John Owen and Trinitarianism, Part II

Despite my agreement with what Owen had to say about the Trinity in Chapter 1 of The Priesthood of Christ, I would be remiss if I did not inform readers that Owen proceeds to affirm numeric unity in chapter 2. I've outlined what that means here, but it will be useful to give examples of writing which indicates it. As one might expect, the divine nature becomes the ultimate principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity rather than the Father:

... the holy writers would never have ascribed the creation unto more than one, unless that one in some sense or other had been more than so. Wherefore, they do not change, as is pretended, the plural expression into a singular; but the Holy Ghost, expressing the same thing, of making man in the image of God, sometimes expresseth it in the singular number, by reason of the singularity of the nature of God, which is the original of all divine operations, for God works by his nature; and sometimes in the plural, because of the plurality of persons in that nature ... because his nature is one and singular, but subsisting in more persons than one ...

It is important to note that throughout this chapter, "God" refers to the divine essence or nature:

Wherefore the visible works of God, man only excepted, were designed for no other end but to declare in general the nature, being, and existence of God. But in this nature there are three persons distinctly subsisting; and herein consists the most incomprehensible and sublime perfection of the divine being.

How numeric unity views the relationship between the persons of the Trinity and the one divine nature as coherent is a mystery, for it seems they must either admit the person are merely parts of God or that the persons are separate, self-existent Gods (autotheos). By referring to the persons as subsisting "in" the "one divine nature" "equally" and recalling his true remarks on eternal generation in my last post, Owen appears to have implicitly opted for the former:

But whereas creation is a work proceeding from and an effect of the infinite properties of the one divine nature, our Creator is but one, although that one be equally Father, Son, and Spirit.

The divine nature, then, becomes a sort of supra-Person in whom the persons subsist and who subsists in the persons, a sort of disfigured perichoresis wherein it is hard to avoid the idea that the persons become merely modes of operation for the divine nature:

God doth not here speak unto others that are not himself, but by speaking as he doth, he declares himself to exist in a plurality of persons, capable of mutual consultation and joint operation ... For we say not that God speaks unto others besides himself, nor calls in others to the work of creation; but God alone speaks in himself and to himself, because as he is one in essence, so as to personal subsistence there are three in one, as many other places of the Scripture do testify. And these three are each of them intelligent operators, though all working by that nature, which is one, and common to or in them all.

This is the inevitable effect of making the seemingly simple but remarkably damaging mistake of referring the divine nature abstracted from and as the subject of propositions about the persons of whom it ought to be predicated:

Man was peculiarly created unto the glory of the Trinity, or of God as three in one.

John Owen and Trinitarianism

Since I've recently written a few posts on the subject of Trinitarianism, I found this short summary by Owen in The Priesthood of Christ (link),  to be an excellent summation of my own position:

(1.) The Son was the essential and eternal image of the Father antecedent unto all consideration of his incarnation. He is in his divine person “the image of the invisible God,” Colossians 1:15; “the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person,” Hebrews 1:3: for having his essence and subsistence from the Father by eternal generation, or the communication of the whole divine nature and all its infinite perfections, he is the perfect and essential representation of him.  

(2.) The order of operation in the blessed Trinity, as unto outward works, answereth unto and followeth the order of their subsistence. Hence the Son is considered as the next and immediate operator of them. Thus, as he is said to have made all things, John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, so the Father is said to make all things by him, Ephesians 3:9; not as an inferior, subordinate, instrumental cause, but as acting his wisdom and power in him, to whom they were communicated by eternal generation. Hence, the immediate relation of all things so made is unto him; and by and in his person is God even the Father immediately represented unto them, as he is his image, and as the brightness of his glory shines forth in him. Hereon follows his rejoicing in the creation, and his delights in the sons of men, Proverbs 8:30, 31, because of their immediate relation unto him.  

(3.) Therefore should he have been the immediate head and ruler of angels and men, had they all persisted in their original integrity and innocency, Colossians 1:16; for the representation of God unto them, as the cause and end of their being, the object and end of their worship and service, should have been in and by his person, as the image of the Father, and by and through him they should have received all the communications of God unto them. He should have been their immediate head, lord, and king, or the divine nature in his person; for this the order of subsistence in the blessed Trinity, and the order of operation thereon depending, did require.

While I'm not sure I agree with Owen's seeming implication that the economic activity of the Trinity necessarily reflects the intra-Trinitarian relationships, it is encouraging to discover so much agreement with a theologian for whom I have great respect:

• He mentions the persons of the Trinity have distinct subsistences.
• He alludes to an "order" of subsistence among these persons, giving the [causal] primacy to the Father while carefully maintaining the co-equality of the Son in respect to deity.
• He agrees with a derivation, so to speak, of the "essence and subsistence" of the Son from the Father as conveyed by eternal generation.
• He willingly equates "the Father" with "God."
• He explains in what manner the Son can be said to perfectly represent the Father and enable communion with Him: as the divine Son, He images the Father.

Apologetics and Speculations

I do think that there is a place for speculation in apologetics, such as when providing a defense - which, given available information, we neither know to be true or false - against allegations of internal contradictions. In these cases, the point is to shift the burden of proof to the accuser. But care must be taken to keep in mind the fact that the defense is just a speculation, not fact, and to make sure that it is actually the case that the speculation is compatible with what is currently knowable.

To give an example of what I mean, I've finally gotten around to reading John Owen at length, which I had been meaning to do for some time. You can read his work on the Priesthood of Christ here, though I bought the paperback which smooths out some of the eyesores. While I plan to write on what he has to say about the priesthood of Christ, I came across an excellent section in which Owen takes Socinians to task for suggesting that the incarnation of the Son would have occurred even if man had never sinned. I think it's a good illustration of why I think that counter-factual reasoning in particular is dubious:

10. As to the first opinion, concerning the incarnation of the Son of God without respect unto sin and redemption, there are many pretences given unto it, which shall be afterwards particularly considered. They say that “the manifestation of the glory of God required that he should effect this most perfect way of it, that so he might give a complete expression of his image and likeness. His love and goodness also were so perfectly to be represented, in the union of a created nature with his own. And herein, also, God would satisfy himself in the contemplation of this full communication of himself unto our nature. Besides, it was necessary that there should be a head appointed unto the whole creation, to conduct and guide it, man especially, unto its utmost end.” And sundry other things they allege out of the Bible of their own imaginations. It is granted that even in that state all immediate transactions with the creatures should have been by the Son; for by him, as the power and wisdom of God, were they made, John 1:3; Hebrews 1:2; Colossians 1:16,17. He, therefore, should have immediately guided and conducted man unto his happiness, and that both by confirming him in his obedience and by giving him his reward; an express document whereof we have in the angels that sinned not. But for the opinion of his being incarnate without respect unto redemption and a recovery from sin and misery, the whole of it is ἄγραψον, or unwritten, and therefore uncertain and curious; yea, ἀντἰγραψον, or contrary to what is written, and therefore false; and ἂλογον, or destitute of any solid spiritual reason for the confirmation of it.

11. First, It is unwritten, — nowhere revealed, nowhere mentioned in the Scripture; nor can an instance be given of the faith of any one of the saints of God, either under the old testament or the new, in this matter. The first promise, and consequently first revelation, of the incarnation of the Son of God, was after the entrance of sin, and with respect unto the recovery of the sinner, unto the glory of God. Hereby are all other promises, declarations, and revelations concerning it, as to their end, to be regulated; for that which is the first in any kind, as to an end aimed at, is the rule of all that follows in the same kind. And therefore that which men ground themselves upon in this opinion is indeed neither argument nor testimony, but conjecture and curiosity. They frame to themselves a notional state of things, which they suppose beautiful and comely, (as who are not enamored of the fruits of their own imaginations?) and then assert that it was meet and according unto divine wisdom that God should so order things unto his own glory as they have fancied! Thus they suppose, that, without respect unto sin or grace, God would take unto himself the glory of uniting our nature unto him. Why so? Because they find how greatly and gloriously he is exalted in his so doing. But is this so absolutely from the thing itself, or is it with respect unto the causes, ends, effects, and circumstances of it, as they are stated since the entrance of sin, and revealed in the Scripture? Setting aside the consideration of sin, grace, and redemption, with what attends them, a man may say, in a better compliance with the harmony and testimony of Scripture, that the assumption of human nature into union with the divine, in the person of the Son of God, is no way suited unto the exaltation of divine glory, but rather to beget false notions and apprehensions in men of the nature of the Godhead, and to disturb them in their worship thereof; for the assumption of human nature absolutely is expressed as a great condescension, as it was indeed, Philippians 2:5-8, and that which served for a season to obscure the glory of the Deity in him that assumed it, John 17:5. But the glory of it lies in that which caused it, and that which ensued thereon; for in them lay the highest effects and manifestations of divine love, goodness, wisdom, power, and holiness, Romans 3:24-26. And this is plainly revealed in the gospel, if any thing be so. I fear, therefore, that this curious speculation, that is thus destitute of any scriptural testimony, is but a pretense of being wise above what is written, and a prying into things which men have not seen, nor are they revealed unto them.

12. Secondly, This opinion is contradictory to the Scripture, and that in places innumerable. Nothing is more fully and perspicuously revealed in the Scripture than are the causes and ends of the incarnation of Christ; for whereas it is the great theater of the glory of God, the foundation of all that obedience which we yield unto him, and of all our expectation of blessedness with him, and being a thing in itself deep and mysterious, it was necessary that it should be so revealed and declared. It were endless to call over all the testimonies which might be produced to this purpose; some few only shall be instanced in. First, therefore, On the part of the Father, the sending of the Son to be incarnate is constantly ascribed unto his love to mankind, that they might be saved from sin and misery, with a supposition of the ultimate end, or his own glory thereby: John 3:16, “God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” Romans 3:25, “Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation.” Chap. 5:8, “God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ, died for us.” Chap. 8:3, “For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh.” 1 John 4:9; Galatians 4:4, 5. Secondly, On the part of the Son himself, the same causes, the same ends of his taking flesh, are constantly assigned: Luke 19:10, “The Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost.” 1 Tim. 1:15, “This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.” Hebrews 2:14, “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil.” Galatians 2:20; John 18:37, “To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth,” — namely, of the promises of God made unto the fathers concerning his coming; Romans 15:8. See Philippians 2:6-11. And all this is said in pursuit and explication of the first promise concerning him, the sum whereof was, that he should be manifested in the flesh to “destroy the works of the devil,” as it is expounded 1 John 3:8. This the whole Scripture constantly and uniformly giveth testimony unto, this is the design and scope of it, the main of what it intends to instruct us in; the contrary whereunto, like the fancying of other worlds, or living wights in the moon or stars, dissolves the whole harmony of it, and frustrates its principal design, and therefore is more carefully to be avoided than what riseth up in contradiction unto some few testimonies of it. I say, that to ascribe unto God a will or purpose of sending his Son to be incarnate, without respect unto the redemption and salvation of sinners, is to contradict and enervate the whole design of the revelation of God in the Scripture; as also, it riseth up in direct opposition unto particular testimonies without number. Origen observed this, Hom. xxiv. in Numer.: 

“Si non fuisset peccatum, non necesse fuerat Filium Dei agnum fieri; sod mansisset hoc quod in principio erat, Deus Verbum. Verum quoniam introiit peccatum in hunc mundum, peccati autem necessitas propitiationem requirit, propitiatio vero non sit nisi per hostiam, necessarium fuit provideri hostiam pro peccato;”

— “ If sin had not been, there would have been no necessity that the Son of God should be made a lamb; but he had remained what he was in the beginning, God the Word. But seeing that sin entered into the world, and stood in need of a propitiation, which could not be but by a sacrifice, it was necessary that a sacrifice for sin should be provided.” So Austin,Serm. 8 de Verbis Apostoli, tom. x., “Quare venit in mundum peccatores salvos facere. Alia causa non fuit quare veniret in mundum.”

13. Thirdly, This opinion is destitute of spiritual reason, yea, is contrary unto it. The design of God to glorify himself in the creation and the law or covenant of it, and his design of the same end in a way of grace, are distinct; yea, they are so distinct as, with reference unto the same persons and times, to be inconsistent. This our apostle manifests in the instance of justification and salvation by works and grace:

“If it be by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work,” Romans 11:6.

It is impossible that the same man should be justified by works and grace too. Wherefore God, in infinite wisdom, brought the first design, and all the effects of it, into a subordination unto the later; and so he decreed to do from eternity. There being, by the entrance of sin, an aberration in the whole creation from that proper end whereunto it was suited at first, it pleased God to reduce the whole into a subserviency unto the design of his wisdom and holiness in a way of grace; for his purpose was to reconcile and gather all things into a new head in his Son, Jesus Christ, Ephesians 1:10; Hebrews 1:3, 2:7, 8. Now, according to this opinion, the incarnation of the Son of God belonged originally unto the law of creation, and the design of the glory of God therein. And if this were so, it must, with the whole old creation and all that belonged thereunto, be brought into a subordination and subserviency unto the succedaneous design of the wisdom of God to glorify himself in a way of grace. But this is not so, seeing itself is the fundamental and principal part of that design. “Known,” indeed, “unto God are all his works from the beginning.” Therefore, this great projection of the incarnation of his Son lying in the counsel of his will from eternity, he did, in wisdom infinite and holy, order all the concernments of the creation so as they might be disposed into an orderly subjection unto his Son incarnate. So that although I deny that any thing was then instituted as a type to represent him, — because his coming into the world in our flesh belonged not unto that estate, — yet I grant things to have been so ordered as that, in the retrieval of all into a new frame by Jesus Christ, there were many things in the works of God in the old creation that were natural types, or things meet to represent much of this unto us. So Christ himself is called the “second Adam,” and compared to the “tree of life,” whereof we have discoursed in our exposition on the first chapter.

Drake Shelton's Triadology: A Summary

In a Christian context, debates about monotheism and trinitarianism seem to reduce to this: who are [or is] the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who or what is God, and how are these related to one another? Drake’s view is as follows:

There are three divine persons: Father, Son, and Spirit. To be divine is to be eternal, omniscient, good, just, etc. These are universals which may be predicated of the Father, of the Son and of the Spirit; that is, each is divine because there are a set of distinct, divine attributes which may be predicated of each of them. Why this is the case will be explained momentarily.

Whereas these attributes are what each has in common with the others, each is individuated from the others by his respective property or properties. So, for instance, the Father is eternally unoriginate, the Son is eternally begotten or generated from the Father, and the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father.

Hence, the Father, Son, and Spirit must be distinct persons. To be a person is to possess a mind capable of reflexively indexing a certain set of propositions. So, for example, the reasons that the Father, Son and Spirit are distinct persons or minds is that only the Father can think “I am unoriginate,” only the Son can think “I am eternally begotten,” and only the Spirit can think “I eternally proceed.”

[These variances in reflexive thought do not imply that omniscience is impossible. The subject of the proposition "I am unoriginate" is, for the Father, "the Father," and both the Son and Spirit also assent to the proposition "the Father is unoriginate." Propositions are the meanings of declarative statements, and the meaning of the Father's thought "I am unoriginate" is synonymous with "the Father is unoriginate." Reflexive knowledge can accordingly be considered an indexation of propositional thought.]

Eternal generation and procession may be distinguishing properties, but they also point to the source of unity among the persons: the Father. It is the Father who communicates His divine nature, essence, or attributes in the Son and Spirit whose very persons are metaphysically grounded in the Father. This is not to say that the Son and Spirit are creations, however. Each is eternal and consubstantial with the Father in respect to His divine nature, for both persons causally extend from the Father necessarily rather than as an act of free will. And though eternal generation and eternal procession can be considered types of emanation or consubstantial extension from the Father, it is not Neoplatonic since such causality is a property of the Father alone. But the point is that the Father is the point of unity among the divine persons, not an abstract set of attributes which each person allegedly possesses of Himself. The Son and Spirit are not "autotheos." From this, Drake concludes that in the ontological as well as economic Trinity,

There is a subordination of persons but not of nature. The nature in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost is the same in character. However, the Father is the source of the Son and Spirit and all operation... Therefore, the Son is said to obey these commands and operations of the Father (John 10:18, Heb 10:7). The Son never commands the Father but the Father commands the Son. Jesus said in John 14:28 that the Father was greater than he was. The very terms Father and Son require a subordination of some kind.

It may be better, when first trying to grasp this view, not to think of the divine nature abstractly at all. There is certainly nothing wrong with the question, "what is the divine nature?" The divine nature is an idea – a proposition enumerating the attributes which must be predicable of an person in order for him to be divine – analogous to human nature. But neither divine nor human nature in themselves are minds or persons but attributes which identify divine or human minds or persons. Now, I may be said to be human and Jesus may be said to be divine, but in both cases the person is the subject.

As such, "God is three persons," "God is Triune," etc. are false. These propositions make the subject an impersonal divine nature and lead either to the view that the three persons are merely modes of God, which is the error of Sabellius, or to the view that the three persons are in some sense merely parts of God, which is unintelligible. It is no more proper to state that "God is three persons" than it is to state that "human is x number of persons."

This is a danger of considering the doctrine of the Trinity by beginning with the divine nature abstract from persons of whom it may be predicated. Hence, it is often the case that those who hold to the Western or Latin view will first ask “what” – not “who” – is God yet proceed to use personal [relative] pronouns in describing God’s attributes. This turns the divine nature into a person and either leads to a quaternity or a collapsing of the Trinity into [parts of?] one person.

The alternative to this conception of "numeric unity" is "generic unity" which in Drake's words, means that "the divine nature is generic in the sense that it defines the necessary predicates of three different things: three different divine minds." The only subjects to whom the genus "deity" can apply are the Father, Son, and Spirit. These persons are said to be united because of each the genus "deity" may be predicated, albeit with the qualification that the ground of this unity lies in the Father's eternal communication of this genus in the Son and Spirit.

The debate regarding generic and numeric unity is primarily about the ground of unity, though, of course, why one thinks the Father, Son, and Spirit may be said to be united will affect how one thinks they are united. Generic unity holds the Father as the principle of unity whereas numeric unity holds the divine nature as the principle of unity. The latter view, therefore, requires that the Son and Spirit are autotheos. Drake argues the contrary: "Aseity is not a divine attribute. It is a personal property of the Father. If Aseity is an divine attribute then this denies the eternal generation of the Son, which requires derivation."

The debate between numeric and generic unity is important because, for example, the view of the divine nature as absolutely simple presupposes that the principle, cause, origin, or source of unity among the Father, Son, and Spirit lies in the divine nature "itself" (numeric unity), whereas a view of the divine nature as allowing for real distinctions would be perfectly compatible with the Monarchy of the Father (hence, with generic unity). Absolute divine simplicity is problematic because it is unable to account for how men can participate in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:3-4) given that there are no real distinctions in it. In fact, if there are no real distinctions in the divine nature, some sort of Neoplatonic Monad seems to follow. Real distinctions in God's knowledge and attributes, for instance, are good and necessary to the perfection of the Trinity.

Given these considerations about individuation, personhood, the divine nature, unity, etc., what does "God" means? Drake writes:

I have found that the word “God” can mean at least 6 things in this discussion: 1. The Father/Monarchy; Concreted person; 2. The Divine Nature; abstract substance; or that an uncreated person possesses a divine nature 3. Godhead 4.Source of operation; 5. Auto-theos: that is uncaused 6. An indirect sense in that the Logos and the Holy Spirit are called God as they inter-dwell (perichoresis) and are consubstantial with the Father.

Drake usually uses definitions 1, 4, and 5 when referencing "God." So, for example, Jesus is referred to as the Son of God. Just as the Son is a person, “God,” in this context, is a person – namely, the Father. As the Nicene Creed states, “We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen.” The one God is the Father. The Father alone is Monarch, autotheos, inoriginate, the principle of unity, etc. Drake doesn't use definition 3.

As for definitions 2 and 6, “God” may in this sense be predicated of the Son and Holy Spirit, but in these cases such is due the fact they are persons who are divine; that is, to say Jesus [or the Holy Spirit] is God is a reference to the essence communicated from the Father. Even in this sense, “God” is an adjectival predicate, not a subject.

The most serious charge against this position is that it implies tritheism rather than monotheism, and Christianity is a monotheistic religion. But this charge can be answered only when it is clarified who or what the "one God" is. On Drakes view, Christianity is monotheistic insofar as the Father is the only person of the Trinity of whom “God” can be predicated qua personhood (cf. definitions 1, 4, and 5): “On my Nicene view, being the one God is a hypostatic property of the Father, not a divine attribute.” This does not preclude the divinity of the Son and Spirit:

God is not three gods as in Tri-theism but God is the Father and with the Father are his Word and Spirit in whom the Father communicates the divine nature. There is only one God, one divine nature and one divine operation. God is the only cause though there are different agents of action in the world. Causality requires infallible operation to produce a uniform effect. The Father is this cause. God is static and immutable. Ad extra the action of God is one in that all things are different aspects of one eternal act. This eternal act is governed by the plurality of Ideas or Thoughts in God as his nature Ad Intra. This eternal act is good because it is in accord with his divine nature/thought affirmations.

Does this mean that on Drake's view, Christianity is tritheistic with respect to definitions 2 and 6 for "God"? Yes. But since whenever Scripture references the "one God" it is always with reference to the Father, this is irrelevant. In the contexts of Scripture in which monotheism is emphasized, only definitions 1, 4, and 5 are applicable anyways. Where, then, is the error? It's principle of individuation coupled with it's rejection of an abstract divine nature as the principle of unity among the Trinity precludes Sabellianism. It's rejection of the Son and Spirit as created in favor of the monarchy of the Father as presented in Scripture, the original Nicene creed, and the Cappadocian Fathers precludes Arianism. Unitarianism appears to be an undefined catch-all which, if applied in this instance without accompanying counter-arguments, would signal a pejorative hit-and-run tactic.

None of this is meant to imply I have no more questions or concerns about this view. But then, those questions or concerns are not solely related to Trinitarianism. For instance, I still have questions about which theory of time is true or whether the idea of multiple possible worlds is intelligible, and the implications of Drake's strict view of the Trinity would seem to demarcate what possibilities are live options. But then, I'm going to have the same or similar questions with respect to any Trinitarian position, and I'd probably have further questions specifically relevant to that Trinitarian view.

To conclude then, Drake's view is the most coherent I have read. I would recommend his posts on Triadology (cf. here, here, here, and here), particularly for the sections of Scriptural support for his preference in using definitions 1, 4, and 5 for "God."

* Personal note: a thanks to Drake for reviewing this post and making some suggestions.

The Procession of the Spirit and the Filioque

I know of very few Scripturalists who make significant contributions to the common philosophy that Clark, Robbins, Cheung, etc. have each developed in his own way. Being able to read, retain, and reproduce what good arguments these men have learned by God’s grace and revelation is a worthy goal. But I think that Scripturalists who attempts to further this common philosophy deserve recognition. As it seems to me that Drake Shelton’s Triadology is an instance of this, I want to provide a summary of and comment on his view for those who are, like I was and to some extent still am, unacquainted with the eastern perspective of the Trinity.

While I continue the process of summarization, I wanted to comment on five objections Drake makes against the Filioque, an issue I think is a little more open-ended than some other doctrines related to the Trinity. Drake seems to agree when he writes, “I do not have that strong of a feeling about the doctrine but I must say that much heresy and division could have been avoided if the root errors of the Filioque would have been exposed.” He does proceed to defend single procession, however. I think these arguments are interesting but ultimately require elaboration in order to be sound proofs that the Filioque is false:

Argument 1. Drake cites Robert Letham as saying “Augustine’s beginning with the trinity rather than with the Father, as the Cappadocians had done, together with his stress on the divine simplicity, makes the Filioque almost inevitable.” From this, Drake concludes, “if Divine Simplicity is wrong, so is Filioque.” But this does not follow, for the Filioque could be [almost] inevitable for reasons other than divine simplicity. Of course, the onus would be on the one who affirms the Filioque to provide these reasons, but that seems to be what most of these arguments come down to. Rather than refuting the Filioque, it seems to volley the burden of proof back to the proponent of the Filioque. In a post on the Monarchy of the Father, Drake says, "If then the Father is Monarch/hypostatic origin and cause, causality need not be predicated of the Son and therefore need not posit the Filioque." It's true that, given the available evidence, the Filioque seems superfluous. But impossible? I don't know that these arguments go so far as to show that. Scripture seems to be silent on the ontological relation between the Spirit and Son, which, if true, is why Argument 2 fails:

Argument 2. Drake asserts that the Filioque “posits a subordination of the Holy Spirit.” I believe I am correct in stating that Drake means to imply this is unacceptable due to an underlying premise: as persons, the Holy Spirit is co-equal with the Son. But this premise is not established. If the Son and Spirit can be subordinate to the Father, why not the Spirit to the Son? Now, the silence of Scripture can cut both ways. Instead of the Spirit proceeding from the Father and Son, perhaps the Son is generated by the Father and Spirit. So I hope I'm not giving the impression that I lean towards acceptance of the Filioque. On the contrary, my intuitions lie in the opposite direction. But that's not enough, which is why I hope this post will lead to a definitive answer.

Argument 3. The Filioque “confuses the distinct properties among the divine Persons.” Why must “cause” be a predicate of the Father alone? Even if the Filioque is true, aseity would remain a distinguishing property of the Father. Furthermore, even if the Father and Son shared a common predicate that the Spirit does not, this would only be relevant if the Spirit can be shown to necessarily be co-equal with the Son.

Argument 4. The Filioque is said to posit “the Son as a cause and therefore a Father.” One defense against this could be that the Son cannot be a "Father" unless He were unoriginate. After all, the Monarchy of the Father is said to be the principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity; the Son and Spirit are identified as such in accordance to their relation to the Father from whom they ultimately logically derive, not according to the way in which they relate to each other.

Argument 5. Drake cites Photius as asking, “what does the Spirit gain which He did not already possess in His procession from the Father?” I'm not sure this is phrased as well as it could have been, so if I may, Photius' problem with the Filioque is this:

The Son extends from or is generated by the nature of the Father. The Father and the Son are consubstantial; that is, the one divine nature is predicated of distinct individuals. The Spirit is also consubstantial with the Father and Son. Given this, how can the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son as well as the Father? In what way could the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

It cannot be from the divine nature of the Son that the Spirit proceeds, for there is nothing in the divine nature of the Son which could supplement the divine nature of the Father in the procession of the Spirit. The divine nature just refers to a set of predicable attributes that identify a subject as divine. The Son possesses no more of these attributes than the Father - the Son is not "more divine" than the Father, as if that could even make sense.

This means, however, that if the Spirit extends from the Father's nature at all, to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well is to say that He proceeds from the Son in some respect other than from His nature. But what, then?

That is the argument. But here too the argument would end with an open-ended question. It seems to me that a full refutation of the Filioque depends on answers to one of these questions:

• Is there a subordination of the Spirit to the Son?
• Does the Filioque stem from absolute divine simplicity, or is there another reason one could believe it?
• Is causality a property of the Father alone?
• Does causality imply fatherhood? If so, so what?
• Can the Spirit be said to proceed from the Son in some respect other than His nature? Why not?

To me, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th questions seem the most promising.

The Meaning to Finding Meaning

I finished up my essay on Objectivism this past week, so I should have more time to blog. While finishing that essay, I took some time to reflect on what could have been Rand's point in writing dozens of books dedicated to portraying the "ideal man."

Theists constantly make the point that secularism implies purposelessness, but modern culture seems to sweep this away with the reply that individuals make their own meanings for living. I think this backfires on secularism.

Think about it. If men make their own reasons for living, what a sorry choice secularists have made. If Rand's worldview was correct, she has nothing to show for defending it. Most importantly, if secularism were true, truth itself would be overrated; I would have no non-arbitrary reason for accepting truth. Or, at least, I could have my own reasons, purposes, or created meanings for the selective acceptance of truth. I would only accept what I would want to be true - in other words, not secularism.

Maybe this selectivity would be self-defeating, but if secularism is true, so what? Does secularism imply some sort of obligation to defending truth? No.

So when you mention this to a secularist and the reply is condescension, just point out that his condescension follows from his and only his reason[s] for living. Since that secularist would agree - at least, he would if he were as "logical" as his condescension would imply - with the more fundamental principle that his reason for living is no less subjective than mine, he has no basis for refusing me my reasons for rejecting certain truths.

Knowledge and Metaphysics

It seems to me Scripturalists can sometimes be too quick to subordinate metaphysics to epistemology when they actually are interdependent disciplines. For instance, in Clark and His Critics (pg. 28), Clark wrote, "...before any type of metaphysics can be accepted, another and far more crucial question must be asked and answered... How do you know?"

But doesn't Clark's statement beg the question regarding the ontological nature of knowledge? What is knowledge? Of course, I could then ask how one "knows" what knowledge is, but this question too entails a certain view of knowledge on the part of the questioner.

I have written posts on preconditions for knowledge: logic, language, an omniscient and self-authenticating source, etc. But they are preconditions for a certain kind of knowledge, knowledge as propositional belief in which the possibility of error is precluded. But suppose someone says they reject that anyone can know in that sense. In fact, most people I discuss with say something like, "In the sense of your extreme, radical, Cartesian notion of knowledge, we can't know anything." And then they go on to provide a different definition of knowledge, not realizing that their denial of and substitute for knowledge as I have defined it both presuppose knowledge as I have defined it.

So you could say that I think philosophical knowledge is a precondition both for philosophical knowledge and a more colloquial understanding of knowledge. That is, in part, how I know what knowledge is. But again, I can explain how I know what knowledge is if and only if I also know what knowledge is. Knowing what knowledge is, though, requires that I have a metaphysical as well as epistemological position. It doesn't appear to be meaningful to say that one discipline is logically prior to another when at least some metaphysical questions and assertions regarding knowledge are as much preconditions for knowledge as are [some] epistemic questions and assertions.

This doesn't take away from the primacy of epistemology in philosophy, it simply adds metaphysics. Both are necessary; we must still explain how we know, but we also must explain what it is to know. One can't have an epistemic position without a metaphysical one nor a metaphysical position without an epistemic one.

The Precondition of Self-Authenticity

I have written in many posts that an omniscient source is a precondition for knowledge, essentially because unless we have access to such a source, the possibility that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" (including this proposition) would lead to skepticism.

But isn't this necessarily self-defeating? For I am not omniscient. Is it not possible, then, that the truth value of the proposition in which I assert what the omniscient source is to which I have access is one which could be predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition?

No. For it is possible for an omniscient source to be self-authenticating. In fact, given that we are not omniscient, it is necessary in order to avoid skepticism. What this means is that while an omniscient source is necessary, it is also necessary that for those who are not omniscient to know anything, the proposition that "it is possible the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" is false.

But since this proposition is false, does that mean an omniscient source is unnecessary after all? Again, no. There is a mutual dependency among the preconditions for knowledge. For example, logic and language are preconditions for knowledge. You can't have one without the other. You can't know what logic is without using language, and you can't know what language is without using logic.

Similarly, I am saying it logically follows that you can't know that an omniscient source is necessary if that source isn't self-authenticating, and you can't know a source is self-authenticating if you did not deduce that from an omniscient source. And you can't know either of these if the alleged source is illogical or doesn't communicate. Etc.

To assert "source x is self-authenticating" without having recourse to an omniscient source which states or implies such falls prey to the possibility (within that worldview) that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition." Rejection of this too as a possibility falls prey to the same possibility that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition." These rejections are propositions, after all.

Rather, what saves the possibility of knowledge at this point is precisely having recourse to an omniscient source which, since the source knows all, knows that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" isn't, in fact, a possibility. Furthermore, the source is able to communicate such information to men, able because the communication is, among other things, self-authenticating. The need for self-authentication strictly pertains to the need for the possibility of communication from an omniscient source; it doesn't erase the need for an omniscient source.

[I have tried to be as neutral as possible in describing the nature of this "source," though it must be the God of Scripture. For why I would write my post in this way, see the last five paragraphs here.]

Questions on Time

In recent posts, I’ve criticized the A-series view of time. To be fair, however, I think I should also outline some reservations which have prevented me from whole-heartedly accepting the B-series view of time.

As I understand it, the primary way in which the uni-directionality – a seeming precondition for the intelligibility divine purpose – of the B-series view of time is said to be preserved is by grounding the temporal order on the causal order, a notion which seems to harmonize quite nicely with Christian determinism. Time is the measure of change, not a medium in which change takes place. So, for example, event A is said to be “earlier than” event B because it either is a cause of event B or is simultaneous with a cause of event B.

However, if this is the case, then how can Christians regard the generation of the Son, procession of the Spirit, and creation to be eternal or timeless? For if generation, procession, or creation imply causation, then since the temporal order is grounded on the causal order rather than the reverse, it would seem to follow that these events are temporal: generation, procession, or creation would be later than that which caused them.

What about the incarnation? This is one of the older objections to divine timelessness, if I’m not mistaken. How can the Son be timeless yet act in time (assuming He did)?

I’m certainly not saying these questions have no answers, especially considering the relatively little I’ve read. I’m aware that a few Christian B-theorists have written about time and the incarnation, so it’s quite possible they have considered things I haven’t. The same goes for issues regarding time and causation.

Truthmakers and Time

From Time and Realism: Metaphysical and AntiMetaphysical Perspectives, pgs. 20-22:

Note, in passing, that the term “token” is used here, and will continue to be used throughout the book, to denote something to which a specific date can he attached—an occasion on which someone speaks, prints, writes, reads, or thinks a certain sentence…

Returning to the tensed and tenseless accounts of the truth of “The destruction of Pompeii by Vesuvius is an event of the past,” the two accounts are alike in that for both the relevant linguistic entities are tokens, rather than types of sentences. Types of tensed sentences do not have determinate truth-values: “Today is Monday” is true on some occasions and false on other occasions. The same holds of “The destruction of Pompeii by Vesuvius is an event of the past.” Some of the tokens of this sentence are true, others are false. But each of these tokens has a single fixed, unchanging truth-value. It cannot be both true and false. Again, this is true on both accounts. The difference between the tensed and tenseless accounts is that in the former truth conditions are nonrelational, whereas in the latter they are relational in the following sense. The tensed truth condition on which a token of “The destruction of Pompeii by Vesuvius is an event of the past” is true is the nonrelational condition that the event in question is past. In specifying this condition no mention is made of the temporal relationship between the event and the token whose truth condition this condition is. That is, this relationship does not enter into the condition. In contrast, this relationship is integral to the tenseless truth condition of this sentence: a token of the sentence is true on the condition that the event in question—the destruction of Pompeii by Vesuvius—stands in the temporal relationship of being earlier than the tokening of the sentence.

Mellor’s crucial observation is that to insist, as McTaggart’s opponents do, that tensed conditions constitute truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences is to imply that tokens can be both true and false. For, as time flows, tensed conditions change and with them the truth-values of tokens describing these conditions. For example, up to the moment of Vesuvius's eruption, the tensed conditions that obtain are that this event is future, and these conditions establish the falsehood of all tokens of “The destruction of Pompeii by Vesuvius is an event of the past.” After the eruption, the tensed conditions that obtain are that this event is past, conditions in light of which all tokens of “Vesuvius erupted in the past” are true. It turns out that if McTaggart is wrong, that is, if the tenses are real and time flows, then each token of “Vesuvius erupted in the past” is both true and false, a blatant contradiction, the contradiction McTaggart uncovered.

Of course, it cannot he objected that these tokens have different truth-values at different times. Tokens, to repeat, have determinate, unchanging, truth-values. The other escape is to correct the account so that those tokens of “Vesuvius erupted in the past” that occur before the eruption are assigned “false” as their truth-value, and those that occur after the eruption are assigned “true” as their truth-value. This move, indeed, fixes the truth-values of tokens and removes the contradiction. But it concedes everything to the tenseless theorist, and is tantamount to endorsing the tenseless, relational token-reflexive account.

If I understand this correctly:

To assert that the token “Vesuvius will erupt [in the future]” is true if one utters, thinks, writes[, etc.] the token earlier than the eruption of Vesuvius would be to assert a tenseless truthmaker for the tensed sentence. More generally, the assertion that some token p referring to some event in the {past, present, future} is true if one utters, thinks, writes[, etc.] the token {later than, simultaneous with, earlier than} the event conveyed by p would be to assert that truthmakers are tenseless. The B-series view is coherent.

On the other hand, the token “Vesuvius will erupt [in the future]” is both true and false if there are tensed truthmakers. Why? Because if time flows, Vesuvius’ eruption, which was once future, becomes present and then past. An irreducibly tensed token, then, will bear the truth values for each of these tensed truthmakers, i.e. the token will be both true and false, a contradiction. It will not do to say that the sentence is true when uttered when the event is future and false when uttered when the event is past because what is under consideration are tokens, not types, of sentences. What is under consideration is an actual instance in which “Vesuvius will erupt [in the future]” is uttered. So the A-series view is incoherent.