More Thoughts on Necessitarianism

Many years ago, I noted in passing that I had rethought my position on necessitarianism (link), the view that everything that happens [or is] could not have happened [or be] otherwise: the way all things are is the only way all things could have been. The catalyst for my reconsideration was wondering whether what flaws I had discovered in certain aspects of Gordon Clark's metaphysics extended to this position as well, for while Clark rejected necessitarianism earlier in his life - as seen, for example, in the following quote - he accepted it later (link):

Christian theologians have commonly pointed out that creation as a voluntary act is incompatible with Hegelian philosophy. Hegel can very sincerely say that the world depends on God or the Absolute, and to this extent he sounds like a Christian, but Hegel continues as no Christian can and adds that the Absolute conversely depends on the world. This mutual dependence is essentially pantheism. No single thing by itself, the Sun, the Moon, or John Doe, is God but the whole, not in its plurality but in its unity, is God. God and the universe are one reality. Barth’s rejection of this mutual dependence, of this reciprocity between whole and part, is clear cut: “God would be none the less God if he had not created a world and man. The world’s existence and our existence is no wise essentially necessary to God, even as the object of his love” (I, 1, 158) (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 36 – original date of publication: 1963)

[As an aside, Clark's early acceptance of ethical and perhaps even alethic voluntarism (link) - on which God's justice and truth are defined by what God indeterminatively does - are totally irreconcilable with necessitarianism].

Formerly, I could not see how necessitarianism leads to pantheism. It seemed to me that a necessitarian could relatively consistently hold that "creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not... have willed to] communicate His nature to creation" (link). That is, while a necessitated creation might share some attributes with God, it wouldn't share others (omniscience, for example) and, therefore, wouldn't be consubstantial. 

As I see it now, the question of whether theistic necessitarianism entails pantheism seems to turn on to what extent individuation is possible if all things are, as necessitarianism seemingly entails, internally related. Does necessitarianism entail monism, as Amy Karofsky argues? Gordon Clark agrees:

Now, first, the brief intellectual biography at the beginning noted that Russell early renounced Hegelianism and became an empiricist. This change started with an attack on Bradley’s, and Hegel’s, theory of internal relations and the substitution of an atomic theory of external relations. The former, holding that everything is implicated in everything, results in an absolute monism. The definition of cat, for example, is part of the definition of dog, and also of Betelgeuse. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, pg. 174)

As Karofsky puts it, "The essence of one thing contains the essence of every other" (The Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 143). If Karofsky is right, the arguments I make here would require her to be omniscient to know anything. 

Upon further reflection, though, even if she did claim to be omniscient, due to the sort of monism for which she argues, her position reduces to skepticism anyways for the simple fact that I do not claim to be omniscient. Further, if "her" mind "contains" "my" mind - if there is even a meaningful way, on such a reductionistic monism, to individuate between the two - that would suggest quite the solipsistic cognitive dissonance!

Further, if monism results from necessitarianism such that there is only one truth or essence, whence the appearance of change or plurality? Clark:

Now I don’t want to bore you by reading what you can read yourself but this is very important and it would be well to read it over several times because there have been, since Parmenides’ day, types of monism, where being is one, but I guess there has never been such an absolute monism as that of Parmenides. From this point on, those who had been monists had always tried to smuggle in a little plurality and we shall see that later on. (link)

On a Parmenidean monism, there is neither time nor change: not even a non-directional C theory. There is no distinction between contingentarians and necessitarians: they are one. There is no such thing as arguments: premises and conclusions are the same. 

Now let's compare Parmenides to Karofsky, who says that 

Although I do think that contingentarians should change their view and alter their contingentarian beliefs, I do not take that to mean that the future is open and not necessitated. The claim that one ought to change and alter their beliefs does not entail that there are two possible futures; instead, when a person changes a belief, that merely means that they held it at some earlier time and rejected it later. Change is consistent with necessitarianism; all change occurs necessarily (pg. 152)

Here is the smuggle. At least Wittgenstein acknowledged he threw away the ladder he climbed. Karofsky uses concepts of time, change, distinctions between contingentarians and necessitarians, etc. - this is not reconcilable with her claim at the end of the book, viz. "I will continue to follow Parmenides' route on which it is..." (pg. 159). And again, see here:

....given the monism that I defend, there are neither individual moments nor individual causes and events; instead, there is a singular, continuous flow of movement and change, and we merely posit “moments,” “causes,” and “events” as a way of articulating and communicating certain ways that we perceive the world to be working. (pg. 154)

Can Karofsky define define "time" without there being individual events? No. Can she define "change" or "flow of movement" consistent with Parmenides' route? No. How Karofsky seems to think of "change" is purely epistemic, a way "we" order the working of the world. But on monism, there is no "we." There is no distinction between us and the world. That is, our (i.e. Karofsky's) articulations and communications and posits are false:

I take it that necessitarianism probably does entail monism and all of the aforementioned monist theses. But it also seems to me that monism can be shown to be plausible, especially in comparison to the difficulties faced by pluralistic theories... The monist account that I have in mind seems to be similar to the ontological monism and blobjectivism that Horgan and Potrč defend. I take it that there is only one reality that is the whole universe, a universe that does not have any genuine parts. And, as I articulated in this section, I believe that there is just one true proposition that is the statement of the entire universe that is the combination of all of the statements that are true. But it also seems to me that there are simple expressions of the one statement, like: there is one reality that is the universe, X =X, and it is. Such expressions are complete and true, but they are not distinct statements; rather they are different ways of expressing the one true proposition, the truthmaker for which is the ultimate existence fact, namely the way that the one reality—the universe—is, where, the is in that claim indicates that the universe: exists, is in fact the case, is real, is such as it is, and that propositions that correspond to it are true (pgs. 139, 144) 

"One reality" "that does not have any genuine parts," "difficulties faced by pluralistic theories," and the like are the closest Karofsky comes to admitting the fully orbed nature of Parmenidean monism. But these are precisely what makes the Parmenidean "route" of "it is" entail no change. For what "flow of movement" can there be other than "from-to"? But there is not really a "genuine" distinction between "from" and "to" given the monism described above. Likewise with change: there can be no "genuine" distinction between and "earlier" or "later" time. The smuggle has been busted.

Now, even if a theistic necessitarian could avoid monism and pantheism, I've argued here that they would nevertheless be caught on the other horn of a dilemma, and a horn which still involves, as Clark mentions above, the problem of mutual dependency. If divine sufficiency is an essential distinction between the Creator and creature (Acts 17:24-25; John 5:26; 2 Corinthians 2:14-16, 3:4-6, 9:8, 12:8-10), then any position which involves mutual dependency between Creator and creation would be problematic.

This is a presuppositionalist reply to necessitarianism. Other arguments - such as those which might be found in contemporary literature - may be less well-founded. For example, I don't have much issue with Amy Karofsky's first chapter on bad arguments for contingentarianism. I agree with her "that there cannot be any empirical evidence in support of contingentarianism because there cannot be any experience of what is never-actual" (The Case For Necessitarianism, pg. 31). 

We only experience the world as it actually is, so it does not make sense to use our experience as grounds for a world that could be otherwise. That is, a posteriori knowledge cannot suffice to rule out necessitarianism, and philosophers who argue to this effect are wrong for doing so. 

Other arguments she mentions in the same chapter - those grounded in "probability," "intuition," "majority opinion," and "contingency-talk" or the way we use language - are also rather weak. I think philosophers who use these arguments tend to conflate metaphysics with epistemology, overly inflate the value of opinion, or trade on our epistemic limitations. To what extent these sorts of fallacious reasonings represent how contemporary philosophers defend contingentarianism, I don't know. Karofsky's work appears well-documented, at least. Nonetheless, I found none of the arguments presented in the entire chapter for contingentarianism to be persuasive.

I think this illustrates one way in which a presuppositionalist or foundationalist can argue a priori knowledge is foundational for a posteriori knowledge. I imagine that many empiricists or scientists would balk at the suggestion that the world could not have been otherwise. If so, however, could they provide reasonable pushback against Karofsky with purely empiricist reasoning? If they can't, might this not persuade them to re-examine their epistemic presuppositions?

There aren't too many other arguments which need addressing. Foremost would be the two mentioned at the end of this post which deal with time and immutability. These topics being so complicated in themselves (and anyone can read my posts with the "Time" tag to see that I've wrestled with this), I can only be brief: 

The "succession" and time argument - "Making God's knowledge contingent on a 'free' choice... requires a succession of ideas in His mind" - depends on Clark's definition of time and can probably be dealt with just by defining time a different way, such as "the chain of secondary effects from secondary causes." This would protect eternal generation as well as timeless divine omniscience, for example. Most debates about time seem to turn on how one defines it, and this seems as satisfying a definition as I've seen. It might still requires some nuance for cases such as justification depending on saving faith but not being temporally subsequent to it, but I don't think such a point requires pause concerning the whether the definition is felicitous.

The immutability argument - "God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability" - conflates God's being and activity (see my discussion of divine knowledge as divine activity under the Horton subsection here). God's ability to do or know otherwise does not entail that He would be otherwise. There is also the question of divine immutability within a broader scope, especially given the incarnation (link).