Saturday, April 3, 2021

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 1)

As someone whose own thinking has benefited and developed from Gordon Clark’s epistemological system called Scripturalism and has advocated for like-minded people to look to the future, every so often, I tend to review a book, article, or audio which either criticizes or attempts to correct the thinking of Gordon Clark (see hereherehere, or here, for just a few examples). Sometimes this is due to my own curiosity, and sometimes it is at the request of a friend.

Last year, I briefly skimmed through a book on Kindle Unlimited called, Scripturalism and the Senses: Reviving Gordon H. Clark's Apologetic. This book was written by Shawn Lazar, an author of whom I have not otherwise heard. Beyond noticing very slight similarities to my own thoughts on developing Scripturalism, which it seems the author arrived at independently, I didn’t remember the book until a friend recently asked my opinion of it. So I decided to revisit the book, review it after all, and here we are. 

The first five chapters of Mr. Lazar's book are an attempted exposition and evaluation of Gordon Clark's epistemology on its own terms (subsumed under the heading, "Why Did Scripturalism Fail?"), with the remainder of the book seeking to improve upon Scripturalism ("How Can Scripturalism Be Revived?"). I read and formed initial notes of the book in three days, so it was not at all a chore to read. There are some good points made by Mr. Lazar, and I will try to be fair in highlighting at what points I believe he is correct. At the same time, I do not believe the book, as a whole, accurately depicts Clark's published thought. The book is 15 chapters (including the Introduction, Conclusion, and an Appendix), and I will engage each chapter at points I find significant. 

In the remainder of this post, I will only examine Mr. Lazar's Introduction. My notes became longer than I had originally anticipated – in part because, for various reasons, it has been quite some time since I have consciously thought about Scripturalism. So I have decided that I will edit and reproduce my notes in separate posts corresponding to each chapter. I hope the author takes any disagreement with the same charity I will try to remember to display throughout this review.

Introduction

Mr. Lazar's main point here seems to be that Gordon Clark "had many admirers, but few followers." In my experience, this evaluation has been correct. There are few people who have followed Clark, and there are fewer who follow him in all his thought (which would be tricky, as it appears, as I will endeavor to show in future posts, that Clark himself changed his mind on certain subjects). 

Now, I don't know that Clark himself wanted people to follow him per se. Clark likely would have hoped to play a role in convincing people that what he taught was true, but I also would expect Clark would have applied the 1 Corinthians 3:4-7 principle to himself. Just as Mr. Lazar states the book is written mostly for his own benefit (and this entire blog is mostly for my own), I think Clark would have accepted that certain ideas he presented were open to correction or development.

Mr. Lazar probably would agree with this. If so, however, then even if or though Clark has convinced few people – and before we count this criticism as a given, let us remember that there is a history ahead of us left to be revealed (perhaps Scripturalism will prove more influential than first glance) – I doubt this would have much affected Clark, as he was more concerned with truth rather than popularity. I do not mean to accuse Mr. Lazar of thinking otherwise, but I think it bears explicit emphasis that Clark himself may have preferred that Mr. Lazar's introduction be solely aimed against the truth of his beliefs rather than the influence of them. As a consistent Calvinist, Clark (and Mr. Lazar) must recognize that only the Holy Spirit actually convicts sinful minds. This is just a minor suggestion.

One other consideration regarding his Introduction that I want to address – and I could be reading too far into this – is that Mr. Lazar seems torn about how to present his position. Should his suggested modifications be regarded as on a continuum of Scripturalism or a departure from it? He decides to split the difference and call his reformulation "Neo-Scripturalism," although he states that he will continue to "think of it as Scripturalism."

I am sympathetic to this dilemma. I too have benefitted from Clark in many ways, yet I find myself in some disagreement with him, even regarding epistemological considerations. Should we consider disagreement with Clark to be a reason to be dissuaded from identifying with Scripturalism? Are we still Scripturalists if we try to "improve" Clark's thought? We would not want to be dishonest in our disagreement with Clark, and yet the spirit of what he intended to communicate seems to resonate.

How I currently have come to a resolution of this dilemma is through consideration of the following question: is "Scripturalism" Gordon Clark's brainchild? Is it merely a descriptor of those who agree with Clark? In this case, divergence from Clark would be the decisive factor upon which we ought to own our disagreement and abandon the title. I doubt this is how Clark would have wanted us to view matters. 

If, however, "Scripturalism" is rather an appropriate title for a prescribed theory of knowledge which Clark discovered and articulated from the Scriptures – perhaps erring in his holistic presentation of it in certain respects – then whether or not one is a "Scripturalist" does not quite belong to Clark. It belongs to anyone who believes his or her theory of knowledge ought to be founded upon the Bible as [the extant extent of] divine revelation. Much in the same way two empiricists or rationalists might disagree with one another in certain respects, two Scripturalists also may disagree in certain respects. 

Of course, a Scripturalist will argue that God's word is a better method of resolving disagreement than is available to the empiricists or rationalists (or Muslims, etc.). The point is that with this framework in mind, I think admirers of Clark need not be shy in expressing disagreement with him.

6 comments:

Joshua Butcher said...

Hey Ryan, good to see you posting again. I’ve been quite remiss myself. I just had one question. Given the claim that anyone who sought to derive their epistemology from Scripture would be a Scripturalist, where would that leave Van Tillians?

Ryan said...

Good question. It is strange the things we remember. I had a conversation some 11 years ago or so with Ask Mr. Religion on the first theology forum I ever joined called the FightingFundamentalForums. That conversation was about this question, and I recall asking him something along the lines of why one wouldn't want to be called a Scripturalist if his epistemic presupposition is about Scripture. Unfortunately, it appears the site has experienced turnover and that it doesn't shows threads prior to 2016.

If someone doesn't want to own the title even though he would hold "the Bible as [the extant extent of] divine revelation" as his epistemic presupposition - say, due to disagreement with Clark in certain areas - I could understand why. Perhaps one worries that certain connotations are implied by by the label, as it's always been generally associated with Clark's thought. Although, as I'll point out at the beginning of my next post, I cannot find one published instance in which Clark used the word, let alone in reference to his own views (if you find one, let me know).

I was mainly speaking to situations like Mr. Lazar's - people who seem to really want to identify as a Scripturalist but also want to be honest about areas in Clark's thought they believe need refinement. Clark himself changed his mind in certain areas, and I don't think he would have been opposed to others disagreeing with him so long as they reasoned better than he did from Scripture.

In what way would you distinguish the epistemic presupposition(s) of a Van Tilian and a Scripturalist? Or would you say that the distinction lies in what they infer from Scripture?

Joshua Butcher said...

Thanks for the reply, Ryan. I’m not sure I could answer your question accurately as I’ve been out of that area of reading for many years. One possible distinction might be whether or not Clarkians admit innate knowledge not deduced from Scripture, which Van Tillians would probably assert. I recall one line of criticism against Clark was that self-knowledge is not deductible from Scripture. I do not recall whether the argument was devasting, or if Clark or Clarkians had an answer.

Ryan said...

I alluded to self-knowledge in the post when I mentioned subject about which "Clark himself changed his mind." So I don't think it is definitional of Scripturalism even if we were to think of it as Clark's brainchild. I happen to argue for self-knowledge.

https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/05/clark-on-self-knowledge.html

http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/01/scripturalism-and-self-knowledge.html

Innate ideas *not deducible from Scripture* could probably be a mark of distinction, since Clark would have said any knowledge we can attain is only [deducible from] Scripture.

I believe you reviewed Bahnsen and found him to have misunderstood Clark in certain respects. I agree with that. I think both sides need to be more literate on the other to articulate accurate points of disagreement. I don't know Van Til well enough to be sure, but here are areas I suspect self-professed Van Tilians and self-professed [strict] Clarkians might epistemologically disagree:

- paradox as resolvable in this lifetime (Clark's belief)
- coherence vs. correspondence theory of truth (Clark rejected the latter, unsure about Van Til)
- possibility of extra-biblical knowledge (Clark denies)
- occasionalism (I doubt Van Til believed this? many "Scripturalists" probably don't either, but Clark did)
- epistemic knowledge as always propositional (Clark's belief)
- univocal vs. analogical knowledge, content of thought (cf. propositional or not, external vs. internal relations)
- epistemic knowledge as always infallible (Clark's belief, not sure about Van Til)
- maybe logic as created vs. the structure of God's thought (I recall reading a statement by Van Til that knowledge is created?)
- role of classical apologetics (may be semantic, since, if I recall correctly, Clark associated it with Aquinas)

I would agree with Clark in respect to paradox, univocal knowledge, logic as uncreated, classical apologetics (again, I think the issue is just semantics), and the *need for* propositional, infallible, and biblical epistemic knowledge (though I would not rule out the possibility that other kinds of knowledge can be inferred from Scripture).

I would disagree with Clark in respect to rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, occasionalism, and whether or not extra-biblical knowledge is possible.

As I mentioned, I don't think Clark would have wanted anyone who found value in his thought to follow him *if he were wrong* (the content of which he nevertheless would have loved to argue about). So I wouldn't consider Scripturalism as reducible to strict Clarkianism. Just how much of the above one could disagree with Clark about and yet refer to himself as a Scripturalist is an open question. The analogy to empiricists and rationalists who disagree with one another makes sense to me, but how I've currently resolved the question to my satisfaction may not be how others do.

Anonymous said...

Several of those are helpful distinctions, Ryan. I'm not sure what you mean by role of classical apologetics (that it has a role? that it is invalid?). I've been listening to Bahnsen's lectures on apologetics and he believes classical apologetics can be useful, but only within the Christian Worldview.

A lot of the epistemic debate seems to depend upon contemporary literature I haven't read, and which neither Van Til nor Clark seemed to have paid attention to, although some of it was available in their lifetimes. (Ron DiGiacomo and Paul Manata have done some work in this area).

I wonder if Clark would accept the distinction between having knowledge and being able to give an account for that knowledge? Plato certainly didn't allow for that distinction, since, for him, knowledge required an account.

I have to cut this reply short as I'm being hailed, but I'll try to come back to it again.

Ryan said...

"I've been listening to Bahnsen's lectures on apologetics and he believes classical apologetics can be useful, but only within the Christian Worldview."

Yes, this is what I meant when I referred to the disagreement as "semantic." Because Clark viewed classical apologetics as a product of Aquinas, and because he disagreed with the philosophy of Aquinas, he disagreed with classical apologetics having a role in apologetics. But Bahnsen and Van Til don't agree with Aquinas either, so I believe disagreement in this area mainly rests on semantics: what is classical apologetics?

"I wonder if Clark would accept the distinction between having knowledge and being able to give an account for that knowledge? Plato certainly didn't allow for that distinction, since, for him, knowledge required an account."

That is a question of the structure of epistemic justification that would align with John Robbins' view and implies positism (ultimately, it means axioms can't be known because you have no prior premises/account for axioms). Take a look at the 2nd part to my review which I posted yesterday. I argue Clark would be a foundationalist rather than that, a coherentist, or an infinist.

I also argued in a recent post that Clark would have identified as an internalist about knowledge, although I agree with you there that it is topic in contemporary epistemology I suspect he missed:

https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2019/11/gordon-clark-and-necessity-of.html