Thursday, November 27, 2014

Scripturalism, Internalism, and Externalism

In one of my more recent posts, I mentioned the need for Scripturalists to focus on contemporary issues in epistemology, as there are a lot of interesting dimensions that have yet to but should be explored. To give just a brief example as to why, let’s briefly look at the current internalist-externalist debate. 

A fairly common explanation of internalism is as follows: “the epistemic justification of a person’s belief is determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access… things that are internal to the person’s mental life” (Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition, pg. 408). Externalism is the denial of this thesis: one’s justification of his beliefs is determined by things other than his mental life to which he has cognitive access. [There are varying positions I am skipping for convenience, e.g. one in which internalism and externalism are collectively sufficient although individually insufficient conditions for justification.]

So, whereas an internalist, for example, might reflect on his own beliefs to examine whether they have been properly inferred from other beliefs or pass an epistemic test which a properly foundational belief would, an externalist might appeal to an aetiological explanation for why we can have justified beliefs: for example, our beliefs are justified when they have been caused in a certain way, as that which causes them either in general or even must engender true beliefs.

As such, externalists are sometimes said to view justification from a third-person perspective, where justification is just something persons have: given a person in such and such an environment or circumstance, he will be justified in believing x. Internalists, on the other hand, view justification from a first-person perspective, where justification is something persons can [additionally] show themselves as having: I am justified in believing x because I can cognitively access my mental state y, which is self-justifying (here the internalist would be a kind of foundationalist).

Now, while some Scripturalists like myself have argued for the necessity of self-knowledge (linklink, link, link, link, link), many Scripturalists and non-Scripturalists have denied that, on Scripturalist presuppositions, self-knowledge is possible. For two such examples in this past year, see (here and here). What does this have to do with the internalist-externalist issue?

For starters, if we rule out self-knowledge, do we have cognitive access to our own beliefs? Perhaps pragmatically, but not in an epistemic context, at any rate, which is the context in which the internalist-externalist issue is framed. So if we can’t access our own thoughts, then if our beliefs are justified, it obviously cannot be from an internalist perspective. That would suggest Scripturalists who deny self-knowledge must be externalists. But there are several individuals who have observed that Scripturalism and internalism are a package deal: link, link, link, and so forth. 

A point they make is that if an integral part of a Scripturalist apologetic is that if an individual cant show how they know x is true, then they have no justification for it, Scripturalists are implicitly arguing that internalism is true. But if Scripturalists reject self-knowledge, theyre hypocritically applying a standard to others which they dont even attempt to meet themselves. The result is sloppy apologetics.

Ironically, Scripturalists who deny self-knowledge would logically have a kind of unwitting affinity with the externalists of Reformed epistemology... whom some of those same Scripturalists have criticized. A pure externalist of, say, the empirical variety will face a meta-regress regarding how he knows that his theoretic scenario – reliabilism, proper functionalism, etc. – according to which men allegedly acquire knowledge is itself a product of that scenario. A Scripturalist who denies self-knowledge will face the meta-question of how he knows that he is a person to whom God has imparted knowledge of Scripturalism. 

Scripturalists who think they can side-step the force of this by humbly admitting that while they might not be Scripturalists or even be persons, Scripturalism as a system comes out unharmed need to realize that they’ve already effectively ruined for themselves any chance of knowing that from an internalistic perspective. Theyve as much as admitted they can show no basis for that belief, so whence the assurance? How are they better off than the empirical externalist who is sure that, while he may not be able to know that he knows his belief regarding reliabilism was reliably arrived at, at least reliabilism itself is unharmed?

This is why I’ve stressed the need for Scripturalists to read contemporary epistemologists and issues currently being debated. There is clearly room to improve Scripturalism, if not in revision, then at least in development. [For instance, if internalism is true, so much the better for my argument that we must have self-knowledge.]

And as for my thoughts on the merits and truth/falsity of internalism or externalism - since the above paragraphs were not designed to address that - I will save that for another post. I will only say here that I see no reason why we can’t say we “know” certain things in a looser, externalist sense and “know” other things in a stricter, internalist sense. But I do agree with Bonjour that 
...there is a clear way in which an internalist approach, in addition to being intellectually legitimate on its own, has a fundamental kind of priority for epistemology as a whole, so that externalist views, whatever their other merits, do not constitute satisfactory responses to... whether we have any good reasons to think that any of our beliefs about the world are true (and what form these reasons might take). (Epistemic Justification, 2003, pg. 39)

39 comments:

Max said...

Hey, you're back. The apostle Paul said a person can know his own thoughts:

"what man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him?" (1 Cor 2:11).

Conversely: "even so, the things of God knoweth no man, but the spirit [mind] of God."

I am an internalist.

Joshua Butcher said...

Do you ever wonder if dyadic problems like internal/external or universal/particular ought to be resolved upon some triadic harmony, taking cue from the being of God as Trinity?

Ryan said...

Not really. I never really saw the appeal of tri-perspectivalism.

Joshua Butcher said...

I haven't seen any other form of triperspectivalism than Frame, and his isn't really what I was thinking about when I posed the question. I was thinking more of Augustine's and others attempts at formulating a definition of the Trinity. I wouldn't argue that the problems of dichotomies are all solved by a trinitarian answer, of course.

Ryan said...

I guess I didn't follow your question then. If it has to do with Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity, though, I suspect I'd disagree with it.

Joshua Butcher said...

I wasn't aiming to be that specific, truthfully. I should have been more clear, but I was really just throwing out a blanket question. Probably should have left it unasked :-D.

Anonymous said...

"That would suggest Scripturalists who deny self-knowledge must be externalists."

"But if Scripturalists reject self-knowledge, they’re hypocritically applying a standard to others which they don’t even attempt to meet themselves."

No way on both counts - it just means they applied it to themselves but were unable to come up with Scriptural justification for knowing it.

"A Scripturalist who denies self-knowledge will face the meta-question of how he knows that he is a person to whom God has imparted knowledge of Scripturalism."

To which his reply is: I don't know precisely because there is no Scriptural justification for knowing it.

"Scripturalism as a system comes out unharmed need to realize that they’ve already effectively ruined for themselves any chance of knowing that from an internalistic perspective."

This doesn't follow since such a one could claim/show that there is Scriptural justification for knowing that.

let me ask you:
A Scripturalist/internalist knows that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures.

Or are you denying that he knows that?

Ryan said...

"No way on both counts - it just means they applied it to themselves but were unable to come up with Scriptural justification for knowing it."

...did they apply it to themselves? How do they know that?

"To which his reply is: I don't know precisely because there is no Scriptural justification for knowing it...

This doesn't follow since such a one could claim/show that there is Scriptural justification for knowing that."

To which my reply is: how do you know whether the Scripture you claim is God-breathed is, in fact God-breathed, as you can't know that God has revealed that to you either? If you can't, then of what importance is "Scriptural" justification? You would be operating from an opinion as your foundation.

"A Scripturalist/internalist knows that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures.

Or are you denying that he knows that?"

If he denies self-knowledge, then of course he denies that he knows such in an internalist sense, for he admits he has no knowable access to his own beliefs.

Anonymous said...

Are you denying that he knows P in the internalist sense even though he shows Scriptural reasons (the same you yourself would produce) for knowing P?

And if you do deny it, why did you write that when Scripturalism urges exactly that it is implicitly arguing that internalism is true?

Ryan said...

Yes I do deny it, and the point is that they shouldn't deny self-knowledge.

Anonymous said...

And if you do deny it, why did you write that when Scripturalism urges exactly that it is implicitly arguing that internalism is true?

Anonymous said...

No reply?
Well I asked simply because I don't think Scripturalism (Scr) as voiced by Clark/ Robbins fits neatly into these pegholes at all. There seems to me to be at least one major part of Scr that is externalist - would that mean that Scr implicitly argues that externalism is true too? I doubt it. As for the example, and to reply to your question concerning knowing that the Bible is God-breathed one need only look at Clark's "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" (among many) - the axiom of Scr is believed/known by the work of the Holy Spirit; of which work the beneficiary is not even aware (Robbins) or conscious(Clark). There are no reasons from which to deduce the axiom. It just "dawns on him". I would venture that's not internalism. GBahnsen derided Clark right at this point for appealing to an external cause and not an internal reason (GB of course opts for the TAG at this point). So maybe the best you can do is that Scr is externalist with regards to knowing the axiom, yet internalist in regard to knowing the theorems. So I am not one who thinks that Scr and internalism are a package - anymore than Scr and externalism are a package. But what is curious is that the citations you produce actually consider the Scr-internalist package to be a reason to *reject* Scr. Yet you double down on internalism.

What is also curious is that, perhaps sensing in some fashion, the arguments both Clark and Robbins made from the Scriptural data on self-deception, you opt for an argument as opposed to bare introspection/reflection. One would think that from what you wrote above, that your argument would be something like:

If you do not have self-knowledge then you cannot know anything in the internalist sense.

Now, I'm not sure if any internalist has actually argued that, but is still seems trivial. However, as it goes, that is not your argument at all. Your argument is:

"If I were not regenerate, then I would not be able to know anything: by reductio ad absurdem, I must be regenerate."

Is that actually in Bonjour somewhere? If this is internalism, then it's not the modern day internalism - again pegholes. But since you claim to be trying to refine Scr in the direction of internalism - despite what those citations recommend - I don't think it follows that "if internalism is true then so much the better for my argument". Your argument may be false or absurd, but it wouldn't follow that internalism is false.

continued...

Anonymous said...

So what about your argument? Well lets' start with a variation that you propose elsewhere. And let's think about it in light of the internalist-externalist distinction.
Elsewhere you wrote,
If you may not be a sheep, you cannot know you've heard the voice of the Shepherd.
Allegedly from John 10. But there is a problem: you cannot get from John 10 that the sheep know they've heard his voice – you cannot deduce that they know they know the voice. It's just not there. The sheep know his voice, yes, the sheep hear his voice, yes, but do they have self-knowledge? No – and here's what's so funny – they are sheep and sheep are not known for self-knowledge. Famously it's externalism -not internalism – that attributes knowledge to animals. So, from John 10 the best you can get is:
If you are not a sheep, you cannot know the voice of the Shepherd.
Actually this may not even be correct – the idea in John 10 is that (v26 and 27), logically, if you are his sheep then you know his voice. But your argument has it that if you know the voice then you are a sheep – but this isn't true since demons (Mark 1) recognized his voice as well (and were terrified). Self-knowledge is an imposition on John 10 – not a deduction therefrom. Further the imposition of self-knowledge and, by extension, your argument, to this verse results in an absurdity: by your argument (leaving aside the reductio) the sheep cannot know anything (since no self-knowledge) but the verses are clear they know something. Of course you can say they “know” in the “looser” sense – but again this defeats the purpose of your argument. Your use of John 10 is mistaken.

So what about 1 Cor 2:11,12? Let it be true that a man can be aware or even know the content of his thoughts – but, of course, that does not imply that he knows his beliefs – or to say it again, that he knows that he believes those contents. In the modern day epistemology, beliefs are not occurrent thoughts but are dispositions which do not necessarily enter conscious awareness. This distinction alone ought give you pause, but add Clark and Robbins point about self-deception precisely at this point (of belief in the Gospel) and you have what amounts to a strong defeater of self-knowledge on this point. The way around this is, per Clark and Robbins (and implicitly yourself) is to come up with a Scriptural argument proving that you believe. Alas, such a Scriptural argument does not exist – yours has been shown to be wanting – further,

your argument as stated above is absurd since it makes unregeneracy impossible. Every “I” turns out to be regenerate.

So let me redo your argument to keep in what you ought to have argued:

If you do not know you are regenerate then you cannot know anything in the internalist sense
(you will have to drop the reductio since it makes no sense here in this corrected recasting).

And I will leave that to you and Bonjour to haggle over. It touches not Scr.

Given then the breakdown of your argument, I wouldn't think that means internalism is false – but it's obvious Scr fares better without your so called internalist improvements (which fail anyway) – perhaps you ought take those citations a little more seriously?

Ryan said...

"No reply"

I missed your comment, either way I thought I answered it in my previous response.

"There seems to me to be at least one major part of Scr that is externalist"

Which part?

"There are no reasons from which to deduce the axiom. It just "dawns on him". I would venture that's not internalism."

I'm not arguing the axiom of revelation Clark espoused is deduced from something, and the efficient cause of one's belief in the axiom is irrelevant to the question of epistemic justification. I'm arguing Clark's axiom implicitly ontologically presupposes something - one's regeneration - if it is to avoid being relegated to opinion. You can't know (internalistically) whether the Scripture you claim is God-breathed is, in fact God-breathed, as you can't know that God has revealed that to you either.

"GBahnsen derided Clark right at this point for appealing to an external cause and not an internal reason (GB of course opts for the TAG at this point). So maybe the best you can do is that Scr is externalist with regards to knowing the axiom, yet internalist in regard to knowing the theorems."

I have no idea what you are talking about to be honest. In no case does one who rejects self-knowledge have access to his own reasons or reasoning. Such a person can't be an internalist. I thought that was your question.

"So I am not one who thinks that Scr and internalism are a package - anymore than Scr and externalism are a package."

Ok? I never said you did, I'm the one who said and has argued they are in comment 7.

"But what is curious is that the citations you produce actually consider the Scr-internalist package to be a reason to *reject* Scr."

What is the reason you refer to?

"What is also curious is that, perhaps sensing in some fashion, the arguments both Clark and Robbins made from the Scriptural data on self-deception, you opt for an argument as opposed to bare introspection/reflection."

I never understood why Scripturalists would cite passages like Jeremiah 17:9 as evidence for their case against self-knowledge and then fail to realize that they are implicitly presupposing they know they are not deceived with respect to the meaning of this passage. Makes no sense.

"If you do not have self-knowledge then you cannot know anything in the internalist sense."

See my recent post on internalism as more fundamental than externalism.

"If I were not regenerate, then I would not be able to know anything: by reductio ad absurdem, I must be regenerate."

So you are the same anonymous I've had to correct multiple times on this point. See below on this.

"Is that actually in Bonjour somewhere? If this is internalism, then it's not the modern day internalism - again pegholes."

What are you talking about here? Do you even know what internalism is?

"But since you claim to be trying to refine Scr in the direction of internalism - despite what those citations recommend"

Which citations? Where does Bahnsen or whoever talk about Scripturalism in the context of int/ext? Or any Scripturalist? Or are you talking about my citations in the OP? But those citations say nothing about Scripturalism one way or another... what are you on about?

Ryan said...


"Allegedly from John 10. But there is a problem: you cannot get from John 10 that the sheep know they've heard his voice – you cannot deduce that they know they know the voice. It's just not there. The sheep know his voice, yes, the sheep hear his voice, yes, but do they have self-knowledge?"

Supposing they don't, one couldn't know one was following the Shepherd, in which case one can't know anything in virtue of Scripturalism, which I've argued is the only means by which one can know. So yes, if they reason it out.

"But your argument has it that if you know the voice then you are a sheep – but this isn't true since demons (Mark 1) recognized his voice as well (and were terrified)."

Demons also know what they are, as evidenced by that passage. So even thinking you aren't a demon disqualifies you from that possibility.

"So what about 1 Cor 2:11,12? Let it be true that a man can be aware or even know the content of his thoughts – but, of course, that does not imply that he knows his beliefs – or to say it again, that he knows that he believes those contents."

Then he doesn't know his thoughts about his beliefs. That route doesn't work.

"In the modern day epistemology, beliefs are not occurrent thoughts but are dispositions which do not necessarily enter conscious awareness."

Source?

"This distinction alone ought give you pause"

I mentioned that distinction in a post I wrote months ago. I wouldn't be surprised if you only found out about it through that post.

"...but add Clark and Robbins point about self-deception precisely at this point (of belief in the Gospel) and you have what amounts to a strong defeater of self-knowledge on this point."

Clark did not deny self-knowledge, I don't know why you keep asserting this. I've written many posts showing this wasn't the case.

"...your argument as stated above is absurd since it makes unregeneracy impossible. Every “I” turns out to be regenerate."

Every "I" implies that one knows oneself to be regenerate or that one inconsistently believes he doesn't know that. This is what I corrected you on last thread and the last time I will mention it. You're free to start your own blog if you want to say anything further on the subject. If you continue to repeat this stale argument as you did in the other thread, I will delete your comments. Fair warning, I'm not about to have another 100+ comment thread over several more months on the same topic.

"So let me redo your argument to keep in what you ought to have argued:"

My argument is just fine as it is.

"And I will leave that to you and Bonjour to haggle over. It touches not Scr."

Why do you keep mentioning Bonjour? Bonjour only shows why internalism is more fundamental than externalism. He doesn't have anything to say about Christianity in that book, have you even read it? Or do you still not understand the application of internalism to the question of self-knowledge?

Roughly, one who doesn't have self-knowledge can't have internalistic knowledge. Internalistic knowledge is the most fundamental type of knowledge. Rejection self-knowledge therefore leads to a rejection of the most fundamental type of knowledge.

"Given then the breakdown of your argument, I wouldn't think that means internalism is false – but it's obvious Scr fares better without your so called internalist improvements (which fail anyway) – perhaps you ought take those citations a little more seriously?"

Perhaps you should write more substance in fewer paragraphs.

Anonymous said...

"Supposing they don't.. So yes, if they reason it out."

Absurd. Sheep do not/cannot have self-knowledge ("reason it out"). Self-knowledge is an imposition on not a deduction from John 10. And, further, the sheep do not (cannot) know anything on your view despite the Scriptures which say they know something.

Further, Jer 17 and Matt 7:21 etc.. indeed at the very least raise the possibility of self-deception (hence the possibility of error) precisely at the point of thinking oneself regenerate. You may know you think you are regenerate but you don't know you are regenerate and actually may be self-deceived on this. That is the possibility. Which for better or worse brings you to your argument:

"Every "I" implies that one knows oneself to be regenerate"

OK. However, I point out that the latter part of your "or" does not follow at all. The above conclusion is obviously absurd for every I.

You have not established knowing yourself regenerate.

Ryan said...

"Further, Jer 17 and Matt 7:21 etc.. indeed at the very least raise the possibility of self-deception (hence the possibility of error) precisely at the point of thinking oneself regenerate. You may know you think you are regenerate but you don't know you are regenerate and actually may be self-deceived on this. That is the possibility."

You could only know Jeremiah or Matthew are divinely revealed on the assumption you are regenerate, which is to give away the debate before it's started. You can't know (internalistically) whether the Scripture you claim is God-breathed is, in fact, God-breathed if you can't know that God has revealed that to you either.

1 John 4:6 We are from God; he who knows God listens to us; he who is not from God does not listen to us. By this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error.

"OK. However, I point out that the latter part of your "or" does not follow at all. The above conclusion is obviously absurd for every I."

Wrong.

Do you admit you aren't an internalist, now, by the way?

Anonymous said...

I now realize that John 10 is utterly destructive of your view point: the sheep know his voice minus self-knowledge.

It turns out that your final formulation of your argument, viz,
"If you are both (regenerate and do not know you are) then you don't know anything"
is false. They certainly know his voice - minus self-knowledge.

I never said I was a Scr nor did I ever claim to be an internalist when it comes to knowledge.
Cheers.

Ryan said...

Knowing Scripture presupposes one is regenerate. One's denial that he is regenerate is inconsistent with his claiming to know Scripture, period. Only God's sheep listen to His voice, I don't see what you are having trouble comprehending.

Are you a Scripturalist, and are you an internalist?

Anonymous said...

Knowing God's Voice does not require self knowledge of one's regeneracy nor does it require that one know that one knows his voice. That's what the sheep of John 10 teach.

"If you are both (regenerate and do not know you are regenerate) then you don't know anything"
is both false and unScriptural.

Ryan said...

It took you 2 weeks to avoid answering my questions? I'm already aware of you can't make a good counter-argument, try something new.

Anonymous said...

What, am I on a schedule?

Knowing the Voice presupposes one being regenerate, but does not presuppose one knowing that one knows the voice, neither does it presuppose knowing one is regenerate. Nor does it imply any of those.

Nothing in John 10 amounts to the sheep claiming to know the voice or knowing that they know the voice.
It is perfectly consistent by John 10 to know the voice and not know that you know. etc...

are you denying that the sheep know the voice because they do not know that they know? That certainly seems to be your position.

Ryan said...

If you're going to take that long to respond, I expect a bit more than a rehash of tired points. I also expect an answer to my questions. Are you a Scripturalist, and are you an internalist? I don't much care to have an anonymous stalker.

"Knowing the Voice presupposes one being regenerate"

So rejecting this leads to a self-defeating position. The end.

"are you denying that the sheep know the voice because they do not know that they know?"

No, nor has that ever been my position. From 2 years ago:

http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/02/necessary-and-sufficient-conditions-for.html

//Now, it is clear one cannot reject that or those principle[s] which suffice for knowledge yet still possess knowledge, at least given said principle[s] alone suffice[s]. But I think one can reject a necessary principle yet possess knowledge. Why? Because he may simply be being inconsistent; that is, it may be the case that from what he accepts as sufficient follows the necessary principle[s] but that the person does not realize it. If upon a logical examination of a worldview itself the necessary principles would be compatible with it, then the possibility that one might erroneously reject said principles would not mitigate against his worldview and, thus, what he has actually derived from it.

So when I refer to a “necessary precondition for knowledge,” what I mean is a proposition which must be accountable within a worldview for it to be true. The laws of logic, a philosophy of language, an omniscient source, self-knowledge, etc., must be necessarily possible for Scripturalism as such to be true, though individual Scripturalists really only need to hold to the sufficient condition - divine revelation in general and the Bible (as the extant extent of divine revelation) in particular - by which these propositions may be justified in order to possess knowledge.//

Refer to the bolded portions.

Anonymous said...

I take what you say above as a concession that this:

If you are both (regenerate and do not know you are) then you cannot know anything

is false.

self-knowledge, etc., must be necessarily possible for Scripturalism as such to be true

If Scr just is "knowing the Voice" then by John 10 self knowledge is not such a precondition sir.

Am I a Scr? well I don't wrest John 10 to make it say something it cannot possibly say - so where it actually counts: who is the Scr, me or you?

Am I an internalist? Certainly not about knowledge - how can any Scr be in light of John 10?

Ryan said...

How is it a concession if I never espoused it?

"self-knowledge, etc., must be necessarily possible for Scripturalism as such to be true"

This is still true. Again, what don't you get? I don't have to know the underlying principles of language or the laws of logic to know something... those things still must be true in order for Scripturalism to be true. So it must be necessarily possible to know them in order for Scripturalism to be true. Same goes for self-knowledge.

"If Scr just is "knowing the Voice" then by John 10 self knowledge is not such a precondition sir."

Yes it is.

"who is the Scr, me or you?"

Why are you so afraid to answer? Are you ashamed of your philosophy?

"Am I an internalist? Certainly not about knowledge - how can any Scr be in light of John 10?"

Lol, where does John 10 say believers can't access their own beliefs? This should be good.

Anonymous said...

Aside:
in 1 Cor 2:11, if the word 'know' is taken to be knowledge technically speaking (not opinion), then Scr is false ipso facto.
The knowing of one's thoughts comes from inner reflection, not at all based on or from or preconditioned on any Divine Utterance at all. The scope of the verse does not limit "man" here to say "only regenerate Scr who know they are regenerate" - the reference has no such limit. Basically God could have revealed nothing and man would still have knowledge (technical) of his own thoughts via reflection. Interestingly this verse (understood this way) vindicates the Augustinian claim against the skeptics that every man has knowledge based on self-consciousness (without revelation).
So for Scr to remain true the word "know" must be glossed to refer to opinion not knowledge in the technical sense. But having done that this verse cannot be used as a support to prove that Scriptures teach internalism about knowledge -since we're not talking knowledge here afterall.

Anonymous said...

Do sheep in John 10 have access to their own beliefs?

Yet they have knowledge.

Access to one beliefs not required to know the Voice sir.
When are you going to concede this? The Bible is not about to change.

Ryan said...

"Do sheep in John 10 have access to their own beliefs?"

They necessarily can, in principle, access their beliefs, which is sufficient for the purposes of internalism.

"Access to one beliefs not required to know the Voice sir."

But where does John 10 say that?

Ryan said...

So you're not a Scripturalist, I take it?

Ryan said...

Anonymous,

When you feel up to answering the questions I've asked, feel free to respond. Until then, this is not a platform for evasive parries and one sided questioning, I don't have the inclination for that.

Anonymous said...

Max,
you said,
"The apostle Paul said a person can know his own thoughts"

does the word "know" mean knowledge/knowing in the technical sense or not? Does it mean to have knowledge or does it rise only to mere opinion?
Thx

Max said...

I think it means infallible knowledge of what one is thinking, since Paul compares it with God's own knowledge.

You wrote earlier about this passage: "Let it be true that a man can be aware or even know the content of his thoughts – but, of course, that does not imply that he knows his beliefs – or to say it again, that he knows that he believes those contents."

If you know the content of your thoughts, then you know your thoughts. Some of those thoughts or ideas might be false, but you know you are thinking them.

Anonymous said...

Max,
Thanks,

in order for a man to know (infallible knowledge) what he is thinking (as you say just above),
would you say it is required that the man be regenerate?
would you say that revelation is required?
or would you say all that is required is just self-awareness/self-introspection/self-reflection?

Thanks

Max said...

I sort of see where you're headed with your question, but I don't think it debunks Scripturalism, because God is still revealing all certain truths.

Self-awareness is required, but Since God is the one who causes thoughts to occur, I would say there is some kind of subtle revelation being made, even though the person might not be "saved" or "regenerate". (I don't know exactly what you mean by the term "regenerate", because I think it's a term used in Calvinism but I left Calvinism a while ago and forgot what they mean by it, if there is a uniform definition of it by Calvinists.)

Also, in my bible, Jeremiah 17:9 says the heart is "deep" not "deceitful". I read the Greek Septuagint, which I feel that God led me to. I am a different sort of "Christian" than most others. And in Matthew 7:21, I don't see self-deception in there at all; it looks like those people knew that they were in the wrong, but they didn't think Jesus knew.

Anonymous said...

Thanks Max,

let me put it this way - an atheist can know (infallibly) his own thoughts right?

and that without the Scriptures correct?

Thanks,


Max said...

Correct

Anonymous said...

Max,

Thanks for being so clear.

May I add something?

Even if there is self-deception, hence the possibility of error in knowing your own thoughts, yet, as Augustine taught, if you err then you exist and that is infallibly known.

Thanks,

Max said...

You're welcome

But I don't understand... If someone is in error, usually they are unaware of their mistake.

Anonymous said...

Yes, but Augustine's point is:

If someone is in error, then they exist.

Thanks,