I know of very few Scripturalists who make significant contributions to the common philosophy that Clark, Robbins, Cheung, etc. have each developed in his own way. Being able to read, retain, and reproduce what good arguments these men have learned by God’s grace and revelation is a worthy goal. But I think that Scripturalists who attempts to further this common philosophy deserve recognition. As it seems to me that Drake Shelton’s Triadology is an instance of this, I want to provide a summary of and comment on his view for those who are, like I was and to some extent still am, unacquainted with the eastern perspective of the Trinity.
While I continue the process of summarization, I wanted to comment on five objections Drake makes against the Filioque, an issue I think is a little more open-ended than some other doctrines related to the Trinity. Drake seems to agree when he writes, “I do not have that strong of a feeling about the doctrine but I must say that much heresy and division could have been avoided if the root errors of the Filioque would have been exposed.” He does proceed to defend single procession, however. I think these arguments are interesting but ultimately require elaboration in order to be sound proofs that the Filioque is false:
Argument 1. Drake cites Robert Letham as saying “Augustine’s beginning with the trinity rather than with the Father, as the Cappadocians had done, together with his stress on the divine simplicity, makes the Filioque almost inevitable.” From this, Drake concludes, “if Divine Simplicity is wrong, so is Filioque.” But this does not follow, for the Filioque could be [almost] inevitable for reasons other than divine simplicity. Of course, the onus would be on the one who affirms the Filioque to provide these reasons, but that seems to be what most of these arguments come down to. Rather than refuting the Filioque, it seems to volley the burden of proof back to the proponent of the Filioque. In a post on the Monarchy of the Father, Drake says, "If then the Father is Monarch/hypostatic origin and cause, causality need not be predicated of the Son and therefore need not posit the Filioque." It's true that, given the available evidence, the Filioque seems superfluous. But impossible? I don't know that these arguments go so far as to show that. Scripture seems to be silent on the ontological relation between the Spirit and Son, which, if true, is why Argument 2 fails:
Argument 2. Drake asserts that the Filioque “posits a subordination of the Holy Spirit.” I believe I am correct in stating that Drake means to imply this is unacceptable due to an underlying premise: as persons, the Holy Spirit is co-equal with the Son. But this premise is not established. If the Son and Spirit can be subordinate to the Father, why not the Spirit to the Son? Now, the silence of Scripture can cut both ways. Instead of the Spirit proceeding from the Father and Son, perhaps the Son is generated by the Father and Spirit. So I hope I'm not giving the impression that I lean towards acceptance of the Filioque. On the contrary, my intuitions lie in the opposite direction. But that's not enough, which is why I hope this post will lead to a definitive answer.
Argument 3. The Filioque “confuses the distinct properties among the divine Persons.” Why must “cause” be a predicate of the Father alone? Even if the Filioque is true, aseity would remain a distinguishing property of the Father. Furthermore, even if the Father and Son shared a common predicate that the Spirit does not, this would only be relevant if the Spirit can be shown to necessarily be co-equal with the Son.
Argument 4. The Filioque is said to posit “the Son as a cause and therefore a Father.” One defense against this could be that the Son cannot be a "Father" unless He were unoriginate. After all, the Monarchy of the Father is said to be the principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity; the Son and Spirit are identified as such in accordance to their relation to the Father from whom they ultimately logically derive, not according to the way in which they relate to each other.
Argument 5. Drake cites Photius as asking, “what does the Spirit gain which He did not already possess in His procession from the Father?” I'm not sure this is phrased as well as it could have been, so if I may, Photius' problem with the Filioque is this:
The Son extends from or is generated by the nature of the Father. The Father and the Son are consubstantial; that is, the one divine nature is predicated of distinct individuals. The Spirit is also consubstantial with the Father and Son. Given this, how can the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son as well as the Father? In what way could the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?
It cannot be from the divine nature of the Son that the Spirit proceeds, for there is nothing in the divine nature of the Son which could supplement the divine nature of the Father in the procession of the Spirit. The divine nature just refers to a set of predicable attributes that identify a subject as divine. The Son possesses no more of these attributes than the Father - the Son is not "more divine" than the Father, as if that could even make sense.
This means, however, that if the Spirit extends from the Father's nature at all, to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well is to say that He proceeds from the Son in some respect other than from His nature. But what, then?
That is the argument. But here too the argument would end with an open-ended question. It seems to me that a full refutation of the Filioque depends on answers to one of these questions:
- Is there a subordination of the Spirit to the Son?
- Does the Filioque stem from absolute divine simplicity, or is there another reason one could believe it?
- Is causality a property of the Father alone?
- Does causality imply fatherhood? If so, so what?
- Can the Spirit be said to proceed from the Son in some respect other than His nature? Why not?
13 comments:
Keep in mind that as an institution, there is no one “the eastern perspective of the Trinity”. There are individuals like Thomas Hopko that explain things like I do but others like Perry Robinson follow John of Damascus’ Neoplatonism which is indistinguishable from the Latin view.
“But this does not follow, for the Filioque could be [almost] inevitable for reasons other than divine simplicity. ”
>>>Well, the point I am making is that ADS provides the confusion between nature and person. As I recently pointed out on my blog, Augustine states, “to God to be is the same thing as to subsist”. (Augustine, On the Trinity, Book VII. Chapter 5.10) The principle error of the Filioque is stating that causality is not the Father’s personal property but a divine attribute. Augustine argues, that since the Son is God he therefore must cause. (New Advent Version of On the Trinity by Saint Augustine(Book XV)Chapter 26.47) Therefore, it is only by divine simplicity that causality can be confused as a divine attribute that the Filioque doctrine arises.
“I believe I am correct in stating that Drake means to imply this is unacceptable due to an underlying premise: as persons, the Holy Spirit is co-equal with the Son. But this premise is not established. If the Son and Spirit can be subordinate to the Father, why not the Spirit to the Son? ”
>>>Because the subordination of the Son and HS to the Father is at the level of hypostasis not nature. To deny causality to the Holy Spirit is to subordinate his nature and that cannot be the case seeing that thee HS is homoouios with the Father and Son (Acts 5:4, Heb 9:14).
“Why must “cause” be a predicate of the Father alone?”
>>>Mat 26: 64 Jesus *said to him, “You have said it yourself; nevertheless I tell you, hereafter you will see the Son of Man sitting at the ****right hand of Power****, and coming on the clouds of heaven.”
John 6:57 As the living Father sent Me, and I live because of the Father, so he who eats Me, he also will live because of Me.
Mat 7:21 “Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven will enter.
Heb 10:7 “Then I said, ‘Behold, I have come(In the scroll of the book it is written of Me)
To do Your will, O God.’”
John 6:38 For I have come down from heaven, ******not to do My own will********, but the will of Him who sent Me. 39 This is the will of Him who sent Me, that of all that He has given Me I lose nothing, but raise it up on the last day. 40 For this is the will of My Father, that everyone who beholds the Son and believes in Him will have eternal life, and I Myself will raise him up on the last day.”
1 Cor 15:24 then comes the end, when He hands over the kingdom to the God and Father, when He has abolished all rule and all authority and power.
Let me be clear in the way I am using that term in this context. By “cause” I mean eternal consubstantial extension. The word emanation is not absolutely out of place, but it is Plotinus’ idea of emanation that I am trying to completely avoid. In Plotinus, causality is something necessary to the monad and this attribute passes down infinitely constituting the chain of being and the Hierarchies of differing brilliance and simplicity. This is exactly what Filioque turns into when taken consistently; enter the Hierarchy of the Anchoretic Churches.
“Even if the Filioque is true, aseity would remain a distinguishing property of the Father. ”
>>>But according to the Theology Proper necessary for the Filioque, to be is the same thing as to subsist. Thus the idea of a property distinct from the other persons is meaningless.
“Argument 4. The Filioque is said to posit “the Son as a cause and therefore a Father.” One defense against this could be that the Son cannot be a "Father" unless He were unoriginate.”
>>>I disagree. The only defense that could be made is that he is not THE Father. However, the Father's Fatherhood of the Holy Spirit does seem to be a mysterious issue.
“The Son extends from or is generated by the nature of the Father.”
>>>I would have some qualms with this wording. True, the Son extends from the nature of the father, but that is not ontologically divorced from his person. I would say:
The Father, considered as a complete metaphysical package [both nature and hypostasis], generates the Son eternally as a necessity of nature.
“This means, however, that if the Spirit extends from the Father's nature at all, to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well is to say that He proceeds from the Son in some respect other than from His nature. But what, then?”
>>>Exactly. Well put.
“Is there a subordination of the Spirit to the Son?”
>>>Yes and as I showed it would refer to nature thus creating the straight up and down Hierarchy that emanates infinitely and ultimately creating justification for a Supreme Infallible teaching office in the Roman papacy with the development of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Ecclesiastical writings in the Roman Scholastics.
“Does the Filioque stem from absolute divine simplicity, or is there another reason one could believe it?”
>>>Yes, and I showed why.
“Is causality a property of the Father alone?”
>>>Yes
“Does causality imply fatherhood? If so, so what?”
>>>I think the real question here would be, “is the Father, considered in his relation to the Holy Spirit a Father?” The Spirit is not begotten of the Father but proceeds from the father, so it is a difficult question. I am not sure the Bible speaks to this at all.
“Can the Spirit be said to proceed from the Son in some respect other than His nature? Why not?”
>>>No. Because they are already consubstantial with regard to nature and his procession from the hypostasis of the Son refers to the Economia.
“To me, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th questions seem the most promising.”
>>> I like all but would be willing to set down 4 due to its mysterious nature.
I did not realize that the Filioque entails the idea that "causality is not the Father’s personal property but a divine attribute." My point regarding causality was that it may be argued that it is neither a property (individuating characteristic [of the Father]) nor an attribute but rather a common predicate of both the Father and Son alone, which would lead to a subordination of the Spirit to the Son "at the level of hypostasis not nature." Obviously, if the Filioque asserts causality as an attribute, then that's a huge problem.
The verses you cite to support the view that "cause" is a predicate of the Father alone seem rather to show that the Father is the cause of the Son, not necessarily that He is the exclusive cause of the Spirit etc. I was suggesting that the Filioque could be compatible with the Monarchy of the Father in that the Father remains the ultimate cause of all things yet the Son is a cause of the Spirit.
But this may depend on what you mean by "cause." When you say "By “cause” I mean eternal consubstantial extension," does this mean that causality is a predicate which has to do with the nature from whom one emanates? If so, is your argument that since it must be the case that the Spirit would have to proceed from the Son in some respect other than nature [in order for the Filioque to be true] an indictment against the idea the Son could be a cause?
I guess this all comes down to whether to be a "cause" is or can be, in the historical context of the Filioque, a property, attribute, or something in between.
Thanks for the reply.
“The verses you cite to support the view that "cause" is a predicate of the Father alone seem rather to show that the Father is the cause of the Son, not necessarily that He is the exclusive cause of the Spirit etc.”
>>>Well if the Son is seated at the right hand of the father Acts 2:33 and that means the right hand of POWER which said power bequeaths the Holy Spirit as an instrument which he has power over (Acts 2:33) , it is easily inferred that he is the supreme cause. I was unaware that there was dispute on this point: John 15:26 “When the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, that is the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, He will testify about Me
“I was suggesting that the Filioque could be compatible with the Monarchy of the Father in that the Father remains the ultimate cause of all things yet the Son is a cause of the Spirit.”
>>>Filioque cannot be compatible with Monarchia because Filioque requires causality to be a divine attribute instead of the Father’s Monarchial property.
“But this may depend on what you mean by "cause." When you say "By “cause” I mean eternal consubstantial extension," does this mean that causality is a predicate which has to do with the nature from whom one emanates?”
>>>Yes. It means that the one that extends at the level of nature from another is necessarily consubstantial. This is the meaning of begotten. If you build a shed in your back yard, that pertains to your will and is therefore not consubstantial with you-you do not beget a shed. If you beget a son, this extends from your nature and therefore bears your generic nature (Consubstantial-homoousios). Granted this is not eternal but the meaning is the same.
“an indictment against the idea the Son could be a cause?”
>>>I don’t understand what you said here.
“I guess this all comes down to whether to be a "cause" is or can be, in the historical context of the Filioque, a property, attribute, or something in between.”
>>>yep
"I don’t understand what you said here."
Here's the argument I inferred from your statements: as you agreed earlier, for the Filioque to be true, the Spirit must "proceed[s] from the Son in some respect other than from His nature." But in order for the Son to be a "cause" of the Spirit, the Spirit would have to proceed from the Son's nature. Therefore, the Son cannot be a "cause." That would make sense.
But could you expand on what would be the implications of the counter-argument the Holy Spirit could proceed from a property of the Son as well as the nature of the Father with whom the Son is consubstantial?
Also, could you clarify why Acts 2 and John 15 do not refer to the economic Trinity rather than the ontological Trinity?
"But could you expand on what would be the implications of the counter-argument the Holy Spirit could proceed from a property of the Son as well as the nature of the Father with whom the Son is consubstantial?"
>>>1. That is nowhere taught in the bible. 2. That would put causality as a personal property of the Son, therefore , not the Father, making the Father the Son and vice versa.
Acts 2?
John 15 is clearly saying that the Son is sending the Spirit in the economia to perform activity on created natures. The Spirit's procession from the father has no contact with the created universe.
I wanted to point you to a couple comments on David waltz's blog saying the same thing I said about eternal generation:
http://articulifidei.blogspot.com/2012/09/basil-great-letter-cxxv-excellent.html
"==The meaning is that the son is of both the person and substance of the father. Do you think my reading is correct?==
Yes, that is how I read Basil too."
What are both of your opinions on Revelation 22:1 teaching the Filioque?
I wrote a post demonstrating that Revelation 22:1 clearly proves the filioque.
I am not opposed to the Filioque per se because it seems to me that a common predicate shared by the Father and Son need not be a property or attribute of either. I haven't made my mind up one way or another on this issue.
However, to play devil's advocate, cannot this verse be viewed as an instance of the economic rather than ontological Trinity, given that the symbolism suggests the activity of the Spirit terminates, as it were, upon "the healing of the nations"?
Towards the end of the post I addressed the objection that tries to make the verse about the economic Trinity. There are two problems with that. First, it assumes a dichotomy that really is man-made and even dangerous, namely that the economic cannot reflect anything of the ontological. Second, the fact the same Greek term 'proceeds' is used would make the objection purely ad-hoc, since there is no consistent basis to say 'proceeds' must mean ontological in Jn 15:26 but it must mean economic in Rev 22:1. (I'd also add the Greek form that the Creed uses is that of 22:1, not 15:26)
Drake says that John 15:26 references the economic Trinity here. It isn't an ad hoc objection because he makes no such argument in the first place.
I don't know that the economic Trinity can or can't reflect the ontological Trinity - Drake could probably speak more to that than I - but I would assume that a point he would make is that since the correspondence isn't one-to-one, there is no necessary reflection. But then that the Spirit proceeds from the Son economically would require further reasons for asserting that He proceeds ontologically as well.
Nick's reply to this verse referring to the economy of salvation is,"This argument fails because it is purely ad-hoc, and worse yet, it destroys any principled basis for saying "proceeds" is a special theological term for the inner life of the Trinity in the first place (as per John 15:26)."
>>>Mat 23:22 affirms that the throne of God is in heaven which we know to be a created realm Gen 1 upon pain of creation ex nihilo. Not only so but this activity terminates upon created natures as well. Joh 7:38 He that believeth on me, as the scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. Well the fact is Rev 22:1 is referring to the economy of salvation. To say the economy of salvation reflects the ontological trinity is just another way of affirming that creation is an absolute necessity OF NATURE, thus finding oneself neck deep in origen's heretical theology.
Secondly, I would like to point out that the verse does not say that the River proceeds from the Father and Son. It says it proceeds from the THRONE of God and of the Lamb. Acts 7:49 refers to heaven as being God’s throne. Rev 3:21 refers to the fact that Christ is seated WITH the Father on his throne. Not only so but in Rev 4:5 we read that lightnings and thunderings and voices also proceeded from the throne, so to make Rev 22:1 define the ontological trinity is weak IMO.
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