The creature is image, God is archetype. The knowledge of the creature is thereby analogous to the knowledge of the Creator. The previous sentences are true given what was just said in the last paragraph. It's when these sentences are stated without any definitions of key terms (or in defining key terms in a way that is self-refuting) that there is a problem. But this is just what Horton does on the next page:
All of this is a non sequitur. Again, analogy presupposes univocity. No one denies that the Creator-creature distinction is not something to be "overcome" - it is a reality to be acknowledged - but so too must we recognize the Creator-creature overlap lest we follow the likes of Paul Tillich and fail to do justice to man as image of God. We not only empty the word "image" of meaning if we overemphasize our differences with God (innumerable as they are), we by extension unintentionally weaken other doctrines, like the Trinity (cf. the Son as image of the Father).
Another piece of information of which I was unaware was that Clark actually compared Van Til and Barth prior to the 1951 letter I quoted in my last post (cf. Muether, pg. 126, endnote 26). Muether mentions that Van Til wrote to his nephew indicating awareness that Clark compared he and Barth in 1948. I would like to have heard more from Muether on whether Cornelius Van Til offered any pushback to this charge or merely reported it to Henry Van Til, but the tidbit was interesting enough.
There is more from Muether. Van Til apparently wrote (to an unknown addressee) in October of 1953 that:
I was not aware Van Til (pg. 127) compared Clark to Barth. Given the above, though, it does make some sense:
Q You believe the statement in Chapter 2. Section 1, that the one only living and true God is incomprehensible?
A I believe that there are indications in Scripture that when we shall be glorified, our knowledge will continue to increase forever, and that in all probability there will be no end to such increase.
Q That there will always be then, something which we could not yet comprehend?
A It seems to me entirely likely, though the exegeses of it are a little weak, but it seems to me entirely likely that there will always be certain particular truths that we do not know.
If it isn't possible to attain infinite knowledge, wouldn't it be sinful to seek it? Clark's answers here are a bit tentative, but he leans the correct way and may simply have been nervous. It's hard for me to accept what Muether asserts about Clark's "feedback" on Van Til's syllabus. Muether's following sentences on pgs. 101-102 are also source-less:
Later that same spring Clark published “On the Primacy of the Intellect” in the Westminster Theological Journal. Van Til again pressed Clark on the Creator-creature distinction, fearing that Clark’s argument failed to distinguish between a Christian and a pagan understanding of the intellect. Van Til cited Calvin and Warfield to argue that the intellect was no less fallen than other human faculties. Further conversations confirmed for Van Til his suspicion that Clark’s thought was deeply grounded in Greek philosophy; Van Til summed up Clark’s position in the Socratic motto that “knowledge is virtue.”
To be sure, Van Til was willing to affirm the primacy of the intellect in a certain sense: coming to faith is no mere act of emotional enthusiasm. But Van Til believed that faith is deeper than mere assent, because the Word of God makes an impact on the believer’s heart. Van Til feared that Clark’s exclusive emphasis on assent to doctrine denied the demands that Scripture places on the whole man. The Bible shapes what one knows, but also what one loves and how one behaves.
I have read Clark's article on The Primacy of the Intellect (1943) very closely and do not find that Clark says anything remotely close to the idea our intellect was or is unfallen. Nor does Clark even discuss saving faith. Muether's point about "Clark's exclusive emphasis on assent" indicates he is conflating of what Clark believed later in his life with what he believed earlier in it; or if Muether means Van Til argues this against Clark in the 1940s, I want to see where he does this.
The evidence I can find against this idea is only indirect, but here is a snippet from an article in The Presbyterian Guardian (link). Note that there is no indication that Clark disagreed that there were three elements of saving faith:
Mr. Hamilton then again rose to deliver another paper on the relation between regeneration and human understanding, which again he said had received Dr. Clark's approval. Confusion was injected, however, by the interpolation of some of Mr. Hamilton's own observations which had not been approved by Dr. Clark. In the course of the speech, Mr. Hamilton declared that notitia (knowledge) and assensus (assent) could be possessed by the unregenerate man but that fiducia (trust) could not. These are three theological terms to designate the three elements of saving faith. Mr. Hamilton was promptly challenged for holding that the unregenerate man possesses two-thirds of the elements of saving faith. On this position, said the complainants, the only thing wrong with the unregenerate man is that his saving faith is one-third incomplete. Moreover, since the answer terms assent the central element in faith, the unregenerate man might then, on Mr. Hamilton's position, be said to possess the central element of saving faith.
Mr. Hamilton then said that he had just been told that Dr. Clark would not agree that the unregenerate man was in possession of the first two of the three elements, but only of the first.
Now, I have read Clark's 1943 article was the tipping point for some concern among men in the OPC. But I have not heard sufficient explanation - with references to the actual article itself - as to why. Clark summarizes the positions of philosophers and theologians, occasionally remarks on which thoughts they had were good or bad, discusses emotions, volition, and intellect as activities (not divided parts) of a man, and then argues that the intellect has primacy because it is that by which we will enjoy God forever. This appears to me to be unrelated to what Muether mentions about the fallenness of the intellect and definition of faith, but since he cites no sources, I have no idea what to think.
What, then, was the problem? I'll provide some facts and then some speculation. It is a fact that Clark wrote letters - some dating back to at least 1938 - and likely had conversations with Van Til, Buswell, and perhaps others relating to the content of the final article seen in 1943. How Clark's understanding was interpreted in those writings and discussions he had with others prior to the publishing of the 1943 product may have been the underlying cause for concern. An example that comes to mind would be that in "The Primacy of the Intellect," Clark writes:
...voluntarism conceived reality as fundamentally irrational, as ultimately an unknowable mystery before which man must remain a skeptic; whereas intellectualism with a love of truth resolutely affirms that reality is essentially rational, logical, and knowable.
While this may seem innocuous at first glace, it would possibly recall to Van Til's mind (and Buswell's, who read and agreed with Van Til's letter) a letter he wrote to Clark on December 5th, 1938 (link):
If we say that the real is the rational and the rational is the real we must apply this first to God as He exists by Himself apart from the created world. To that we must add the doctrine of creation into nothing. Thus we make a basic distinction between the reach of God's intellect and the reach of man's intellect.
Reality, uncreated reality, divine reality may and must, it seems to me, be forthwith identified with rationality. God's consciousness and His being are coextensive; His being and His attributes are one. Created reality too is rational in the sense that whatsoever comes to pass happens in accord with the counsel of God. On the other hand God might have created the universe otherwise than He did. There might be various rational ways of existing for the created universe. Hence with respect to the created universe we cannot say that the rational is the real.
There is no prior (nor posterior) letter of which I'm aware that was written by Clark to provide context to this. Clark, who gave Buswell access to this letter with Clark's notes in the margins, tells Buswell in a different letter that Van Til quotes him (Clark) from a previous discussion they had, so an in-person conversation may have precipitated Van Til's above letter. Regardless, Van Til is correct to mention God's freedom. To say "the rational is the real" implies creation was and is necessary, that there is a single intelligible world (with Creator and creation) which can comprise reality. This ruins numerous doctrines.
In an ironic, prophetic twist on Clark's negative view of the word "exists" later in his life, Buswell (writing to Clark; letter dated January 26, 1939) adds to Van Til's criticisms: "If you mean that the rational is the whole of reality, then the word rational ceases to have any meaning." Buswell also dislikes a comment Clark wrote in the margins of Van Til's letter. Clark highlighted Van Til's statement that "with respect to the created universe we cannot say that the rational is the real" and wrote in the margins, "In which case the world cannot be known." But Clark's reply to Buswell in a letter from February 9, 1939 somewhat clarifies matters on all these points:
You are perhaps unduly exercised about my note at the top of page two of Van Til’s letter. In reading a letter I sometimes jot down notes hurriedly to guide me in my reply. Van Til said the rational is not the real with respect to the created universe. You take this to mean that there are ideas in God’s mind which are not realized in creation. Quite true; but whether God might have created some other sort of world is a slightly different question, on which Augustine and Anselm disagree... Very consciously I tried to avoid this particular problem in my paper. So there is not the profundity in my note at the top of p.2 of Van Til’s letter which you find there. As a matter of fact, I had in mind the notion that the real is not rational (granted that is not what he said) and I drew the conclusion that it could then not be an object of knowledge.
In other words, Clark wrote a note quickly that didn't respond to what Van Til said but still was of use in that Clark believed both uncreated and created reality must be rational. Clark then used that idea in his article on "The Primacy of the Intellect": reality is rational. The final product does not suggest the converse, and this is where a careful reading is required.
To my knowledge, Van Til was not aware of Clark's exchange with Buswell. That's one reason which may have contributed to any worry Van Til and/or other of his acquaintances may have had about the 1943 article. Another might be the further suggestions that the discussions between Van Til and Clark revolving around Van Til's December 5th letter definitely contributed to Clark's 1943 article. For example:
- From both Van Til's letter and the 1943 article (Van Til may have been quoting Clark from a prior conversation): "Life is not deeper than logic."
- Van Til from his letter: "As we say, personality is a unit, which thinks and wills and loves. Psychologically we may and must speak of the priority of the intellect but not logically." On the other hand, Clark from the 1943 article: "Each man is a single personality... The question at issue, then, treats not of the temporal order but of the logical order, or to repeat more exactly, of an order determined by the degree to which these actions unite us to God." This indicates a disagreement between Van Til and Clark.
- Another disagreement is that Clark speaks of intellect as the only "mode of action" by which our telos can be fulfilled, i.e. to contemplate God. Clark: "if in Christianity the end of all human endeavor is to see or contemplate God, evidently the desire for God or the love of God is subordinate." Contrast this to Van Til: "The 'vision of deity' is no more ultimate as an end for man than the love of deity or the work for deity" (vision of deity is in quotes because Van Til is quoting Clark).
Perhaps more examples could be given, but this sufficiently shows that "The Primacy of the Intellect" was long in the making. Clark definitively staked out a different position than Van Til. But to assert Clark's position was "pagan" or "grounded in Greek philosophy" takes a little more effort to substantiate, especially since these do not deal with Clark's arguments.
As I said, those are the facts. Now, the speculation: while not said in print, it may have been clear to many OPC churchmen that for the first time, Clark publicly opposed Van Til on intellectual grounds. It was only during Clark's examination that these men had an opportunity to challenge Clark with little to lose.
[As a side note, the stenographic record (
link,
link) is obviously wrong in some places. For example, "the premise of the intellect" should obviously be "the
primacy of the intellect" - the men are clearly questioning Clark based on his 1943 article.]
In his examination, Clark answers Welmers and Stonehouse - both of whom unsurprisingly turned out to be complainants - very thoroughly when they ask about this article, even citing John 17:3 as (a non-pagan, non-Greek) reason for his views. It is a shame Stonehouse was cut off just as it seems he was about to elaborate on "a deep-seated difference between" his and Clark's conceptions. Following this exam, the next significant mention of Clark's article or its contents was
The Complaint and
The Answer themselves (and since Muether mentioned him as a source Van Til used, note Clark's citations of Calvin; pgs. 23-24 in Douma's typed version), and here, I think, we can stop.
In terms of issues at stake regarding Clark's ordination, Muether mentions procedure, theology, and ecclesiology. The last one is a familiar topic, since Muether mentions it in his books with Hart (cf. my last post):
Should the church cooperate with other forms of conservative Protestantism in America? Or ought it to preserve its distinctively Reformed identity? How could the church best combat the modernism of its day: by joining the emerging evangelical movement or by defending and propagating the Westminster Standards? (pg. 103)
This is an unjustified dichotomy. It presupposes a both-and answer isn't possible. Maybe that's true, but it isn't obvious to me, and it is more or less an unargued assumption in many of the OPC historical works I've read. See my interaction with Dennison above.
As an aside, though, I'd like to mention a point that often gets brushed over: the procedural question. Take the Presbytery of Philadelphia, which was found to be in error on failing to follow the Form of Government in acting too hastily regarding Clark's examination process. This is usually all that is said about the matter, but minutes from the Presbytery of Ohio tell a different story. The following is a communication to the 14th OPC General Assembly recorded in the Ohio Presbytery's minutes from the their meeting on April 8, 1947:
The four ministers who reside within the bounds of the Presbytery of Ohio were compelled, by their calling and by the failure of the Thirteenth General Assembly to finish its business in five days, to return to their pressing duties and to miss the final sessions of that Assembly. It is common knowledge that commissioners from other Presbyteries also were likewise compelled to miss the final sessions.
The Presbytery of Ohio therefore requests the Fourteenth General Assembly to make strenuous efforts to finish its business before too many of the commissioners must leave.
If this is impossible, the Presbytery of Ohio implores the Fourteenth General Assembly, in the interests of justice, not to make decisions in the final sessions on matters of vital importance to the Church as a whole; but to confine its actions to routine matters.
Some of us came out of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., and we know the practice of deferring important matters to the closing session. This practice is not conducive to justice and fair dealing. The Thirteenth General Assembly in the evening session of its last day, after a noticeable proportion of the commissioners had left, took action with regard to a matter that had presumably been settled three days previously. This action was taken after the time limit for reconsideration had expired.
The injustice of this action is further seen in the fact that that Assembly, diminished in numbers, elected a quasi-judicial committee in which one of the interested parties but not the other of the interested parties was represented.
The Presbytery of Ohio therefore prayerfully implores the Fourteenth General Assembly to proceed with justice and equity.
Sincerely yours, MARTIN J. BOHN,
Stated Clerk Presbytery of Ohio
These minutes confirm Clark and the only three other ministers of his presbytery (4 total - Thomas Gregory was ordained later that year as a 5th member) missed the final, Monday sessions of the 13th OPC General Assembly. This is important, as it was during these late, final sessions that the following occurred (link):
It was moved and carried that this Assembly instruct the Clerk of the Assembly to inform the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the action of the Assembly, to wit, that “this Assembly finds that there is ground for complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia and declares that the Presbytery of Philadelphia, at its meeting on July 7, 1944, erred in the decision to deem the examination sufficient for ordination, and in the decision to ordain Dr. Gordon H. Clark at a subsequent meeting of the Presbytery called for that purpose, in that the Presbytery failed to observe the plain intent of the provisions of the Form of Government (XIV, 1 and XV, ll), in circumstances which made the propriety of these provisions apparent.” This Assembly also. implores the Presbytery of Philadelphia to make acknowledgment of these errors and of its failure thereby to preserve the peace of the Church, and to report accordingly to the Fourteenth General Assembly...
It was moved that:
Whereas the purity and the peace of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church are of the deepest concern to the General Assembly, and
Whereas “to the General Assembly. . . belongs the power of deciding in all controversies regarding doctrine . . ." (Form of Government, XI, 5), and
Whereas there has appeared to be a difference in our Church concerning the Scriptural teaching pertaining to the doctrines of the incomprehensibility of God, the position of the intellect in reference to other faculties, the relation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, and. the free offer of the gospel,
Be it resolved that Messrs. Murray, Clowney, R. Gray, W. Young and Stonehouse be appointed to study these doctrines in the light of Scripture and the Westminster Standards in relation to all expressions of views on the doctrines that have appeared or may appear in connection with the discussion of the Complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia in the matter of the licensure and ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark, for the purpose of clarifying these matters, and report to the Fourteenth General Assembly.
In other words, Clark left the 13th General Assembly unaware that of what happened in the Monday afternoon and evening sessions, including the movement made to form a study committee stacked with ministers whom he, as an "interested party," found no representation. This is all the more important when one considers Muether's point that:
Strictly speaking the General Assembly never addressed the substance of the complaint against Clark. Instead, it assigned the theological issues of the debate to study committees that reported over the course of three years, and these reports were distributed to congregations for their study. (pg. 103)
I don't find (and this could be my mistake) any reference in the minutes for the 13th General Assembly as to how this committee was elected - or how the committee itself was even proposed. Three of the five members were from the study committee formed by the 12th General Assembly; Stonehouse surely would not have been viewed as a welcome addition by Clark. The Ohio presbytery's allusion to the injustice of the PCUSA is quite striking - Clark is nearly being styled as a new Machen.
If not a procedural error, the Ohio Presbytery certainly was not happy with the conduct of the 13th General Assembly. Sympathizers with Clark (and Clark himself) appear to have had good reason to be upset at important decisions - decisions about presbytery fault and committees which would inform and color the minds of OPC commissioners less able to devote time to study of the issues in The Complaint and The Answer - made during extra meetings without any prior indication given to officers who had to leave at the expected time.
Here's how the 14th General Assembly's COMMITTEE ON OVERTURES AND COMMUNICATIONS responded to the Ohio Presbytery:
8. With regard to the communication from the Presbytery of Ohio imploring the Assembly to conclude important business in five days, the committee recommends that the Assembly take cognizance.
The final note on how the 14th General Assembly itself reacted to this recommendation is anti-climactic:
It was moved and carried that the Assembly take no action on the eighth recommendation.
So, after all, the Presbytery of Philadelphia was "implored" to acknowledge error, and it did so... barely. Muether reports that "The Presbytery registered its contrition by the slim margin of 16-14" (pg. 103). Well, if the imploring occurred after many interested commissioners went home - again, not a procedural error, but, perhaps, a bad look - the reticence of some members of the Philadelphia presbytery makes sense.
Clark would later rebuff his old Philadelphia presbytery for an actual procedural mistake in his tenure within the Ohio Presbytery:
The Presbytery of Ohio of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church hereby replies to the Presbytery of Philadelphia, relative to the latter's complaint dated July 21, 1947:
The said complaint states that the Presbytery of Ohio acted illegally in receiving licentiate Thomas M. Gregory. The ground alleged in support of this charge is an action of the complaining Presbytery relative to granting licentiate Thomas M. Gregory a letter of dismissal.
The Presbytery of Ohio wishes it to be known that its action commenced with the presentation of the letter of dismissal. The Form of Government, Chapter XX, states, "It shall be the duty of the clerk... to grant extracts from them (the minutes) whenever properly required; and such extracts under the hand of the clerk shall be considered as authentic vouchers of the fact which they declare, in any ecclesiastical judicatory and to every part of the church."
Whatever method the Presbytery of Philadelphia chose to follow in granting the letter of dismissal could not properly have been and was not a matter for the Presbytery of Ohio to act upon.
The Presbytery of Philadelphia seems to believe that Mr. Gregory was not a resident of the state of Indiana when he was received by the Presbytery of Ohio. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Gregory has established residence in Indiana before he was received. However, this has no bearing on the case, and the Presbytery of Ohio repudiates the notion that such a consideration was or ought to have been before it. The Presbytery of Ohio received Mr. Gregory on the basis of a regular letter of dismissal from the Presbytery of Philadelphia. There is nothing illegal in such a procedure.
The Presbytery of Philadelphia in the second part of the same complaint charges that the Presbytery of Ohio ordained Mr. Gregory illegally. The ground alleged in support of this charge is that Mr. Gregory had no call warranting ordination.
The Presbytery of Ohio replies that the determination of such a question of fact lies in the discretion of the examining Presbytery. Questions of fact that are placed in the discretion of Presbyteries cannot be reviewed by another Presbytery or even by a higher court. An attempt to sit in judgment on matters within the discretion of another Presbytery is in effect an attempt to destroy Presbyterian polity. If such a complaint were allowed standing in a court, it would mean that every ordination and every action of every Presbytery might have to await the approval of the Presbytery of Philadelphia. The Presbytery of Ohio therefore is compelled to reject the complaint addressed to it by the Presbytery of Philadelphia.
Clark (who wrote the above) defended the ordination of a man against the very Presbytery which questioned his own ordination. The Presbytery of Philadelphia seems to have backed off, and Mr. Gregory's ordination stood.
Perhaps these observations are incidental to Muether, but as much as I have heard OPC historians remark that the broader ecclesiastic and cultural views played a bigger role in the 1940s debate than some have thought - it's not all just about the theology - I haven't heard as much about the loosely "procedural" dimensions. There is much background context to the 1940s debate that has not been available to the public, so I thought to include some of that context here just as example of how much influence one can have (or try to have) without relevant parties (Clark, OPC commissioners) even being present.
Moving on, Muether's summary of the incomprehensibility of God question (pgs. 104-105) is typical and does not need comment, especially since I've already said so much about that. What is worth comment is Muether's following citation of Robert Strong, a supporter of Clark. Strong said Clark's ordination was "a very great victory" for the church because it recognized that "there could be some difference at minor points without a man's loyalty to the system of doctrine being impeached."
In his book, Muether adds in brackets "[of the Westminster Standards]" after "system of doctrine" and makes an interpretive statement of Strong's citation that I don't understand. Muether says, "This was a revealing statement, because Clark himself never conceded that his views required an exception from the church's standards" (pg. 105).
Maybe I'm reading the Strong or Muether horribly wrong, but this doesn't make any sense to me. Strong wasn't saying anything close to the idea that Clark's views required an exception; he was saying the opposite and celebrating that especially on points where the Westminster Standards are silent, "there could be some difference" while yet allowing that both sides are loyal Presbyterians. I have no idea what Muether means by Strong's statement being "revealing" of something. Strong may well have had in mind something like what he helped with as Committee Secretary of The Answer:
The second problem of this section is one of human psychology, and its discussion will again
underline the fact that the Complaint is not a matter of the doctrines of the Westminster Confession but of technical and abstruse subtleties more suitable for philosophers than for preachers.
The rest of what Muether says about Strong can be skipped, as can his comments about "whether the church's ecclesiology would be Reformed or evangelical" (pg. 107). There isn't anything Muether says that hasn't already been discussed or accounted for above or in one of the links at the beginning of this post. The next interesting thing Muether says is found on pg. 108:
By the controversy’s end they had persuaded the church that its Reformed militancy needed to express itself in careful distinction from Reformed evangelicalism. It is in this sense that Van Til “won” the debate, and in the larger context of Reformed ecclesiology, Van Til’s role in the Clark controversy, far from being an embarrassment, should be interpreted as one of his finest moments.
Over whom was Van Til victorious? Clark? If that is Muether's implication, he has not nearly established Clark's Reformed views were one rather than the other, as if they can't be both. This was addressed in my last post, and it also applies to Dennison.
Further, on the point of Reformed ecclesiology, there may have been some ecclesiological questions - including whether Westminster Theological Seminary should remain independent, which is not, as far as I can tell, mentioned by Muether - but so far as Clark is strictly concerned, the 1940s debate must remain a strictly theological matter.
There remain only a few matters on which I will comment. Much of Van Til's admiration for Murray, Klooster, and Bavinck as well as Reymond's admiration for Clark can be omitted, but to just point out how easy it is for contemporary theologians to speak in terms which will give a wrong view of those with whom they disagree, take Muether here:
If Clark and Reymond resisted the notions of mystery, Van Til found himself at home with that expression, because of his deeper commitment to revelation and covenant. Van Til was comfortable even to the point of embracing the language of his mentor, Herman Bavinck, that “mystery is the life of all dogmatics.” Because the finite cannot contain the infinite, Bavinck underscored that the revelation of the infinite God to the finite creature cannot be exhaustive of the being of God, and so God remains incomprehensible. (pg. 110)
"Mystery" must mean "paradox." In any case, nothing Bavinck says in the highlighted portion is disagreeable with what Clark argued. Clark didn't argue we exhaust God, so if that were the only question, the whole debate would have been moot. The highlighted portion simply has nothing to do with Clark's concerns, but Muether gives the impression that Van Til was opposed by them on this point.
Speaking of Bavinck, buried in an endnote is a definition of analogical knowledge according to Bavinck, though. On pg. 250, Muether references Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatic, 2:28, which states:
The knowledge we have of God is altogether unique. This knowledge may be called positive insofar as by it we recognize a being infinite and distinct from all finite creatures. On the other hand, it is negative because we cannot ascribe a single predicate to God as we conceive that predicate in relation to creatures. It is therefore an analogical knowledge: a knowledge of a being who is unknowable in himself, yet able to make something of himself known in the being he created. Here, indeed, lies something of an antinomy. Rather, agnosticism, suffering from a confusion of concepts, sees here an irresolvable contradiction in what Christian theology regards as an adorable mystery. It is completely incomprehensible to us how God can reveal himself and to some extent make himself known in created beings: eternity in time, immensity in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in change, being in becoming, the all, as it were, in that which is nothing.
In other words, when we say "God is good" and "man is good," "good" cannot be ascribed to God as it is to creatures. And this goes for every single predicate. So it isn't just that "good" means something different when ascribed to God, it means something totally different. Were this not the case, we could then use a single predicate to meaningfully ascribe similarity regarding what "good" means. This is equivocity, not analogicity.
This criticism will sound familiar to those who have actually read the whole of this long-winded post, for it is yet again the same criticism that "analogical knowledge" is a misnomer as it is applied by Van Til, the other complainants, and, it seems his Dutch forefather.
On another note, Muether says Nash called Clark a "rationalist presuppositionalist" and Van Til a "revelational presuppositionalist" (pg. 113). If there is one persisting complaint I have, it's that Muether does not provide enough sources for his statements. I would have been interested in following up on this, but yet again, I have nothing to go on.
To close with one more engagement with Muether, he criticizes Clark for violating a common classroom illustration by Van Til. Pay attention to the kicker at the end:
The most memorable feature of Van Til’s teaching involved a diagram of the two circles that he drew in his classroom lectures. Van Til positioned the larger one above the smaller one, and the two did not overlap. The former represented God, and the latter the world that he created, which was always dependent upon God and his revelation. The two circles represented not only the creaturely and analogical standing of humanity and God’s transcendence, but as Van Til connected them with two vertical lines, they indicated man’s covenantal standing before God. By connecting creation and covenant in this way, Van Til established the similarity of the being and knowledge of man, as God’s image bearer, with God’s while denying their identity at any point. Gordon Clark, intolerant of any notion of mystery, committed the error of allowing the circles to touch. (pg. 116)
Two last points on this:
1) Muether admits that there must be "similarity of the being and knowledge of man, as God's image bearer, with [God]..." This is an admission which, as I said with Horton, gives the case away. If analogy does indeed involve similarity, it involves overlap. It is unintelligible to compare two subjects, call them similar, and yet have no account for the similarity. On the other hand, any such account will involve univocal predication, for whatever is taken to be the account for the similarity will also be that whereby univocal predication is possible.
Example: is Van Til's account that of "connecting creation and covenant"? If so, then "God is covenanted" and "man is covenanted" mean the same thing. If not, there is no similarity after all, for the meaning is equivocal. We can and should qualify these propositions by adding information - "God is covenanted [in that He is the Suzerain]," "man is covenanted [in that he is the vassal]" (or whatever) - but the content of the additional information will not change the content of the simple, singular predication.
2) Van Til seems to have forgotten what he wrote to Clark in the December 5th, 1938 letter. God must be considered first as apart from creation. Drawing two circles already presupposes two realities. More accurate, I think, would be to make the creation circle dotted rather than solid to indicate its contingency.
Further, on the assumption of creation, these circles are similar insofar as they are circles - why does it matter if they touch? "Similarity" returns us to point 1). It doesn't matter that God needed to breathe "life" ("color" might be apt if Van Til had used a markerboard) into creation. That's the trouble with illustrations, especially in this context: no matter if Van Til were to make different colors, shapes, or drawings, the nature of his attempted illustration itself requires a comparison between two of some same, univocal category (that is, between two colors, shapes, drawings, etc.).
So it is with language, and I would not think Muether has plans to pull up a Wittgensteinian ladder by discarding the very revelation we use to talk about God, nor do I think Van Til would discard the use of "reality" in his "analogization" (let's say) of Creator to creation.
Finally, if the circles are just to illustrate the dependence of creature on God and His revelation, Clark would never have allowed the circles to touch if that mean some part of creation did not stand in such a dependence relation. If Van Til or Muether were to reply that while this may not have been Clark's intent, he nevertheless did so in his refusal to accept man's "analogical standing," these men have much they need to respond to - see this entire post - before that charge can be taken seriously.
Postscript
The nature of the content discussed and resultant disagreement can tend to give an unwanted impression. These men have all labored for the kingdom of God. I appreciate the work they have done and continue to do for my church, for I too attend and love the OPC. I have tried to restrict my comments to the relevant content, so if anything else seems to have bled through the text, it is unintentional.
