Trinitarianism and Monotheism: Framing the Discussion

In the little time I have spent reviewing and discussing this subject, there seems to be a tendency for each party to talk past the other when referencing who or what "God" is. Obviously, different views of Trinitarianism and monotheism define "God" in different ways. Instead of focusing on areas of agreement first, however, each side focuses on what relevant heresy with which to label the other due to his or her different definition of "God." I think establishing common ground first is a viable alternative, at least if there is any - a denial of sola scriptura, for instance, would logically take precedence to this sort of discussion.

In any case, the sort of common ground to which I refer is the specific methodology by which it can be verified whose definition of "God" takes primacy. A word may, of course, have more than one meaning, but is there a proper or common usage? If such an argument is to be made, it should be kept in mind that Scripture rather than modern (or ancient) trends is the source material which one ought to appeal to as his justification; supposing the majority of professing Trinitarian monotheists may have one conception of "God," that would not imply theirs is the meaning the authors of Scripture most often associated with the word. Separating preconceptions from our examination of the pertinent Scriptural data is necessary. 

But in the context of this debate, it should be easy to do this. Given that the discussions which this post is primarily written to facilitate have to do with disagreements about whether "God" refers to a divine person or to one [set of] attribute[s], first impressions would suggest that it shouldn't be very hard to look at a given passage and make the right conclusion. I fully admit I could be wrong, as a text can be clear, agreed to as the source for the resolution of a dispute, and nevertheless not yield agreement. Still, it's a simple enough idea. 

Further, any self-professing Trinitarian monotheist should wish to avoid the charge of tritheism, where "tritheism" is understood as mutually exclusive with "monotheism." Both sides agree that there is one God, differing on who or what God is. So it seems to me that the most efficient course is for all sides to agree that the main meaning of "God" is whatever is most often (if not always) associated with monotheistic passages. For all the emphasis Scripture places on monotheism, I believe that is a natural assumption. Really, the only reason I can think of that one would oppose this is knowledge that the outcome would be unfavorable to his view. For the undecided, however, it may be useful. Collect all passages relevant to monotheism, determine with help from the context the meaning of "God" in each, and you have your answer as to the "proper" definition.

Salvation and Synergism Revisited

A recent comment thread on the facebook group "Gordon H. Clark Discussions" has been discussing this topic recently. I've written a post on these subjects before, and I've not changed my beliefs since then. However, someone called Monty Collier has publicly accused me of associating with Arminians, Roman Catholics, and Federal Visionists on these points, so while I don't plan to waste my time beating this dead horse any more than is sufficient to show that he is, indeed, a dead horse, I thought I'd publish a typical "conversation" between us for all to see. It speaks for itself, and anyone further interested can join the facebook group to verify for themselves that it is typical. Monty's posts and responses will be indented; mine will not be:

Monty: ‎@ everyone, 

Yesterday Ryan Hedrich wrote:

"Faith is an act of will, a volitional decision. In that sense, it is a [good] work. It is certainly not a work in the Pauline sense (meritorious), but then again, that is not the sort of work which is relevant to "-ergism." Also, faith is a precondition to justification. If conversion is synergistic, then it follows justification is the product of synergistic activity. The declaration itself is made by God alone, but it is conditional." 

Now, it is no secret that Hedrich got caught saying that he actually does something to save himself. I pointed this out yesterady, as well. When Hedrich made this claim, he stole Christ's glory and made himself a savior. In contrast, Calvinism teaches that it is ONLY what Christ did that saves, unless some sinful chump should come along and boast (Ephesians 2:8-9). Today, in case anyone missed it, Hedrich repeats for us all that him and Sean Gerety hold salvation to be conditional and that Christ is but half a savior. Notice above how Hedrich appeals to the act of his faith to be a "nonmeritorious" work God accepts as payment--just like Federal Vision heretic Doug Wilson, who is also publicly teaching synergistic sanctification.  

According to Hedrich and Gerety, Christ lied when He said "It is finished" (John 19:30). Poor Jesus, didn't He know that the work of salvation wouldn't be finished until Sean Gerety, Doug Wilson, and Ryan Hedrich did their part by meeting certain conditions, such as believing? Away with such synergist blasphemy! 

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Covenant of Grace is not conditional, that is, the Gospel does not require us to do anything. Why? Because it is the Law, as a Covenant of Works, that demands and requires, not the Gospel. The Gospel demands nothing, requires nothing from us! In the Covenant of Grace, it was Christ alone who met all the conditions of salvation for us! I've said it from the beginning, and I will say it again: Hedrich and Gerety, like their teacher Dough Wilson, are mixing Law and Gospel. They are teaching that we must meet conditions to be saved, and when they do this they assert human free-will and deny that Christ alone met all the conditions of the Covenant of Grace for us! They are teaching justification by faith and works. Let's see a quote from a little book I have:

"In the Covenant of Grace, God promises salvation to all members of the Covenant, and God keeps his promises: He actually gives salvation to all members of his Covenant. Not one person for whom Christ died is lost. Not one member of the Covenant of Grace goes to Hell. God does not break any promise of salvation to those who are outside the Covenant of Grace, for he makes no promise of salvation to anyone outside the Covenant of Grace. Effectual calling, regeneration, justification, BELIEF IN THE GOSPEL, adoption, sanctification, perseverence, and glorification ARE NOT CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING OR MAINTAINING the Covenant of Grace; they are in fact the benefits, the blessings of the Covenant, which God gives freely, unilaterally, and UNCONDITIONALLY to all those he has chosen to save by Christ...God unilaterally made this Covenant of Grace; GOD ALONE maintains it in force, and it is an everlasting and efficacious Covenant."
(Not Reformed At All, pages 67-68, emphasis is mine)

That book, published by the Trinity Foundation, was written by John W. Robbins and Sean Gerety! Now, Sean Gerety has changed his position, for he is now a synergist claiming the Gospel has conditions we must meet in order for us to be saved! Or, maybe Gerety didn't write that part of the book! At any rate, the free-will teachings of Sean Gerety, Ryan Hedrich, and their teacher Doug Wilson are not Reformed at all. Once again, for those who are not familiar with the basic teachings of the Protestant Reformation:

It is the Law (Covenant of Works) that is conditional, that requires and demands us to meet conditions and obey perfectly in order for us to be saved. Since the fall, no sinner can do this--so the Law is the ministry of condemnation and death (2 Corinthians 3:7-9). The Law must be kept separate from the Gospel (Covenant of Grace). The Gospel is unconditional, so it does not require or demand us to meet conditions or to obey, but rather, in the Gospel, Jesus Christ perfectly obeys the Law for us and meets all the conditions of our salvation--so the Gospel is the ministry of righteousness (2 Corinthians 3:9).

The heresy of Federal Vision is led by Doug Wilson, who also teaches that faith is active in justification and that justification is synergistic. It is well known that Wilson rejects Law / Gospel Distinction and mixes the Law and the Gospel. It is sad to see one who co-wrote a book with John Robbins against Doug Wilson turn and join Doug Wilson in utter heresy. Even the current editor of the Trinity Foundation is now rebuking the false teachings of Gerety and Hedrich, but they are not listening. The Gospel is not a list of demands / conditions that we must meet: the Gospel is the radical proclamation of the free grace of Christ alone!

Ryan: I realize this will likely fall on deaf ears, however:

1. I don't speak for Sean.

2. Nothing I said implies I believe I save myself, as I have many times had to spoon-feed you the fact I believe God is the ultimate cause of all things in general and the sole efficient cause of faith in particular.

3. I never said God accepts my faith as "payment." I have consistently distinguished the instrumental (faith alone, which unites us to Christ) from the efficient (grace alone) and meritorious (Christ alone) causes of justification. You, on the other hand, have completely ignored these distinctions.

4. One cannot be justified if he is not a believer in Christ. Hence, belief in Christ is a precondition for justification. That should be obvious. But I guess that if Monty were in Paul's and Silas' place, he would have responded to the jailer who asked what he must DO to be saved by telling him to do nothing. What a joke.

5. Christ alone fulfilled the stipulations of the covenant of works and redemption according to which He procured for us all that the Holy Spirit must redemptively apply, including faith. We are not the origin of our faith, nor any other spiritual blessing.

6. As for what the "editor of the Trinity Foundation" believes, Mr. Juodaitis is comfortable calling faith the instrumental cause of justification and Christ's work its ground or merit; why aren't you? He further agrees with Sean that "Monergism and Synergism should be only used when talking about Regeneration as you state" and agrees that saving faith is active. But again, this shouldn't be about what any one person believes, it should be about what is rational.

Monty: @Hedrich, who writes: "justification is the product of synergistic activity." 

Notice Hedrich thinks man and Christ both work together to produce justification. Because Hedrich does not understand what it means for faith to be an instrumental cause, he teaches that the act of his faith is a nonmeritorious work that works with the obedience of Christ to produce justification. 

In his essay "The Gospel Of Jesus Christ versus Neo-legalism," John Robbins explains that saving faith is NOT act of obedience that meets conditions of salvation. Remember, Robbins taught that salvation was unconditional, unlike Hedrich, Gerety, and Doug Wilson. Commenting on Q&A 61 of the Heidelberg Catechism, Robbins writes: 

"Q. 61 Why do you say that you are righteous only by faith?
A. 61 Not that I am acceptable to God on account of the worthiness of my faith, but because only the satisfaction, righteousness, and holiness of Christ is my righteousness before God, and I can receive the same and make it my own in no other way than by faith only." 

Robbins comments: 

"Here the Catechism makes it clear that our faith itself is not a good work or an act of “faithful obedience” by which we meet the conditions of salvation. It is merely the instrument by which we receive the righteousness of Christ Jesus imputed to us." 

Notice that for Robbins, faith is not a synergistic activity that produces justification, but rather, it is only an instrument that passively recieves the perfect imputed righteousness of Christ alone.
The difference between Robbins and the synergistic conditionalists is striking! Here's the link to the essay: 

http://trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=112

Ryan: For the benefit of interested third party readers in whose belief systems I am sure a fastidious theologian such as Monty Collier will be able to find some detail he will pronounce a profound and heretical flaw, here is how I recommend you go about responding to him (if you bother at all): make a note of all the ambiguities, hidden assumptions, fallacies, etc. Then simply list them. So let's show some examples from his latest crusade:

"Notice Hedrich thinks man and Christ both work together to produce justification."

What does he mean by "produce" - is he denying that man's faith is instrumentally causal? Let's hope not. Or is he accusing me of believing man's faith is efficiently, meritoriously, or ultimately causal? Let's hope not. But wait... what then is the accusation? Refusal to represent an opponent in his own terms - indeed, in terms common to the tradition they both claim to follow (Reformed Clarkian) - is a sign one wishes to confuse others rather than enlighten them.

"John Robbins explains that saving faith is NOT act of obedience that meets conditions of salvation."

The appeal to authority is obvious. I might as well remind Monty that Clark and Calvin referred to the "obedience of faith" without any qualms (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? pg. 83).

But further, what is the hidden assumption in the following objection: "Ryan believes saving faith is a condition of salvation. John Robbins denies that saving faith is a condition of salvation. Therefore, Ryan and Robbins disagree." The hidden assumption is that Robbins and Ryan are using the word "condition" in the same sense. But that's false, so Monty has equivocated in his argument. Here's what Robbins says in the link:

//You asked, “Is a person ‘saved’ who disbelieves and disobeys God?” We are tempted to answer that only such a person can be saved, for the righteous do not need salvation. But if you are asking, Can a person be saved apart from belief of the Gospel, the answer is no. Faith, that is, belief, is, to use the words of the Westminster Confession, the “alone instrument of justification.” Because it is alone, belief is the indispensable instrument. Because it is alone, belief is both the necessary and sufficient instrument.//

But to refer to saving faith as an "indispensable," "necessary... instrument" is precisely what I mean by calling saving faith a condition of salvation (in this context, justification). So that Robbins denies saving faith is a condition does not necessarily imply I disagree with him. How does he mean "condition"?

//Please note: “They can never fall from the state of justification.” This is the doctrine of the sufficiency of Christ’s work applied to the lives of all believers. Believers can and do sin continually and grievously, yet they can never fall from the state of justification. To read the warnings of Scripture against unbelief and presumption as suggesting that justified sinners can either lose their salvation or that retention of their salvation depends on their faithful obedience is logically and theologically perverse.//

He is clearly speaking of meeting a "condition" in terms of the ultimate cause of faith. Saving faith does not originate in ourselves, it is a gift from God. Our active will is activated by the Spirit, as Clark said. The faith is ours, but we are not its author or ultimate cause. As such, we cannot fall away from salvation, for God has determined that those in whom He effect the act of assent to the propositions of the gospel will always assent to the propositions of the gospel. In this, Robbins and I agree. So the apparent disagreement is merely semantic.

Acts 16:30 He then brought them out and asked, “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?”
31 They replied, “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved—you and your household.”

Monty: @Hedrich, who writes: 

""John Robbins explains that saving faith is NOT act of obedience that meets conditions of salvation." 

The appeal to authority is obvious. I might as well remind Monty that Clark and Calvin referred to the "obedience of faith" without any qualms (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? pg. 83)."  

Notice how Hedrich casually hints that Robbins has contradicted Calvin, while ignoring the obvious: Robbins is speaking of justification (so faith is called passive), while when Calvin speaks of faith being obedient he is speaking of sanctification. Hedrich and Gerety continuously try and mix justification and sanctification, that's what papists do, while Robbins and Calvin clearly separated them. Ask yourself, reader: Where has Martin Luther, John Calvin, John Owen, or John Gill EVER said that "justification is the product of synergistic activity"?

Ryan: Ludicrous. Do you even own the book? Clark mentions "belief in the Gospel message" in the very next paragraph. Sanctification is nowhere mentoned in the context. If you are suggesting Clark misinterpreted Calvin, that may be true. But it is at least the case that Clark had no problem referring to faith in the divine word in general and saving faith in particular as obedience (when rightly understood as nonmeritorious with respect to justification, of course).

Monty: Do you two intellectual midgets even realize that you are now suggesting that sinners can be obedient outside of sanctification? The act of our faith is sanctification, not justification. The object of our faith is justification, not sanctification. Tom explained that to you two, but I guess it didn't take. 

@Hedrich, who writes: 

"Acts 16:30 He then brought them out and asked, “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?”
31 They replied, “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved—you and your household.” 

Hedrich and Gerety pretend that these two verses imply that we do something to save ourselves. We shall have to find them a nice introduction to basic deductive logic, for neither questions, nor commands, imply anything. The question "What must I do to be saved?" does not imply that I can do something to be saved. The command "Believe in the Lord Jesus" does not imply that one can believe in the Lord Jesus. I keep telling people that these two don't seem to have read the basic writings of Martin Luther (see Luther's "Bondage of the Will), and they keep proving me right. We can do nothing to be saved. God alone must save. This is why God alone gets the glory! 

Ryan: "Do you two intellectual midgets even realize that you are now suggesting that sinners can be obedient outside of sanctification?" 

In what way? The beginning of sanctification is regeneration and conversion. That is the point at which we begin to be conformed to Christ's image.

"The act of our faith is sanctification, not justification."

No, the act of our faith is an instance of sanctification. It doesn't encompass it. And I never said faith is justification. You are pretty dull if you think I'm going to fall for that trick.

"Hedrich and Gerety pretend that these two verses imply that we do something to save ourselves."

No, I teach that they imply we must do something in order to be saved, viz. believe the gospel. If you don't believe the gospel, you cannot be saved. If Monty disagrees, he rejects sola fide.

"The command "Believe in the Lord Jesus" does not imply that one can believe in the Lord Jesus."

It does imply, however, that one must believe "to be saved." Otherwise, Paul and Silas are evading the question.

"We can do nothing to be saved. God alone must save."

So you can be justified if you don't believe? Here comes the backtrack.

Monty: @Hedrich and Gerety, who believe: 

"Faith is an act of will, a volitional decision. In that sense, it is a [good] work. It is certainly not a work in the Pauline sense (meritorious), but then again, that is not the sort of work which is relevant to "-ergism." Also, faith is a precondition to justification. If conversion is synergistic, then it follows justification is the product of synergistic activity. The declaration itself is made by God alone, but it is conditional." 

Compare that with some excerpts from the following essay:

"A Refutation of the Auburn Avenue Theology’s Rejection of Justification by Faith Alone"
by Brian Schwertley

"The Auburn Avenue theology (in a manner very similar to Roman Catholicism) makes the human will the most important element in justification. Because the careful distinctions that the Bible makes between faith, repentance, good works, obedience to the law, justification, sanctification and perseverance are all blurred or denied by collapsing everything under the category of covenant faithfulness, justification is ultimately defined as a covenant process rather than a judicial act of God. Like Romanism and Arminianism salvation is a joint effort (SYNERGISM) between God and man....The Auburn Avenue theologians will no doubt strenuously object to the use of this verse against them by saying, “We reject merit. We do not believe that merit plays any role whatsoever in a person’s justification.” The problem with this objection is that they contradict it by their insistence that saving faith and works are the same thing; that men can only be justified if they persevere in the covenant. In other words, SOMETHING WE DO MUST BE ADDED TO CHRIST IN ORDER TO BE SAVED. When the Auburn Avenue apologist Rich Lusk substitutes the word “value” for merit, speaks of “NON-MERITORIOUS CONDITIONS” and speaks of the REQUIREMENT OF “THE OBEDIENCE OF FAITH” (i.e. good works)[64] he (like Shepherd before him) is equivocating...The Auburn Avenue theologians give lip service to forensic justification. But their doctrine of faithful obedience or covenantal perseverance as it relates to final justification renders forensic justification irrelevant and impotent. If we reject the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, replace it with forgiveness only and then make man’s personal obedience and continued effort to be faithful to the covenant the co-ground or partial instrument of final justification we clearly have a SYNERGISTIC system of salvation by faith and works." Emphasis Mine. 

Ryan: "...justification is ultimately defined as a covenant process rather than a judicial act of God."

I reject that.

"If we reject the imputation of the righteousness of Christ..."

But I don't reject that. I also rejected the idea faith is the "co-ground" or merely "partial instrument" of justification.

Also, since Clark used the phrase "the obedience of faith" in reference to justification, are you accusing him of being a Federal Visionist? 

Clark's Lectures 5

I was fortunate enough to go to New York this past weekend and obviously wanted to see the public library, but I had no idea I'd discover that they had a copy of Gordon Clark's thesis for his doctorate at UPenn. Unfortunately, it was only a fragment of it, as the rest of the pages seem either to have been torn or fallen out at some point - there were perhaps 20 of the original 50 pages. Nevertheless, what I read impressed on me how much Clark must have developed his personal philosophy over time, even though it was obvious that Clark then was an able philosopher, fluent in multiple languages and ancient philosophies. At any rate, it was a pleasant surprise to find it, and I hope others will enjoy these few points he made that I transcribed:

History, Textual Criticism, and Skepticism

The opening sentence to his thesis was as follows:

Page 5: "Save us, we pray, from those who have so entombed themselves in the dark and damp of antiquity that they no longer appreciate the light of the present day; but save us all the more from those who go blithefully on their way in utter disregard of the lessons the past can teach."

The point of his poetic remark is well-taken but, if taken strictly, is stated a little imprecisely. The past doesn't teach. Its utility lies in its capacity to occasion ideas in our minds as to what is truth. I think I have addressed this issue here, but perhaps a further comment on a statement by Clark will be helpful:

Page 10: "In the case of Aristotle we are not dependent on fragments, for we have his complete works; we are perfectly familiar with the usages of his language; the only difficulty is textual and whoever bases a skepticism in textual criticism asserts that not only nearly all philosophy, but nearly all history as well, before the Renaissance, it forever unknowable. This is a reductio ad absurdem. We can with tolerable certainty ascertain the exact working of Aristotle, but to understand his thought we need also to know the arguments and discussion of previous arguments men which were the motives to his solution. Are these unknowable? My answer would be, try and see."

I thought it was ironic that Clark should have logically followed the implications of textual criticism so closely only to derive a conclusion opposite to what should be drawn from his philosophy of Scripturalism, viz. it is indeed the case that nearly all history is unknowable, since textual criticism often presupposes an empirical methodology. This is not a reductio ad absurdem to the individual who believes that man is efficiently illumined by God, though not necessarily apart from experiential stimulation. Of course, it would be silly of me to heavily criticize a man's early writings when it is that man whose theology I consider myself occasioned to be so indebted.

The Thesis

The purpose of his thesis, Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Aristotle's De Anime, was to determine how trustworthy Aristotle was in his historical interpretation of the philosophies of his forebears', with particular attention to Aristotle's treatment of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. He was well aware that his conclusions were tentative due to the focused nature of his thesis, but he believed that similar studies would solidify his generalizations:

Page 6: "What would be necessary for the final verdict on Aristotle would be a series of such theses, treating each philosopher referred to in each of Aristotle's works. Only after such an induction could generalizations be made. But how easy it is to anticipate the generalizations without going through the induction is perhaps only too well illustrated in the following pages."

Page 7: "The firm belief in the final truth of his own system led him to examine others through Aristotelian spectacles."

Page 46: "It appears, therefore, even in the little so far covered that A. is as trustworthy as any historian can be expected to be."

It is too bad that the majority of the pages between these last two statements were missing, as it is otherwise difficult to reconcile them. Perhaps he meant that although a historian cannot be trusted as an objective, unbiased source of information, he can be relatively charitable. But at least this shows Clark seemed to recognized a distinction between incomplete and complete induction and that his work falls under the former category.

Theological Statements

As much of Clark's thesis concerned itself with finding out what Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle taught, there is less of the author's own opinion than may be desired. But this is proper, and it leaves me with only a few more interesting statements:

Page 45: "Now obviously to argue from a man's theism what his psychology ought to be is rather precarious."

I do not believe Clark would have considered this idea to be so obvious later in his life. But again, Clark was only 26 or 27 when he wrote this, so it is not strange that over the next 55+ years of his life that he would change his mind on a few of his beliefs. He apparently changed his mind on the infinitude of God as well (cf. The Incarnation, pg. 62):

Page 46: "The knowledge of an infinite mind, which is not the result of a learning process peculiar to finite minds, may be compatible with impassibility. Yet the more we insist that God is unchangeable, the less we understand how he recognizes temporal events as having happened or as about to happen."

This last statement is profoundly true, reflecting my current struggle to understand God's immutability in relation to time. As Clark changed his mind, I may very well change mine. But it is good to share a God whose truthworthiness is unchangeable.

John Owen and Trinitarianism, Part II

Despite my agreement with what Owen had to say about the Trinity in Chapter 1 of The Priesthood of Christ, I would be remiss if I did not inform readers that Owen proceeds to affirm numeric unity in chapter 2. I've outlined what that means here, but it will be useful to give examples of writing which indicates it. As one might expect, the divine nature becomes the ultimate principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity rather than the Father:

... the holy writers would never have ascribed the creation unto more than one, unless that one in some sense or other had been more than so. Wherefore, they do not change, as is pretended, the plural expression into a singular; but the Holy Ghost, expressing the same thing, of making man in the image of God, sometimes expresseth it in the singular number, by reason of the singularity of the nature of God, which is the original of all divine operations, for God works by his nature; and sometimes in the plural, because of the plurality of persons in that nature ... because his nature is one and singular, but subsisting in more persons than one ...

It is important to note that throughout this chapter, "God" refers to the divine essence or nature:

Wherefore the visible works of God, man only excepted, were designed for no other end but to declare in general the nature, being, and existence of God. But in this nature there are three persons distinctly subsisting; and herein consists the most incomprehensible and sublime perfection of the divine being.

How numeric unity views the relationship between the persons of the Trinity and the one divine nature as coherent is a mystery, for it seems they must either admit the person are merely parts of God or that the persons are separate, self-existent Gods (autotheos). By referring to the persons as subsisting "in" the "one divine nature" "equally" and recalling his true remarks on eternal generation in my last post, Owen appears to have implicitly opted for the former:

But whereas creation is a work proceeding from and an effect of the infinite properties of the one divine nature, our Creator is but one, although that one be equally Father, Son, and Spirit.

The divine nature, then, becomes a sort of supra-Person in whom the persons subsist and who subsists in the persons, a sort of disfigured perichoresis wherein it is hard to avoid the idea that the persons become merely modes of operation for the divine nature:

God doth not here speak unto others that are not himself, but by speaking as he doth, he declares himself to exist in a plurality of persons, capable of mutual consultation and joint operation ... For we say not that God speaks unto others besides himself, nor calls in others to the work of creation; but God alone speaks in himself and to himself, because as he is one in essence, so as to personal subsistence there are three in one, as many other places of the Scripture do testify. And these three are each of them intelligent operators, though all working by that nature, which is one, and common to or in them all.

This is the inevitable effect of making the seemingly simple but remarkably damaging mistake of referring the divine nature abstracted from and as the subject of propositions about the persons of whom it ought to be predicated:

Man was peculiarly created unto the glory of the Trinity, or of God as three in one.

John Owen and Trinitarianism

Since I've recently written a few posts on the subject of Trinitarianism, I found this short summary by Owen in The Priesthood of Christ (link),  to be an excellent summation of my own position:

(1.) The Son was the essential and eternal image of the Father antecedent unto all consideration of his incarnation. He is in his divine person “the image of the invisible God,” Colossians 1:15; “the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person,” Hebrews 1:3: for having his essence and subsistence from the Father by eternal generation, or the communication of the whole divine nature and all its infinite perfections, he is the perfect and essential representation of him.  

(2.) The order of operation in the blessed Trinity, as unto outward works, answereth unto and followeth the order of their subsistence. Hence the Son is considered as the next and immediate operator of them. Thus, as he is said to have made all things, John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, so the Father is said to make all things by him, Ephesians 3:9; not as an inferior, subordinate, instrumental cause, but as acting his wisdom and power in him, to whom they were communicated by eternal generation. Hence, the immediate relation of all things so made is unto him; and by and in his person is God even the Father immediately represented unto them, as he is his image, and as the brightness of his glory shines forth in him. Hereon follows his rejoicing in the creation, and his delights in the sons of men, Proverbs 8:30, 31, because of their immediate relation unto him.  

(3.) Therefore should he have been the immediate head and ruler of angels and men, had they all persisted in their original integrity and innocency, Colossians 1:16; for the representation of God unto them, as the cause and end of their being, the object and end of their worship and service, should have been in and by his person, as the image of the Father, and by and through him they should have received all the communications of God unto them. He should have been their immediate head, lord, and king, or the divine nature in his person; for this the order of subsistence in the blessed Trinity, and the order of operation thereon depending, did require.

While I'm not sure I agree with Owen's seeming implication that the economic activity of the Trinity necessarily reflects the intra-Trinitarian relationships, it is encouraging to discover so much agreement with a theologian for whom I have great respect:

• He mentions the persons of the Trinity have distinct subsistences.
• He alludes to an "order" of subsistence among these persons, giving the [causal] primacy to the Father while carefully maintaining the co-equality of the Son in respect to deity.
• He agrees with a derivation, so to speak, of the "essence and subsistence" of the Son from the Father as conveyed by eternal generation.
• He willingly equates "the Father" with "God."
• He explains in what manner the Son can be said to perfectly represent the Father and enable communion with Him: as the divine Son, He images the Father.

Apologetics and Speculations

I do think that there is a place for speculation in apologetics, such as when providing a defense - which, given available information, we neither know to be true or false - against allegations of internal contradictions. In these cases, the point is to shift the burden of proof to the accuser. But care must be taken to keep in mind the fact that the defense is just a speculation, not fact, and to make sure that it is actually the case that the speculation is compatible with what is currently knowable.

To give an example of what I mean, I've finally gotten around to reading John Owen at length, which I had been meaning to do for some time. You can read his work on the Priesthood of Christ here, though I bought the paperback which smooths out some of the eyesores. While I plan to write on what he has to say about the priesthood of Christ, I came across an excellent section in which Owen takes Socinians to task for suggesting that the incarnation of the Son would have occurred even if man had never sinned. I think it's a good illustration of why I think that counter-factual reasoning in particular is dubious:

10. As to the first opinion, concerning the incarnation of the Son of God without respect unto sin and redemption, there are many pretences given unto it, which shall be afterwards particularly considered. They say that “the manifestation of the glory of God required that he should effect this most perfect way of it, that so he might give a complete expression of his image and likeness. His love and goodness also were so perfectly to be represented, in the union of a created nature with his own. And herein, also, God would satisfy himself in the contemplation of this full communication of himself unto our nature. Besides, it was necessary that there should be a head appointed unto the whole creation, to conduct and guide it, man especially, unto its utmost end.” And sundry other things they allege out of the Bible of their own imaginations. It is granted that even in that state all immediate transactions with the creatures should have been by the Son; for by him, as the power and wisdom of God, were they made, John 1:3; Hebrews 1:2; Colossians 1:16,17. He, therefore, should have immediately guided and conducted man unto his happiness, and that both by confirming him in his obedience and by giving him his reward; an express document whereof we have in the angels that sinned not. But for the opinion of his being incarnate without respect unto redemption and a recovery from sin and misery, the whole of it is ἄγραψον, or unwritten, and therefore uncertain and curious; yea, ἀντἰγραψον, or contrary to what is written, and therefore false; and ἂλογον, or destitute of any solid spiritual reason for the confirmation of it.

11. First, It is unwritten, — nowhere revealed, nowhere mentioned in the Scripture; nor can an instance be given of the faith of any one of the saints of God, either under the old testament or the new, in this matter. The first promise, and consequently first revelation, of the incarnation of the Son of God, was after the entrance of sin, and with respect unto the recovery of the sinner, unto the glory of God. Hereby are all other promises, declarations, and revelations concerning it, as to their end, to be regulated; for that which is the first in any kind, as to an end aimed at, is the rule of all that follows in the same kind. And therefore that which men ground themselves upon in this opinion is indeed neither argument nor testimony, but conjecture and curiosity. They frame to themselves a notional state of things, which they suppose beautiful and comely, (as who are not enamored of the fruits of their own imaginations?) and then assert that it was meet and according unto divine wisdom that God should so order things unto his own glory as they have fancied! Thus they suppose, that, without respect unto sin or grace, God would take unto himself the glory of uniting our nature unto him. Why so? Because they find how greatly and gloriously he is exalted in his so doing. But is this so absolutely from the thing itself, or is it with respect unto the causes, ends, effects, and circumstances of it, as they are stated since the entrance of sin, and revealed in the Scripture? Setting aside the consideration of sin, grace, and redemption, with what attends them, a man may say, in a better compliance with the harmony and testimony of Scripture, that the assumption of human nature into union with the divine, in the person of the Son of God, is no way suited unto the exaltation of divine glory, but rather to beget false notions and apprehensions in men of the nature of the Godhead, and to disturb them in their worship thereof; for the assumption of human nature absolutely is expressed as a great condescension, as it was indeed, Philippians 2:5-8, and that which served for a season to obscure the glory of the Deity in him that assumed it, John 17:5. But the glory of it lies in that which caused it, and that which ensued thereon; for in them lay the highest effects and manifestations of divine love, goodness, wisdom, power, and holiness, Romans 3:24-26. And this is plainly revealed in the gospel, if any thing be so. I fear, therefore, that this curious speculation, that is thus destitute of any scriptural testimony, is but a pretense of being wise above what is written, and a prying into things which men have not seen, nor are they revealed unto them.

12. Secondly, This opinion is contradictory to the Scripture, and that in places innumerable. Nothing is more fully and perspicuously revealed in the Scripture than are the causes and ends of the incarnation of Christ; for whereas it is the great theater of the glory of God, the foundation of all that obedience which we yield unto him, and of all our expectation of blessedness with him, and being a thing in itself deep and mysterious, it was necessary that it should be so revealed and declared. It were endless to call over all the testimonies which might be produced to this purpose; some few only shall be instanced in. First, therefore, On the part of the Father, the sending of the Son to be incarnate is constantly ascribed unto his love to mankind, that they might be saved from sin and misery, with a supposition of the ultimate end, or his own glory thereby: John 3:16, “God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” Romans 3:25, “Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation.” Chap. 5:8, “God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ, died for us.” Chap. 8:3, “For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh.” 1 John 4:9; Galatians 4:4, 5. Secondly, On the part of the Son himself, the same causes, the same ends of his taking flesh, are constantly assigned: Luke 19:10, “The Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost.” 1 Tim. 1:15, “This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.” Hebrews 2:14, “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil.” Galatians 2:20; John 18:37, “To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth,” — namely, of the promises of God made unto the fathers concerning his coming; Romans 15:8. See Philippians 2:6-11. And all this is said in pursuit and explication of the first promise concerning him, the sum whereof was, that he should be manifested in the flesh to “destroy the works of the devil,” as it is expounded 1 John 3:8. This the whole Scripture constantly and uniformly giveth testimony unto, this is the design and scope of it, the main of what it intends to instruct us in; the contrary whereunto, like the fancying of other worlds, or living wights in the moon or stars, dissolves the whole harmony of it, and frustrates its principal design, and therefore is more carefully to be avoided than what riseth up in contradiction unto some few testimonies of it. I say, that to ascribe unto God a will or purpose of sending his Son to be incarnate, without respect unto the redemption and salvation of sinners, is to contradict and enervate the whole design of the revelation of God in the Scripture; as also, it riseth up in direct opposition unto particular testimonies without number. Origen observed this, Hom. xxiv. in Numer.: 

“Si non fuisset peccatum, non necesse fuerat Filium Dei agnum fieri; sod mansisset hoc quod in principio erat, Deus Verbum. Verum quoniam introiit peccatum in hunc mundum, peccati autem necessitas propitiationem requirit, propitiatio vero non sit nisi per hostiam, necessarium fuit provideri hostiam pro peccato;”

— “ If sin had not been, there would have been no necessity that the Son of God should be made a lamb; but he had remained what he was in the beginning, God the Word. But seeing that sin entered into the world, and stood in need of a propitiation, which could not be but by a sacrifice, it was necessary that a sacrifice for sin should be provided.” So Austin,Serm. 8 de Verbis Apostoli, tom. x., “Quare venit in mundum peccatores salvos facere. Alia causa non fuit quare veniret in mundum.”

13. Thirdly, This opinion is destitute of spiritual reason, yea, is contrary unto it. The design of God to glorify himself in the creation and the law or covenant of it, and his design of the same end in a way of grace, are distinct; yea, they are so distinct as, with reference unto the same persons and times, to be inconsistent. This our apostle manifests in the instance of justification and salvation by works and grace:

“If it be by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work,” Romans 11:6.

It is impossible that the same man should be justified by works and grace too. Wherefore God, in infinite wisdom, brought the first design, and all the effects of it, into a subordination unto the later; and so he decreed to do from eternity. There being, by the entrance of sin, an aberration in the whole creation from that proper end whereunto it was suited at first, it pleased God to reduce the whole into a subserviency unto the design of his wisdom and holiness in a way of grace; for his purpose was to reconcile and gather all things into a new head in his Son, Jesus Christ, Ephesians 1:10; Hebrews 1:3, 2:7, 8. Now, according to this opinion, the incarnation of the Son of God belonged originally unto the law of creation, and the design of the glory of God therein. And if this were so, it must, with the whole old creation and all that belonged thereunto, be brought into a subordination and subserviency unto the succedaneous design of the wisdom of God to glorify himself in a way of grace. But this is not so, seeing itself is the fundamental and principal part of that design. “Known,” indeed, “unto God are all his works from the beginning.” Therefore, this great projection of the incarnation of his Son lying in the counsel of his will from eternity, he did, in wisdom infinite and holy, order all the concernments of the creation so as they might be disposed into an orderly subjection unto his Son incarnate. So that although I deny that any thing was then instituted as a type to represent him, — because his coming into the world in our flesh belonged not unto that estate, — yet I grant things to have been so ordered as that, in the retrieval of all into a new frame by Jesus Christ, there were many things in the works of God in the old creation that were natural types, or things meet to represent much of this unto us. So Christ himself is called the “second Adam,” and compared to the “tree of life,” whereof we have discoursed in our exposition on the first chapter.

Drake Shelton's Triadology: A Summary

In a Christian context, debates about monotheism and trinitarianism seem to reduce to this: who are [or is] the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who or what is God, and how are these related to one another? Drake’s view is as follows:

There are three divine persons: Father, Son, and Spirit. To be divine is to be eternal, omniscient, good, just, etc. These are universals which may be predicated of the Father, of the Son and of the Spirit; that is, each is divine because there are a set of distinct, divine attributes which may be predicated of each of them. Why this is the case will be explained momentarily.

Whereas these attributes are what each has in common with the others, each is individuated from the others by his respective property or properties. So, for instance, the Father is eternally unoriginate, the Son is eternally begotten or generated from the Father, and the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father.

Hence, the Father, Son, and Spirit must be distinct persons. To be a person is to possess a mind capable of reflexively indexing a certain set of propositions. So, for example, the reasons that the Father, Son and Spirit are distinct persons or minds is that only the Father can think “I am unoriginate,” only the Son can think “I am eternally begotten,” and only the Spirit can think “I eternally proceed.”

[These variances in reflexive thought do not imply that omniscience is impossible. The subject of the proposition "I am unoriginate" is, for the Father, "the Father," and both the Son and Spirit also assent to the proposition "the Father is unoriginate." Propositions are the meanings of declarative statements, and the meaning of the Father's thought "I am unoriginate" is synonymous with "the Father is unoriginate." Reflexive knowledge can accordingly be considered an indexation of propositional thought.]

Eternal generation and procession may be distinguishing properties, but they also point to the source of unity among the persons: the Father. It is the Father who communicates His divine nature, essence, or attributes in the Son and Spirit whose very persons are metaphysically grounded in the Father. This is not to say that the Son and Spirit are creations, however. Each is eternal and consubstantial with the Father in respect to His divine nature, for both persons causally extend from the Father necessarily rather than as an act of free will. And though eternal generation and eternal procession can be considered types of emanation or consubstantial extension from the Father, it is not Neoplatonic since such causality is a property of the Father alone. But the point is that the Father is the point of unity among the divine persons, not an abstract set of attributes which each person allegedly possesses of Himself. The Son and Spirit are not "autotheos." From this, Drake concludes that in the ontological as well as economic Trinity,

There is a subordination of persons but not of nature. The nature in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost is the same in character. However, the Father is the source of the Son and Spirit and all operation... Therefore, the Son is said to obey these commands and operations of the Father (John 10:18, Heb 10:7). The Son never commands the Father but the Father commands the Son. Jesus said in John 14:28 that the Father was greater than he was. The very terms Father and Son require a subordination of some kind.

It may be better, when first trying to grasp this view, not to think of the divine nature abstractly at all. There is certainly nothing wrong with the question, "what is the divine nature?" The divine nature is an idea – a proposition enumerating the attributes which must be predicable of an person in order for him to be divine – analogous to human nature. But neither divine nor human nature in themselves are minds or persons but attributes which identify divine or human minds or persons. Now, I may be said to be human and Jesus may be said to be divine, but in both cases the person is the subject.

As such, "God is three persons," "God is Triune," etc. are false. These propositions make the subject an impersonal divine nature and lead either to the view that the three persons are merely modes of God, which is the error of Sabellius, or to the view that the three persons are in some sense merely parts of God, which is unintelligible. It is no more proper to state that "God is three persons" than it is to state that "human is x number of persons."

This is a danger of considering the doctrine of the Trinity by beginning with the divine nature abstract from persons of whom it may be predicated. Hence, it is often the case that those who hold to the Western or Latin view will first ask “what” – not “who” – is God yet proceed to use personal [relative] pronouns in describing God’s attributes. This turns the divine nature into a person and either leads to a quaternity or a collapsing of the Trinity into [parts of?] one person.

The alternative to this conception of "numeric unity" is "generic unity" which in Drake's words, means that "the divine nature is generic in the sense that it defines the necessary predicates of three different things: three different divine minds." The only subjects to whom the genus "deity" can apply are the Father, Son, and Spirit. These persons are said to be united because of each the genus "deity" may be predicated, albeit with the qualification that the ground of this unity lies in the Father's eternal communication of this genus in the Son and Spirit.

The debate regarding generic and numeric unity is primarily about the ground of unity, though, of course, why one thinks the Father, Son, and Spirit may be said to be united will affect how one thinks they are united. Generic unity holds the Father as the principle of unity whereas numeric unity holds the divine nature as the principle of unity. The latter view, therefore, requires that the Son and Spirit are autotheos. Drake argues the contrary: "Aseity is not a divine attribute. It is a personal property of the Father. If Aseity is an divine attribute then this denies the eternal generation of the Son, which requires derivation."

The debate between numeric and generic unity is important because, for example, the view of the divine nature as absolutely simple presupposes that the principle, cause, origin, or source of unity among the Father, Son, and Spirit lies in the divine nature "itself" (numeric unity), whereas a view of the divine nature as allowing for real distinctions would be perfectly compatible with the Monarchy of the Father (hence, with generic unity). Absolute divine simplicity is problematic because it is unable to account for how men can participate in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:3-4) given that there are no real distinctions in it. In fact, if there are no real distinctions in the divine nature, some sort of Neoplatonic Monad seems to follow. Real distinctions in God's knowledge and attributes, for instance, are good and necessary to the perfection of the Trinity.

Given these considerations about individuation, personhood, the divine nature, unity, etc., what does "God" means? Drake writes:

I have found that the word “God” can mean at least 6 things in this discussion: 1. The Father/Monarchy; Concreted person; 2. The Divine Nature; abstract substance; or that an uncreated person possesses a divine nature 3. Godhead 4.Source of operation; 5. Auto-theos: that is uncaused 6. An indirect sense in that the Logos and the Holy Spirit are called God as they inter-dwell (perichoresis) and are consubstantial with the Father.

Drake usually uses definitions 1, 4, and 5 when referencing "God." So, for example, Jesus is referred to as the Son of God. Just as the Son is a person, “God,” in this context, is a person – namely, the Father. As the Nicene Creed states, “We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen.” The one God is the Father. The Father alone is Monarch, autotheos, inoriginate, the principle of unity, etc. Drake doesn't use definition 3.

As for definitions 2 and 6, “God” may in this sense be predicated of the Son and Holy Spirit, but in these cases such is due the fact they are persons who are divine; that is, to say Jesus [or the Holy Spirit] is God is a reference to the essence communicated from the Father. Even in this sense, “God” is an adjectival predicate, not a subject.

The most serious charge against this position is that it implies tritheism rather than monotheism, and Christianity is a monotheistic religion. But this charge can be answered only when it is clarified who or what the "one God" is. On Drakes view, Christianity is monotheistic insofar as the Father is the only person of the Trinity of whom “God” can be predicated qua personhood (cf. definitions 1, 4, and 5): “On my Nicene view, being the one God is a hypostatic property of the Father, not a divine attribute.” This does not preclude the divinity of the Son and Spirit:

God is not three gods as in Tri-theism but God is the Father and with the Father are his Word and Spirit in whom the Father communicates the divine nature. There is only one God, one divine nature and one divine operation. God is the only cause though there are different agents of action in the world. Causality requires infallible operation to produce a uniform effect. The Father is this cause. God is static and immutable. Ad extra the action of God is one in that all things are different aspects of one eternal act. This eternal act is governed by the plurality of Ideas or Thoughts in God as his nature Ad Intra. This eternal act is good because it is in accord with his divine nature/thought affirmations.

Does this mean that on Drake's view, Christianity is tritheistic with respect to definitions 2 and 6 for "God"? Yes. But since whenever Scripture references the "one God" it is always with reference to the Father, this is irrelevant. In the contexts of Scripture in which monotheism is emphasized, only definitions 1, 4, and 5 are applicable anyways. Where, then, is the error? It's principle of individuation coupled with it's rejection of an abstract divine nature as the principle of unity among the Trinity precludes Sabellianism. It's rejection of the Son and Spirit as created in favor of the monarchy of the Father as presented in Scripture, the original Nicene creed, and the Cappadocian Fathers precludes Arianism. Unitarianism appears to be an undefined catch-all which, if applied in this instance without accompanying counter-arguments, would signal a pejorative hit-and-run tactic.

None of this is meant to imply I have no more questions or concerns about this view. But then, those questions or concerns are not solely related to Trinitarianism. For instance, I still have questions about which theory of time is true or whether the idea of multiple possible worlds is intelligible, and the implications of Drake's strict view of the Trinity would seem to demarcate what possibilities are live options. But then, I'm going to have the same or similar questions with respect to any Trinitarian position, and I'd probably have further questions specifically relevant to that Trinitarian view.

To conclude then, Drake's view is the most coherent I have read. I would recommend his posts on Triadology (cf. here, here, here, and here), particularly for the sections of Scriptural support for his preference in using definitions 1, 4, and 5 for "God."

* Personal note: a thanks to Drake for reviewing this post and making some suggestions.

The Procession of the Spirit and the Filioque

I know of very few Scripturalists who make significant contributions to the common philosophy that Clark, Robbins, Cheung, etc. have each developed in his own way. Being able to read, retain, and reproduce what good arguments these men have learned by God’s grace and revelation is a worthy goal. But I think that Scripturalists who attempts to further this common philosophy deserve recognition. As it seems to me that Drake Shelton’s Triadology is an instance of this, I want to provide a summary of and comment on his view for those who are, like I was and to some extent still am, unacquainted with the eastern perspective of the Trinity.

While I continue the process of summarization, I wanted to comment on five objections Drake makes against the Filioque, an issue I think is a little more open-ended than some other doctrines related to the Trinity. Drake seems to agree when he writes, “I do not have that strong of a feeling about the doctrine but I must say that much heresy and division could have been avoided if the root errors of the Filioque would have been exposed.” He does proceed to defend single procession, however. I think these arguments are interesting but ultimately require elaboration in order to be sound proofs that the Filioque is false:

Argument 1. Drake cites Robert Letham as saying “Augustine’s beginning with the trinity rather than with the Father, as the Cappadocians had done, together with his stress on the divine simplicity, makes the Filioque almost inevitable.” From this, Drake concludes, “if Divine Simplicity is wrong, so is Filioque.” But this does not follow, for the Filioque could be [almost] inevitable for reasons other than divine simplicity. Of course, the onus would be on the one who affirms the Filioque to provide these reasons, but that seems to be what most of these arguments come down to. Rather than refuting the Filioque, it seems to volley the burden of proof back to the proponent of the Filioque. In a post on the Monarchy of the Father, Drake says, "If then the Father is Monarch/hypostatic origin and cause, causality need not be predicated of the Son and therefore need not posit the Filioque." It's true that, given the available evidence, the Filioque seems superfluous. But impossible? I don't know that these arguments go so far as to show that. Scripture seems to be silent on the ontological relation between the Spirit and Son, which, if true, is why Argument 2 fails:

Argument 2. Drake asserts that the Filioque “posits a subordination of the Holy Spirit.” I believe I am correct in stating that Drake means to imply this is unacceptable due to an underlying premise: as persons, the Holy Spirit is co-equal with the Son. But this premise is not established. If the Son and Spirit can be subordinate to the Father, why not the Spirit to the Son? Now, the silence of Scripture can cut both ways. Instead of the Spirit proceeding from the Father and Son, perhaps the Son is generated by the Father and Spirit. So I hope I'm not giving the impression that I lean towards acceptance of the Filioque. On the contrary, my intuitions lie in the opposite direction. But that's not enough, which is why I hope this post will lead to a definitive answer.

Argument 3. The Filioque “confuses the distinct properties among the divine Persons.” Why must “cause” be a predicate of the Father alone? Even if the Filioque is true, aseity would remain a distinguishing property of the Father. Furthermore, even if the Father and Son shared a common predicate that the Spirit does not, this would only be relevant if the Spirit can be shown to necessarily be co-equal with the Son.

Argument 4. The Filioque is said to posit “the Son as a cause and therefore a Father.” One defense against this could be that the Son cannot be a "Father" unless He were unoriginate. After all, the Monarchy of the Father is said to be the principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity; the Son and Spirit are identified as such in accordance to their relation to the Father from whom they ultimately logically derive, not according to the way in which they relate to each other.

Argument 5. Drake cites Photius as asking, “what does the Spirit gain which He did not already possess in His procession from the Father?” I'm not sure this is phrased as well as it could have been, so if I may, Photius' problem with the Filioque is this:

The Son extends from or is generated by the nature of the Father. The Father and the Son are consubstantial; that is, the one divine nature is predicated of distinct individuals. The Spirit is also consubstantial with the Father and Son. Given this, how can the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son as well as the Father? In what way could the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

It cannot be from the divine nature of the Son that the Spirit proceeds, for there is nothing in the divine nature of the Son which could supplement the divine nature of the Father in the procession of the Spirit. The divine nature just refers to a set of predicable attributes that identify a subject as divine. The Son possesses no more of these attributes than the Father - the Son is not "more divine" than the Father, as if that could even make sense.

This means, however, that if the Spirit extends from the Father's nature at all, to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well is to say that He proceeds from the Son in some respect other than from His nature. But what, then?

That is the argument. But here too the argument would end with an open-ended question. It seems to me that a full refutation of the Filioque depends on answers to one of these questions:

• Is there a subordination of the Spirit to the Son?
• Does the Filioque stem from absolute divine simplicity, or is there another reason one could believe it?
• Is causality a property of the Father alone?
• Does causality imply fatherhood? If so, so what?
• Can the Spirit be said to proceed from the Son in some respect other than His nature? Why not?

To me, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th questions seem the most promising.

The Meaning to Finding Meaning

I finished up my essay on Objectivism this past week, so I should have more time to blog. While finishing that essay, I took some time to reflect on what could have been Rand's point in writing dozens of books dedicated to portraying the "ideal man."

Theists constantly make the point that secularism implies purposelessness, but modern culture seems to sweep this away with the reply that individuals make their own meanings for living. I think this backfires on secularism.

Think about it. If men make their own reasons for living, what a sorry choice secularists have made. If Rand's worldview was correct, she has nothing to show for defending it. Most importantly, if secularism were true, truth itself would be overrated; I would have no non-arbitrary reason for accepting truth. Or, at least, I could have my own reasons, purposes, or created meanings for the selective acceptance of truth. I would only accept what I would want to be true - in other words, not secularism.

Maybe this selectivity would be self-defeating, but if secularism is true, so what? Does secularism imply some sort of obligation to defending truth? No.

So when you mention this to a secularist and the reply is condescension, just point out that his condescension follows from his and only his reason[s] for living. Since that secularist would agree - at least, he would if he were as "logical" as his condescension would imply - with the more fundamental principle that his reason for living is no less subjective than mine, he has no basis for refusing me my reasons for rejecting certain truths.

Knowledge and Metaphysics

It seems to me Scripturalists can sometimes be too quick to subordinate metaphysics to epistemology when they actually are interdependent disciplines. For instance, in Clark and His Critics (pg. 28), Clark wrote, "...before any type of metaphysics can be accepted, another and far more crucial question must be asked and answered... How do you know?"

But doesn't Clark's statement beg the question regarding the ontological nature of knowledge? What is knowledge? Of course, I could then ask how one "knows" what knowledge is, but this question too entails a certain view of knowledge on the part of the questioner.

I have written posts on preconditions for knowledge: logic, language, an omniscient and self-authenticating source, etc. But they are preconditions for a certain kind of knowledge, knowledge as propositional belief in which the possibility of error is precluded. But suppose someone says they reject that anyone can know in that sense. In fact, most people I discuss with say something like, "In the sense of your extreme, radical, Cartesian notion of knowledge, we can't know anything." And then they go on to provide a different definition of knowledge, not realizing that their denial of and substitute for knowledge as I have defined it both presuppose knowledge as I have defined it.

So you could say that I think philosophical knowledge is a precondition both for philosophical knowledge and a more colloquial understanding of knowledge. That is, in part, how I know what knowledge is. But again, I can explain how I know what knowledge is if and only if I also know what knowledge is. Knowing what knowledge is, though, requires that I have a metaphysical as well as epistemological position. It doesn't appear to be meaningful to say that one discipline is logically prior to another when at least some metaphysical questions and assertions regarding knowledge are as much preconditions for knowledge as are [some] epistemic questions and assertions.

This doesn't take away from the primacy of epistemology in philosophy, it simply adds metaphysics. Both are necessary; we must still explain how we know, but we also must explain what it is to know. One can't have an epistemic position without a metaphysical one nor a metaphysical position without an epistemic one.