RC Hermeneutics and Divine Contraception

Pope Benedict XVI’s recent comments on condoms and male prostitution have sparked numerous debates about whether or not Rome’s stance against contraception is shifting. That is an issue for which so-called “traditional” RCs can fend for themselves; I have no interest in playing he-said/she-said. The pope’s comments, however, provide an occasion for wondering why Rome opposes contraception at all, and therefore provides me with the opportunity of reflecting on the subject of typology.

This post will not pretend to address all arguments against contraception (especially since I myself lean towards anti-contraception). However, because I have been told on more than one occasion by an RC that Protestants in general (and myself in particular) do not fully appreciate Scriptural typology and analogy - and what with the recent surge amongst the Reformed in the area of so-called biblical theology, I find this criticism a little amusing - I have felt inclined to show that it is rather the case that RCs are typically wont to cite passages with the barest appearance of relevance to a subject to, as they see it, buttress their beliefs. In the case of contraception, the arguments I most often hear from RCs and the arguments that will serve as the examples of the wild nature of RC hermeneutics (admittedly based on my singular experience) are as follows:

- Men are commanded to be fruitful and multiply (Genesis 1:28, 9:7, 35:11), and since a couple’s ability to fulfill this is at least hindered if contraception is used, contraception ought not be used.

- Union between man and wife reflects the union between Christ and His bride, the church (Ephesians 5:25-32); if the concept of contraception is not found in the latter covenant, then, it should not be found in the former covenant.

The first argument, in short, presupposes that believers are under the covenant of works and/or that we constitute the physical line through which the Messiah will come, as those were the contexts in which God's commands to Adam, Noah, and Jacob, were given. Both are false and, if taken to their logical conclusions, damnable. At the very least, both fail to understand the way in which Jesus fulfills the covenants - He, by His life, death, and resurrection, merited and secured the graces necessary for the salvation of the elect. We become children of God and Abraham by the Spirit, not the flesh. Only by divorcing history from Christ could one make such a hermeneutical faux pas. Ironically, in this case it is the RC, not the Protestant, who fails to see the typological connections extant in pre-redemptive history. As I have written elsewhere:

“Jesus made it clear in the Great Commission that the church was to spread His name throughout all nations (cf. Romans 10:14-15), and the reason He did not do this on His own [is]… because the assistance of the church is necessary in the same way woman was necessary for Adam to have protologically fulfilled the dominion mandate (compare Genesis 22:18 to Matthew 28:19). The church is God’s chosen means of effecting His predestined, merited goals. She spreads the gospel which, when the Father sends His Spirit to regenerate an individual unto the image of Christ, adopts the newborn believer into God’s family so that he or she can further propagate God’s word, literally extending the temples of God in which the Holy Spirit dwells and which we are, as a royal priesthood, to treat with care. The primary point is that the dominion mandate is fulfilled spiritually, not physically (John 1:12-13), which is why Paul – who didn’t marry – could call Timothy and his other disciples his own children (1 Corinthians 7:8, Titus 1:4, &c.).”

Too, we know that the way in which Christ and the church procreates is through the preaching of the word (Romans 10:17), as that is the appointed means by which new creations – Spirit-children – come to faith (James 1:18). The assertion that in such work a notion of contraception is non-existent – and therefore ought not to be existent in the analogous relationship between man and wife – may seem plausible at first glance. However, considering the plethora of times God has hardened the minds of men against His word (John 12:37-40), refusing to work miracles or speak plainly for the express purpose of prohibiting unbelievers from becoming children in God’s family (Matthew 11:21 and 13:10-15, respectively), may one not suggest this is indeed a form of contraception? That we are to preach the gospel to all without exception, that the Son gives life to whom He wishes, and that the Son does not wish to give life to all without exception would actually seem to imply a sort of divine contraception.

One could argue that this is a case in which analogical connections are pushed too far. I would agree. But in that case, it might similarly be argued that using the fact that the union between Christ and church is similar to man and wife to argue that there must be similarities between the way in which each covenantal union procreates is a case in which analogical connections are pushed too far.

As opposed to the naive hermeneutic which republishes as commandment that which is accomplished by Christ and spiritually fulfilled by means of His bride, this second argument connotes a radical hermeneutic. The common denominator is a system which encourages a defensive, rather than a biblical, theology.

Epistemology and the Nature of Revelation

Lane Keister over at Green Baggins has posted a very good argument by Owen defending the Protestant belief (against RC) about the way in which the canon is discerned. Naturally, we could extend this a fortiori defense to encompass the perspicuity of Scripture and other doctrines relates to sola scriptura. I think, however, one can push the natural/supernatural analogy further and use it to internally critique what generally passes for RC epistemology. Matthew Schultz at BeggarsAll touches on this point in final paragraph of his most recent post on Whitaker's "Dispuations."

RCs predicate the justification of the canon on an allegedly infallible church. Allowing this, by what means do RCs justify their knowledge of an infallible church? If the Magisterium requires no external justification, then we can, like Matthew, ask what distinguishes Scripture from the Magisterium such that the former cannot be afforded the same presuppositional privilege as the latter. [We might also ask what differentiates Scripture from, say, God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son of promise; Abraham did not need to think about whether or not some omnipotent demon was attempting to trick him. Why? Because God's word is self-authenticating, self-verifying.]

However, I can't recall the last time I asked a RC by what means they claim to know the Magisterium is infallible and received a response which didn't in some way appeal to history. Disregarding the fact many of these responses commit the appeal to antiquity fallacy (not to mention that they are only probabilistic arguments), these are, at the very least, responses which implicitly appeal to natural revelation to justify a belief in an infallible authority. We could modify Owen's argument, then, to read: "if Protestant presuppositional epistemology, grounded on supernatural revelation, is unsound, how much more so is RC epistemology, grounded on natural revelation."

Praise and Blame

I've been Reformed long enough to know the emphasis [consistent] Calvinists place on God's ultimate causation of all things, man's responsibility, and Soli Deo Gloria. This emphasis is not mistaken. Each of these doctrines convey truths that follow from Scripture.

However, I think that we (myself included) can sometimes get carried away by Soli Deo Gloria. Of course, everything we do ought to be to God's glory, just as everything God does is for the same reason. But in our haste to prostrate ourselves before God, we can forget that we are good and faithful servants if God gives us a talent and we turn it into 10. Doing such is a good work worthy of praise.

Of course, God causes our good works by His grace, so we ought not be prideful in our good works, but rather realize that we are as we are by grace. If, however, we are to be blamed for disobeying God - even though He ultimately caused our actions - it only makes sense that we should be commended for obeying God - even though He ultimately caused our actions.

I have encountered some who pose an argument against Reformed Theology that highlights what I am attempting to explain. The argument runs thusly: if God is the ultimate cause of all things and if man's good works, caused by grace, imply that God alone ought to be approved, as if man is the "mere" vehicle through which God purposes the good work to occur, one's sinful works should similarly be traced back to God alone.

The way in which one refutes such an argument is twofold: firstly, by asserting that God's praiseworthiness is measured on the same grounds as is ours, viz. by whether or not God's actions are to the purpose of the maximal manifestation His glory; secondly (and this is really only a logical extension of the first), by admitting men are to be commended for good works just as God is to be praised for His righteousness.

To conclude, then, we thank God for His mercy and grace. Without it, we could not do things which are worthy of praise. His unconditioned choices are what have made us who we are - He has done this for His glory, and we glorify Him for it. But we should not confuse thankfulness and glorification with praiseworthiness or commendableness.

Books and book suggestions

What with Christmas and my birthday in the coming months, my family has asked for gift ideas. Being unimpressed with the boring request for a massive amount of amazon gift cards, they asked for specifics. After some thought, I was able to come up with the following books, and have for the purposes of this blog included reasons why I am asking for these books. Perhaps the reader will find something of interest or be able to suggest a book that I might find interesting.

Forthcoming books:

Michael Horton: The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way
James M. Hamilton Jr.: God's Glory in Salvation through Judgment: A Biblical Theology
John Frame: The Doctrine of the Word of God

This is an interesting gift list because it is the first time I can recall that I have asked for one book - let alone three - which have not yet been made available to the public. In the last year, I have been on a covenant and biblical theology kick, which explains the interest in the first two books. I've been consistently impressed with Horton's covenantal perspective, and it will be nice to have a book in which his thoughts are centralized. I had never heard of Hamilton Jr. before having stumbled across the book on amazon, but after reading the blurbs by men like Thomas Schreiner and this publication of his related to the subject of the book, it reminds me of Piper's exegesis of Romans 9 with a biblical-theology oriented focus. I've had my eye on Frame's book for a couple years now, since I believe a systemic presentation of the doctrine of Scripture has been lacking in the church. His Doctrine of God was unbelievable; I had to set it aside because it was so deep I didn't think I could do it justice until I was more well-read. I am hoping for the same impression with this book.

Meredith Kline: God, Heaven and Har Magedon: A Covenantal Tale of Cosmos and Telos

Of course, since I like Horton, it follows that I like Kline. I recently found most of his books are available online (link), and the only other book that is not available to me at a local library is his magnum opus. He and Horton make connections between Testaments that bespeak a true knowledge of the inter-connectedness of God's plan.

John Robbins: The Church Effeminate and Other Essays

A gift list would not be complete without a book or six from the TrinityFoundation. This Reformed anthology on ecclesiology will, I hope, give me a well-grounded understanding of the church that I have been lacking.

Gordon Clark:

1. The Trinity
2. The Incarnation
3. Commentaries on Paul's Letters
4. Philippians
5. First Corinthians

Clark has been my favorite philosophical-theologian for some time now. I will have, with these books, all his concise yet rich Scriptural commentaries. I have been meaning to purchase his books on the Trinity and Incarnation for some time now, after having heard that both are controversial. Clark was nothing if not consistent in his attempt to be logically consistent, and if the fundamentals of Christianity can inspire such intriguing thoughts after 2000 years, I would be remiss if I did not attempt to inform myself.

Counter-factuals and the Righteousness of God

I’ve been working on this post for several weeks now. Having finished it, while I believe the conclusion I come to is true, the assertions in this post are meant to be tentative rather than dogmatic. I do not usually enter into the arena of speculative theology, but perhaps after this post, it will be clearer as to why I have prefaced the post in this way.

So as to avoid confusion, the following is an outline several points I believe are biblically backed and to which I will refer throughout the rest of this post:

- God ultimately causes all things, meaning that it is by His will that this possible world is an actual world.

- A possible world is a world which God could have decreed to effect.

- God knows counter-factuals, meaning that He knows of possible worlds which He has chosen not to effect (e.g. Matthew 11:21).

- God is righteous, meaning He always acts such that the manifestation of His glory is the teleological end of all things; there is a correlation between God’s righteousness and His glory.

Theologians sometimes distinguish between types of knowledge in God’s mind: 1. Necessary knowledge - knowledge of what must be

2. Middle knowledge - knowledge of what could be 

3. Free knowledge - knowledge of what is One might say that the first type of knowledge is predicated on God’s knowledge of Himself, the second type on that which He is able to effect, and the third type on His eternal decree. One might also argue that God’s middle and free knowledge are predicated on the knowledge depicted in the higher wrung[s] of the above hierarchy, since, for example, it makes sense that God would have to know what “must be” to know what He “could effect” and would have to know what He “could effect” to know what He “has decreed will be effected.” Whether these categories of knowledge hold under scrutiny remains to be seen.

As I was flipping through Carl F. Henry's magnum opus, God, Revelation and Authority at the library some time ago, I found, in Volume 5, several sections on divine omniscience and immutability. Since I had recently been writing about both, I naturally skimmed through those sections, and when I did, I found the following question:

"Does the very notion of "events which could have been otherwise" violate divine omnipotence and omniscience?" - pg. 295

This question is asked in a context in which Henry is talking about process theology, so what Henry has in mind is probably God's "free" knowledge. But because I didn't realize this at first, the quote actually inclined me to think about whether or not there is an inconsistency between my notion of God's knowledge of counter-factuals - i.e. His "middle" knowledge - and His righteousness.

Why did God decree to effect this possible world over against all others? Because, it would seem, this possible world maximally manifests His glory. If this possible world, which God has decreed to effect, manifests His glory less than one which He has not, God’s righteousness would be called into question. Or, if we suppose two possible worlds would equally manifest His glory, it would appear that God arbitrarily chose to actualize this possible world – after all, since both worlds are consistent with His righteousness, what reason had He to choose to actualize this possible world over against the other? Scripture, on the other hand, depicts a God who chooses according to His good pleasure and desires. God had a reason for decreeing to effect this possible world over against another. If God had actualized another possible world, then, He would have done so for a purpose other than the manifestation of His glory. But this would deny that the telos of all things is the maximal manifestation of God's glory. Recalling that there is a correlation between God's righteousness and His glory, and that God is righteous, God's decree to effect this possible world implies that this possible world is entailed in God's decree to maximally manifest His glory; that is, given God's purpose to maximally manifest His glory, God necessarily must have decreed to effect this possible world.

But then – and here is the point – how is it that God even knows of counter-factuals? Apparently, God knows what is logically impossible: what would have happened had God acted inconsistent with His righteous nature. It is one thing for God to know what He cannot do (e.g. lie), it is another to suggest that God can know what would happen if He does what He cannot do (e.g. lie); the latter presupposes an ability to do the former, which is contradictory. Applying this argument to the subject of this post, it would seem that there is no such thing as “middle” knowledge – or, more precisely, there is no distinction between God’s necessary knowledge, middle knowledge, and His free knowledge.

This stumped me for a while, but after having thought about it, I believe there is a way to counter this dilemma, and that is to ask how God knows this world would more greatly manifest His glory than a counter-factual world. This question exposed a hidden presupposition in the above paragraph, viz. that God purposed to maximally manifest His glory because God is righteous. God's righteousness and His glory are indeed correlated, but the predication between the two is opposite to what I had thought: God is righteous because His eternal decree purposes the maximal manifestation of His glory as the end of all things.

In other words, instead of the idea that God's righteousness is an intrinsic attribute which determines God's choices be to the purpose of His glory, His righteousness is rather, like holiness and sovereignty, an effect of His eternal decree. If God’s righteousness is entailed in His necessary, self-knowledge - that is, if it is an intrinsic, causal attribute - it would constrain His middle knowledge such that He could not know counter-factuals, because for God to be able to decree to effect a possible world which does not maximally manifest His glory would contradict His so-called intrinsic righteousness.

Unlike holiness and sovereignty, however, both of which are contingent upon God's relation to creation, God's righteousness is ipso facto determined by whether or not His decrees maximally manifest His glory. This idea that God's righteousness is predicated on whether or not He decrees to effect a possible world which maximally manifests His glory is consistent with knowledge of counter-factuals. For instance: supralapsarians note that God’s eternal decree is teleological and implies no temporal displacement in God’s mind. With this in mind, God's eternal decree is, as noted earlier, predicated upon knowledge of various possible worlds. The supralapsarianism claims God decreed to maximally manifest His glory as the telos of all things. Decreeing in reverse proportion to the execution of his eternal decree (i.e. teleologically), God non-arbitrarily chose between several possible worlds - worlds which are, tangentially, logically possible, i.e. consistent with His necessary, self-knowledge - by choosing the possible world which would maximally manifest His glory.

Thus, although God could have effected another possible world, God's righteousness is not only correlated to His glory but is itself determined by whether He unswervingly upholds His glory, the telos of all things. He could have chosen to effect a possible world in which His glory was not maximally manifested, in which case one might argue that there is unrighteousness with God, but God instead, acting according to His good pleasure, chose to maximally manifest His glory as the telos of all things, a decree which, in effect, determines all other decrees, decrees which evince His righteousness.

Fesko on Baptism: Reflections

After having read Part I of J. V. Fesko's three-part book, Word, Water, and Spirit: A Reformed Perspective on Baptism, in which Fesko traces the historical theology of baptism, a few thoughts came to mind:

- The London Baptist Confession 1689 sticks out like a sore thumb by claiming immersion is the only valid administration of baptism. Baptism, as a sign and seal of the New Covenant, is meant, analogous to circumcision, to reflect the the cleansing of Christ's blood and the washing of regeneration. Imagery of these significations in both the Old and New Testaments include, in contrast to "immersion," both sprinkling and pouring (e.g. Ezekiel 36:25, Luke 22:20, Titus 3:6, 1 Peter 1:2).

- The Reformers were awesome. Fesko covers, in brief, the beliefs regarding the nature of the sacraments and [infant] baptism of the following Reformers and Reformed Catechisms: Calvin, Polanus, Wollebius, Ames, Turretin, Witsius, The Thirty-Nine Articles, the Irish Articles, the Heidelberg Catechism, the Belgic Confession, and the Westminster Confession. I hadn't even heard of some of these giants, but I believe that out of all of them, I shall be revisiting Witsius the soonest.

- The Abrahamic covenant received brief attention, and though I expect it will be treated later in the book, I cannot help drawing attention to the fact of covenant continuity and its implications. A standard point of difference between Baptists and Presbyterians is the extent to which each see a covenant continuity. I will not post an extensive defense of infant baptism here, as I expect it will be treated by Fesko in Part II or III, wherein he considers baptism from the perspectives of biblical and systematic theology, respectively. However, the cumulative force of several of the following [paraphrased] observations made by the aforementioned Reformers necessitate the practice of infant baptism:

1) Circumcision no longer functions as the sign and seal of the Abrahamic covenant, a covenant which has not been abrogated (cf. Galatians 3-4).

2) In order for it to be true that the blessings of the Abrahamic covenant extend to Abraham's descendants and throughout their generations (Genesis 17:7), it must be the case that we have a correlative sign and seal by which we may claim, as could Abraham, that we have a covenant in our flesh for an everlasting covenant (Genesis 17:13).

3) Although it may be imprecise to call baptism a replacement for circumcision, since there are differences which shall, in due time, be pointed out, it is undeniable that baptism signifies the same soteric activity as did circumcision (Colossians 2:11-12). It is the sign and seal of the God's eternal covenant with Abraham (Galatians 3:27ff.).

4) Moreover, infants were regarded as members of the OT covenant community, as is evident from the fact that the sign and seal of the Abrahamic covenant was applied to them at the command of God (Genesis 17:12).

5) Baptists sometimes complain that there is no explicit Scriptural command to baptize infants. I believe I will from now on complain that Baptists cannot point in Scripture wherein infants born after the institution of baptism are said to be cut off from the Abrahamic covenant. That is indeed what Baptists must argue, for there is no other reason to deny a member of the covenant the sign and seal of that covenant, given that the parallel sacrament from the OT (circumcision) was applied indiscriminately (cf. Matthew 19:13, Acts 2:39, 1 Corinthians 7:14, et. al.).

- One final observation, and I believe it is the most interesting: Fesko mentions in his section on Luther that Luther wavered between the idea that infant baptism implies infants possess faith and the idea that infant baptism is based on the faith of another (fides aliena). While Luther ultimately defended the former, the contrast compelled me to examine the Roman Catholic belief, for what reason I shall make clear in a moment.

Augustine, upon whom Fesko argues Rome grounded their baptismal practice, wrote in Book I of his A Treatise on the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on the Baptism of Infants:

Chapter 25. Infants are Described as Believers and as Penitents. Sins Alone Separate Between God and Men.

“Some one will say: How then are mere infants called to repentance? How can such as they repent of anything? The answer to this is: If they must not be called penitents because they have not the sense of repenting, neither must they be called believers, because they likewise have not the sense of believing. But if they are rightly called believers, because they in a certain sense profess faith by the words of their parents, why are they not also held to be before that penitents when they are shown to renounce the devil and this world by the profession again of the same parents?”

Now it is clear that Augustine held to fides aliena, and predicated the validity of infant baptism upon the faith of the parents. The sense in which infants are said to be believers is not due to intrinsic faith, but is rather coventantal or relational: viz. the infant was to be regarded a believer due to the faith of his or her parents. It would appear, at least, that Rome has followed suit, as its Catechism, while qualifying that the fides aliena is a reference to the church, nevertheless teaches fides aliena:

1282 Since the earliest times, Baptism has been administered to children, for it is a grace and a gift of God that does not presuppose any human merit; children are baptized in the faith of the Church. Entry into Christian life gives access to true freedom.

However, if infants are regarded by God as believers on the basis of the faith of another, this undercuts the ontological charge of "legal fiction" so commonly put forth against the Protestant teaching on justification. It seems to me that the closer Rome gets to covenant theology, the less they are able to wield these types of arguments.

The Ultimate Cause of Sin

The following is a response to a modified Arminian who cited 2 Samuel 12:9b as proof that one who causes sin is a sinner. His point was to undercut my belief that God is the ultimate cause of all things.

//I encounter this objection from time to time. Sin, like obedience is relational. To what? The law. David's sin was that he intended the unlawful slaughter of Uriah. You would agree, I hope, with the idea that David's choice would have been sinful even if Uriah had counter-factually lived. Why? Because David's intention constituted a breach in God's law.

Now, the way in which God relates to the law is different from the way man relates to the law. Example: God can't steal or covet, because He owns everything. But that there is a disanalogy means the burden of proof is on the one who relies on an analogy between the relation between God and the law and the relation between man and the law to show that what applies to the latter applies to the former.

In this case, you suggest that if God sent the Ammonites to kill Uriah, He would have sinned. But God's intentions and David's intentions would necessarily have been different. Uriah was a sinner in God's eyes, as was Isaac when God commanded Abraham to kill him in Genesis 22 or as were the Israelites when God sent the Assyrians to kill them in Isaiah 10. Note that God judged the Assyrians but commended Abraham. Why? Because the immediate intentions of each were that by which each was judged. Hence, Abraham was commended because He obeyed God's precept, whereas the Assyrians were judged because they disobeyed God's precepts.

If any analogy exists, then, it would be between the fact that whether or not one has broken the law is ascertained by checking his - immediate cause's - intentions and how they relate to the law. That's why I've asked repeatedly what law God has broken for having decreed sin or how God has acted contrary to His nature by ultimately causing sin. Your silence suggests you can't think of one, in which case my position stands as do my arguments in its favor.

At most, the above passage shows it is wrong for humans to cause sin. Even disregarding my above points, that itself would be an inductive argument, and inductive arguments are fallacious.

...I have demonstrated God's eternal omniscience necessitates God is the ultimate cause of all things. I have demonstrated that by ultimately causing sin, God's maximally manifests His glory, which, in fact, is what it means to be righteous. I can quote myself again, but I'm getting tired of repeating myself.//

Gordon Clark similarly comments:

"...neither the eighth commandment nor any other applies to God. God cannot steal for the simple reason that he owns everything. Obviously he cannot obey the fifth commandment. God is righteous in the sense that he determines the laws of righteousness; we are righteous in proportion to our obedience to those laws." - The Pastoral Epistles, pg. 119

While Clark's point that God is not obligated to obey the same commandments we are is on the mark, I would add, in conjunction with the above link to the post on John Piper's exegesis of Romans 9, that both God's righteousness and ours can be said to be proportional to how the actions of each reflect God's glory: insofar as God's glory is maximally manifested through God being the ultimate cause of reality, God is righteous, and insofar as man perfectly obeys that which he ought to obey, thus appreciating rather than scorning God's glory, he is righteous.

100th post: An indulgent look back

I don't usually reflect, so for those few who read this blog, feel free to skip over this post, as it's more for my benefit than anyone else's. Or maybe God will, in the spirit of the verse I have at the top of this blog, use this as an opportunity to help someone.

When I started this blog a little over a year ago, I wasn't sure if I would be able to keep putting out new material at a consistent rate. After all, I tried starting a blog two years ago and got no further than half a dozen posts before I realized I was out of my depth.

While a part of me still feels that way, I've been blessed to have had the opportunity within the past year to have written some book reviews, had my first semi-formal debate, and have written a couple of essays I believe do an adequate, if incomplete, job of beginning to address why I believe what I believe. It's amazing how much God has taught me in the three and a half years since I've had my spiritual awakening.

Prior to that awakening, I grew up in a Christian high school which I admittedly took for granted. After a semester of college, I picked up a witty book which contained some quotes by Soren Kierkegaard, who, although he believed some wrong, wrong things, I will always be indebted to for having been the occasion by which my interest in philosophy and theology was piqued.

This being back in 2007 and having just gone to college, what with the facebook craze rising, I started to discuss theology on different groups. Naturally, my upbringing coupled with my personality gifted me with knowledge of facts without the wisdom to know how to use them, much less systematize them. When I received my first introduction to Reformed Theology, however, I was struck by its depth and rationality. Some people are turned off by that, and I doubt I'll ever know why. I won't brag too much, I hope, by mentioning after a half a week talking about it with some people, I accepted it as an accurate, sound, systematic representation of salvation. Even as I have come to appreciate its implications, I still believe that.

After a year of reading various authors, I began to list several doctrines which seemed to me to be very important, told myself I would study each of them for a given period of time, and then - somehow - put it all together. That lasted a week, maybe. Still, as I look back, I can discern distinct periods in which my knowledge of a given subject was raised to a high level: the first year it was sola gratia, the second year it was sola fide, and in the last year and a half it's been sola scriptura.

But it's true what they say: "the more you know, the more you know how ignorant you are." That is to say, God's word is truth, and truth is systematic; while I believe it is a duty to systematize truth - for that is the only way to give a cogent defense for one's faith - it can be (and is, for me) an overwhelming prospect. So I'll end this, my 100th post, with a prayer that God will give me the understanding and wisdom for 100 more, always with 1 Corinthians 4:7 in the back of my mind.

The "value" of fallacious argumentation revisited

While rereading Robert Reymond's The Justification of Knowledge, I stumbled across the following quote by Clark who, using the cosmological argument as an augmentative example, argues the same point I did in a recent post; that is, that in the realm of evangelism and apologetics, invalid argumentation is only arbitrarily "valuable":

“If one wishes to use the cosmological argument without asserting its formal validity, there is a difficulty that requires explanation. The expression that the natural evidence for God’s existence is convincing for all practical purposes must be understood as simply a form of enthusiastic speech, for obviously it cannot be taken literally. There are many people, both Christian and unbelievers, to whom this argument is by no means convincing; nevertheless, the conversion of the unbelievers and even the enlightenment of the Christians would have to fall within the class of all practical purposes. If then it is not satisfactory for all practical purposes, can it be defended as satisfactory for some practical purposes? After all, it is convincing to those who use it. But this explanation is no better. People are frequently convinced by the flimsiest of evidence and the most glaring of fallacies. If it is justifiable to use an argument merely because it serves some practical purpose, would not evangelism be reduced to utter sophistry? Any evidence or any fallacy could be used, if only it were convincing to the person addressed. And this would remain the case even when the evangelist himself knew that his arguments were inherently unsound. The confusion arises from the unwillingness to see that an argument is either valid or fallacious. There is no third possibility. And in choosing arguments there is no substitute for valid logic.” (Contemporary Evangelical Thought, pgs. 149-150)

Omniscience: Eternal or Bust

I was thinking about this post today as I was reviewing both Robert Reymond's version of the argument from which that post received its inspiration (cf. The Justification of Knowledge, pgs. 36-37) and some books on Open Theism, and I had an interesting thought. First, for convenience, here is the argument:

//For a being to claim to know a proposition is true presupposes that he knows it's truth is not contingent or, if it is, said being knows that upon which the veracity of the proposition is contingent. Let's call this being Ryan. This implies two things:

1. Ryan is omniscient or has acquired his knowledge from a being who is omniscient, as Ryan would be required to know the relation between a proposition and anything upon which the veracity of the proposition might be predicated (which in turn implies knowledge of everything, including respective contingencies).
2. Ryan's knowledge is infinite or has acquired his knowledge from a being whose knowledge is infinite, as there are infinitely many possible relations one might posit between the proposition in question and everything imaginable.//

The thought that occurred to me was that not only is man's knowledge dependent upon an omniscient, infinitely knowledgeable being, but said being cannot have become omniscient or infinitely knowledgeable through a process; that is, it is necessary that the being in question is eternally omniscient. For simplicity, let's call this being God and let "eternal omniscience" encompass the notion of infinite knowledge.

Now God, if He is not eternally omniscient, must, if one is to allege that He has or can become omniscient, have at some point learned that which He did not know. In other words, God was not omniscient prior to having learned that which He did not know. So far, so obvious.

But if this is so, it would not have been possible for God to know the relation between that which, prior to His learning, God did not know and everything else imaginable. Given this, however, God would have been in the same boat as man! Again, from the aforementioned post:

//Or we may consider these questions: how does Ryan know the proposition he claims is true isn't contingent on x, y, or z? If Ryan doesn't know, can he justifiably claim to know the proposition is true? No.//

Or: how would God have known any proposition He claimed is true isn't contingent on that which He did not know? He couldn't, precisely because He can't know any relation between that which He does not know and everything else imaginable until He actually knows the unknown proposition. This in turn implies God either wouldn't know anything unless He knows everything from eternity or that He has, like men, acquired His knowledge from one who is (but in this case, He from whom God would have acquired His knowledge would actually be "God" in the traditional sense).

The implications of this thought appear deep: for instance, predicating God's knowledge on that which is extrinsic to God would, since God alone is eternal, not only destroy God's omniscience, it destroys God's knowledge, period. It refutes Open Theism outright, and it is yet another weapon in the Christian's arsenal of elenctic arguments for which secular philosophy cannot answer.

[I've tried to make this post as short as possible even though I think I could make the thought contained herein clearer, because I wanted to put the point as simply as possible before I forgot it.]

P. S. Should anyone ask how I know that this argument is self-affirming, I'd point him to the Bible..