Church History and Presuppositions: Dioscorus and Oriental Orthodoxy

In a post last year, I noted that works of history involve presuppositions (link). History is not methodologically neutral. So, too, it is with those who read church history. So, too, it is with this post. 

This does not lead to skepticism, however. Truth is objective. When two people agree about what is historically true, it becomes easier to compare and evaluate their presuppositions at points of disagreement.

When I read church history, I don't expect to see pristine models of perfection. Why? Because I accept the doctrines of total depravity and progressive sanctification. Professing Christians can be nominal Christians, and true Christians battle sin (Romans 7-8, Galatians 2, 1 John 2). While we can commend the faith of those who've gone before us (Hebrews 11), Christ is our model of perfection, and it is in His image Christians are conformed. This presupposition dovetails with sola scriptura, for it is what Scripture itself teaches.

Contrast this to the presuppositions of those whose traditions align with solo ecclesia (link). Because adherents of this sort of tradition - e.g. Oriental Orthodoxy, Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism - tend to create lists of venerable "saints" from church history which are discordant with lists of other traditions, adherents are incentivized to be zealous for the sake of sinful men rather than God. Solo ecclesia entails a distorted anthropology.  

One example of this can be seen in a recent dialogue I had with an Oriental Orthodox believer (link) who attempted to defend the actions of Dioscorus at the council of Ephesus II (otherwise known as Ephesus 449). Dioscorus is regarded as a saint in Oriental Orthodoxy. 

I pointed out that on Oriental Orthodoxy's own presuppositions, Dioscorus seems to have acted wrongly at Ephesus II. In particular, Dioscorus did not follow Apostolic Canon 74 (link):

If any bishop has been accused of anything by men worthy of credit, he must be summoned by the bishops; and if he appears, and confesses, or is convicted, a suitable punishment must be inflicted upon him. But if when he is summoned he does not attend, let him be summoned a second time, two bishops being sent to him, for that purpose. [If even then he will not attend, let him be summoned a third time, two bishops being again sent to him. ] But if even then he shall disregard the summons and not come, let the synod pronounce such sentence against him as appears right, that he may not seem to profit by avoiding judgment.

Maria Constantinou's article, "The Threefold Summons at Late Antique Church Councils," details in what way Dioscorus, who presided over Ephesus II, subverted this canon (link):

It is fortunate that the details of the parallel ecclesiastical threefold summons procedure and the way it evolved can be deciphered from the copious pertinent evidence from conciliar acts of the fifth and sixth centuries. The fact that detailed accounts of threefold summonses are a substantial and extensive part of conciliar proceedings and the minutes thereof does not come as a surprise, since the validity of a trial in absence depended upon the attestation of the orderly conduct of the summons...

A trial in absentia without three summonses was considered illegal, since the accused had to be given the opportunity to defend himself. It is indicative that the condemnations at the Second Council at Ephesus 449, almost all of which were imposed on absentees and uninvited, were unanimously declared void at the first session of the Council of Chalcedon; see, for instance, the bishops’ request to annul the deposition of Ibas of Edessa at the tenth session of Chalcedon: κακῶς ἐποίησαν οἱ παρὰ τοὺς κανόνας κατακρίναντες αὐτόν. τὰ κατὰ ἀπόντος γενόμενα ἀργείτω. ταῦτα πάντες λέγομεν· οὐδεὶς ἀπόντα κατακρίνει: Those who condemned him contrary to the canons did so wrongly. The proceedings against an absentee should be annulled. We all say this: nobody condemns someone in his absence, ACO II.1.3 § 5 p. 17 lin. 16–18; cf. also the verdict regarding Ibas’ reinstatement pronounced by Francion of Philippopolis and Basil of Trajanopolis: τὸν ἐν τῆι κρίσει μὴ παρόντα, ἀλλὰ μήτε προσκληθέντα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον βλάπτεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξενεχθείσης κατ’ αὐτοῦ ψήφου δοκιμάζομεν: Since he was not present at the trial and was not even summoned, we decide that he should in no way be wronged by the sentence passed against him, ACO II.1.3 § 175 p. 41 lin. 31 to p. 42 lin. 2; cf. Steinwenter, Kirchlicher Rechtsgang (fn. 4) 66–67; Troianos (fn. 4) 78 with n. 49...

ACO II.1.2 § 5 p. 9 lin. 16–19. Eusebius emphasised that he and Flavian were deposed at Ephesus II without being summoned to defend themselves.

Likewise does Richard Price speak of Ephesus II and Dioscorus in his The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. I (pg. 34):

None of those accused and condemned was present to defend himself – a breach of due process that was one of several reasons why this council ultimately acquired its distasteful reputation… 

Theodoret had been barred from the council by imperial decree (Chalcedon, I. 24) and Ibas was actually imprisoned (Chalcedon, X. 1). Although Domnus was in town, pleading absence due to illness, the synod made no attempt to give him any notification that he was to be put on trial – let alone the canonical three summonses – before proceeding with his case. None of the other bishops dealt with at the second session appears to have been present.

In short, Dioscorus acted uncanonically and against his own presuppositions. This is a problem for Oriental Orthodoxy. The problem is not merely that someone who is regarded as a saint did something bad - rather, it's that also Oriental Orthodoxy holds Ephesus II rather than Chalcedon (the latter of which condemned Dioscorus and revoked decisions made at Ephesus II) to be "ecumenical." If decisions made at Ephesus II were uncanonical (which, the Oriental Orthodox must admit, entails immorality), that must in turn affect Oriental Orthodoxy's theology of "ecumenical" councils and jeopardize its underlying presupposition of solo ecclesia. 

The Oriental Orthodox believer with whom I spoke attempted to undercut my argument in four different ways:

1) He argued that Chalcedon also acted uncanonically.

2) He argued that Ephesus II was accepted by the emperor at the time.

3) The Apostolic Canons only apply to Christians.

4) Ephesus II had good reasons for their charges against those they accused.

The first counter is a tu quoque fallacy. He appears to have assumed that I was an Eastern Orthodox believer. His reasoning was that if I take it that Oriental Orthodoxy has a problem in dealing with Ephesus II, I would similarly have a problem in dealing with Chalcedon. Firstly, that wouldn't discharge the burden he bears regarding Ephesus II; secondly, because I am not Eastern Orthodox, even if I did admit that Chalcedon acted uncanonically, there is no issue. On the contrary, errors and immorality in church history are to be expected (WCF 31.4). As an aside, though, Chalcedon did follow Apostolic Canon 74 before ratifying the deposition of Dioscorus (Price, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. II, pgs. 69ff.).

The second response is irrelevant. If churchmen can make mistakes, so can an emperor. Even Dioscorus tries to blame the emperor instead of owning his own mistakes (see below). It might also be pointed out that when the emperor who accepted Ephesus II (Theodosius II) died and the new emperor called and then accepted Chalcedon, does that therefore obligate Oriental Orthodoxy to accept Chalcedon? Obviously, Oriental Orthodox believers say no. Further, how does Oriental Orthodoxy view the decision of Theodosius II to depose Cyril of Alexandria for a time at Ephesus I (i.e. Ephesus 431)? Did that deposition put in question the ecumenicity of Ephesus I? From conversations I've had, this is not the perspective of the Oriental Orthodox. In fact, I've been told by notable Oriental Orthodox apologist Daniel Kakish that 1) Ephesus I "could have been been considered ecumenical" even during the time Theodosius II deposed Cyril and, therefore, 2) imperial policy is "irrelevant as a criterion for ecumenicity. Eventual imperial backing of the determinations of the Cyrillian council is a bonus rather than a necessary condition" (link). 

The third assertion is absurd. Nowhere do the Apostolic Canons say that they only apply to those one regards as Christians. On the contrary: "If any bishop has been accused of anything by men worthy of credit, he must be summoned by the bishops..." The idea that the Apostolic Canons only apply to those whom one regards as a Christian would undermine the very purpose of canon 74. Even Nestorius was summoned three times at Ephesus I. He ignored the summons and was deposed.

Like the second response, the last one is irrelevant. The question is whether Dioscorus and Ephesus II acted canonically, not whether they had good reasons for charging those they accused. Did not those accused have canonical rights which, in the case of Ephesus II, were prevented them? Why were the accused 1) barred from being able to defend themselves or 2) uninformed they were even on trial? When Eusebius confronted Dioscorus about this at Chalcedon, Dioscorus' response to to try to pass the blame:

187. During the reading Eusebius the most devout bishop of Dorylaeum said: ‘When Eutyches, whom I had accused, presented his plaint to the holy council, he mentioned that I was his accuser. I demand an inquiry of how, when the judge Flavian of sacred memory demanded that I as the accuser should appear, as proper procedure and the canons required, I was prevented from doing so.’ 

188. The most glorious officials and the exalted senate said: ‘When Flavian of sacred memory requested the appearance of Eusebius as Eutyches’ accuser, why did you, to whom authority to act as judge had been committed, not give orders for this in accordance with the canons?’ 

189. Dioscorus the most devout bishop of Alexandria said: ‘I ask that the testimony of Helpidius be read. I would not have had the power to prevent it, had not Helpidius brought an instruction in which he certified that the emperor had ordered him [Eusebius] not to appear.’ 

190. Juvenal the most devout bishop of Jerusalem said: ‘It was the admirable count Helpidius who didn’t allow him to appear.’ 

191. Thalassius the most devout bishop of Cappadocian Caesarea said: ‘I was not responsible.’ 

192. The most glorious officials and the exalted senate said: ‘When the faith is being decided, this is no excuse.’

Dioscorus tried to excuse his uncanonical action by blaming emperor Theodosius II for barring Eusebius from appearing at Ephesus II - yes, the same emperor that the Oriental Orthodox believer above appealed to regarding the ecumenicity of Ephesus II is the same emperor to whom Dioscorus attempts to shift blame. Dioscorus is justly reprimanded.

When his responses failed, the Oriental Orthodox believer turned to obscenities (link), at which point I ended the conversation. 

There is an irony in having zeal for sinful men rather than God: a distorted elevation of sinful men will always lead to a distorted degradation of others. A distorted anthropology leads to a distorted understanding of history. Both of these follow from a distorted theology, such as when one fails to uphold solus Christus, sola scriptura, soli Deo gloria, sola fide, and sola gratia. Presuppositions matter, and history confirms the principle that we become like that which we worship (Psalm 115:8, Romans 8:29). Let us take care to avoid idolatry.

Veneration, Prayer, and the Possibility of Apostasy: A Dilemma

Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Oriental Orthodox are known to venerate and pray to those whom they consider to be saints who have died: Cyril of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, etc. These traditions also are known to reject the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints: those who come to be saints at one point in life are thereafter capable of apostatizing, losing the salvation which they once possessed.

This leads to a question: do these traditions have grounds for believing that it is impossible that those whom they regard as saints apostatized on their deathbeds? Raising this hypothetical may be thought of as offensive, but if it is possible or may even have happened, the real offense would be against Christ.

Supposing it is possible that some of those whom these traditions regard as saints apostatized, is it not also possible that members of these traditions are venerating and praying to someone who is actually in hell? Orthopraxy depends on orthodoxy. If we cannot be sure someone is orthodox, should that not have implications for one's praxis involving them? Surely, veneration of and prayer to one who may be in hell cannot be obligated. I expect most of the aforementioned traditions would reject this supposition.

What is the alternative? Infallible assurance of another's faith (let alone perseverance) is ordinarily impossible. If these traditions argue that it is not possible that those whom they regard as saints apostatized - if one can have infallible assurance that those who are venerated and prayed to remained saints unto death - such can only be the case if they accept an extraordinary source of and means for such knowledge. I can think of no other possibility than that it somehow has been divine revealed which saints persevered.

The mechanism by which these traditions believe God has revealed those who persevered currently differs among these traditions. For example, papal approval obviously will not be viewed as necessary in Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy. Actually, though, while Roman Catholics would argue that papal approval is now required by canon law, the process of canonizing saints is apparently revisable. In fact, it seems that even Roman Catholics admit that papal involvement was not only unnecessary but also entirely absent in the first nine centuries (link). A Roman Catholic, then, would have to be open to defending different mechanisms.

Another consideration is that Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy consist of autocephalous or self-governing churches. This may lead some churches within these broader traditions to venerate as saints those who are not venerated by another church within the same, broader tradition. For example, within the broader tradition of Oriental Orthodoxy, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church venerates John of Damascus (link), whereas the Coptic Orthodox church does not. 

This is interesting in that John of Damascus opposed miaphysitism, a Christology typically characterized as distinctive to the tradition of Oriental Orthodoxy. In fact, as a Chalcedonian, John of Damascus is ironically anathematized by the Ethiopian Orthodox. Here, the problem is even more obvious than the hypothetical I posed above: how can one coherently venerate or pray to a theologian whom he regards as having been anathematized?

One possibility is that anathematizations can be lifted. One case of this happening occurred when the Roman pope and Eastern Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople mutually agreed to nullify the anathemas of 1054 (link). This appears to be mental gymnastics, however, and I know of some within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church who would sooner admit John of Damascus should be removed from their synaxarium than defend the possibility that John of Damascus is venerable or worthy of hearing one's prayers. 

Another possibility is to suggest that a synaxarium (or parish, priest, bishop, or any other vehicle of communicating a list of saints) is only infallible indirectly, i.e. insofar as those who are listed as saints have been declared so by that which is the direct mechanism of divine revelation - say, a synod.

Regardless, the logical end of each of the aforementioned traditions is a hyper-realization of solo ecclesia. These traditions might speak of "historical investigation" that goes into their decision-making. These traditions might speak of only "recognizing" who already is or is not a saint. But this cannot be. 

Given their rejection of the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, to rule out deathbed apostasies as a live possibility presupposes that these traditions not only have the prerogative of interpreting divine revelation but also have the prerogative of actively creating such ex nihilo, upon which they further obligate the consciences and practices of their members. 

For these traditions, new and public divine revelation is ongoing. They are not merely drawing out inferences from the God-breathed Scriptures but are claiming themselves to be able to draw out the breath of God - through their papal, synodal, or popular voice - at will. Protestations to the contrary will logically entail, as has been pointed out, that members of these traditions could be venerating and praying to someone who is actually in hell.