar's thesis that I could find was the following: "…Dogmatism does not conflict with truth from other sources because there are no other sources of truth!" (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 20). If Clark meant that a Dogmatist would say that his epistemological source of truth is the Bible alone, then Clark's axiom would be problematic. It then would be impossible to identify when the second coming of our Lord and our glorification occurs, for no new divine revelation could ever be known (or even true). Of course, this is not what Clark thought. For a few examples of what he did think:

...a Christian university should commit itself to the proposition that the triune, sovereign God, the creator and preserver of the universe, is the source of all truth, that as revealed in the Scriptures he directs the course of history to its determined end, and that the chief end of man is to glorify him... (The Philosophy of the Modern University)

It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183)

Christ said, “I am the door”; but he did not mean that he was made of wood. Christ also said, “This is my body.” Romanists think he spoke literally; Presbyterians take the sentence figuratively. Similarly the statement, “I am…the truth,” must be taken to mean, I am the source of truth; I am the wisdom and Logos of God; truths are established by my authority. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37) 

In a broad sense, all Christians could and should say the ontological source of truth (and knowledge) is the Trinity, for they are the ontological source of all things. But the propositional, divine revelation particularly codified in the Bible is our sole, current epistemic source of "knowing" ontological (or any) truths insofar as it is the extant extent of divine revelation. It is the epistemic foundation for the extant extent of what we can know to be true:

The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation of the notion that theology has several sources such as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion, or psychology. There is but one source, the Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. Under the word truth there is included, in opposition to irrationalism, logic and the law of contradiction. Whatever contradicts itself is not truth. Truth must be consistent, and it is clear that Scripture does not both affirm and deny an atonement. God is truth. Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life. (How Does Man Know God?)

There is a difference between highlighting a source where truth currently is to be "found" (read: "known") and who the sources of truth ultimately and ontologically are. To show the difference, the Trinity will always be the ontological source[s] of truth. But sola scriptura will not be true forever, for Scripture will not always be the sole location from which we can find (know) truth. Even Clark recognized this: 

...no limit is placed on the knowledge redeemed men man acquire in heaven. If the redeemed are to know as God knows them, it would seem that God will reveal a much greater amount of knowledge in the future life than we now expect. Furthermore this verse implies that though our present knowledge is partial, it is nevertheless true knowledge of the same meaning that God has. (The Answer, 1944, pgs. 13-14).

That is, the more abstract formulation of a Scripturalist's epistemic foundation (say, an appeal to "divine revelation" in general rather than the "Bible" in particular) will never change. But our concrete epistemic foundation will change, for Scripture alone does not comprise the entirety of what will ever be divinely revealed, only what is currently revealed. More knowledge is yet to come, for more divine revelation is yet to come. 

But we must note that the concrete revelation we do have is not something we epistemically reason towards discovering, so referring to it (the Bible/Scriptures/codified propositional content) in our formulation of our epistemic axiom is not only understandably motivated, it is legitimate. We can qualify such formulations by noting that when divine revelation expands, so too will our epistemic foundation. To use a few quotes from Clark that Mr. Lazar brings up to illustrate, perhaps it's more digestible to distinguish our epistemic axiom in the following way:

Concrete formulation: "[L]et the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures." (How Does Man Know God?)

Abstract formulation: "[R]evelation should be accepted as our axiom." (An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, 1993, pg. 59)

Denotatively, these currently refer to the same thing: the content of Scripture. For only Scripture has been currently divinely revealed to us. But the latter formulation is generic enough to allow that the scope of the concrete formulation can broaden to include future divine revelations which will also be axiomatically knowable. Both formulations are true in that both new divine revelation (that will come in the future) and current divine revelation can be known axiomatically or apart from inference. Both formulations overlap in the propositional content they currently reference. It's just that the former content is static (Scripture will always remain Scripture) and the latter content is capable of expanding on the former content in the future.

Vagueness

To return to the question of vagueness or [lack of] clarity, perhaps this explains why Mr. Lazar believes Clark's formulation to be vague: to capture both our present circumstances and potential future ones, a Scripturalist might oscillate between concrete and abstract expressions of his axiom. Whether or not this was true of Clark, Scripturalists should find this to be a good thought for future consideration. 

In any case, I argue that the basic thrust of the axiom and what Clark says is clear enough, however we end up parsing or attempting to fine-tune it. We can agree that there is a more precise way to state the axiom of Scripturalism... just as there is a more precise way to phrase most other statements we make. For example, this blog could probably be more clear! 

Nevertheless, we can't necessarily call vagueness a failure of the test of reason for the same reason that we can't refer to Paul's difficult sayings in Scripture (2 Peter 3:16) to be due to a failure of the test of reason. Rather, these difficulties may be expected due to the deep questions being asked. Sometimes, clarity requires background knowledge. Other times, vagueness is even useful: think of double entendres. Vagueness is important so that both meanings can be communicated with one line. Similarly, in this context, we want both the concrete and abstract formulations of our axiom communicated. Regardless, in the whole of his works, Clark does define, elaborate on, or specify the relevant terms Mr. Lazar questions.

History and Apologetics

In conclusion, Scripturalism does not fail the test of reason here, for it is not self-referentially incoherent. Or, at least, Mr. Lazar's attempted blow may hit the mark against some disciples of Clark, but from what I've read, speaking of "Clark's later formulation of the axiom" is historically inaccurate, for there is no such thing. 

One can't leave a critical point of historical accuracy for "historians to debate" when one's criticisms of a person depend on historical accuracy. Likewise, it would hardly be fair for me to say that Mr. Lazar revised his position based on what some readers of his book say, attack that position, and leave it to others to decide whether Mr. Lazar himself even believed what I attacked. 

Should Mr. Lazar provide evidence that Clark himself did change his axiom or was imprecise at certain points, I would have no problem admitting that (so long as I understand such evidence rightly). Lord knows I've criticized Clark as much as anyone else! That is because I respect the man and his work, as I believe Mr. Lazar does. Because we both respect him, when we criticize him, we should be careful to depict his thoughts as they were, not as others have construed them to be.

[Side Note: Mr. Lazar references extra-Scriptural knowledge as a reason for considering the Scripturalist's axiom to be self-referentially incoherent. I will interact with this more so when reviewing chapters 7 and 8 of the book, chapters to which Mr. Lazar also defers when making this reference. To briefly anticipate: if we construe "knowledge" to refer to a certain kind - along the lines of what I mention in my post on Clark and meta-epistemology linked above - I believe any perceived tension in the Scripturalist's epistemic axiom evaporates. Analogously, a Scripturalist can and should accept that husband can sexually "know" his wife without inference of such from Scripture. The kind of "knowledge" we are speaking about in different contexts is important and why Scripturalists should be more precise about and interested in what sort of epistemic "knowledge" they intend to apologetically defend.]

Means of Knowledge

Mr. Lazar mentions one other criticism of Clark in this chapter. The question revolves around the means by which we know anything. Mr. Lazar writes, "Scripturalism fails the test of reason due to Clark's answer to a recurrent objection to his apologetic." From what he continues to describe, I think Mr. Lazar should have said "his epistemology," not "his apologetic," since Mr. Lazar is going to question the means by which Clark thought one comes to know the propositions of Scripture.  

In any case, Mr. Lazar quotes Ronald Nash favorably: "In order to know what the Bible says, I must be able to read it with my eyes or hear it with my ears or touch the braille with my fingers. But this is sense perception." The issue at hand is that Clark rejects sensation as a means of knowledge. The criticism is that Scripture is physical. It is writ. That writ corresponds to propositions, but it is not itself propositions. So how do you "get" the propositions from the physical writ if you reject sensation as a means of knowledge? Mr. Lazar cites Crampton’s following argument as Clark's response: 

Since all knowledge is propositional, and since the senses in interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation. Rather, as noted above, the senses seem to stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition, to attend to or to recollect the God-given innate ideas that man already possesses. Dr. Clark used the illustration of a piece of paper on which is written a message in invisible ink. The paper (by illustration, the mind) might appear blank, but in actuality it is not. When the heat of experience is applied to the mind (as when heat is applied to the paper), the message becomes visible. Human knowledge, then, is possible only because God has endowed man with certain innate ideas.

Mr. Lazar refers to this as an extra-biblical theory and, therefore, dismisses it. His point is that Clark only believes biblical theories can be known. Since this view is extra-biblical, it cannot be known on Clark's own grounds. 

There are a few comments to be made here. Firstly, Mr. Lazar cites the book "Lord God of Truth" as where he finds Clark's theory of recollection. Perhaps he meant to cite Religion, Reason, and Revelation, where Clark does speak to that. I don't know what pages he has in mind because Clark himself is not quoted at this relevant juncture. While Crampton and others might summarize Clark rightly, I think it best to deal with a person's own publications when advancing arguments against him. 

In Lord God of Truth, Clark defends Malebranchian occasionalism (pg. 27) and thinks that Augustine's theory of divine illumination anticipated it. He also thinks Jonathan Edwards, an Islamist, and the Westminster divines (timidly) support the position. Clark's idea that the "second causes" in the WCF can be identified with Malebranche's occasions is absurd, but nonetheless, whether one agrees with Clark or not, it is not as if Clark never defended his premises from Scripture (or, at least, others' expositions of Scripture). See Lord God of Truth (pgs. 16-18):

More surprisingly Jonathan Edwards, of all people, provides some support for Malebranche’s views. This is not to say that the great Puritan agreed with Malebranche in great detail. He does, however, provide some Scriptural support for the doctrine of divine illumination. The general Christian public, then, will be somewhat disabused of their anti-philosophical, pragmatic prejudices, and the apologetes will be warned not to strain out a Plato and swallow an Aristotle.

Though there is enough in Malebranche that Edwards would not like, nevertheless in his sermon on A Divine and Supernatural Light Immediately Imparted to the Soul, Section three, he goes further than one might anticipate. Note the word Immediately in the title. The subhead to Section III refers to a “spiritual light that has been… immediately let into the mind by God.” Hence sensation cannot be the means. This he supports by a number of Scripture verses: 1 John 3:6, negatively, “Whoever sins has neither seen him nor known him.” John 17:3, not obviously pertinent, “And this is eternal life, that they may know you.” More clearly pertinent is his comment, “This light and knowledge is always spoken of as immediately given of God.” Of Matthew 11:25-27 he writes, “This effect is ascribed exclusively to the arbitrary operation and gift of God.” I have italicized immediately and exclusively because apologetes, confronted with the Scriptures, make a last ditch stand and argue that God uses other and necessary means. Edwards continues with 2 Corinthians 4:6, “For it is the God who commanded light to shine out of darkness who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God….” Again he comments that this light is “immediately from God… the immediate effect of his power and will.” There is also Psalm 119:18, “Open my eyes, that I may see wondrous things from your law.”

In paragraph 2 of his Secondly (pg. 18) he repeats: “It is rational to suppose that this knowledge should be given immediately by God, and not be obtained by natural means.” He then continues to stress its immediacy, using the word several times on this one page, and negatively adding, “it should not be left in the power of second causes…. Immediately by himself, as a thing too great for second causes to be concerned in…. immediately by himself, according to his own sovereign will” (18, 19).

The empiricists, as hinted at above, will no doubt remark that the reference to beholding wondrous things in the Law shows that sensations of black on white are necessary second causes, so that our knowledge of divine truth is obtained by “natural means.” For the moment, and not to repeat or anticipate all the arguments against empiricism, it will suffice to say that Jonathan Edwards denies it. The empiricists may find some solace in Abraham Kuyper and Guido de Brès, who had some idea of divine illumination, but who did not go so far as Malebranche and Edwards. However, I neither assert that Edwards totally agrees with Malebranche, nor that the latter is infallible. But both men show that Christianity cannot be empirical.

If Mr. Lazar thinks the theory Clark presents is extra-biblical, he ought to engage with Clark at these points, since Clark does attempt to defend his theory as biblical. Note, by the way, that Clark is arguing (through Edwards) that knowledge acquisition is immediate. The question is not whether or not there are innate ideas. That may be a further inference Clark makes elsewhere. But the question in Lord God of Truth and the question about whether Clark "has" to read his Bible is, for Clark, satisfied if he can show that "God alone is the cause" of everything. 

To say "the senses stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition" rather seems to suggest that senses could play a causal role in knowledge acquisition. If it does, I would agree, but I doubt Clark would go that route. The whole point of his appealing to occasionalism is to say that sensation is not causal. Or if Clark would not mean that senses play a causal role when speaking of their capability to "stimulate," then such a position must basically collapse back into occasionalism to explain what does cause the ideas in question. Hence, I personally try to speak directly against Clark's occasionalism.

I have criticized Clark's occasionalism here. I think the criticisms are sufficient to show the inconsistency of the position both with Scripture and several of Clark's other beliefs. However, for my part, to respond to Clark by way of responding to Edwards' comments on the Scriptures mentioned, God can be an ultimate cause without being an immediate cause. God opens eyes, yes. He also opens wombs. But while he may be the ultimate cause of these things, it is still the eyes that see and wombs that give birth as mediate or secondary causes. Even supposing that divine illumination is immediate in some circumstances, it would be fallacious to infer it is immediate in all circumstances. Edwards' and Malebranche's comments do not warrant Clark's conclusions in favor of occasionalism in Lord God of Truth. But interaction with these comments is needed so that readers are aware of the reasons for the theory (even if they are wrong).

There are a few more things to say about why Clark was an occasionalist. To me - and I could be wrong - it is as though Clark felt pressured by the "don't you have to read your Bible?" criticism and took up occasionalism in order to refute it. This could have been another stepping stone toward the propositional monism that, while he never fully embraced, Clark was heading towards. Clark may have reasoned that if our "knowledge," properly speaking, is of propositions (which is true), then it would be problematic if these propositions corresponded to non-propositional realities (which is false, but it is something Clark seemed to reject in rejecting the correspondence theory of truth). For then how could we know that the propositions we claim to know correspond to these physical or spiritual non-propositional realities (e.g. Scripture, persons, etc.)?

Even if that was not Clark's concern - again, I am only hypothesizing as to why Clark accepted certain, extreme positions like occasionalism, the idea that persons are propositions, etc. - I think Clark would have done better to respond to the criticism in the following way: do I have to read my Bible (or hear someone preach it) to know the propositions encoded therein? Perhaps, perhaps not. 

If I do, however, this only speaks to an ontological precondition for me to come to know anything. Consider that God is an ontological precondition for me to come to know anything, my parents were ontological preconditions for me to come to know anything, etc. I wouldn't exist and so could not know anything unless God or my parents existed. Similarly, is it impossible to conceive of sensations as ontologically causing thoughts? No. God could certainly decree that sensations function as a mediate cause of my thoughts just as He decreed my parents to function as mediate causes of my existence (and, therefore, thoughts). My thoughts may exist because of certain sensations I've had.

However, whether I do or do not have to hear or read the Bible for ontological preconditions to be satisfied such that I can come to know the corresponding, propositional content, the point is that I don't need to give a particular account of the causal chain by which I come to know anything in order to know anything. If I didn't know who my parents were, I would still know I needed parents in order for it to be ontologically possible to be who I am and know what I do of myself. If I don't know the particular chain of sensations (or other potential causative factors) that have led to my beliefs, that doesn't mean I can't know what I believe. To take another example:

The Bible may have been written by the apostles such that their births were ontologically prior to inscripturation, but the only reason I know about apostleship in the first place is by means of Scripture. So Scripture is epistemically prior to the birth of the apostles. Scripture is a historical document. Things occured prior to inscripturation on which inscripturation depended (ontological preconditions), but the point is these can only be known by Scripture (epistemological precondition). (link)

That is, analogous to the distinction between ontological and epistemic sources of knowledge mentioned above, there is a distinction we can make between ontological and epistemic means of knowledge. The ontological source or foundation of all knowledge and truth and things are the Trinity. But they are not the sole cause of all things (a la occasionalism). The [current] epistemic source of all "knowledge" (of a certain kind) of the truth is divine revelation in general and Scripture in particular. 

Now, linguistically, words refer to certain things. Do we then axiomatically begin with Scripture/the Bible as physical and non-propositional writ, or do we begin with the propositions to which the words of the writ refer? The latter. My knowledge claims are founded or sourced on divine revelation. Divine revelation is primarily propositional, not physical. 

When newer prophets, apostles, or Christ Himself quote older prophets as Scripture (divinely revealed), they refer to the propositional content those prophets communicated. They were not primarily referencing a particular, physical text, although there were and are such texts that correspond to, codify, and perhaps even cause thoughts regarding these propositional contents. This should be especially clear given that when new prophets do reference Scripture, they often do so to an audience through an entirely differently codified sensory medium (like speech) than that by which Scripture was originally revealed (writ) as well as that what writ they did possess wasn't the same as that which originally codified the revelation.

Hence, the WCF also is completely sensible when it says that things may be "deduced" from Scripture by good and necessary consequence. These deductive inferences come by reflection and are our means of knowledge. The WCF is, I think, clearly referring to Scripture as a primarily propositional source from which we can make propositional inferences, not primarily as a physical, non-propositional text. 

Again, this is not to diminish the value of non-propositional texts or roles they can play in knowledge acquisition, as they do codify the propositions in language. We are an embodied, physical people. It would make sense that we ontologically come to causally acquire knowledge by means physical, non-propositional realities. Thus, we can construe sensation as having a causal role (ontological) in knowledge acquisition. This is not troublesome, and in that sense, sensation can be a means of knowledge (of a certain kind). 

It is only if we suggest sensation has an inferential role (epistemic) in knowledge acquisition that we would have to confront Sellars' Dilemma: how can that without propositional content - that which cannot be either true or false, like a sensation - be a foundation or means from which we attempt to infer or deduce the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]? In this sense, a Scripturalist would (correctly, I think) deny that sensation is a means of knowledge (of another kind). 

Instead the epistemic means of knowledge is the other side of the coin of the epistemic source of knowledge. In conjunction, these refer to the structure of our epistemic justification for knowledge, which is foundationalistic. Foundationally, we begin with propositions. We make propositional inferences from propositions. The codification of a proposition may be in or from a text such that it is a secondary causal means by which the propositions are effected as ideas we have, but we epistemically start with the propositions that have been codified and only can only "know" (in a certain sense) this hypothetical by deduction from said propositions. 

In this way, Clark would have avoided the trap in which his critics wanted to catch him. They want Clark to defend himself with occasionalism, for that theory is rife with problems. Or they wanted Clark to admit that sensation does play a role in knowledge acquisition, for then they could ask why Clark would say it can only play that role for acquiring knowledge from reading Scripture. That would be special pleading, and the critics would be right to say so. But if we approach the question as I have above, I think there is a way in which to preserve the heart of what Clark wants to get at... although this would seem to concede to critics of Clark (including myself) that there are other kinds of knowledge that can indeed be acquired apart from Scripture. 

Now, this begins to wade us into the waters of discussing the differences between internalist and externalist accounts of knowledge, which is why I having been alluding to different senses or kinds of knowledge throughout this post. But as this will be addressed in future chapters of Mr. Lazar's book, I will reserve comment on that until later. Textual issues will also be something Mr. Lazar brings up in a later chapter. I will likely revisit what I have said here, which I think is a good start for confronting later questions that will arise. 

For those interested in reading more now on the relationship between the divinely revealed propositions, texts in which those proposition have been correspondingly encoded, and externalism as an explanation for why such propositions have been encoded even though I am here suggesting that the Scripturalist's epistemic axiom primarily refer to the propositional content of divine revelation, I'd suggest the following (link, link). 

I will conclude that while Mr. Lazar could have said more to the effect of why it is wrong, he is ultimately correct that Clark's occasionalism is in need of revision. Yet this is not fatal to the project of Scripturalism, and I do not think that Clark's epistemic axiom fails the test of reason. Instead, I conclude Clark failed to make correct inferences about means of knowledge from his epistemic axiom.

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 3, which Mr. Lazar calls the test of skepticism.

Trinitarianism and [Eternal] Hierarchicalism

Because I wasn't able to participate in our monthly podcast in May due to the passing of my grandmother, I recently reviewed a book called "Masculine Christianity." In the course of writing the review, I had a few thoughts on "hierarchicalism," a term I use to mean that all [earthly] societies exhibit an ordered hierarchy. These thoughts diverged from the point of the review enough that I felt a separate post on the subject was warranted. So here we are:

Whether it is in the context of the church, government, family, or work, all earthly organizations have authorities and those who submit to said authorities. Because, as I mentioned in the review, I think earthly societies image the divine society, I think there is good reason to consider some idea of eternal hierarchicalism as understandably motivated. It would make sense that the functions of the economic Trinity were rooted in the ontological Trinity, for example.

Could the Father have been sent by the Son to become incarnate? Did the Father not have authority to send His Son? Is it possible for the Son to even obey the Father? A common reply to eternal hierarchicalism is the idea that there is one Trinitarian will, which would seemingly prevent any one person from submitting to or having the capacity for authority over any other. This idea does not seem to do justice to the fact the Father sent/loves His Son (cf. John 17:24) or how the Son obeyed/loves His Father. Rather, a more plausible possibility is that the members of the Trinity have distinct wills - similar to how they must have their own, distinct minds to respectively think "I am the Father" vs "I am the Son" (and perhaps distinct minds itself entails distinct wills) - which, because they are of the same nature, will always be mutually interdependent and directed.

In the book, the author made much of chronological priority in Adam and woman's case as to why Adam was the head over woman. Is there perhaps an analogy to be made - albeit not in temporal terms, obviously - with eternal generation (in that the Father may be considered the fount of divinity)? If so, eternal hierarchalism would make the author's case in the book even stronger. Of course, I would stress that the author is correct to say that women and men are of equal value, equally image God, are equally human, and think they are equally important to that for which God commissioned them in the dominion mandate. But, as the author says, "rank" or hierarchy exists. So too, the Father and Son are equal in nature... thus, I think 1 Corinthians 15:28 and the like (John 5:19, 26) could use better argumentation as to why the authority or hierarchy implied is only an economic one (due to the incarnation) rather than an eternal one - especially since, in the 1 Corinthians passage, Paul specifically switches terminology from Christ to Son.

Nevertheless, in spite of my above reservations and thoughts, I am not as dogmatic about this as I used to be. The subject is complicated, to say the least! Before all else, I deny that the Father and Son are of different natures. After all, if we are speaking of analogies, there is a clear analogy between sonship in human terms vs. Sonship in divine terms in that our being sons of fathers doesn't mean we have different natures than our fathers. So, too, the Son and Father do not have different natures. This parallel is clear, and it is the one I think through which we should evaluate any other parallels we wish to draw (if such there be). That is, human nature and generation differs from divine nature and generation. Thus, if any other parallel we draw would logically imply that the Father and Son are not of the same nature, we should reject such parallels as being instances of disanalogies due to these differences.

While it is possible for those of the same nature to differ in terms of who is authoritative, then (for earthly fathers have authority over sons), if - and this is the big question - it turned out that eternal hierarchicalism would entail that the Father and Son have different natures (e.g. due to aseity), we must reject that the idea that a father-son relationship necessarily entails a hierarchy. One can point out that earthly fathers have authority over their earthly sons as an example of how those of the same nature can differ in rank or authority. But to parallel this to the Trinity would be wrong to do so if such would imply that the Father and Son are of different natures. The intended parallel would break down at precisely this point due to the difference in human and divine nature. Eternal hierarchicalism would be wrong.

Now, I don’t find such an entailment to be a clear implication - and if it were, I would have questions about eternal generation too - but the situation is unclear enough that I hesitate to dogmatically assert eternal hierarchalism. On the other hand, in contrast to the author of the book, I would not be dogmatic in denial of eternal hierarchicalism either. The position makes sense to me, but there are orders of belief, and this one would be subordinate to my belief in the consubstantiality of the Trinity.

Perhaps the author or others have searched the matter more deeply. If so, and to return to the question and men and women and authority, I wish the author would have explained why he thinks a difference in rank or authority implies a difference in nature between men and women, both of whom he regards as equally human but, somehow, as having different natures. After all, fathers and sons or masters and slaves or kings and citizens or elders and congregations have different authority, but they do not have different natures (presumably?). If rank or authority does not usually imply a difference in nature, why suppose that men and women must have different natures? Is it because in the other cases, the relationship is contingent (one can fail to become a father, master, king, or elder) whereas a human is necessarily either a man or woman? Crucially missing in the book was a definition of “nature,” so I can only attempt to hypothesize the author’s case so far.

Either way, care is needed when comparing the earthly father-son parallel to the Heavenly Father-Son parallel. For example, when children leave their earthly fathers and mothers to start new families, new headships and priorities are established that eclipse old ones. In fact, at some point, children begin to become responsible for the well-being of the parents in their old age. Should we press the analogy such that when the Son left His Father’s domain to come wed the church, He similarly has left the divine family to be the Head of a new one? Of course not. Nor can we regard the Father as capable of aging, etc. There are limits to parallels and analogies we can make between human and divine families, though such parallels there are.

Of What Advantage is Baptism [for Infants]?

Much in every way. Firstly, I think a good way to frame the question is in terms of advantages and privileges, for baptism does not always communicate or indicate grace. No one ought to question that the world aside from Noah's family, Pharaoh's army, or unbelievers at the parousia were or will be fearfully judged, for example. Baptism can point to this eschatological reality as well as to blessed salvation. Likewise, one baptized into the visible body of the covenant community is privileged to be a member of it - properly able to be instructed and disciplined by elders-fathers, as I will return to below - though not without warning should they rebel and fall away (Hebrews 6:4-8, 10:26-31).

Anthropologically, soteriologically, and ecclesiologically, we are (or can be) newly born into households. Only those born into these houses are, properly speaking, discipled and disciplined by the fathers of said houses. Only sons and daughters consistently receive fatherly instruction, training, and correction. The potential blessings should be obvious. But this too means judgment must begin at the house of God - since, a fortiori, it is obvious what judgment befalls those who are not members of the house (1 Peter 4:17-18). Now, we know sons and daughters can rebel against fatherly authority. But such cases, as heartbreaking as they are, does not mean there is no reason for sons and daughters to have been in a position to receive instruction and discipline in the first place. At the very least, it must cause sober reflection upon our own relative births and positions into the various, divinely appointed households. But we must remember that all things work together for good to those who love God and are called according to His purpose, not all without exception.

Or, to put the point another way. In addition to the anthropological, ecclesiological, and soteriological households, we can consider the cosmological household of God of which we are all a part, believer and unbeliever alike. Nature has a way of instructing and disciplining men (Romans 1:18-32), because we are all God's offspring (Acts 17:29), His image, in His macrocosmic house of creation (Genesis 1). This too comes with its own advantages and privileges, for life is good.

However, it might be a bit difficult to understand, from a bird-eye view of the reprobate, how he has been divinely favored by the rain and sunshine God sends and makes (Matthew 5:45). That is, should we view such as grace? Gordon Clark thought we could:

One theologian argues that the gospel is both a savor of life unto life and also a savor of death unto death. To the reprobate the preaching of the gospel is no favor because as it increases their knowledge, it increases their responsibility and condemnation. Better if they had never heard the gospel. One can reply, nonetheless, that in some cases the preaching of the gospel may restrain an evil man from some of his evil ways. Since therefore sins are not all equal, and since some are punished with many stripes, but others with few, the preaching of the gospel results in the lessening of the punishment. Thus preaching would be a small favor, a modicum of grace. (link)

I am less sure. We could regard it as an advantage or privilege for anyone who already exists and sins to not be immediately cut off from his sinful life, and to that extent what Clark says above can hold true. It is, likewise, certainly a privilege to have once been enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, have shared in the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come. Perhaps this restrains one from committing as much evil as he would otherwise have done. Yet it seems to me that the privileges of these new births which even reprobates can experience must be balanced against the strong language of, for example, Mark 14:21 - spoken of one who was a disciple of Christ (how much more advantage or privilege towards a sinner can one conceived?) - and that baptism can be unto fearful judgment. To whom much is given, much is expected (Luke 12:47-48). If one tramples underfoot the advantages and privileges of God, it would be better for that man if he had not been born.

Nevertheless, this bird's eye view is not available to us. We can only speak in regards to what we know, and what we know is that one is advantaged or privileged to hear the gospel, for one can only please God and be at peace with Him through justification by faith, and faith can only come by hearing the gospel. We cannot know, in this lifetime, who will hear and reject the gospel, and it is far beyond our purview to presume upon who will or won't heed its call. Much less are we able to determine whether, even if it is rejected, it may yet be beneficial to the extent that those who hear and reject it sin less and are punished less severely as a result. Similarly, we may consider the case of baptism to be a privilege and advantage, if not necessarily a means of grace, even in the case that it leads to negative judgment.

Suppose instead that our infants are only welcome to church meetings to the extent that other unbelievers are. In the first place, we should probably think harder than we do before inviting open unbelievers to what is supposed to be a family communion with and worship of God rather than an evangelistic outreach. What is the goal? Unbelievers should normally find our worship strange and alien because in it, we draw near to God (precisely where they usually don't want to be).

But is this normally how our infants grow to view our assembling to worship? They may, of course, have questions of the worship service (Exodus 12:24-27), but do they normally shrink back as we draw near to God and He to His church? Are not our children participants in corporate worship? If not, I do not see how church can even be considered a foster home to unbaptized children. Rather, it looks as though these children get (have?) to visit a family not their own once a week without participating in the corporate life of it then and there, much less throughout the rest of the week.

On the other hand, if they are participants, fathers discipline sons. Likewise, elders administer discipline to their sons, the visible flock over which they shepherd. If infants are never members of the visible church, then they are never disciplined by elders. You might discipline your son, but just because his friend is around when you do doesn't mean his friend is a "participant" in that discipline. To the extent one wants to speak of someone as a participant in worship and yet without discipline, I think such a person would be an illegitimate child rather than a son (Hebrews 12:7-8).

The same could be said regarding instruction. Fathers are to instruct their children (Ephesians 6:4). The elder instructs his sons, the visible flock, in worship. But if infants are never members of the visible church, then they are never instructed by elders. You might instruct your son, but just because his friend is around when you do doesn't mean his friend is a "participant" in that instruction.

Whether or not your son rebels against your discipline and instruction is a separate question. But it is without question he is a legitimate son of yours because of how you behave towards him. Likewise in regards to God towards His elect sons and the elders towards their sons-flocks.

One final question that bears pastoral reflection: if infants are not treated as sons, how will they come to think about the church? Frankly, as a child, I would have felt awkward and out of place in the presence of my friend being instructed or disciplined by his father. I would be viewing an internal family matter as an outsider. To say in the first place that infants cannot be participants in worship - that they are presumed to be outsiders - then, would naturally seem to lead them to doubt, uncertainty, or anguish. Being cognizant of the manner in which we, as the visible church, treat our children from birth as well as how they grow to perceive themselves in virtue of our treatment is easier said than done, especially if some of us actually view them as looking in from the outside of God's visible household.

Meta-epistemology and Gordon Clark

Recently, I've been reviewing a book on Scripturalism (link). Before proceeding any further in that review, I wanted to clarify that I am speaking about "knowledge" in the same sense in which Clark usually does: "knowledge with a capital K" by which "certainty" is possible (Clark and His Critics, pgs. 75-76). I will return to what this means in a moment. 

As I was organizing my thoughts on the next chapter, I found that what I was writing (i.e. what follows) was less of a review of that book and more of an important background for an historical understanding of the epistemological thought of Gordon Clark. While I have maintained and continue to maintain that Scripturalism is not synonymous with the thought of Clark, Clark popularized Scripturalism. 

Since a discussion of Scripturalism usually involves evaluating or mentioning the thought of Clark, it is helpful to exposit that thought for a few reasons: 1) most importantly, to distill what ideas are or are not Scriptural; 2) to be historically accurate (so far as is possible) in representations of Clark; 3) to determine whether an author correctly understands Clark, which may or may not be relevant to how he understands Scripturalism. With these reasons for this post in mind, I want to wade into the waters of "meta-epistemology."

If an epistemology is a theory of knowledge, a meta-epistemology questions what epistemology itself aims to answer: what is the nature of knowledge? What is the structure of epistemic justification? What is truth? These sorts of definitional questions are important in establishing a context for and focus of an epistemology, and they are questions I have been thinking about in the context of Scripturalism for almost 10 years (link). 

One point I would immediately make about definitions is that in order to "know" one's own answers to these questions and be consistent with one's own epistemology, one's own source[s] of knowledge must be able to furnish the answers:

One’s first principle is his first principle... when one is evaluating opposing first principles, definitions of truth, or methods of epistemic justification, he cannot pretend that he is evaluating them abstract from his background as a skeptic, agnostic, coherentist, pragmatist, empiricist, rationalist, Scripturalist, etc. Even the meta-epistemological statements I have made throughout this post have been informed by my own epistemological background. (link)

In other words, what a word means is context-laden. Especially in epistemic discussions, establishing a meta-epistemic context for what it is that under discussion is helpful, for it frames what the "knowledge" is that is in view, why such knowledge is important, etc. This takes some time (as this blog demonstrates!), yet it should not distract us from the point that our source of knowledge should itself inform any meta-epistemic context we wish to set and claim to know; otherwise, we would either have another source of knowledge. 

For example, to return to Clark, from what he wrote, it is clear he understood that his own source of "knowledge" allowed for various meanings of the word:

The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. (The Pastoral Epistles, pg. 166).

While "knowledge" can refer to different things, it is not surprising that Clark's primary interest related to forming a "basic epistemology." That is, Clark's interest in a basic theory of knowledge had little to do with a theory of sex! He was not interested in "opinion" or "conjecture," "accident or good luck" (Lord God of Truth, pg. 40). Such things are not formative in a basic epistemology. 

He was rather, as was quoted initially, interested in "certainty" and "infallibility." In contemporary epistemological terms – and distinct from whether or not he was entirely consistent, logically or personally (i.e. did he change his mind on some issues) – Clark [implicitly] sought to defend an internalist and infalliblist epistemology (link). That is, he was interested in beliefs in true propositions sourced in a self-authenticating, axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect. 

[Parenthetically, to many, this may not seem to be not so "basic" upon close inspection! However, let the reader understand that I am only attempting to describe Clark's epistemology. I will, below, quote reasons why I believe the above is an accurate summary of Clark's meta-epistemic views, and in these quotes, Clark will defend, successfully or not, why his views are what they are. While reading this entire section, let the reader keep in mind the distinction between epistemology and apologetics that is critical to a right understanding of Scripturalism (link). 

That is, it is one thing to know "the truth of the Bible" - the truth of the Bible "is the basic axiom of Christian theism," according to Clark (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 43). It is another thing for Clark [or I] to expound on the meanings of terms Clark used in order to describe his axiom - and its theorems - as "knowable" (including spelling out some context as to what that entails). This is meta-epistemic and can be known only in virtue of Clark's [or my] epistemic axiom. It is yet another thing for Clark [or I] to defend his epistemic axiom or implicit meta-epistemic views. Only if we constantly keep in mind that Clark's apologetic is subsumed under his epistemology and not the basis for it will we realize that his epistemology is simpler than we think. To summarize:

...a man may learn several propositions about God without reflecting on the method by which he learned them. Musicians and painters usually produce good works of art before they understand the theory. Hence in temporal psychology a knowledge of God precedes a knowledge of method. But to explain this process an apologist ought to start with the methodology. For while the unreflective reader may be unaware of the methodology – he may not realize how he does what he does – he nonetheless uses the method. And for Clark and Henry the method is Scriptural. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 184-186)

Thus, "skepticism ends where divine revelation begins" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 258-259)... just as our salvation really begins when we are regenerated unto faith in the gospel. Yes, we could define and elaborate upon meaning of faith, the content of the gospel, and more. We could even defend our views in these areas. Nevertheless, a child can be saved by grace through faith, because actually having faith in the gospel is itself simple, albeit only possible by grace.]

Returning to Clark, I said he was interested in a certain kind of knowledge: "beliefs in true propositions sourced in an axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect." While I have argued these points in scattered posts across this blog, I do not suppose anyone has read all of my published thoughts on this matter, let alone retained them (I haven't!). So, here are some definitions and reasonings from Clark about various components of epistemology: propositions, beliefs, truth, sources, axioms, foundations, infallibility, awareness, and reflection.

Propositions defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

…all propositions require a distinction between subject and predicate. Knowledge also requires the distinction, logical if not actual, between the person knowing and the object known. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 146-147)  

Knowledge consists of propositions, of predicates related to subjects, i.e., of truths. The meaning which the words designate is the object of knowledge. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 149-150)  

In Thales to Dewey (455) Clark, after some pages of technical detail, arrives at the subhead “Propositions and Concepts.” But the simplest reason why truth must be propositional is that a noun all by itself can be neither true nor false. Suppose someone says, without any implicit context, “Two,” or “Cat,” or “Star.” No one could understand; neither truth nor falsity has been spoken. Only when a predicate is attached to a subject by a copula can the expression be true or false. “Two is an even number” is true; “Two is an odd number” is false; but just plain “Two” is unintelligible. Therefore, Clark insists that when a botanist says, “A cactus has no true leaves,” he uses the word true in a metaphorical sense, contrasting the spines of a cactus with the ordinary leaves of an ocotilla or rose bush. What the metaphor means, a good botanist can explain in literally intended propositions. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 180-182)

Truths defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

...every item of God’s knowledge must surely fit in with every other item. This also seems to me to solve the philosophic problem of truth. The three chief contenders in this field are the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. For reasons too numerous to include here, I believe pragmatism leads to complete skepticism. The correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object. This is impossible. The coherence theory remains. (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948)

This gentleman distinguishes between logical consistency and a coherence view of truth. Since he stresses the latter rather than the former, he might think that Nash rates me too highly by asserting that I hold to coherence. However, neither Professor Nash nor I acknowledge this distinction, and while I now prefer the word consistency for clarity’s sake, I have no objection to Nash’s statement at this point. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 142)

Beliefs defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Belief is the voluntary assent to an understood proposition. (First John, 1980, pg. 119) 

Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will... Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pgs. 83, 85) 

Faith is the belief in or assent to an understood proposition. Saving faith is assent to certain Scriptural propositions – the good news of the Gospel, the information the Scriptures put before us. The power and strength we derive in answer to Paul’s prayers come through and are proportionate to our grasp of Scripture... Scripture tells us, if I may condense it, “Believe and be saved.” Believing is an intellectual process... we may add, believe presupposes understanding. A true Christian, by definition, loves the truth. He must oppose both the existential emotionalism of the so-called Neo-orthodox and also those scientists who have a zeal for truth but do not have the truth. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pgs. 87-88) 

How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169) 

Assurance and conviction are belief, strong belief, voluntary belief, and as intellectual as you please. They are intellectual because their objects are meaningful propositions. Their objects are truths. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 79, 175)

Self-Authenticating Sources, Axioms, or Foundations for knowledge defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

To the same effect, it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore, the same conclusion follows: Either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 53-54)

The argument is that every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically... Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures... The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation of the notion that theology has several sources such as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion, or psychology. There is but one source, the Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. God is truth. Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life. (Against the Churches, 2002, pg. 34)

Mavrodes notes, “It is a common tactic of Christianity’s opponents to direct some of their first and most effective attacks against the Axiom.” In this tactic, so it seems to me, there is a satanic wisdom that passes by derivative propositions and fixes on the very basis of Christianity. These opponents know or perhaps dimly but rightly surmise that if they can destroy the foundation, nothing remains. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 235)

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47)

Infallibility defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

How then may we know that the Bible is true? The Confession answers, “Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority [of the Scripture] is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit.”

Faith is a gift or work of God. It is God who causes us to believe: “Blessed is the man whom thou choosest and causest to approach unto thee” (Psa. 65:4).

Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe, 1985, pg. 18) 

With infallibility gone, the other doctrines of Scripture automatically drop by the wayside. If the writers of the Bible were not infallible, could any of us be infallible percipients of our needs? Dare we claim to have made no error in our self-analysis? The Bible furnishes us with an analysis of human nature and need. It tells us that the guilt of Adam’s first transgression was immediately imputed to us with the result that we were born in iniquity and that our heart is deceitful above measure. If this Biblical statement is true, any merely human analysis of human nature is bound to be unreliable. And if the Bible is not true, what reason is there for thinking that we have a more accurate understanding than the prophets, who even on Neo-orthodox principles stood so close to the fountains of the faith? May I suggest therefore that anyone who says he does not need the doctrine of infallibility has misunderstood his own needs? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 55, 61-62)

Awareness or reflection defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Communication is of course possible only by means of words or some other signs; but the words, instead of teaching anything new, rather stir up our memories of things we had previously understood. Thus, when a speaker says something, unless he is referring to sensory objects present at the moment, we consult the Truth within our minds to see whether or not he is telling the truth. In the Platonic dialogues a series of questions stimulates reflection, and the learning or assent comes from within... communication and teaching, although making use of words or signs, is possible only because the mind possesses Truth. Socrates or Augustine is not really the teacher or master: The true master is Christ, who is the Truth and who enlightens every man. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 184-186) 

Now since it is the conclusion of a demonstration that we are trying to prove, and since it is proved by giving the premises, it follows that the premises of demonstrated knowledge are better known than the conclusion. If we did not know the premises, obviously we could not know the conclusion. The conclusion cannot be more certain than the premises on which it is based. The premises are the cause of the conclusion, and therefore they must be prior to it. And also, in demonstration, although not in every formally valid syllogism, the premises must be true. For demonstration is knowledge, and there can be no known of the non-existent. The premises, therefore, must be statements of what exists or what is so, i.e., they must be true... It has been shown above that scientific knowledge or demonstration is impossible without immediate premises. However, since these principles are indemonstrable, a knowledge of them cannot be “scientific” knowledge. There must therefore be another kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is actually superior to scientific knowledge because conclusions cannot be more certain than the premises on which they depend. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 101-103) 

...the mind can rest in this knowledge with greater security than in any reasons. This is obvious because the security of a conclusion can be no greater than that of the premise on which it is based. That the sum of the squares on the other two sides is equal to the square of the hypotenuse cannot be any more certain than the axioms from which it is deduced. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21) 

This criticism, so it seems to me, proceeds on the assumption that the “Bible” is just a word – a sound in the air, to use a nominalistic phrase. Apparently Mavrodes thinks that I would be better off technically if I made every verse a separate axiom. To me this seems like more machinery, which can be obviated by referring to them all under one name, the Bible. Similarly, the proposition “Everything God says is true,” need be a separate axiom, only if “God” too is just a word. But if the word has a meaning, the Biblical meaning, then it is analytically certain that everything God says is true. Indeed Mavrodes acknowledges this in his immediate discussion; and that is why these initial criticisms cannot be taken seriously. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 232-233)

Quotations could have been multiplied, and if I were writing a book, I might organize and explain this a bit more precisely and thoroughly. To summarize, to "knowledge" is about truth. Truth is the set of coherent or consistent propositions. When one reflects upon a true proposition, believes it, has either deduced it from an axiom or believes it axiomatically, and the axiom [and/or deduction] is infallibly justified, he can be certain (in an epistemic, not merely a psychological, sense) that what he believes is truth. He possesses knowledge of the proposition[s] in question.

[Another, longer parenthetical: It is not the case, as Clark says, that "the correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object" (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948, pgs. 173-177). Clark has confused a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification. Note Clark's conflation of a "test of truth" with a "theory of truth." Just as his acceptance of a coherence theory of truth doesn't require him to accept coherentism, acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth doesn't require one to accept a theory of epistemic justification on which we must look to the correspondent to justify, by comparison, the corresponding truth. 

For example, I can and do still hold that truth is propositional and denotatively defined as the meaning of the thought[s] of the Trinity. Their revelation of these propositions to us may indeed be mediated to us by non-propositions. However, just as Clark should have replied to his objectors ("Don't you have to read your Bible?") that his source of knowledge does not require a certain, causative means by which we are justified – an internalist variety of epistemic justification is not etiological, except perhaps in relation to the structure of epistemic justification (which needn't be empirical even if non-propositions are secondary causes of our propositional thoughts) – he should have recognized that a theory of truth likewise does not necessarily entail a certain method of reasoning by which we know.

The correspondence theory of truth also needn't mean that we only have an analogy or representation of the truth; it only means that truths (propositions) correspond to other realities (some of which would be non-propositional). We may not immediately interface with non-propositional realities intellectually... but that is to be expected, because these realities are not reducible to propositions. Thus, I suspect Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and hasty reasoning – if one "knows reality, there is no need for an extra something which corresponds to it" (God's Hammer, pgs. 34-37) – led him to accept unorthodox views.

For instance, the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in favor of coherence or consistency (as if one can't hold to both) means that unless one accepts necessitarianism, there could be multiple coherent yet mutually contradictory systems. In this case, not only would knowledge of which system is "true" be impossible, it would be unintelligible, for intelligibility presupposes truth. Mutually contradictory yet internally coherent propositional systems would mean the supra-system[s] that would constitute truth unfortunately can't, for coherence or consistency would break down. Hence, necessitarianism seems unavoidable, and this is a view Clark held only late in his life.

Another example of an unfortunate conclusion was Clark's view that persons are propositions. Truth is real and propositional, but if there is no correspondent to it, then to speak of persons as real leads to the idea persons just are propositions. If he had pushed this another (again, seemingly inevitable) step further and applied this line of reasoning to all of creation, then all of creation would just be propositional, in God's mind, and Clark would have landed in panentheism, not to mention propositional monism.

Frankly, Clark's discussion of the correspondence theory of truth on pg. 181 of Modern Philosophy (2008) leads me to wonder whether he even understood the theory, because he says "this theory provides us only with pictures of [reality]." In this quote, it sounds to me as if he didn't understand the correspondence theory of truth still held propositions to be truth-bearers, especially since he continues to talk about "similarity" between the "picture" we have and corresponding "object." Perhaps he is just arguing that even if truths would be propositions in such a scenario, we can't tell whether they correspond to objects by comparing them. I don't know if it would be better to say that Clark just didn't understand the theory or worse to say he thought he understood it and rejected it. If it is the latter, then to repeat the above, no correspondence theorist needs to suggest that we compare a proposition to a non-proposition to see if they correspond. That confuses a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification.

Better would be to follow Clark's own conclusion, when discussing his own theory of language, that correspondence is not objectionable:

In one sense of the term, a photo corresponds to or looks like its object, but no one supposes that a word corresponds to a thing in this way. Language is not a picture of reality. The letters c-a-t do not look like the purring animal. It is all the more true that words cannot possibly look like spiritual realities, if such there be, for these are not visible entities. But in a non-photographic sense a mathematical formula may be said to correspond to the motion of a freely falling body. Could not this be an absolute correspondence? Or, if the term absolute causes hesitation, could not such a formula be or be understood as a literal assertion? Further, if the sound cat is essentially an arbitrary sign of the animal, what more correspondence could be desired? (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 194-195)

Indeed, one needn't compare cat to the animal to epistemically justify the legitimacy of the word referring to the animal. So, too, a Christian needn't epistemically justify the legitimacy of a proposition about a cat corresponding to the animal. One may even hold that correspondence between propositions and non-propositions is not even arbitrary but rather established by the will or persons of the Trinity (depending on the realities involved, such as God Himself). But the main point is that Clark never repudiated words as symbols of concepts, so it appears that, to the extent words are not propositional, he never fully embraced propositional monism.

One last thought. If Clark's line of reasoning leads to even "belief" itself just being a proposition, then insofar as he held that belief is an act of will, it would again seem to follow that the will is reducible a mere proposition. In that case, insofar as propositions are eternal - because God knows them eternally - it would appear that we ourselves are eternal, for our persons as well as our actions would be eternal.

For more of my thoughts on why the correspondence theory of truth is compatible with Scripturalism, see here and here.]

Why is it important to establish a meta-epistemic context? One reason is that since, as we have seen, apologetics is subordinate to epistemology, one's apologetic will be better to the extent one is better able to explain one's epistemology. Further, the better we can both explain and defend our epistemology, the more grounded or full our assurance (link) of our salvation will be, as Clark says:

With some diffidence and reserve because of the complex difficulties, I suggest the following: By loving in deed and truth we shall know that we are of the truth... Assurance of eternal life can be deduced from a knowledge that one is a believer. Of course, as the negro spiritual says, “Everybody talking about heaven ain’t going there.” With constant frequency people are assured of many things untrue. Indeed certainty increases in direct proportion to ignorance. The less educated a man is, the more things of which he is certain. If this obvious truth disturbs anyone, he should also realize that assurance is not essential to salvation. Different people have different mentalities. John Bunyan was so morbid he could hardly have had much assurance. With others more careless, doubts never arise. But if one knows, if one has a clear intellectual understanding that he believes, he should have legitimate assurance. (First John, 1980, pg. 113, 161)

This confidence, in turn, should lead us to boldly work out our salvation. The more brightly our light shines, the more glory is given to God. Whether our labor bears fruit on earth - such as God shining light into the darkness of the hearts of others - or in heavenly rewards, there is every reason to develop our understanding of our faith-knowledge in God's word.

Clark believed this too, and while he was inconsistent (both in that he changed his mind over time and that he accepted some positions which were inconsistent with other beliefs of his), what this amounts to is that Clark's attempt to explain his epistemology (i.e. his meta-epistemology) falls short of perfection. It does not, however, imply that his epistemology itself is false. 

The Day Draws Near

Hebrews 10:24-25 And let us consider how to stir up one another to love and good works, not neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of some, but encouraging one another, and all the more as you see the Day drawing near.

As I was listening to Dr. Masters preach at our church yesterday on Hebrews 10:19-25 (link), I was drawn, so to speak, to the last phrase: you see the Day drawing near. 

At first glance, I supposed the reference was to when an event would happen. The Day "drawing near" would then mean that the readers should keep in mind a future, destined event that would become a present one. Similar to the way in which Paul writes that salvation is nearer to us than when we first believed and then draws out the inference that we ought to remain awake and watchful (link), the author of Hebrews would then similarly be exhorting his readers to stir up one another to love and good works, meeting together as the means by which such takes place. 

If true, one could think about what event might be in view, like the destruction of Jerusalem or eschatological Parousia. In favor of the former, the vanishing of the old covenantal (8:13) is certainly a concern of the book, and the destruction of the second temple was a sort of visible seal of judgment of the obsolescence of that covenant. Christians were being persecuted by the Jews, and so the author's call that they should not shrink back (10:39) or neglect to meet was a timely injunction. His timely injunction is matched by his timely encouragement. The author would be following his own advice in stirring up his audience to love and good works. [Incidentally, this would suggest Hebrews was written well before 70 A.D.]

On the other hand, I don't think we need to pit one interpretation against another. The Bible depicts many pictures of our salvation, each of which has been drawn by God in the course of history. Even if the above is true, history is rhythmic. The judgment of Jerusalem was typological of the final judgment, when all of God's enemies will experience fearful punishment. Peter wrote that Christians in every age should pattern their lives accordingly (2 Peter 3).

Peter also wrote that God's word is sometimes difficult. The author of Hebrews differentiates between basic and mature principles of the oracles of God (Hebrews 5). Let's face it: God's word is sometimes vague. Why? Well, one benefit is that in order to understand the whole counsel of God, the reader has to actively meditate on the word, not just passively receive it. Jacob wrestled with God while day had not yet broken and prevailed, receiving a thigh wound and a new name (Genesis 32). We wrestle with God through learning to wield the sword of His word while "Day" has yet to break. When Day does break, will we have prevailed? Will we receive blessing? Though we may limp, will we be named Christians after the name written on the thigh of the sword-wielding King of kings and Lord of lords (Revelation 19:16), Jesus Christ? Holding fast until (or "in"?) the Day is a theme of Hebrews (Hebrews 3-4, 10).

Another benefit of vagueness is versatility. Thus far, this post has used the word "draw" in four or five different ways: I was "drawn" or attracted to God's word. We can "draw" or figuratively pull out inferences from God's word as drawing water from a well. God's word itself "draws" or illustrates salvation in multiple, picturesque stories. A day can figuratively "draw" closer in that there is less and less time until a destined event will occur. People, too, can "draw" near to one another (spatially or spiritually), which I will to return in a moment. The point here is just that we can say more with fewer words: the disciples were drawn to Jesus. Do I mean that they were attracted to Him, that they got nearer to Him in a spatial sense, or that someone or something pulled them toward Jesus? My statement isn't an either/or, it's all of the above: The Father drew (pulled) the disciples to Jesus by making them drawn (attracted) to Jesus, and therefore they were drawn (spatially) to Jesus.

That is what struck me about the passage in Hebrews: the Day is not just a time, He is a person. More than any other New Testament book, it is the concern of the author to argue it is possible and important for his readers to draw near to God (4:16, 7:19, 25, 10:1, 22, 11:6). When 10:25 uses the same language, then, we should see "the Day" not only (or even principally) as a reference to when an event will come but also who is coming. Christ is the Day. Our persons ought to draw near to Him, not draw back from Him, for His person is inevitably drawing nearer to us, whether that be to fearful judgment or blessing. Ready or not, here He comes.

When Christ spoke to Nicodemus at night (John 3:2), it had not dawned on Him that he was witnessing the Day drawing near for the first time. We often think of daybreak as when we can begin to see one another face to face. We forget that Light can be blinding (cf. Acts 9, cf. John 12:40). Daybreak was in the presence of Nicodemus, yet he was so used to the shadowy darkness of the old covenant that the Light actually blinded him from seeing the kingdom of God (John 3:3). 

How much more should we who have been born of God hold fast, not shrinking back or seeking to hide ourselves from the [second] coming of the Day-light, as if darkness can allow us to perpetually keep evil works secret (John 3:19-21). The Light came into the world once before (John 1). Once more will He return, and then there will no longer be any cover of night (Revelation 21). Christians ought not to draw back, as the author of Hebrews said was the way of those who, to their own destruction, wished to remain under the terms of the old covenant. 

Because our hope and faith in Christ’s return unites us to Him, we are enabled to enter the same holy places He entered (Hebrews 10:19). Our objective grounds for confidence gives us subjective reason for full assurance (10:22). All that remains for us to do is consider how to love and do good works for one another (10:24), knowing that all works will be brought to the light of Day (10:25). Joshua may not given the people rest, but God has "spoken of another Day later on" (Hebrews 4:8) in whom we who have believed enter rest: His Son, the radiance of His glory (Hebrews 1:2-3, 4:3).