Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 13)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's twelfth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

Clark, Occasionalism, and Internalism: One More Time

In this chapter, Mr. Lazar surveys a few objections leveled against Clark's Scripturalism to compare how his own epistemologically distinct views enable him to fare "better" against the same objections. 

One common objection to Clark's views is the question, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" In an earlier review, I mentioned that Clark responds to this question by defending occasionalism: "God and God alone is the cause" (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 27, cf. link). Clark cites Augustine, Jonathan Edwards, and Malebranche to make his case. While I would have liked to see more substance to Mr. Lazar's criticisms of Clark's occasionalism, I've elsewhere argued why I think occasionalism is flawed (link). 

On the other hand, I don't think any of the passages Mr. Lazar mentions are to the point. Clark didn't deny that men experienced sensation (see below quotes). He does deny that sensations were causes [of knowledge]... just as he denied anything besides God counted as a cause. But even if Clark had believed senses could function as causes, none of the referenced verses say anything about sensations causing knowledge. 

Still further (and more importantly), even if one's reading of Scripture itself causes knowledge, such does not necessarily imply that one's reading is a factor in one's epistemic justification. Clark himself puts the point quite sarcastically:

The professor insists that sensation must play a role in knowledge acquisition. Of course it does! Breakfast plays a role too. If some people miss their morning coffee, they get so irritated and irritable that they cannot pay attention to their studies. Hence Sanka is the salvation of scholarship. (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 23)

Even if eating "causes" (and Clark is fair to ask, in context, what "causation" means) one to learn the Bible - in the sense of it being a precondition for being able to learn (since one must eat to live, focus, and learn) - eating is not epistemically relevant to whether our study yields knowledge. 

Along these lines, a similar response I can imagine Clark making to Mr. Lazar is that language ought not be conflated with thought:

Obviously, Henry and Clark do not “reduce” truth to language, especially not to sounds in the air and ink marks on paper. (See Clark’s quotation from Abraham Kuyper in Language and Theology.) Before truths or thoughts can be “written,” that is, symbolized on paper, the thoughts must be thought. Different literal words can express the same thought. For example, “Das Mädchen ist schön,” “La jeune fille est belle,” and “The girl is beautiful,” are three different sentences with all different words, but they are the same, single, identical proposition. Daane’s argument seems to be based on inattention to the distinction between thoughts and their symbolic surrogates. (God's Hammer, 1995, pg. 182)

…if one may think the same thought twice, truth must be mental or spiritual. Not only does it defy time; it defies space as well, for if communication is to be possible, the identical truth must be in two minds at once. If, in opposition, anyone wishes to deny that an immaterial idea can exist in two minds at once, his denial must be conceived to exist his mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does not occur to us to refute it. (A Christian View of Men and Things, pg. 224)

Epistemology has to do with what we think is true - specifically, which thoughts do we say we know are true, and how do we know them? Now, if thoughts are immaterial, mental, or spiritual, to argue against Clark that a material, physical, or sensory process undermines his epistemology begs the question. One must, in providing such an external critique, specify his grounds for regarding a physical process as integral to epistemic justification. That is not Clark's burden of proof to discharge here. In response to, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" Clark is well within his rights to reply, "Well, do you? If so, how, and to what end?" 

There are plenty of indications, contrary to many Scripturalists today who think otherwise (Mr. Lazar not among them), that Clark was not an externalist. Consider the following quotes in which Clark demands that one show what he defends, theorizes, or claims to know in order to be justified or even have an epistemology:

I think you are begging the question. You would first have to show how black marks on a page can produce anything intelligible. You ought to define sensation, you ought to show how sensation produces perception, you ought to defend your theory of images, and try to construct abstract ideas out of images, and I think it cannot be done... (Clark-Hoover Debate)

If you are an empiricist there is no use of your beginning with saying, “well I have a Bible in my hand and I can see it.” You will have to begin and give a consistent philosophy of empiricism. You don’t start with midway through the system, that is begging the question. You must decide on your first principles. Now I think I said last night that observation can never demonstrate the validity or truth of observation. It cannot show that observation is the way of knowledge. In order to have a thoroughgoing empirical position, you, presumably, you must begin with sensation. Now if you disagree with that statement I’d be willing to listen to you for two hours or more but at least most of them say that. You must begin with sensation. Then, to make your system tick, you will have to show how sensation develops into perception. And this is something hardly anybody ever does. And beyond that you will have to show how perception develops into or involves images, from which concepts are abstracted...

I do not deny, of course, that the apostles had certain visual sensations, but they cannot deduce from those visual sensations any Christian doctrine. And I would repeat again that if you think that is possible you are under obligation to show how sensation becomes perception, how perception develops images, and to give a theory of abstraction so that you can get such doctrines as the Trinity and justification and the other doctrines. (Believer’s Chapel Tape Ministry, 1977, link)

The gentleman asserted that sensation plays “a role in knowledge acquisition.” How can one come to such a conclusion? Clearly by discovering what the role is. Unless one knows what the role is, one cannot know that there is any role at all. For example, in the case of the large debt of the United States government some economist hold that deficits play no role in producing unemployment, while other economists assert the contrary. To sustain their position, these latter must show what the role is. If they cannot, then neither can justify their position… Therefore one cannot logically maintain that sensation plays a role in the acquisition of knowledge without showing precisely what that role is.

All the apologists with whom I have debated refuse to face this question… When I ask them to show how images can be transformed into abstract concepts, not one of them has even tried to explain. They even refuse to define sensation. Likewise perception. They really have no epistemology at all, and their words, to omit an inapplicable part of a popular quotation, are full of sound, signifying nothing. (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 22-23)

"Have to," "ought to," "under obligation to, "must" - quite strong language to use for persons to qualify as being able to "justify their position" or "really have" an epistemology. For Clark, we are intentionally active in acquiring epistemic justification (link). What Clark essentially argues is that a defense of externalist knowledge is, in the words of Mr. Lazar, a performative contradiction. In making knowledge claims with the intention of defending them (as one "ought" to do), one presupposes internalism.

The above implies Clark held to an internalist understanding of knowledge (cf. link), as I have ever thought - all the more so after my recent, brief glance through Lord God of Truth. I was also right to think my project of collating Clark quotes on epistemology (link) will, before I can be satisfied, require me to reread his books to catch material I may have missed. 

For my part, I think that while a defense of the possibility of externalist knowledge presupposes [a defense of] internalist knowledge (link), I also think having externalist knowledge is possible before one has internalist knowledge. It is possible for one to believe the truth due to the proper functioning of divinely designed second causes, and such a process can occur without one first having infallibilist, internalist knowledge. However, for one to defend that such an external, justificatory process has occurred or even can occur - that is, for one to make a knowledge claim or claim about knowledge - does, in turn, require [a defense of] internalist knowledge.

Now, I would qualify that what I mean by a "defense" of internalist knowledge is somewhat context-dependent. Since I defend a foundationalist structure of epistemically and internally justified beliefs, any "defense" of one's knowledge of axioms is not to be taken as a circular ground for believing said axioms. I don't think that knowledge of axioms in an internalist sense requires a "defense" in order to know them - as Mr. Lazar might say, "knowing" doesn't require "showing" - although an apologetic defense can be provided for purposes of persuasion.

As this is just a blog post reviewing a book, I won't expand too much on what I mean by the above, taking for granted that what I've written elsewhere is sufficient to get the point across should I myself ever revisit my own writing in the future. 

For the sake of any other readers, though, when critiquing or defending Clark, care is needed in these kinds of discussions. An example of this pertains to the very topic of axioms. On page 144, for example, Mr. Lazar says we accept that "sense perception produces propositional knowledge... axiomatically." But one page later, he says, "Based on the Biblical evidence, Neo-Scripturalism affirms that you have sense knowledge..." These statements are contradictory. Inferential knowledge - knowledge based on evidence - is not foundational or axiomatic. 

Additionally, the ideal way in which beliefs are known is not in an externalist sense. Mr. Lazar writes that our axiomatic beliefs are properly basic and warranted. To say that, though, would be to seemingly reject any internalist understanding of how Scripture is "known." Such a position means that our epistemic justification is always [partially] external, that there are elements to our epistemic justification to which we have no reflective access such that we cannot be aware or assured that we know at all, and, worse, that our knowledge of Scripture is seemingly, in principle, defeatable (link). Clark's occasionalism is not a good answer to his critics... but is Mr. Lazar's answer "better"?

At any rate, as already mentioned, the verses Mr. Lazar mentions would require deeper exegesis or engagement with Clark's position for it to be poignant. Yes, for example, the Bereans examined Scriptures. Clark would argue that Scripture is not just ink marks on paper, so a rejection of Clark's occasionalism in favor of a different interpretation, like epistemic externalism, will require more elaboration on why Acts 17 should trouble Clark than simply saying, "Many thought that Clark's Augustinian answer wasn't very satisfying" (pg. 141). Ironically, it is Mr. Lazar's critique that is not very satisfying, especially since there are good reasons for rejecting Clark's occasionalism.

Bahnsen: Clark and "Suppositionalism"

Mr. Lazar mentions Greg Bahnsen as a notable critic of Clark's presuppositionalism - or as Bahnsen sees it, Clark's "suppositionalism," for Bahnsen thought "Clark treats Christianity as a possibility" rather than "demand" that God's Word be regarded as "the precondition for all intellectual endeavor." 

That is, Bahnsen, like Van Til (cf. this post), takes issue with Clark's method of argumentation for Christianity. But as I questioned in the linked post, would Van Til or Bahnsen have taken issue with the apostle Paul's method of argumentation in 1 Corinthians 15:16-19? Does Paul really "suppose" it is possible the resurrection did not happen? Or is Paul not rather using apologetic rhetoric to highlight the implied existential despair that follows from the position of his anti-resurrection opponents? One can defend the faith in more ways than one. 

Further, several of Bahnsen’s objections rest on false assumptions, for Clark did not view Christianity as only hypothetically true or as only one of a number of potentially legitimate choices. Most citations of Clark that Bahnsen brings up in his book, Presuppositional Apologetics (which I read a long time ago), are either entirely true or seem to be misunderstood by Bahnsen. 

One example from Bahnsen's book that Mr. Lazar references is the following statement by Clark: “That religion or Christianity in particular furnishes a better method than secularism is a possibility not to be dismissed without discussion” (Presuppositional Apologetics, pg. 142).

Bahnsen’s response is that “The truth of the Christian world-view provides, not a 'better' or 'possible' method, but the necessary method, of all academic tasks.” But is not a necessary method a better method? And would Bahnsen prefer to dismiss Christianity without discussion? On the contrary, Clark's statement is entirely true. 

Perhaps Bahnsen wishes Clark phrased things differently. but apologetics is a practical business. There isn’t just one solitary moral or programmatic response to any given situation. Clark is entirely within his apologetic rights to defend the faith as he does, so long as he is truthful and faithful to his own epistemic axiom of revelation (as he is here). 

Now compare Bahnsen's accusation that Clark is a mere "suppositionalist" to the following:

Carnell also says: “Since their systems [the systems of thought of finite minds] are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability.” But if this is true, it itself is not true but only probable. And if this is true, the propositions in the Bible, such as David killed Goliath and Christ died for our sins, are only probable – they may be false. And to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation. Conversely, therefore, it must be maintained that whatever great ignorance may characterize the systems of human thought, such ignorance of many truths does not alter the few truths the mind possesses. There are many truths of mathematics, astronomy, Greek grammar, and Biblical theology that I do not know; but if I know anything at all, and especially if God has given me just one item of information, my extensive ignorance will have no effect on that one truth. Otherwise, we are all engulfed in a skepticism that makes argumentation a waste of time. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37)

While Mr. Lazar doesn’t refute Bahnsen's charge against Clark in this way - perhaps because Mr. Lazar rejects the possibility of internalist knowledge (on which see below) - he does, however, push back against Bahnsen on his own grounds: Scripture itself has something to say about this subject. For example, Scripture not only allows that new divine revelation can be examined for consistency with established divine revelation (Acts 17:11) but also, at times, demands it (1 Thessalonians 5:20-21, 1 John 4:1). And I agree with Mr. Lazar insofar as, when properly understood, God's word does invite one to "test" it. 

Now, [any advantages of] "testing" must indeed be balanced against what Bahnsen is likely worried about: if we say that "testing" God's word is a means to providing epistemic evidence for believing divine revelation, we have implicitly subjected God's word to a more sure, foundational standard. This is not what Clark or I am proposing. In the epistemic context of internally and infallibly justified beliefs, the success of a prediction, for example, can only provide confirmatory support that one is a prophet as opposed to epistemic grounding for his claim. 

Aside from concerns about subordinating knowledge of God's word to some kind of empirical epistemology, one reason I don't think mere predictive success can be "epistemic" (in the aforementioned sense of internalism and infallibilism) support for claims regarding prophethood or divine revelation is the following: suppose two people predict contradictories about whether or not it rains tomorrow. Suppose each person also claims to be a divine prophet. It either will rain or won't. Necessarily, one prediction will be false and the other will be true. While one claim will turn out to be false - falsifying that said claimant is a prophet - would such ipso facto mean the other claimant is a prophet, merely because his claim will be true? One would think not. But then, is there a non-arbitrary amount of predictive claims that would establish one as a prophet?

Consider: if everyone in the world were placed into a bracket in which, for each daily round, half of participants predicted rain the next day and half did not, several people would make it a full month in making correct predications before they might make an incorrect predication thereafter. But I would think that says little about whether those people actually are prophets. There must be more that goes into one's being able to recognize the authenticity of a prophet than the sheer amount of correct predictions one may make.

Now, there are some passages of Scripture that indicate that predictive success can, in some cases, lead to "knowledge" that the one who made the prediction[s] is a prophet. Some of these might also outline beginnings of what such a criteria for prophetic authenticity might look like, such as anomalous predictions (Jeremiah 28:8-9, Ezekiel 2:5, 33:33). However, given that Ezekiel 2:5 in particular makes mention that even the rebellious can possess knowledge that the man who speaks the word of the Lord is a prophet, it seems apparent that the sort of "knowledge" alluded to here is of another kind than an internalist, infallibilist sense of "knowledge," the latter being that alone by which one can have full assurance (link). I tend to read the above passages as supporting the possibility of an externalist view of knowledge, especially as they are third-person accounts in which God is saying something about what people know, not the people themselves who are necessarily accounting for their or aware of their own knowledge (cf. link).

One final point about prophecies and epistemology: Christians in particular should consider that at least one prophecy has not yet been fulfilled: the return of Christ. If we could only know that Christ, Paul, etc. are prophets after this prophecy about Christ's return has been the fulfilled, then we wouldn't yet be able to know Christ, Paul. etc. are prophets, which Christians must surely regard as false. We can now know that Christ, Paul, etc. were and are prophets. 

All this is to say - once again, and to assuage the concerns of Bahnsen - that divine revelation is epistemically self-justifying. Testing does, however, give believers in divine revelation apologetic recourse in that performing said tests tend to silence unbelievers and help instill psychological confidence in believers.

So, too, Bahnsen is mistaken regarding Clark's view about the relationship between Scripture and logical consistency, the latter of which indeed can be viewed, when properly understood, as a "test" of the former (cf. the Bereans). I've written about this elsewhere (link). Clark did not view logical consistency as an epistemically foundational method for knowing divine revelation:

To the same effect, it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore, the same conclusion follows: Either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 54)

How then could God show to a man that it was God speaking? Suppose God should say, “I will make of you a great nation...and I will bless them that bless you and curse him that curses you.” Would God call the devil and ask Abraham to believe the devil’s corroborative statements? Is the devil’s word good evidence of God’s veracity? It would not seem so. Nor is the solution to be found in God’s appealing to another man in order to convince the doubter. Aside from the fact that this other man is no more of an authority than the devil, the main question reappears unanswered in this case also. What reasons can this man have to conclude that God is making a revelation to him? It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. God may, to be sure, furnish “evidence” to man. He may send an earthquake, a fire, or still small voice; he may work spectacular miracles, or, as in the cases of Isaiah and Peter, he may produce inwardly an awful consciousness of sin, so that the recipient of the revelation is compelled to cry out, “Woe is me! For I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips.” But whether it be an external spectacle or an inward “horror or great darkness,” all of this is God’s witnessing to himself. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183

But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 113) 

Note the italics. Reading Clark charitably, I take this to mean that divine revelation cannot be subject to any epistemic test. Logical consistency is not superior to divine revelation:

The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth.

Ideally or for God this seems to be the case. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.

Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other...

Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions. Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest. Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth.

Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation.

Now, Bahnsen would be right to criticize Clark's mere coherence or consistency theory about the nature of truth. This theory of truth may be what pushed him to eventually accept necessitarianism (link), since if truth just is a consistent system of propositions, that implies there is and necessarily can be only one such system. If one argues there can be more than one system of consistent propositions, either the systems in question would be consistent (and, hence, would seemingly collapse into one larger system a la necessitarianism) or the systems would be inconsistent (which would constitute a reductio ad absurdem against the theory itself).

So the nature of truth is not merely "consistency." Some truths are necessary, yes; but Christians should also regard some truths as contingent, grounded in God's freedom - hence the Reformed distinction between God's natural and free knowledge. Better, then, is to argue that the nature of truth is both consistency and correspondence (link). There are multiple possible systems of consistent propositions, but truth corresponds to only one.

In any case, the larger point here is that in regards to epistemology, Clark was not a coherentist but a foundationalist. He did not believe that examining worldviews for logical consistency was a means by which we can come to know which one is true over against another. People can falsify worldviews that are inconsistent, but no worldview can be established as true just because it appears to be consistent.

Thus, while he makes some good points in this chapter, I wouldn't put certain things as Mr. Lazar does, such as in apologetically presenting Christianity as a "conjecture" or as "probabilistic" based on what it is that he can show about it to an unbeliever. Christianity is true, full stop. It doesn't matter that we can't "prove" our axiom to others (for no one can do that). Nor is it relevant that we can't believe the truth - that the divine revelation of Christianity is self-justifying - for the unbeliever with whom we are discussing (for no one can believe something for someone else).

Mr. Lazar is right that there is a distinction between knowing and showing. But his analogy to his knowing that he owned a certain car tends to undermine rather than support his case against Bahnsen. Our knowledge of Scripture is (or, at least, can be) more sure than anything we know in an externalist sense, such as knowledge that we owned a car in the past. We can reflect on and be fully assured that Scripture is true, whereas our belief that we owned a car in the past may, upon reflection, be [regarded as] false. The "certitude" Mr. Lazar has about owning a car is - and by his own admission - "psychological" (pg. 148), whereas the assurance we can have regarding the truth of Scripture is absolute and unfalsifiable (although "testable"). An externalist can't be aware that he knows he owned a car; an internalist can be aware that he knows Scripture is true. Or, as I've said in a previous review:

To argue we indeed can be aware that we have sense knowledge seems to assume we can be aware of when we have had sense knowledge. But for us to be aware of when we have sense knowledge would be to suggest that the are no external justificatory factors on which us having sense knowledge would depend. In turn, that would be to affirm an internalist understanding of sense knowledge, a proposal of a sort of empirical epistemology that Mr. Lazar has assured us is not on offer and would invite all the objections to empiricism that Clark wrote in his numerous publications (objections with which Mr. Lazar says he accepts). Thus, I have argued that when it comes to a basic epistemology, sense knowledge (or other kinds of "knowledge" that are justified in an externalist sense) may be important - and it may be that we have it without being aware of the fact - but ought to be regarded as subordinate in fundamentality to knowledge that is justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense, knowledge of which we can be aware. (link)

On this account, then, I think Clark's own writings provide better resources in responding to Bahnsen than Mr. Lazar's do.

Bahnsen, Scripture, and an "Absolute" Presupposition

One other criticism of Clark that Bahnsen makes in this chapter is that Clark does not really accept Scripture as his "absolute presupposition." I'll quote from Bahnsen's Presuppositional Apologetics and make a few points:

...one could easily be led to believe that logic per se is his transcendental rather than Scripture. Instead of the attempt to be independent of God’s Word, “the denial of the law of contradiction, or even the failure to establish it as a universal truth, was the downfall of secular philosophy. For the absolute presuppositionalist, God and His revelation guarantee the possibility of epistemological fruitfulness, for He who is the truth has deigned to give us a revelation of knowledge. Clark, on the other hand, concludes his chapter on epistemology in A Christian View of Men and Things by saying that it “has tried to show by an application of the law of contradiction—a law that is not merely formal but is itself an integral part of the system of truth—that truth exists and that knowledge is possible.” (Presuppositional Apologetics, pg. 144)

Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Bahnsen criticizes Clark for treating "Christianity as a possibility." While that charge is misleading, for Clark did not merely treat Christianity as one among many possibilities, note that an uncharitable reading of Bahnsen's above quote would lead one to criticize Bahnsen for the same language! Does Bahnsen mean that God's revelation only guarantees "the possibility of epistemic fruitfulness"? Surely not any more than Clark means that Christianity is only possibly better than secularism when Clark wrote, "That religion or Christianity in particular furnishes a better method than secularism is a possibility not to be dismissed without discussion." 

Secondly, I think Bahnsen’s unintentionally drives a wedge between Scripture and the law of contradiction. When Clark applies the law of contradiction, he does so because it is itself an integral part of God’s truth as revealed to us: there is a connection between the sufficient condition for knowledge (God’s word) and subsidiary, necessary conditions (law of contradiction, language, etc.). Indeed, the sufficient condition can be "tested" by whether it contains necessary, subsidiary conditions. As mentioned, this testing is not as though Scripture may fail the test; rather, it confirms what we already know about God's self-justifying revelation.

Turning to Mr. Lazar's response to Bahnsen, the following remark he makes is well-put: "God's Word does not teach that you must assume the Bible is true in order to think" (pg. 147). I'm not quite sure that Bahnsen actually means that, but the cited statement by Bahnsen to which this serves as a response is vague enough to warrant the point.

On the other hand, Mr. Lazar responds seems to fall into Bahnsen’s trap in driving a wedge between logic and Scripture, because Mr. Lazar says that Bahnsen must assume a list of hardcore common sense items and, therefore, "he cannot make the word of God his absolute epistemic presupposition, even in principle." But this would mean a rejection of Scripturalism - and neo-Scripturalism, for that matter – because then the Bible is no longer our epistemic axiom. 

Mr. Lazar's axiom[s] would instead be the list he created and says he and we all must “already [epistemically?] presuppose." Maybe that wasn’t his intention, but if not, it is hard to make sense of his paragraph. This goes to show the importance of distinguishing between sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge. Just like the persons of the Trinity are distinct yet inseparable, one must keep distinct - yet inseparable - the sufficient condition for knowledge, God's word, and any subsidiary, necessary (or ontological) [pre]conditions without which knowledge would also be impossible (link, link).

I'll add a thought or two that might help. Perhaps the concern is that Scripture is contingent whereas logic et al. are transcendental. If that is the concern, then while it may be contingently true that Scripture is the sole, extant extent of divine revelation - that is, perhaps God could have revealed Himself in another way had He so chose - the fact is that since it is transcendentally true that divine revelation is needed in order to for us to "know" anything (in the sense by which we may have full assurance of the truth of our beliefs), then we must regard a concrete revelation as divine. Since the concrete revelation which is divine (and self-justifying) is Scripture, it is in that sense we can and should regard it as our transcendental, axiomatic, sufficient epistemic condition for knowledge.

Analogously, this created world is contingent. God did not have to create it. God is free to have refrained from creating. But [by His own nature,] God could not both create and not create, so a concrete world (which happens to be this one) is transcendentally necessary (link). 

Scripturalism is a concrete epistemology - as it should be, for we cannot start with abstract, general truths (not even necessary ones!) and arrive at a concrete, sufficient condition for knowledge. Thus, Scripturalism's concrete axiom is not just a matter of apologetic conjecture or epistemological preference – first among equals – but necessary if one is to have a certain kind of knowledge. And so would and should the Scripturalist argue, at least if he is to have a "better answer": 

…one cannot validly infer from the collection of a few necessary preconditions for knowledge that one possesses a sufficient condition for knowledge. Hence, Scripturalists appeal to a top-down epistemic approach, beginning with a presupposition which is the sufficient condition for knowledge and accounts for all subsidiary, necessary preconditions for knowledge: divine revelation. Men do not need to be omniscient to know truth, but men are only able to know that because Scripture is the sole, extant extent of God's self-authenticating, self-attesting, and rational revelation which communicates this. (link)

In the next part of my review, I will turn to Mr. Lazar's Conclusion.