The Philosophy of Gordon Clark

Over the course of his life, Gordon Haddon Clark, a 20^th century Calvinist, earned a Doctorate in Philosophy, wrote several dozen books, was an ordained, Presbyterian minister, and taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Wheaton College, Butler University, and Calvin College.[1] As an apologist, a chief goal of his was to demonstrate that a Christian worldview can rationally integrate diverse fields of study such as epistemology, theology, metaphysics, linguistics, ethics, and science. To that end, Clark successfully developed a philosophical system commonly referred to as Scripturalism, the central tenet of which may be said to be that the Protestant canon comprises the sole, extant source of knowledge available to man.[2]

Fundamental to Clark’s defense of this, his first principle, was his understanding that epistemology, the study of knowledge, “is the crucial point in philosophy.”[3] Everyone, even the skeptic, espouses a theory of knowledge – if not in word, then in deed. Furthermore, unique to a particular theory of knowledge will be a [set of] presupposition[s] from which all other non-arbitrarily accepted propositions are purportedly derived: “The demonstration of a proposition, such as any theorem in geometry, is completed only when it is referred to the axioms. If the axioms in turn required demonstration, the demonstration of the proposition with which we began would remain incomplete…”[4]

Why Clark accepted the first principle he did is, in fact, a question which lacks specificity. As a Calvinist, Clark believed that one could assent to the aforementioned “axiom of revelation” – or an approximate variation thereof – only by divine causation.[5] However, necessary though it may be for one to be able both to show his first principle is self-attesting and to account for the historical process by which he came to accept it, it is important to realize that such cannot circularly function as justificatory premises by which the first principle oxymoronically becomes a conclusion. Clark accordingly recognized that the concept of a first principle begs the question as to how to evaluate two or more mutually exclusive first principles.[6] In answer to this dilemma, Clark, rather than appealing to an indubitably self-evident postulate as do some rationalists, held that one could judge them by gauging the consistency amongst the propositions pertaining to the respectively educed systems.[7]

Appropriately, Clark utilized apagogic argumentation in order to falsify alternative first principles.[8] As a mathematician might attempt to show a particular theorem is false because it yields a contradiction, so too Clark’s choice method of epistemic refutation was a reductio ad absurdum. It therefore appears that Clark subscribed to a sort of synthesis between classical foundationalism and coherentism insofar as he asserted a unification of first principles with a coherence theory of truth, which is to say that an epistemological system must be both grounded and consistent. Thus, “…if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent while others are self-contradictory, who can deny us, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle?”[9]

Additionally, Clark tentatively stated the following: “…there is a theory that the ultimate test of truth is coherence, and on this theory it would be impossible to have two self-consistent, mutually contradictory philosophies... One might hold that all other theories of truth lead to skepticism.”[10] In other words, a thoroughly consistent epistemic system might suffice as a precondition for knowledge. Of course, in order for Clark to have known this hypothesis, it would have to have followed from his first principle, and insofar as the Bible implicitly claims to, as the presently available disclosure of an eternally omniscient and intuitively knowledgeable God, possess a monopoly on truth, Clark could have consistently believed that.[11] Appearances to the contrary would simply evidence insufficient acquaintance with the relevant intricacies of the systems in question.

When Clark engaged particular epistemological positions, he did so with the understanding that the falsification of any first principle necessitates the falsification of that which is said to follow from it. This evidences just how highly Clark regarded the significance of epistemology. Two persons who believe the same proposition in the context of different first principles must believe the proposition for different reasons. Hence, common belief provides a point of contact whereby two worldviews may apagogically interact but belies the fact that whichever first principle yields contradictories or insufficient epistemic explanatory power is a worldview which must be unsound. For that reason, Clark primarily focused on analyzing a given system’s material relevant to its theory of knowledge, although he did not consider it unworthy to, for the sake of thoroughness, examine the metaphysical, ethical, or scientific posits of a falsified first principle.[12]

Clark may be most well-known for his criticisms of the epistemological proposals of secular philosophers. Because it seems he considered the majority of religious philosophy to implicitly rely on similar constructions and because it follows that if one’s epistemology is disproved then his [religious] beliefs are correlatively disproved – at least in that they cannot be justified – Clark’s epistemological assessments can be broadly categorized as applying to one of the following: irrationalism, empiricism, rationalism, and dogmatism (i.e. Scripturalism).[13]

Clark used “irrationalism” as an umbrella term to designate the Greek skeptics, those associated with existential reaction to Hegelian rationalism, and pragmatists.[14] Clark’s reason for subsuming each of these individual movements under one term was that each is epistemologically set against the idea knowledge can be certain; they are, in a word, anti-philosophy.[15] Adducing Augustine’s reply to his contemporary skeptics, Clark’s criticism of irrationalism is succinctly stated in the following:

The skeptics call propositions false, doubtful, probable, and plausible. Their basic principle, however, does not in consistency permit them to use any of these terms. A false proposition is one opposite to the truth… A doubtful proposition is one that might possibly be true; a probable or plausible proposition resembles or approximates the truth. But it is impossible to apply these terms without knowing the truth by which they are determined.[16]

Irrationalism leads to self-contradiction, as some members themselves admit.[17] “Knowledge means the possession of truth.”[18] “Logic is the science of necessary inference.”[19] Because “unnecessary inference arrives at no truth at all,” knowledge is impossible for he who repudiates logic.[20] If irrationalism is accepted, it is rejected.

Due to its popularity over the course of his lifetime, Clark’s critiques of empiricism – particularly, that advanced by Locke, Berkeley, and the logical positivists, among others – have received ample attention. As an expert in ancient philosophy, Clark was well acquainted with Heraclitean flux, Zeno’s paradoxes, and other theories hypothesized as long as two thousand years ago which could be used to show empiricism is unsound.[21] In fact, Clark’s theological contemporaries thought he took the arguments of the Greek skeptics too seriously.[22] But though Clark believed that no empiricist has yet provided satisfactory answers to these difficulties, he by no means relied on the appraisals of others. Examples of his arguments against empiricism can only be briefly sketched:

· The solipsistic subjectivity of sensation: “What one person sees as red and green, another sees as two shades of gray, or maybe not even as two shades.”[23]

· The unreliability of sensation: “…optical illusions, tricks in perspective, color blindness, and then the too definite and too manifold distinctions in colors that other people call hallucinations, fill elementary textbooks on psychology.”[24]

· The arbitrariness of inferences: “…at any one time a person has dozens of alleged sensations. In order to get a perception you have to combine some of them. On what basis do you make the combination?”[25]

Further problems which could be included: the incomprehensibility of a blank mind; the capriciousness of individuation; the insolubility of Hume’s is-ought dilemma; the possibility that there are more than five senses; the ambiguity of the process whereby concepts are abstracted from sensation; the perplexing and inconsistent nature of images and memory; incommunicability via ostensive definition; the artificiality and presumed accuracy of experimental conditions and instrumentation; the confutation of correlation and causation; the fallacy of induction; the inability to distinguish whether an observation or a hypothesis (or both) has been falsified; the necessary tentativeness of conclusions.[26] Depending on the qualifications made by a given empiricist, these frictions could be multiplied, and even if several are resolved by admitting empiricism is not compatible with them (e.g. induction; ethics), close examination of the majority portend the truth of Clark’s illation.

The final alternative worldview Clark scrutinized was rationalism, especially that of Plato, the seventeenth century rationalists, Kant, and Hegel.[27] Although he disagreed that knowledge can be defended by means of reasoning apart from divine revelation, Clark respected the seriousness, intensity, and brilliant insights each of these philosophers contributed to the history of epistemology. Unlike some allegedly presuppositionless empiricists and the illogical irrationalists, rationalists, like Clark, emphasized logical consistency and first principles. While Clark tended to individually inspect the soundness of the systems rather than rationalism as a whole, he believed it was “exemplified by Plato and Hegel.”[28] By observing what Clark considered to be the principal faults common to each of these philosophers, it may then be possible to conclude on what basis Clark rejected rationalism in toto.

A distinctive characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy was the thesis-antithesis-synthesis. As a proponent of absolute monism, Hegel held that the definition of a concept entails knowledge of its relationship to all other concepts. For instance, the meaning of “cat” includes the idea that it is “not-a-dog,” “not-a-tree,” etc. Clark noted the fatal flaw of this philosophy: “…we cannot know one relationship without knowing all. Obviously we do not know all. Therefore we know nothing.”[29] Hegelianism, therefore, cannot be accepted.

Plato, on the other hand, is perhaps most famous for his theory of Ideas, something Clark thought must, in some form or another, be affirmed in order to avoid nominalism. According to this theory, the possibility of classifications or genera stem from the fact there is an archetypal world of Ideas after which the world in which we live is patterned. The identification of two individual creatures as horses or two different figures as triangles presupposes an archetypal horse or triangle. While Clark believed this to be more or less true, he argued Plato could not account for the way in which one validly accesses these archetypes: “The failure of Platonism… to ascend from Earth to Heaven leaves the theory ineffective. Man before birth may have been omniscient, but here below the Platonic case in which man is a prisoner actually has no opening. Platonism therefore cannot be accepted…”[30]

Clark did not blame either philosopher for attempting or logically implying the need for access to an omniscient source. On the contrary, Clark rejected both systems because they cannot deliver this. One may infer, then, that Clark might have accepted an elenctic argument against rationalism along the lines of the following: to assert one knows a proposition is true without knowing whether or not another proposition is true begs the question. What if the truth of the former hinges on the truth or falsity of the latter? For man to justifiably know even one proposition, then, one must either know all propositions or rely on one who does – one whose knowledge must be eternal, comprehensive, and intuitive. In fact, this argument from the contingency of knowledge can be used against any secular epistemology and many religious ones, not just rationalism. Legitimate knowledge presupposes an eternally omniscient being, and any epistemic axiom must account for that or be subject to this argument.

Having offered his case as to why alternative first principles yield logical inconsistencies and are therefore incapable of functioning as a sound basis for an epistemic system, Clark customarily presented his own first principle for inspection; that is, “the Bible is the Word of God.”[31] Clark’s definition of Scripture and God as well as relevant biblical texts can be found in the Westminster Confession.[32] This comprises what might be called the ground of knowledge. The propositions contained in the Bible collectively form the content of what one is able to, at present, tenably know. Distinguishable from this is the means of knowledge, the historical process by which one gains access to Scriptural propositions. Consistent with his deterministic theology, Clark, following in the footsteps of Augustine, Malebranche, and other Christian philosophers, supported the doctrine of efficient, divine illumination.[33] Hence, one can gain access to the so-called world of Ideas because universal propositions can be mediated to his mind from God’s. On this theory, the role of sensation or experience in knowledge acquisition is at most an occasional stimulant.[34]

Clark submitted that anthropological considerations and linguistics explain the reason man is able to understand God’s thought. Man is the image of God, so the structure of man’s mind images that of God. Logic “is the characteristic of God’s thinking,” so that man’s thoughts may be univocal with God’s is unsurprising.[35] Because man possesses the necessary a priori equipment in order to think logically, persons are able to communicate by knowing the idea which a given word symbolizes.

Of course, because Clark reckoned empiricism to be an unsound epistemology, it follows that when he opined himself to be having a conversation with another human, he knew it could have been the case that he was only imagining it. However, insight into problems or advantages of various epistemologies may be introduced through the medium of opinion, in which case dialogue (and science, for that matter) nevertheless serves a pragmatic purpose. Clark was well aware that his first principle promises less knowledge than do others; he was simply willing to trade empty promises for warranted knowledge.[36]

One of the more interesting features of Clark’s philosophy is the way in which his Calvinistic theology contributes to his theory of knowledge. Clark believed that the telos of all things is the glorification of God, even sin.[37] God ultimately, though not immediately or efficiently, causes sin by determining conditions such that men sin, and through sin God’s glory and wisdom is manifested in the unveiling of God’s full range of attributes. If men had never broken God’s law, it must be the case that God’s wisdom and glory would not have been able to be manifested, at least not to the degree possible in this world. Hence, Clark’s theodicy is actually an assertion of what must be the case as much as it is a defense of what is the case.

However, Clark still viewed man as guilty for having sinned. That all man’s choices are determined does not function as an excuse for his sin because responsibility does not presuppose a will free from antecedent, extrinsic causation; rather, man’s responsibility presupposes a sovereign to whom he is responsible. Clark’s solution to Hume’s is-ought dilemma was that man ought to obey God because God made man as he is: a creature with a [determined] mind, will, emotion, intellect, feeling, and an obligation to obey God’s precepts. Yet insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), his will is determined and volitional.[38]

That men are caused to sin also means they are caused to act irrationally. By disobeying that which they ought to do, man asserts his reasoning as authoritative. Only by divine intervention through the aforementioned regeneration of man is he able to cease continuous rebellion to God, which implies continuous irrationality. One may wonder, then, why Clark was a preacher, given that only God can cause one’s will to change: “…the preaching of the Gospel does one thing that a fallacious argument from a non-existent common ground cannot do: It provides the propositions that must be belief. But the belief comes from God…”[39]

One main reason Clark was a determinist was that it is a precondition for omniscience. If God did not determine all things, something or someone external to God did. Since God alone is eternal, for God’s knowledge to be extrinsically contingent would connote God’s omniscience is not eternal. But omniscience cannot be learned. Like Hegel, God obviously couldn’t know any relation between a given unknown proposition and any other proposition imaginable. Since this applies with respect to all [knowable] propositions, either God is eternally omniscient or not able to be omniscient at all. On the other hand, if God knows what one will choose before he chooses, by what means does God know? If God controlled the historical conditions by which man would necessarily choose what God knows he will choose, man’s choice is determined. If not, then to assert God antecedently knows what man will choose is nonsense. Clark thereby concluded divine omniscience and human free will are incompatible.[40]

Clark’s seemingly and unabashedly radical philosophical system should not cloud one’s discernment. All philosophies of necessity appear novel at some point. One may, as did Clark with other philosophers, sift through his arguments and retain only those which stand the test of reason. Regardless, one must choose, so far as he is able to descry, either consistent and systematic presuppositionalism or whim.

---

[1] John Robbins, An Introduction to Gordon H. Clark.

[2] W. Gary Crampton, The Scripturalism of Gordon H. Clark pg. 91.

[3] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 285.

[4] Gordon Clark, Thales to Dewey pg. 88.

[5] Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy pgs. 91-103, 297-323.

[6] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 29.

[7] Gordon Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education pg. 49.

[8] Gordon Clark, Karl Barth’s Theological Method pg. 117.

[9] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 34.

[10] Ibid. pg. 31.

[11] W. Gary Crampton, Scripturalism: A Christian Worldview.

[12] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 36.

[13] Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy pgs. 15-30.

[14] Ibid. pgs. 71, 162.

[15] Ibid. pg. 71.

[16] Gordon Clark, Thales to Dewey pg. 178.

[17] Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding unscientific postscript pg. 231.

[18] Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things pg. 33.

[19] Gordon Clark, Logic pg. 1.

[20] Gordon Clark, Lord God of Truth pg. 39.

[21] Gordon Clark, Ancient Philosophy pgs. 26-29, 47-50.

[22] Robert Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge pg. 72.

[23] Gordon Clark, Language and Theology pg. 132.

[24] Ibid. pg. 133.

[25] Ibid. pg. 134.

[26] Gordon Clark, Modern Philosophy.

[27] Gordon Clark, Thales to Dewey pgs. 47-85, 237-280, 309-363.

[28] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 29.

[29] Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy pg. 153.

[30] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 30.

[31] Ibid. pg. 52.

[32] Gordon Clark, What do Presbyterians Believe?

[33] Gordon Clark, Lord God of Truth pg. 17.

[34] Gordon Clark, Language and Theology pg. 144.

[35] Gordon Clark, Clark and His Critics pg. 59.

[36] Ibid. pg. 77.

[37] Gordon Clark, What Do Presbyterians Believe? pg. 54.

[38] Gordon Clark, Christian Philosophy pgs. 255-258.

[39] Ibid. pg. 101.

[40] Ibid. pg. 255.

Logical Positivism

I encountered a couple internet logical positivists recently. It's unusual that someone will know what "logical positivism" is and still adhere to it, as some of its primary adherents have all but pronounced it dead. It refers to a movement in the 1920s and 30s which emphasized syntax and empiricism. In any case, these particular logical positivists were emphasizing one of the primary tenets of logical positivism: metaphysics is semantically meaningless. It was interesting how quickly these logical positivists were able to get those to whom they were replying to assume with them that some of the more foundational concepts of logical positivism were true, and given that I've been reviewing logical positivism in my philosophy class over the past few weeks, I thought I'd share some thoughts on it so that one can anticipate these subtle tactics and effectively counter them. As the more insightful critiques of a given philosophy usually come from those who used to believe it, for those who wish to skip the text and just listen to the problems inherent in logical positivism, this interview of A. J. Ayer (begin at 6:28) gives a nice, short summary, although Ayer seems a little reluctant to say logical positivism is a wholly unsatisfying philosophy.

Language

Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics all pertain to linguistics. Syntax refers to the rules or structure of a theory of language, semantics refers to the meaning of words, and pragmatics designates that field of study whereby one utilizes the usefulness of language. A development in logical positivism that allowed men in the Vienna Circle (the original logical positivists) such as Carnap to bridge what was thought to be a metaphysical gap between syntax and semantics/pragmatics was the following postulation: “a sentence ‘S’ is true if and only if S.” Meta-language, whose subjects are sentences (“S”), became connected to object-language, whose subjects are real world referents (S). Example: "The snow is white" is true if and only if it is really the case the snow is white.

Problems: an immediately perceivable problem with logical positivism here is that it is basically susceptible to all the problems of empiricism. Examples: the reliability of sensation must be unreasonably presupposed; "snow" and "white" are ostensibly, arbitrarily defined such that knowledge of communication between persons is, as Augustine anticipated some 1600 years prior to logical positivism, impossible - that is to say, empiricism is solipsistic; etc. But as a matter of fact, logical positivism was radically empirical, as shall be seen in the below.

Verificationism and the Verification Criterion of Meaningfulness

Verificationism is the position that a proposition must be able to be determined to be true or false in order to be meaningful. So, for example, propositions in the future tense are apparently not meaningful. The verificationism of logical positivism and its extreme emphasis on empiricism led to the verification criterion of meaningfulness, the principle to which logical positivists (such as the ones I met recently) refer when asked why they believed metaphysics is nonsensical. The verification criterion of meaningfulness refers to the following: propositions which are not analytic (i.e. tautologous) must be empirically verifiable or else they are meaningless. Such being the case, metaphysics would by definition be meaningless.

Problem: the most obvious problem - one which caused Ayer to step back from logical positivism - was that the verification criterion of meaningfulness is a proposition which cannot itself be verified on its own grounds. It's a self-defeating principle. This is, in my estimation, the crushing blow to logical positivism. Popper was another individual who saw this flaw and attempted to replace verificationism with falsificationism as the demarcation criterion of science. This has its own problems, but at least Popper didn't reject metaphysics outright. Even with these problems, one final subject related to logical positivism merits note.

Ethics

Ayer, consistent with verificationism and Positivism, taught that ethical posits are neither true nor false. “Ought” and “should” statements are rather emotive. This is the ethical theory known as emotivism. Stevenson, another logical positivist, contributed to this theory by explaining that emotivism does not preclude a means of ethical dialogue. By distinguishing between beliefs (eg. “this actor is in the movie”) and attributes (eg. “I prefer tennis to movies”), Stevenson made significant strides in an attempt to resolve disagreements of this nature. He noted that increasing one another’s awareness of facts can only stimulate beneficial conversation, although he realized differences in attributes are irresolvable.

Feigl, on the other hand, thought emotivists missed the point. Forwarding the concepts of validation and vindication, analogous to internal and external questions, Feigl believed he came the closest to resolving ethical disputes. Validation refers to the idea that if two disputants share the same belief in a general ethical principle, this shared belief can function as a means by which they can seek to resolve differences on a specific point. And even in there are no shared principles, according to vindication, the persons can nevertheless compare their respective systems in hopes one will persuade the other. It is only when disagreement on this level persists that one can claim there is no means of resolution on Positivistic grounds.

Problem: I would agree that each of these contributions takes Positivism to its logical end. But that's precisely the problem. One can describe ethical beliefs but not account for them. Ethical discourse is possible, although ultimately, it may certainly be the case conflicts are irresolvable. In fact, it seems to me the emotivists frame the issue in a different manner than does Feigl, but they don’t differ significantly in that both agree insofar as ethical statements are unjustifiable and ethical dialogue can only go so far.

Many logical positivists bite the bullet and accept moral nihilism, in which case one can always appeal to one of the plethora of intrinsically insoluble difficulties, some of which are mentioned above, but given that one will usually hear arguments from incredulity from logical positivists regarding the idea metaphysical statements can be meaningful, it doesn't hurt to be able to throw incredulity back in their face when you ask if they can seriously believe there is nothing objectively objectionable about rape, murder, et. al.

Craig/Harris Debate

William Lane Craig and Sam Harris debated yesterday on the topic "Is Good from God?" You can listen to it here. I have a few criticisms of both sides, mostly with respect to Harris' statements.

Craig

Opening Statement

Contrary to Craig, "ought" does not imply "can." Craig uses this an analogy to attempt to show otherwise: "if somebody shoves you into another person, you're not responsible for bumping into him. You had no choice." This presupposes determinism is incompatible with choice. That does not follow. Determinism is incompatible with free will - the ability to choose apart from antecedent, extrinsic causation - but it is compatible with choice. Choice is volitional, but it is an actual exercise of one's will. Hence, it does not imply one's will has the capacity to have been exercised contrarily. One's choice can be volitional yet necessitated. Religious philosophers as far back as Augustine and as recent as Gordon Clark have noted this. Craig has repeated this false dichotomy for a while now, and he even threw in the robot/puppet caricature one will sometimes hear in these contexts. As I have written elsewhere:

//Neither God’s revelation of what is good nor His decree that men are responsible for obeying His precepts is arbitrary, for in the same way God’s declaration of what is good reflects His own eternal nature, God’s declaration that men are responsible for obeying His law reflects their created natures. That God sovereignly made men for His own ends and glory functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates, in Romans, his claim that men are responsible (Romans 9:19-21). In the absence of a Creator-creation distinction, moral dogmatism is irrational. A dictator may desire to heedlessly enforce his ideas, but he can never possess the divine prerogative. Only a sovereign Creator can universalize His moral precepts to those whom He has created for that purpose, and this God has done by the full, sovereign, and authoritative disclosure of His holy nature and law in Scripture...

Advocates of the free will defense may object that man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose. They also sometimes caricature men in a deterministic world-view as puppets. This method of argument is question-begging and poisoning-the-well. There is no self-evident reason that one who has broken a law is excused from law-breaking because he was unable to do otherwise. Additionally, Scripture teaches that men, in relation to God, are pots, axes, and other instruments God may use as He pleases. What, then, besides emotion, could be the underlying objection laced in the puppet analogy? In fact, God is actually much more sovereign over mankind than a puppeteer is over his puppet. God controls everything men do, whereas a puppeteer is confined by strings and joints. God made men as they are: creatures with minds, wills, emotions, intellects, feelings, and other privileges to which puppets are not privy. Even so, men are not “forced” to will, as that would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary. It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose. “For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory forever! Amen” (Romans 11:36).//

To be fair, Craig does add the addendum that compatibilism is a position which avoid his criticism, but given his statement that" ought implies can," something with which Calvinists disagree, it is not clear whether or not he would include Calvinism in this group.

Harris

Opening Statement

Even if it were allowed "good is well-being," as Harris states, Harris seems to miss the point that providing a demarcation of what is good does not explain why one ought to do good. As I point out in a different post, goodness and oughtness are not synonyms. So when Harris says "if we should do anything in this universe, if we ought to do anything, if we have a moral duty to do anything, it's to avoid the worst possible misery for everyone," again, even if this is true, Harris must substantiate the "if." He doesn't show that the "if" is the case. He doesn't show we should or ought to do anything. He doesn't show we have moral duties. He defines good but provides no objective reason we should do good.

Now, it is true Harris appeals to common sense, but if I were to point out that what Harris considers to be common sense can be thought by another - like myself - to be emotive stupidity, what can be his response? Argumentum ad populum? Harris is an unusual Positivist (he strikes me as one, anyways) in that he argues morality is objective. Most Positivists thought ethical discourse was possible (to a certain point) but that ethical claims themselves are unverifiable.

When Harris says one's values can be objectively wrong with respect to deeper values one holds, this is what Feigl would call "validation" and is analogous to an internal question. But Harris forgets to explain how one can verify these deeper values are objective. Feigl at least admitted that if one cannot "vindicate" his ethical system against another - an external question - there remain root disagreements for which there is no recourse for resolution, at least on Positivistic grounds. At this point, it seems Harris wishes to pass off his own system as objective, but that is clearly not the case. To illustrate how unintelligible Harris becomes at this juncture, he says that those who disagree with him are wrong with respect to values they would hold if they were "deeper persons." What does that even mean? How does Harris know counter-factuals?

A still more fundamental criticism of Harris would simply be to attack the idea his naive utilitarianism can be verified. Suppose - and this is quite a stretch, given the above - that Harris' definition of good is true and that one ought to do good. Criticisms nevertheless remain:

//Utilitarianism is an ethical theory which defines good along a spectrum. A choice which causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest good, and a choice which causes the greatest pain to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest evil. This understanding of good and evil leads to arbitrariness and irrationality. As a form of consequentialism, choices made by Utilitarians are, incredibly, prospectively a-moral; since one cannot know the future consequences of his choice, the choice must be made arbitrarily. Possibilities of future consequences also suggest that the moral value of any choice is subject to change at any instant. Even [relatively] simple knowledge of all the ways in which a past choice has affected present reality is itself a problem, because one would need to be omniscient to know his calculations are both accurate and exhaustive. Yet another problem with Utilitarianism is that in order to judge the comparative “goodness” of one’s choice, one would need to know counter-factuals; ironically, such is only possible by divine revelation. There are still more complications when one considers, within a Utilitarian framework, whether or not one individual’s pleasure could qualitatively exceed the sum pleasure of many, whether or not it is proper to state minorities possess rights, and whether or not utilitarianism can escape the demerits of empiricism, inductivism, and subjectivism. Given the extremely relativistic and flawed nature of Utilitarianism, one may well believe the demise of Utilitarianism would maximize the pleasure of those who sincerely desire to be moral.//

1st rebuttal

Harris takes an intellectually lazy route in his argument against the divine command theory when he references the problem of evil. Not much needs to be said in reply to Harris here:

//The problem of evil is purportedly an internal critique of Christianity. If the Christian God does not harmonize with the atheist's arbitrary and subjective moral perception, why should the Christian suppose that to be a problem? Smuggling non-Christian concepts into the argument – concepts which they use to profane God’s character – can lead nothing more than an inept attack on a straw man. Confusion can only be avoided by providing clear definitions of key terms.//

Harris has provided definition of the key term - good - and it does not square with Christianity. Why Harris would think any Christian would find his argument meaningful, then, is mystifying.

Much more amusing is Harris' attempt to analogize the Bible to The Lord of the Rings. He states that to call Scriptural passages evidence for Hell is like stating passages in LOTR which reference Valinor are evidence for Valinor. He makes the same analogy to Hell in the Qur'an later. Well, if Harris thinks he can show that LOTR or Islam can produce a sound, epistemic system, then he is by all means invited to do so. He didn't, however, so this too is another evidence of intellectual laziness.

After listening to Harris' rebuttal, I almost doubt Harris has read the Bible beyond snippets of quotations provided by fellow new atheists. He accuses Christianity of lacking moral accountability, given that a person can live in sin and nevertheless repent and believe in the gospel unto salvation just prior to his death. His argument suggests unfamiliarity with penal substitution and justification, although he in fact alludes to this view (derogatorily) 5 minutes later. Moreover, Harris accuses God of cruel behavior towards innocent people. Has Harris never heard of the doctrine of original sin? Harris never critiques Christianity on its own grounds. He assumes his view is true and projects it onto other world-views in order to disprove them, which is a faulty methodology.

In any case, Harris imperceptibly shifts from attempting to answer "what are the preconditions necessary for sound moral dogmatism?" to "is Christianity moral?" If Craig is right, evil presupposes theism and every attack Harris makes against Christianity would be an admission his own view is inadequate. Harris doesn't seem to understand that.

2nd rebuttal

Harris here attempts to clarify his position, but I think he really only muddied the waters (perhaps unintentionally). It wasn't clear to me whether he was trying to justify moral statements on the basis of science or if he accepted morality as axiomatic such that aim of science is thereby determined. He said in one part of the rebuttal that axioms are necessary and later states one doesn't need to accept anything on faith. Very confusing. He also tried to distinguish between the way in which he and Craig were using the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity," and here again I didn't really follow what he was trying to say. In his closing statement, Craig noted that he had consistently defined objectivity as that which is independent of human opinion since his opening statement.

Needless to say, none of this was relevant to Craig's criticisms. Harris continued to fallaciously equate preferences with oughtness. Instead of answering the fundamental questions like "how do you know utilitarianism is true," Harris would call such questions stupid and his view objective in a thinly veiled attempt to intimidate opponents into silence. I thought Harris was rather disrespectful throughout the debate.

Concluding Statement

Harris compares morality to mathematics and physics and claims that since the latter don't presuppose God, neither does the former. Actually, the latter do presuppose God, and in any case, "ought" is not synonymous with "is." Harris never addressed the is-ought dilemma Craig mentioned several times.

Conclusion

Craig makes similar points to ones I made or might have made with a few mistakes and omissions.

Harris is neither a logician nor a theologian.

Clark's Lectures 1

This first transcription is taken from Clark's lecture entitled Questions and Answers. In it, Clark is a part of a panel comprised of theologians of all shapes and sizes, most of whom express admiration for Clark. It appears that each person on the panel had already given some sort of lecture and that the audience was allowed to ask the panel questions, most of which (in this clip, at least) were directed to or answered by Clark. There was a lively discussion on the image of God and a few questions pertaining to situational ethics, but Clark's most striking quote, in my opinion, was the following, especially given that my professor used a paper by Quine to attack "foundationalism" in my most recent philosophy class:

//Every system of philosophy – whether it’s Platonism or Aristotelianism in antiquity or logical positivism in this century – every system of philosophy must have a first principle. Since it is first it cannot have been deduced from anything prior. In this sense, logical positivism or Aristotelianism is just as fideistic as I am. It means that a person accepts certain axioms from which he deduces conclusions. I accept the truth of the Scripture as my axiom and deduce conclusions from that, and you can call that fideism, which some people think is a nasty term. It certainly means you have faith. The logical positivists place their faith in sensation. You cannot – and I wish to make this clear – you cannot guarantee the accuracy of observation by observation. If you wish to demonstrate the reliability of observation you’d have to have something prior to observation, but there is never anything prior to your first principle.//

A few reflections. I doubt that my professor would be very happy with this quote by Clark. He is a pragmatist rather than a logical positivist, but the positions are similar. He would say, I imagine, that to assert that all philosophical systems must have a first principle is inaccurate. And I imagine this is true, insofar as not all philosophical systems claim to have a first principle. While it should be remembered pragmatists such as my professor define knowledge and truth peculiarly, I think what Clark should have said - and it's easy for me to say this, since I have had time to think whereas Clark had to give an answer on the spot - was that all philosophical systems ought to have a first principle. I think Clark is more correct in Thales to Dewey (pg. 88):

//The demonstration of a proposition, such as any any theorem in geometry, is completed only when it is referred to the axioms. If the axioms in turn required demonstration, the demonstration of the proposition with which we began would remain incomplete, at least until the axioms could be demonstrated. But if the axioms rest on prior principles, and if these too must be demonstrated - on the assumption that every proposition requires demonstration - the proof of our original theorem would never be finished. This means that it would be impossible to demonstrate anything, for all demonstration depends on indemonstrable first principles. Every type of philosophy must make some original assumptions.//

I, like Clark, don't see any other way in which the infinite regression argument can be avoided.

More interesting than this technicality, however, is that Clark admits one's axiom(s) upon which he purports to construct his philosophical system is taken by faith. This perhaps distinguishes Clark from classical foundationalism - Clark does not appear to assert, as did the Rationalists, that first principles or axioms can themselves be indubitably self-evident.

John Robbins wrote that "Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its truth." Does an axiom have an "account of its truth"? Well, axioms can be reduced to absurdity by showing they lead to skepticism or internal inconsistency, but axioms cannot be demonstrated and, as such, apparently cannot be "known," at least not according to the above definition. I don't know whether or not Clark would agree with that. Perhaps epistemological self-attestation is relevant.

In any case, the above observations incline me to believe that Clark's position is a sort of synthesis between foundationalism and coherentism. Clark subscribed to a coherence rather than a correspondence theory of truth; that is, he believed propositions within a philosophical system ought to be internally consistent (cf. Clark and His Critics pgs. 142, 149). However, he believed the system must be grounded.

This may be too speculative, which is why it is stated somewhat tentatively, but for what it's worth, it makes sense to me. Scripturalism is rational because its basis yields epistemological consistency. Scripturalists utilize apagogic arguments rather than transcendental arguments, so a Scripturalists claims with regards to its axioms should be accordingly tempered (cf. here). One cannot prove an axiom, but it does not follow that one cannot be rational for believing an axiom.

Something of an update

Since the beginning of the semester I have tried to stay focused on schoolwork, which is why I haven't blogged very often in 2011. However, since I will seemingly be allowed to write a philosophy paper on the epistemological beliefs of Gordon Clark - yes, I note the irony - I have some justification for dedicating some time to reading about, writing about, and listening to subjects with which I am, shall we say, pleasantly acquainted, at least in contrast to Complex and Real Analysis.

I have also finally taken the time to listen to some of Clark's free online lectures (link). In part in preparation for my research paper and in part because I have enjoyed and believe others might enjoy reading rather than listening to Clark, I have transcribed some of these audio lectures and will be posting them in the coming weeks. The written recordings are by no means extensive, but it will be easier for me to access the parts of the audio I found interesting if I can simply read through 2 pages rather than trying to remember when Clark said them in the course of a 40 minute presentation. For the reader, however, this should be meant as an encouragement to download the lectures and listen to them in a car (or whatnot) rather than as an excuse to not listen; Clark makes worthy points which I have omitted.

In other news, my recent birthday allowed me to pick up some new books which I hope to be able to take a look at soon. I'm very blessed. I received Horton's The Christian Faith (systematic theology), Hamilton's God's Glory in Salvation Through Judgment (biblical theology), and I was able to stretch a $20 gift card to purchase Clark's The Incarnation, Selections From Hellenistic Philosophy, and his Today's evangelism: Counterfeit or genuine?

Improper Romance

I cannot imagine a more difficult task than writing a satisfying piece of romantic fiction. I am too analytic for it. If I tried, I would be disappointed with the result. However, I can admire others’ works when befitting, and to that end, here are some observations:

Proper romance must subsist between two rational, passionate equals. If one is undeserving of another’s regard, I would rather the fact be acknowledged than ignored, as I am inclined to want to think poorly of as few characters as possible. Furthermore, romance without conflict cannot be compelling, yet I have found conflict is usually and ironically the result of a reason for which the loss of a reader’s respect for a given character is warranted. Questionable is the passion of he who believes external circumstances prevent association. Deference to third party opinion or inability to overlook social differences must disappoint a reader’s hopeful expectation for an ideal character: independent, clever, and sage. Worse still are cases in which there is no such obvious, trite impediment, as the character whose resolve would waver at the precipice of desires fulfilled rather bespeaks of irrationality or insanity.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that I find myself preferring what might be called improper romance, by which I mean a subtly coy relationship between persons of the opposite sex, equal or unequal in terms of intelligence and passion, of which the author’s chief object is to instill in the reader’s mind a teleological end other than union. I have not read or seen many works of fiction of this type; in my experience, Kierkegaard’s The Seducer’s Diary is the best example of such a relationship between unequal persons, and the first half of Pride and Prejudice is the best example of such a relationship between equal persons. Both books requite interest by stimulating the mind rather than – or, if you please, unto – the emotions.

Prayer, Evangelism, and Determinism

I was reading a recent thread in which Calvinists and non-Calvinists were accusing each other of holding to positions which logically precluded the meaningfulness of prayers that God should effect certain events which pertain to the wills of men. The arguments, in brief, were these: the non-Calvinists asserted that since the Calvinist believes all things are already determined, his prayer for God to affect men's wills could not have any bearing on what God has determined and, therefore, is nonsensical; the Calvinists asserted that since the non-Calvinist believes men's wills are free, his prayer for God to affect men's wills could not be accomplished because men's wills would then be determined.

I cannot defend a prayers of this sort made by one who believes in free will. However, if God determines all things - and He does - may it not be the case that His determination of a prayer on behalf of an unbeliever (or anyone, for that matter) is teleologically related to His likewise determined movement to do that for which the believer asks? For instance:

Exodus 32:9 “I have seen these people,” the LORD said to Moses, “and they are a stiff-necked people.

10 Now leave me alone so that my anger may burn against them and that I may destroy them. Then I will make you into a great nation.”

11 But Moses sought the favor of the LORD his God. “LORD,” he said, “why should your anger burn against your people, whom you brought out of Egypt with great power and a mighty hand?

12 Why should the Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that he brought them out, to kill them in the mountains and to wipe them off the face of the earth’? Turn from your fierce anger; relent and do not bring disaster on your people.

13 Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom you swore by your own self: ‘I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give your descendants all this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance forever.’”

14 Then the LORD relented and did not bring on his people the disaster he had threatened.

Here Moses intercedes on behalf of Israel. Did Moses do this of His own, allegedly free will, or was his intercession determined? Calvinists believe it was determined. Was God's relent from His threat spontaneous or determined? Calvinists believe it was determined. God eternally decreed that both these things should happen. Why, then, can't the Calvinist suggest that God was determined to relent from His threat by means of His determination of Moses' intercession?

The prayer argument made by the non-Calvinists is really little different from evangelism; if only by God's determination can one be saved, as Calvinists believe, why evangelize? The answer is obvious: man is God's appointed means for the salvation of unbelievers (Romans 10). His determination of one's evangelistic appeals to Scripture is the means by which God purposed to effect regeneration in His elect, and this too is determined. Here we see a teleological correlation between God's determinations or decrees.

So when Calvinists pray that God would affect an individual's will, the prayer is not irrelevant. Perhaps it is the case that God will be moved by the prayer - not spontaneously, but having determined the very prayer. Or perhaps God will not be moved, and so He has determined that the prayer will be answered in the negative. No one knows the extent of God's eternal decree[s]. But whichever the case may be, it is true that foremost in one's thoughts should be recollection that God's sovereign will cannot be thwarted or resisted (Isaiah 14, Romans 9). Hence, accompanied with an entreaty for, say, the salvation of an unbeliever should be the ready acceptance of whichever way events unfold, as they do so according to God's sovereign will, and, more specifically, for the good of those called according to His purpose.