Canon Closed

Someone recently asked me to explain why I thought the canon of Scripture is closed. I cited a few arguments for him from various authors and then summarized those arguments as follows:

The only explanation of what it can mean when Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:8 that prophecies, tongues, and knowledge will pass away and cease is that after the time of the apostles, the last of whom was Paul - as he was the last to whom Jesus appeared (1 Corinthians 15:8, cf. Hebrews 1:1-2) and therefore he who was to fill up the word of God (Colossians 1:24-26) - the purpose of divine revelation was fulfilled. The apostles laid a foundation to which no other [revealed] knowledge was needed in addition, for what had been revealed was complete or sufficient (2 Timothy 3:16-17) as opposed to that partial, orally disseminated knowledge which accompanying apostolic signs were designated to validate or attest (Hebrews 2:1-2).

If God is speaking to individuals today, this information would be binding on the consciences of all Christians. This is a serious claim which requires answers to at least these following questions:

How are such claims to be verified? Can anyone point to an actual, verified case?

What answer to the question of why God would speak to an individual today could be given which does not impinge on the formal and material sufficiency of Scripture?

Do such claims presuppose the necessity of apostolic succession, and if so, can such succession be identified?

The Good Work of Philosophy

I only just noticed that some of the material from my essay submission to this year's TrinityFoundation contest was not included in what is published on their website (link). I forgot that in many of the essays which place, what is shown is excerpted from the whole. So, whether for the sake of brevity or because I wrote something which they found to be unjustified (which is possible), my critique of rationalism, conclusion on secular epistemology, introduction to Clark's "Westminster Principle," criticism of logical positivism, and thoughts on biblical politics was left out. [I happen to think this was done for the sake of brevity, since the material I wrote on logical positivism in particular was uncontroversial.] Since some of this material will be relevant to a future post I plan to write, I have here reproduced the full essay:

The Good Work of Philosophy

Christians are in need of an apologetic which can thoroughly equip them for the good work of guarding the gospel against those deceptive philosophies by which men are never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Anyone who has attempted to organize a defense of the faith quickly realizes that it is no small task, as one must successfully integrate diverse fields of study like science, ethics, politics, history, and religion. Gordon Clark, a 20^th century Calvinist whose goal was to elucidate such a philosophy, argued that the center of the proverbial web to which each of these disciplines may be traced and by which each may be related to the others is a sound and uniquely Christian theory of knowledge.

Clark’s emphasis on the importance of epistemology as a means to a cohesive belief system is warranted, for to any assertion pertaining to science et. al., the question may be “properly ask[ed], How do you know?”[1] This poignant question is sufficient to refute skeptics who contradict themselves when they claim they cannot know truth, exposes as question-begging statements and actions which advocate a so-called suspension of judgment, and inevitably shapes one’s meta-epistemological thoughts regarding the nature and structure of knowledge itself.

Clark, for instance, contended that “knowledge means the possession of truth”[2] and that truth is “propositions that are consistent.”[3] The criteria to which one can refer to verify that he possesses truth is outlined by Clark in his various works, and a summary of it here will serve as a useful foundation for understanding Clark’s analysis of secular and Christian philosophies as presented in his Wheaton lectures.

Briefly, propositions can be separated into one of two geometrical categories: epistemic axioms and theorems.[4] One can know a theorem is true if it is contained in the body of propositions validly deducible from an axiom which yields a self-attesting, consistent philosophical system in which the ground and means of knowledge are explicated. Hence, while axioms by definition cannot be proven, there is nevertheless a mutual dependency inherent in the relationship between an axiom and its respective theorems. “By the systems they produce, axioms must be judged.”[5] As a theorem can be discredited if it does not follow from a purported axiom, an axiom can be falsified if it bears contradictories.

There are those who accuse Clark of impracticality for demanding that a worldview meet these requirements. Consistency, it is alleged, is an unrealistic, unachievable ideal. In response to such complaints, one can do no more than highlight the chaotic arbitrariness which would ensue if one were to insist on clinging to a self-defeating position. What deserve greater attention are secular axioms – some of which are unfortunately shared by some religious philosophers – chosen for the purpose of acquiring objective knowledge. For despite the impressive number of knowledge claims secular systems have accumulated over time, they are collectively only as rational as the first principle from which they are derived; if one’s axiom is demonstrated to be unsound, then all of his beliefs predicated on it are groundless.

It may be for his survey of these axioms that Clark is most well-known. Due to the continuing popularity of underlying principles first expounded by Aristotle, Clark’s critiques of empiricism have particularly elicited significant replies. Clark believed no empiricist has yet provided satisfactory answers to the difficulties attendant to a theory in which sensation is said to be the means of knowledge. To concisely sketch a few illustrations:

· The capriciousness of individuation: “…for Empiricists… the physical continuum and the Heraclitean flux prevent the identification and even the existence of individuals.”[6]

· Incorporeality: “…if sensory experience cannot deal with mountains and bears, much less can it account for… the ethical concept of justice and the mathematical concept of cube.”[7]

· Inductivism: “…universal judgments… are impossible, because no one has experienced all the past nor any of the future.”[8]

· The arbitrariness of inferences: “In Empiricism there is no reason for choosing six or eight sensations out of the fifty or a hundred we have at any one time and combining these six into the perception of a thing.”[9]

Moreover, these aforementioned problems presuppose that sensation is objective, reliable, self-attesting, and extensive, concessions Clark was by no means willing to vouchsafe.[10] Depending on the qualifications specific to a given empiricist, perplexities may even be multiplied. Any one of these points would corroborate Clark’s inference that empiricism is a futile epistemology; cumulatively, they are conclusive.

Contrarily, it is noteworthy that Clark was able to qualifiedly agree with some key ideas found in rationalism as “exemplified by Plato and Hegel.”[11] Contrary to the incoherence of pluralism, Hegelianism and theism both “hold that everything must be related to everything else in some way; there are no two things utterly independent, though… they may nonetheless be distinct.”[12] Also, because “all thought and speech depend on classification… no epistemology can succeed without something like the Platonic Ideas.”[13]

What both Hegel and Plato have in common with Clark is the recognition that omniscience is an epistemic necessity. Unfortunately, neither Hegel nor Plato adequately details how man accesses omniscience. Plato suggested that man’s senses occasion reminiscence of a part of the innate omniscience with which he was born. “The difficulty is that… sensation stimulates different notions in different people… The failure of Platonism… to ascend from Earth to Heaven leaves the theory ineffective.”[14] Hegelianism, due to its dialectic, maintains that knowledge of a given concept requires knowledge of the way in which it relates to other concepts. Clark pointed out that if such were true, “…we cannot know one relationship without knowing all. Obviously we do not know all. Therefore we know nothing.”[15]

From these considerations, one could argue Clark applied at least a variation of the following elenctic argument against rationalism in particular and secular philosophy in general. To claim to know a given proposition is true without knowing that another proposition is true begs the question: if truth is “a logically ordered series,”[16] it could be that the truth value of a given proposition depends on the truth value of a different proposition. For man to know even one proposition, then, he must either know all propositions or rely on one who does – one whose knowledge must be eternal, comprehensive, and intuitive.

As was seen, locating omniscience in man fails. Attempts to do so were not entirely fruitless, for they highlighted a philosophical problem in need of addressing and acted as a foil against which Clark was able to credibly propose his own axiom for scrutiny; namely, “the Bible is the Word of God.”[17] Faith in an omniscient God whose revelation is necessary for man to know [Him] was Clark’s reasonable alternative to secular axioms which, since they lead to inconsistencies, cannot function as a basis for an epistemic system. It now must be determined whether or not the propositions contained in Scripture can justifiably be said to comprise that which one is presently able to know.

If Clark’s Westminster Principle is to be taken seriously, “there is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible.”[18] Scripture is full of statements affirming its divine origin (2 Timothy 3:16, 2 Peter 1:19-21). Inter-textual analysis (Hebrews 1:1-3, 2 Peter 3:15-16) and divine illumination (John 10:3-5, 26-27) constitute the means by which one becomes enlightened as to the extent and contents of the canon. The role of sensation in Clark’s system is, at most, as an occasional stimulant God uses to mediate knowledge to men’s minds. As God perspicuously spoke to the patriarchs and Jesus to His disciples, the Spirit unequivocally communicates God’s eternal word to modern men through Scripture.

Indeed, the purpose of language is that believers might be able to worship God in truth (John 4:24). If man’s knowledge is merely analogical to God’s, not only would it be impossible to worship Him, but it would also connote that men are skeptics or that they know a proposition which God doesn’t. Either of these deductions would be fatal to Christianity. Providentially, there is no indication that exhortations to grow in knowledge (Colossians 1:10, 2 Peter 3:18) refer to a subspecies of truth, and that one becomes a participant in the divine nature itself by knowledge of God[’s word] necessitates that what men know is univocal with what God knows (2 Peter 1:3-4).

In fact, man was created in God’s image (Genesis 1:26-27). God is truth and logic (John 1:1, 14:6), so one would expect that in these respects the structure of man’s mind mirrors that of God. Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10 confirm that man was created originally righteous. Furthermore, because he naturally possessed knowledge and righteousness, Adam must also have been concreated with the a priori equipment necessary in order to think logically and rightly.

Sin distorted man as the image of God, but he still retains the distinction (Genesis 9:6, Acts 17:28). The image of God, then, must refer to the rational faculty. Unregenerate individuals are by nature extensively depraved because their thinking is, at root, fallacious, but they are still able to understand and construct valid arguments. Restitution of the divine image now requires that man become a new creation (2 Corinthians 5:17). This renewal by the Spirit and word of truth conforms man to the image of Christ, the Logos in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Colossians 2:3). Saving faith in the last Adam obtained by this regeneration, far from being blind, is actually the result of man for the first time being able to see (2 Corinthians 4:4-6).

Logical thinking, then, must be continuously exercised by Christians. As Jesus said, “A disciple is not above his teacher, but everyone when he is fully trained will be like his teacher” (Luke 6:40). Jesus is the teacher, and the sword of the Spirit is the tool with which He instructs a believer to be furnished for every good work (2 Timothy 3:17). Sanctification is by the truth, not an analogy thereof (John 17:17). Upon glorification, the Christian’s transformation will be complete and confirmed, but until then, he must live in and deal with a fallen world. For though their epistemic axioms are erroneous, secularists are still influential. Thus, it will be useful to compare secular ideologies to what Scripture has to say on science, ethics, politics, history, and religion.

In discussing the purpose of science, the previous remarks on empiricism must be remembered. While scientific discoveries cannot produce knowledge, it is often the case that they trigger belief. For example, Hume famously observed that correlation does not imply causation, and yet it is customary to assume a uniformity of nature. Rather than viewing an artificial experiment as a bearer of truth, Clark regarded the purpose of science as “manipulation”[19] or “an attempt to utilize nature for our needs and wants… not a way to any knowledge.”[20] Because Clark accepted that God has determined all of man’s thoughts – his opinions as well as his knowledge – man’s responsibility is to intentionally act on those thoughts in a godly manner. Such does not depend on the possibility of empirical knowledge. One may, by scientific procedures, come to believe something upon which he must accordingly make a choice. What is important in the realm of practical theology is the intention of the choice made in conjunction with one’s belief, not whether or not the belief is true.

This leads to the question of ethics, a less compromising subject. After all, either one is obliged to obey a given precept or he is not. Ethical dialogue can, however, lead to confusion if one does not carefully define his terms. Is good that which one ought to do, or is that which one ought to do good? To be more precise, what principles ought one to follow, if any? It seems intuitively obvious that rape and murder are unethical, but ethical relativists or emotionalists would have to acknowledge that one may validly consider them to be good.

A. J. Ayer, consistent with verificationism and Positivism, taught that ethical posits are neither true nor false. “Ought” and “should” statements are emotive. Stevenson, another logical positivist, contributed to this theory by explaining that emotivism does not preclude a means of ethical dialogue. By distinguishing between facts and preferences, Stevenson commented that increasing one another’s awareness of facts can only provoke beneficial conversation. But Stevenson too realized that fundamental differences in preferences are irresolvable. As such, some logical positivists bite the bullet and accept moral nihilism. One will not usually encounter persons who will admit that murder and rape are amoral choices – and in any case, one can always point out that ethics as well as science is tied to epistemology – so it may be permissible to pass over these rarities for a more representative stance.

Utilitarianism, possibly the most widely acclaimed secular position, is an ethical theory which defines “good” along a spectrum. A choice which causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest good, and a choice which causes the greatest pain to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest evil. This understanding of good and evil leads to irrationality. As a form of consequentialism, choices made by Utilitarians must be prospectively amoral; since one cannot know the future consequences of his choice, choices are arbitrary. Possibilities of future consequences also suggest that the moral value of any choice is subject to change at any instant. Even [relatively] simple knowledge of all the ways in which a past choice has affected present reality is itself a problem, as one would need to be omniscient to know his calculations are both accurate and exhaustive. Another problem is that in order to judge the comparative “goodness” of one’s choice, one would need to know counter-factuals; ironically, such is only possible by divine revelation. There are still more complications when one considers, within a Utilitarian framework, whether or not one individual’s pleasure could qualitatively exceed the sum pleasure of many, whether or not it is proper to state minorities possess rights, and whether or not utilitarianism can escape the demerits of empiricism, inductivism, and subjectivism. Given the extremely relativistic and flawed nature of Utilitarianism, one may well believe the demise of Utilitarianism would maximize the pleasure of those who sincerely desire to be moral.

In short, secularism fails to forward a legitimate theory of ethics because it cannot solve issues like Hume’s is-ought dilemma, the problem of suicide, and moral authoritativeness. Christianity can and does. God, as the creator of all things, made things to be as they are. God created men with the intention that they be responsible to obey His precepts, and so men are (Romans 9:19-21). The chief end of man is to glorify God by following His commandments (1 John 5:3). As a matter of fact, the chief end of God is to glorify Himself in all that He does (Romans 9:22-23, Ephesians 3:10). Consequently, the problem of evil is no problem at all, for sin can function as a means by which God’s glory – His power, wrath, compassion, mercy, grace, wisdom, etc. – is manifested.

Although God is ultimately sovereign, He has seen fit to authorize subordinate institutions such as church and government to dispense discipline and regulations to discourage sin. While a comprehensive political theory was not the focus of the authors of Scripture, there are statements pertinent to private ownership (Acts 5:4) and duties (Genesis 9:6, Romans 13:1-7) which make it possible to delimit the power and design of government (Daniel 6:7-10, Acts 4:19).

Forasmuch as many grumble that Clark’s theory of knowledge is unrealistic, when it comes to matters of science, ethics, and politics, it is more often the secular philosopher than the Christian who must assume an ideal reality. Forced submission is the logical end of any secular society in which there can be found differences in opinions. Totalitarianism or majority rules have historically conquered individual “rights.” Even the hypothetical alternative, anarchism, presupposes an optimistic view of human nature which is simply not historically tenable.

The philosophy of history itself is a matter of debate in secularist circles. Some naively think that history – or any study – can be approached objectively or without presuppositions. Those who admit that history is tinged with an author’s bias are at least honest. Subject matter, source material, significance, and attributed causes are all subjectively chosen by the writer. And, just as with any other topic, history must fit within a coherent epistemic system. The tentativeness of science and the historic horrors which secular philosophers largely ignore have to be accounted for by the historian.

The theistic account of history is somewhat varied and determined by broader religious beliefs. Neo-orthodox theologians, because they consider Scripture to be a human record of divine acts, posit Scripture is fallible and even mistaken on a few points. Additionally, some of the events recorded in Scripture are for didactic purposes only; that is, events need not be assumed to have literally occurred. That these “scholars” do not have immediate recourse to an omniscient God is enough to epistemologically disqualify their view on the nature and hermeneutic of Scripture. It is confusing, though, that one would so highly esteem a source which admits errors. These being the same sorts of individuals who utilize the law of non-contradiction in order to deny it, however, maybe it should not come as surprising. Notwithstanding, the more historical Christian perspective discerns the progressively revealed, cyclically patterned, and eschatological character of history as told by God (Romans 11:36).

In comparison to the assertions made by secularists, what can be extrapolated from Scripture may seem relatively small. More important than this, however, is that a Christian can substantiate his claims. “…whatever knowledge revelation gives us, however restricted, is to be received with thanksgiving.”[21] Or, in the joyous words of the Psalmist, “the sum of Your word is truth, and every one of Your righteous ordinances is everlasting” (Psalm 119:160). Because the Axiom of Revelation satisfies the preconditions for knowledge, “…secular philosophy is not a greater failure than revelational philosophy is a success.”[22]

---

[1] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 28.

[2] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 33.

[3] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 149.

[4] cf. Gordon Clark, Thales to Dewey pg. 88.

[5] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 53.

[6] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 32.

[7] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 33.

[8] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 34.

[9] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 34.

[10] cf. Gordon Clark, Language and Theology pgs. 132-134.

[11] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 29.

[12] Gordon Clark, Modern Philosophy pg. 288.

[13] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 29.

[14] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 30.

[15] Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy pg. 153.

[16] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 23.

[17] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 74.

[18] Gordon Clark, God’s Hammer pg. 3.

[19] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 40.

[20] Gordon Clark, Modern Philosophy pg. 76.

[21] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 56.

[22] Gordon Clark, Ibid. pg. 78.

Faith - Our Righteousness?

I was recently made aware of that [some] Roman Catholics think that faith itself is what is reckoned for righteousness in justification. Sometimes I get so caught up in wanting what Protestants believe about justification to be the center of discussion - doctrine is fortified or exposed when tested by the best counters an opponent has to offer - that I don't press enough to understand what others believe.

After hearing this contention made by more than one RC, all of whom I would consider to know well more than the average layman, I've decided to address it. I remembered reading a book by Piper called Counted Righteous in Christ some time ago which I thought dealt well with this notion of reckoned righteousness as consisting in belief in the gospel, so I thought to select a few arguments from Piper's book which I think illustrate its problematic nature:

1. In Romans 4:4-5, in which Paul contrasts two alternative views of the means by which righteousness could be reckoned to an individual, that which is reckoned in the first example, wages, is external to the individual['s works]. For Paul's "conceptual framework" to be consistent, then, must not the "gift [of righteousness]" (4:4; cf. 5:15-17) be received by means of faith (over against works) as something external to the individual['s faith]?

…So God’s imputation, in Gundry’s view, is not crediting an external, divine righteousness to Abraham, but counting something that he has, namely faith, to be his righteousness.

What seems out of sync with this interpretation is that Paul’s exposition of imputation, which immediately follows verse 3, gives us a conceptual framework for imputation very different from the one Gundry sees in verse 3. Paul speaks immediately in terms of something external (a wage) being credited to our account, rather than something internal (faith) being treated as righteousness. “Now to the one who works, his wage is not credited according to grace, but according to debt.” If Paul’s conceptual framework were the same as Gundry’s, and verse 3 implied to Paul that the credited righteousness consists of faith, then why would it enter Paul’s mind to illustrate this with the words, “To the one who works, his wage is not credited according to grace, but according to debt”? Why would he speak in terms of a wage (or a gift) from outside ourselves being credited to us by debt (or by grace)?

Would he not rather say something like, “Now to him who works, his works are credited as (= treated as) his righteousness according to debt (κατα όφείλημα, kata opheilēma)”? This would correspond nicely with verse 5 (“his faith is credited for righteousness”) if faith-credited-for-righteousness in fact means faith-treated-as-righteousness (which, I will try to show, it doesn’t). Thus Paul would accomplish what Gundry seems to think he wants: to show that our righteousness consists not of our works but does consist of our faith. But this is not the conceptual framework that Paul develops.

2. Piper cites several passages designed to show faith as the instrument to that by which we are reckoned righteous rather than that which is itself reckoned for righteousness (Romans 4:11, 10:10), and the points he makes in respect to each of these passages are worthy of consideration and more so when taken cumulatively, which is why I recommend the reader look at his analysis (pgs. 53-64 in particular in relation to this blog post). For the sake of brevity, however, I think that his best support for the general argument that Scripture teaches faith to be the instrument rather than the ground of justification is found in Philippians 3:9.

Another evidence that Paul does not intend for the phrase “faith is credited for righteousness” (4:5) to mean that our righteousness “consists of faith” (I, 8) is found in Philippians 3:8b-9.

I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them as rubbish in order that I might gain Christ, (9) and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God based on faith.

When Paul says that he aims to be found “in [Christ], not having a righteousness of my own,” does he mean that the righteousness he hopes to have in Christ is the righteousness that consists in his own faith? That is highly unlikely, because therighteousness that he aims to have is his by virtue of being “in Christ” (ἐν αὐτῷ, en autō) and is said to be “through faith” (διὰ πίστεως, dia pisteōs) and “based on faith” (ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει, epi tē pistei). The conceptual framework here is not that faith is our righteousness, but that, because of faith, we are united to Christ in whom we have a righteousness “from God” (τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ, tēn ek theou). This too supports our earlier conclusion that imputed righteousness is not “righteousness that consists in our faith,” but rather an external “righteousness credited to us because of our faith.”

Private Judgment

The accusation of "private judgment" has in my mind always been one of the weakest objections to Protestantism. Take, for example, the following line of argumentation from Bryan Cross (link):

When we approach Scripture, how do we determine what the Holy Spirit is saying? Either each individual is ultimately his own highest authority regarding what the Holy Spirit is saying, or that authority belongs to something outside the individual. In the former case, we are left with “private judgment,” and the endless fragmentation that must accompany it, as history shows. But the only plausible authority outside the individual, for determining what the Holy Spirit is saying in the Scriptures, is the Church.

What is meant by "determine" is ambiguous. It would be clearer if he answered the analogous question "how does Mr. Cross determine what the Roman magisterium is saying?" Nevertheless, here are the two most likely possibilities that come to mind:

1. Perhaps the question posed desires an answer to how one can understand what a communication - specifically, the communication of God through Scripture - means. Denigrating private judgment in this sense would be a plain attack on the divinely ordained function of language in general or special revelation in particular.

Of course, since at least one of Mr. Cross' collaborators thinks that [some] Scripture is incapable of being understood apart from ecclesiastic intermediaries (link), I suppose the latter actually could be what he meant by private judgment. Suffice it to say that the Protestant position is that the ability to understand Scripture is not only available to an elite few who in turn dumb down the message for their subordinates (Psalm 19:7); that is Gnostic.

To respond to the argument in the above link, in order for the argument against perspicuity to work, Nehemiah 8:1-8 must ironically be perspicuous. But to be clear, Nehemiah 8:1-8 doesn't say exposition was necessary for the people, though such certainly could have been conducive to their understanding and is further useful in that it demonstrates clarification and deduction from Scripture is legitimate. Most important to the present subject is the point that Nehemiah 8:1-8 is actually just an example of obedience to the prescription set down in Deuteronomy 31:9-13, a prescription in which Moses makes no mention of a need to speak anything more than what was written (cf. Joshua 8:30-35, 2 Kings 23:1-3, Nehemiah 9:1-3, etc.).

2. Perhaps private judgment refers to the process by which an individual decides to which of two or more mutually exclusive interpretations - one of which may make the most sense to the individual but all of which he understands - he will submit as authoritative. In this case, one can only take Mr. Cross' word that if his own judgment conflicted with that of the Roman magisterium, he would submit to the latter; in other words, he cannot definitively demonstrate to others that he is not one of the men alluded to in 2 Timothy 4:3-4. Finally, as John Robbins wrote in Slavery and Christianity (pg. 34):

The decisions not to think about certain subjects, to abandon one's own analysis, and to trust the Roman Catholic hierarchy in matters of faith and morals are themselves decisions of private judgment - rash, uninformed, and foolish, to be sure, but still private judgment. Those individual decisions, moreover, are not made once for all; they are made daily. The decision not to think about the most important matters is a private judgment that is made repeatedly by every subject of the Roman Church-State. The attack on private judgment is not only self-contradictory, it is also un-Biblical. Speaking to the multitudes, Christ Jesus himself commands them to think for themselves rather than rely on their religious leaders and experts: "Yes, and why, even of yourselves, do you not judge what is right?" (Luke 12:57).

A Short Point on Morality and Politics

If one points out to a moral relativist that on his view, totalitarianism as a political goal or voting according to personal religious beliefs - especially beliefs which conflict with the moral relativist's opinions - are both legitimate options, not infrequently he will quickly appeal to political "rights." When asked why one should respect his "rights" if morality is relative, he will quickly leave. Moral relativism means political relativism.

Clark's Lectures 4

Continuing with select citations from Clark's lectures and works, here are a few interesting quotes from his book Karl Barth’s Theological Method:

Operationalism

Page 66: “Let us not claim unanimity for the new outlook, but a fair number of philosophers and scientists have adopted the theory of operationalism. This type of thought denies that the laws of science describe the processes of the real world. Scientific concepts, instead of being transcripts of “antecedent being,” are merely plans for future laboratory procedure. They are directions for the use of apparatus in the production of some desired result.”

Axioms and Apologetics

Page 92: “…a Christian presupposition, first principle, or axiom produces logical consistency, while a secular presupposition can apagogically be shown to result in inconsistency.”

Page 95: “Axiomatization is simply the perfecting and exhibiting of the logical consistency of a system of thought. In view of Calvinism’s well known reputation for consistency, axiomatization and Calvinism should get along well together. The many theorems derived from the smallest possible number of axioms… And since the axioms, if there be several, depend for their meaning on their interrelationships, axiomatization would rule out the possibility of even a single axiom in common.”

Page 96: “There are two parts to the process [of the reductio]. First the apologete must show that the axioms of secularism result in self-contradiction… Then, second, the apologete must exhibit the internal consistency of the Christian system. When these two points have been made clear, the Christian will urge the unbeliever to repudiate the axioms of secularism and accept God’s revelation. That is, the unbeliever will be asked to change his mind completely, to repent.”

Page 97:“The initial implausibility of a thorough-going, all comprehensive system of axioms and theorems does not lie in the fact that it is a hitherto unrealized ideal. The implausibility rests on the contrast between the common opinion that the secular sciences are true, at least largely true, and the implication of Christian axiomatization that they are all completely false… the present point is simply that God is the origin of all truth. Then all truth is one and self-consistent. But if so, non-Christian systems of thought must be false...”

The Image of God and Apologetics

Page 100: “…Reformed theology, while denying a common epistemological ground, has always asserted a common psychological or ontological ground. Believer and unbeliever alike, though their philosophic axioms and theorems are totally incompatible, bear in their persons the image of God from creation. This image consists of or at least includes their ordinary rational ability as human beings and as an exercise of this rationality certain minimal theological and moral principles. These beliefs, dimly and inconsistently held, often submerged and repressed, can be thought of as a point of contact for the Gospel.”

Pages 102-103“In Reformed theology the defaced but not annihilated image of God is sinful man was never conceived as being an axiom common to two systems of thought. The image is a psychological, mental, ontological reality. It is an existing part of human nature…Faith is a mental activity and by definition presupposes a rational subject. Reason therefore can be considered to be an element common to believer and unbeliever; and if “apprehension” of the Word of God is the understanding of a divine message, then the image of God preserved from creation and the fall is a prerequisite thereto.

Man’s logical capacity is not the only constituent of God’s image. In addition there are a few simple theological and moral beliefs… we must admit the existence of unbelievers who actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths. Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge. Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of contact for the Gospel. What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans. Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of heathen responsibility.

Now, because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation.”

Innate Knowledge

Pages 104-105: “…the Gentiles in the first chapter of Romans were unbelievers. Even if they had heard Paul preach, they were still unbelievers, idolaters, and gross sinners. Yet it is of such people that Paul says, “Knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same but have pleasure in them that do them.” Therefore even on Barth’s exegesis the Pauline unbeliever has a belief in common with the man of faith… Now Paul indeed bases responsibility on knowledge, but he asserts that the heathen had knowledge, some knowledge at any rate; they tried to suppress it, but could not quite succeed. And even if it were Paul who “awakened” this knowledge in them, the implication would be that some remnant or potential knowledge had been lying dormant in their minds to be awakened. And, finally, to repeat, it is indubitable that the heathen and the unbeliever have this knowledge in common.”

People and Truth

Page 113: “If we can contradict ourselves at one point, cannot we do so at any and all points?”

Page 127: “Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? … Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? ”

Knowledge as Propositional

Page 130: “Knowledge and meaning always have the form of a proposition – or if significance is sometimes conveyed in an exclamation or a gesture, like shorthand, it may with little trouble be put into the ordinary sentence structure of a proposition. To prove that he knows botany, a student must make certain statements, often on an examination sheet, such as, “apples grow on trees and belong to the Rosaceae.” If he cannot make any such statements, he flunks and everyone concludes that he knows nothing about botany. It is no different when persons are the objects of knowledge… the distinction between a man and his work is an impossible abstraction; when one praises or condemns a work, he praises or condemns a man at the same time. This knowledge is obviously propositional… Knowledge consists of propositions, of predicates related to subjects, i.e., of truths. The meaning which the words designate is the object of knowledge. To talk of a different inner meaning, not itself a proposition, never proclaimed or thought, is a trait of irrationalism.”

Page 150: “In opposition to subjective idealism Plato made the point, a good point too, that if we think, we must think something, and something that exists. But when this existing object of thought is imagined to be like a physical object, instead of being a truth or proposition, the theory becomes impossible.”

Christianity and Rationality

Page 115: “…Christianity rightly so-called is a rational and intelligible religion. Whatever of zeal, devotion, volition, or even emotion it may have, it is fundamentally intellectual. It brings information. Otherwise it would not meet human need, human need of salvation from sin. Irrationalism is a travesty on human nature, on communion between God and man, and on God himself.”

Pages 174-175: “Two things are equally essential to Christianity: certain historical events and their correct theological explanation. If Jesus did not visibly die on the cross at a definite time and place, Christianity is false; but also Christianity is equally false if that event is not to be interpreted as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice. Historical event and theological explanation are equally essential.”

Page 224: “Christianity is rational because the God who made the Bible his revelation declares that he is a rational Being of wisdom and understanding. He created man in his own rational image; and these two rationalities, if they are to communicate at all, must because of their nature communicate intelligible. Undoubtedly there exist religions of emotion and mysticism, non-Christian religions they are; but let them remain silent, for they have nothing to say, and any noise they make conveys no message. There are also devout but confused minds who, combining elements of different sorts, are inconsistent in their beliefs. Such minds, however refined and agreeable they may be personally, should either hate the one and love the other, or else hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and unintelligibility.

Christianity is rational and rationality requires verbal inspiration. When God, the rational God, speaks to his rational creatures, he must, we insist, speak the truth. His word cannot be false… To insist that God’s words cannot be false, even to the jot and tittle, gives man no control over God; it is merely the expression of God’s nature and man’s need. No rational ground whatever can support the proposition that God speaks falsities. Of course, a man of the Enlightenment, denying that God spoke the Bible, might construct a religion of human invention; but the Bible claims that its words are God’s truth words, so that no theologian can be both Biblical and rational if he rejects verbal inspiration.”

Clark's Lectures 3

Here are a few quotes I found to be interesting from Clark's Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? Though some of the points are particularly well argued, because I don't necessarily agree with everything written, so I've refrained from commenting on anything.

Commands, Emotions, Faith, and Volition

Pages 20-21: “Does the Bible indicate that God is subject to sudden, involuntary, non-intellectual upheavals in his usually calm state of mind? Well, hardly. The Westminster Confession, the best summary of the contents of the Bible, says that God is without parts or passions. Parts refers to bodily organs. Bodies have parts, minds do not. But God is also without passions. The word passion, in more modern terminology affection, is wider than the term emotion but includes the latter. A passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force. A dog is affected by a whipping; a student is affected, sometimes, by the possibility of a good grade. There are modern psychology books written about “the affective consciousness.” But God is not affected by anything. Of, in another translation of the Greek term, God does not “suffer” anything.

On the contrary, not only the Westminster Confession, but all or nearly all the historic creeds says that God is immutable. He does not change. Emotion, however, is a sudden, involuntary change. To have emotions would be inconsistent with God’s eternal state of blessedness.

Now, someone may say that God loves and that love is an emotion. But with respect to love, two points must be made. First, God’s love is eternal, therefore not a sudden change, therefore not an emotion. Second, God commands us to love him. A command requires voluntary obedience. Therefore the love God commands is volitional, not emotional. Doubtless God commands the impossible. He commands us to keep his law perfectly. This we cannot do because of sin. The impossibility arises from us; it does not arise from any irrationality in the commands. God commands the impossible, but he does not command the absurd.”

The Trinity and Absolute Divine Simplicity

Page 28: “The doctrine of the Trinity is found only in the Biblical revelation. No one would ever have thought of it, no one ever did think of it, apart from the Bible. True, some philosophers had three-fold sets of principles. Plato had the world of Ideas, the Demiurge, and chaotic Space. But this is not a tri-personal divine being. Plotinus has something similar. He spoke of the One, the Ideas, and the Soul. But he also had a Logos and a lower world. The whole was continuous. There is no tri-personal supreme being. Plotinus’s One does not think and cannot know. Neo-Platonism is not at all similar to Trinitarian Christianity.”

Propitiation

Pages 49-50: “Even the covenant with Noah, which the dispensationalists try to reduce to politics, and in which they see no reference to the Atonement, speaks of placating an angry God. This idea is obscured in the King James version, and the American version as well. These translations say that God smelled a sweet odor. But the Koehler-Baumgartner lexicon (the latest lexicon at this writing) gives just one meaning to the Hebrew word transliterated niychoach: appeasement (Beschwichtigung). The “smell of appeasement” then means the placating odor. See also the verbal usage in Ezekiel 5:13, “I will appease my anger.” Hence the correct translation of Genesis 8:20-21 is, “And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord… and offered burnt offerings on the altar. And the Lord smelled the placating odor.” Thus anticipations of Christ’s sacrifice in the Old Testament and explanations of his sacrifice in the New agree that he was the propitiation for our sins. He turned aside God’s wrath and anger which we deserved.”

Scripture and Inerrancy, Science and Operationalism

Pages 57-58: “It seems to me that a misunderstanding of science at this point has led the author into a misunderstanding of the Bible. If the Bible contradicts itself, as clearly as the wave theory contradicts the corpuscular theory, we will be forced to abandon the Bible. No one in his right mind can believe contradictions. In fact, if the antinomy is as he says it is, God himself is faced with an insoluble puzzle. And if something is insoluble for God, then God cannot be trusted. Packer tells us that God has given us this antinomy and if he has given it to us, is that not enough? Cannot we trust God? The answer is that we cannot trust contradictions and insoluble antinomies, no matter who gives them to us. If someone told me to believe that the number two was both even and odd, I would conclude that this someone was not God. God, anyone I could not think of as God, does not talk nonsense, and insoluble antinomies are nonsense. They are just as much nonsense as it would be to say that the path of a point equidistant from a given point has three right angles along it.

But if we see what modern science can do with its two theories of light, and if we pay just a little attention to sovereignty and responsibility, these unfortunate consequences never arise. The laws of science should not be considered as intended descriptions of natural motions. They should not be considered as directions for operating in a physics laboratory. They are methods for producing desired results. This in brief is The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God. It is always possible to use either of two mutually exclusive methods for producing the same desired result. To cure milk fever in cows, one may use the antiseptic lugol, or one may use compressed air. Both work satisfactorily. Hence, in manipulating light, a physicist may use either one; or if for a particular purpose the two are not equally satisfactory, for lugol cannot do everything compressed air can do and vice versa, the physicist can use for one purpose and the other for another.”

Language and Internal Relations

Page 66: “There are many who in that day will say to Christ, Lord, Lord. And he will profess, I never knew you. Thus, clearly, a verbal profession of Lord is not saving faith. One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell.”

The Cause of Faith

Page 77: “How God gives a man faith is very easily explained. God gives a dead sinner faith just the way Jesus made dead Lazarus come out of the tomb. Just as God said, Let there be light, and there was light. That is all the how there is. It is an act of omnipotence: the exceeding greatness of his might power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.”

The Nature of Faith:

Choice and Assent; Volitional, Decisional, Obedient

Page 76: “Faith certainly involves an act of will. It is the decision to believe what one understands.”

Page 79:”But often evidence, witnesses, and historical documents are mistaken. Shall I believe them in this case? The evidence does not compel belief, but I may choose to believe, or I may choose not to believe.”

Page 81: “What is needed for saving faith is God’s gracious act of giving him the power to will. When God gives him this power, he will assent, believe, and exercise faith. Faith indubitably is the gift of God. It is the gift of voluntary assent. That an unregenerate man cannot believe does not contradict any of this.”

Page 83: “I regret Calvin, a giant among pygmies, said that assent comes from the heart and not the head. This distinction is unscriptural; the Bible nowhere opposes heart to head, for it does not mention this “head.” Naturally assent comes from the heart because all psychological actions of a person come from the heart. There is nothing else for them to come from.

Aside from this unfortunate slip, Calvin proceeds to say that assent is the obedience of faith. Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will. No pious additions are necessary, for the assent itself is already pious.”

Page 85: “Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. The person who does not assent to the Gospel, the persecutor Saul for example, must assent to propositions regarding the Hebrew or Greek usage of the word Lord, if he is to understand “Jesus is Lord,” and react with a persecutor’s zeal.”

Page 86: “Hodge, however, continues, “But if the question be, What is the act or state of mind which is required in the Gospel, when we are commanded to believe, the answer is very difficult.”

How can it be very different? If faith generically is intelligent assent, every species of faith must be also.”

Assurance

Page 91: “Just because a person believes that he is saved is an insufficient reason for thinking that he is saved. It may be suggested for sober consideration whether or not those who are most easily assured of salvation are least likely to be saved.

Nevertheless, in spite of all hypocrisy and self-deception, it is possible to have assurance.”

Page 94: “Without minimizing the other items in this list, it is well to emphasize knowledge. If one wishes assurance, he will try to increase his knowledge. Knowledge is mentioned trice in the section. Therefore, if one wishes assurance that he is regenerated, let him ask himself, Do I study the Scripture? How much of it do I know? Some people know so very little; some people believe so very little; some evangelists must have so very little assurance.”

The Mode of Baptism

Page 106: “In Daniel 4:33, i.e, LXX 4:30, one of the Greek words used to say that Nebuchadnezzar was wet with dew is baptizo. I can hardly think that this was immersion. Mark 7:4 says that couches were baptized. It seems to me that this means they were washed. In Hebrews 9:10, 13, 19, 21, the several baptisms (King James, washings) were done by sprinkling. In I Corinthians 10:2 the Israelites were baptized, but the Egyptians were immersed. Similarly in I Peter 3:21, Noah was baptized, but the wicked were immersed.”

Transmission

Page 108: “A scribe might make a few mistakes in copying the Word of God, but we would still have substantially the Word of God. The difference is between a correct copy of error and a slightly incorrect copy of truth. I cannot agree that the latter is useless.”

The Theological Necessity of A Priori Divine Revelation

Page 108: “I begin with a question, the basic question. Is there a God? If there is, can I know Him? My answer to this question, If there is a God, I cannot know it unless He tells me about Himself. I can study His doing, Nature; but what shall my conclusion about God be? That He is kind and benevolent? Or that Nature is vicious and careless? I think it is obvious that whatever I see in Nature, and whichever I emphasize, will be for reasons of personal experience and inclination.”

Pages 111-112: “It would seem from several things you say that there are a number of statements in the Bible that contradict your world-view. In fact, you immediately suggest that you would not accept this or that if it contradicted your total experience. Hence, in answer to my question in my last letter, How do you decide to accept some of the Bible’s statements and reject others? You answer that you test the Bible by your experience; you do not accept something as true, just because the Bible says it. But you develop a criterion from experience and measure the Bible by that criterion.

In your total experience you are reading the Bible. You say, “It tells me there is a God… It tells me God revealed himself… It tells me of a Resurrection.” But if you do not accept the truth of propositions on the basis of the Bible’s assertion, you cannot accept these points without confirmation from experience.”

Recognition of the Scope of the Canon

Page 113: “But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth.”