Gordon Clark: The Greeks and the Irrational (New scholasticism)

1953. Review of The Greeks and the Irrational, by E. R. Dodds. New Scholasticism 27 (1):118-120

The Greeks and the Irrational. By E. R. Dodds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Pp. ix + 327, with index. $5.00.

If Greek culture was the triumph of rationalism, were the Greeks blind to the nonrational factors in human nature? The author seems to believe it paradoxical, surprising, or at least noteworthy that a civilization should contain great philosophers, artists, and statemen and also popular irrational elements. Whether this is quite so surprising or not, the author wishes to make sure that the latter elements are not overlooked. However, in order that philosophical readers will not be disappointed, it must be noted that Professor Dodds is not concerned with the anti-intellectualism of the Sophists, but with the irrational superstitions of religion.

No adequate condensation of the details can be included in a review, for the work consists of eight chapters (and two appendices), each about twenty pages long, and each followed by about twenty pages of footnotes. The descriptions of ATE, divine insanity; or MENOS, energy or spunk; of divine madness caused by Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, or Aphrodite and Eros; of the patterns of dreams; of shamanism; as well as of the treatment accorded to these phenomena by Plato, Aristotle, and the tragedians – the descriptions of these defy condensation.

They also defy criticism. The author is cautious and modest. He recognizes the limitations under which such a study can be conducted; and while, or because, he quite probably knows as much as any loving scholar, he is keenly aware of how much is unknown. The unknown comprises not only lost sources of information but also a fuller knowledge of the psychological principles of interpreting the irrational. In this regard, only recently in the Freudian theory have satisfactory principles been obtained for this purpose. And much remains to be done. Here, also, the author is cautious. While he evidently holds the Freudian development in high estimation, he does not wish to accept it uncritically. Whether or not he has in fact depended too greatly on this type of interpretation, each reader must estimate for himself.

As the detailed description piles up, a sort of theme slowly emerges. The Greeks, apparently, were more superstitious even than “my own superstitious countrymen, the Irish” (p. 13). But primitive peoples do not believe magic because they reason faultily; rather, they reason faultily because they are socially conditioned to magic. Thus it is not because he is impulsive that the Homeric man believes in the psychic intervention; but, rather, because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention, he gives way to his impulses (pp. 26, 27, and note 110). The Homeric culture was a shame culture which evolved into a guilt culture in the following centuries, possibly because of economic upheavals.

At any rate the Archaic Age (800-500) was more dismal and fearful than the Homeric Age. A more specific factor is the gradual revolt against the tyrannical power of a father over his children, and the sons’ sense of guilt in opposing the old customs. However, neither a simple Freudian nor a simple Marxian explanation is satisfactory, for culture is too complex.

The title of chapter five, The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism, seems a misnomer to the reviewer. Contrasted with the views of the northern shamans, from the Black Sea to Siberia, nothing could be more rationalistic that the creedally minded Puritans. Only its historical juxtaposition with the licentiousness of the Stuart Restoration could make Puritanism appear ascetic. And to suppose that Puritan Calvinism believe the body to be a tomb, advocated celibacy Janicheism, held that the soul could leave the body, travel great distances, and bring back news is to show that a great knowledge of Greek culture is compatible with antipathy toward the Puritans.

In the fifth century the “inherited conglomerate” began to dissolve under the pressure of rationalism to form an “open society” in which conduct could be directed by free choice. From 330 to 200 custom had almost entirely lost its hold. However, a reaction set in. The Enlightenment had produced wide-spread irresponsibility; rationalism had not yet enabled men to live like beasts - that was possible previously - but it had enabled them to justify their conduct. It was natural, and the restraints of Law were gone. 

In reaction therefore culture turned from rationalism to astrology and magic. Why? The explanation is not "decadence," not racial intermixture, not scientific specialization, not political misfortune, economic collapse - though some of these no doubt contributed. But, rather, it was the fear of freedom in an open society, and unwillingness to accept responsibility.

And while the cautious author is sparing of modern parallels, he remarks at the end that in the last forty years western civilization also has begun to doubt its own credentials. And to draw a lesson for us he suggests that our Freudian understanding of the irrational may possibly enable us to avoid the impending retrogression.

Gordon H. Clark

Butler University,

Indianapolis, Indiana

Simply Yes or No

Every so often, I see a man by the name of Berj Manoushagian attempt to influence readers of Gordon Clark that only one proposition is true: Jesus Christ is Lord (link). What Berj makes of Psalm 119:160, 1 Kings 17:24, etc., I do not pretend to understand. Nor do I find that it makes much sense that he would attempt to influence anyone by means of propositions which he admits are not true. For whatever reason, Berj himself seems to find the work of logical positivists like Hans Hahn - who denied the possibility of metaphysics (link) - influential. Clark handily dealt with nonsense such as this during his lifetime. There would be little reason for me to mention any of this except that Berj has cited Clark as supporting his views.

One method Berj uses to argue that there is only one proposition is that the Law of Excluded Middle "must be discarded." Berj wants to discard the Law of Excluded Middle, I believe, so that no one can accuse him of counting Scriptural propositions as false. As Scripture refers to its own statements as truth, however, his merely allowing that they are not false is insufficient, a point he studiously avoids. 

My interest, however, is more so that Berj thinks Clark and John Robbins wrote statements supporting a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle in favor of a view that some propositions are neither true nor false:

The “Law of Excluded Middle” states that every proposition must be either True or False.

This “law” must be discarded.

Its acceptance hinders the study of meaningful propositions, and is incompatible with the nature of reality and the nature of Truth.

The Quotations given below are in support of the necessity for a third category. (link)

The following are what statements Clark and Robbins made which Berj interprets as denials of the Law of Excluded Middle (emphases his):

A proposition therefore is defined as the meaning of a declarative sentence. Some sentences are not declarative, such as commands in the imperative mood, or exhortations in the well-nigh extinct subjunctive mood. Questions, or interrogative sentences, also are neither true nor false. Only declarative sentences are true or false; and it is this common character that is important for propositions. Of course in English rhetoric there are questions that are intended as propositions. They are called rhetorical questions. They are an embellishment of style. They spruce up a speech. But logically they are propositions. A question that is intended as a question is neither true nor false. It can play no part in an argument.

Let us now return– an exhortation, neither true nor false, but one which it is hoped that the student will follow– to the simplest propositions and the simplest form of arguments.
Gordon Clark; Logic; 1988; p30

As I said earlier, single words without context are neither true nor false.
J. W. Robbins; Without a Prayer; 1997; p78

Ignorance is neither true nor false.
J. W. Robbins

Now, in what way Berj thinks these statements imply a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle is anyone's guess, for they in no way do so. He even quotes Clark as specifically defining a proposition as "the meaning of a declarative sentence." If Berj is arguing that some propositions are neither true nor false, it is of no help to him to cite Clark and Robbins discussing "single words," "ignorance," "questions," or "an exhortation," for none of these are declarative sentences. Thus, none of these - at least in Clark's mind - are propositions, so none of these have any bearing of the Law of Excluded Middle.

As for what Clark actually believed regarding the Law of Excluded Middle, what he says below simultaneously refutes Berj's position and defends Clark's own:

The law of identity, a is a, and the principle of disjunction also fall under Curtis’ condemnation. For a reason he does not state, he objects to the assertion, If I am an historian, I either follow F. J. Turner or I do not. But apparently his conscience pricks him a little, for he admits that it is legitimate to say, Either I am a Christian or I am not. But by what principle can he reject disjunction in history and retain it in religion? If disjunction or excluded middle is a fallacious form of thought, it can never be used legitimately; but if it is legitimate in one case, all the misapplications of slovenly thinkers will not serve to invalidate its proper universality. 

...if a word is to convey a meaning, it must not only mean something; it must also not mean something. If it had an infinite number of meanings, if the term man had the meanings of all the words in the dictionary, it would be useless in speech. In fine, if man means not-man, the sentence, Socrates is a man, means nothing. But those who deny the law of contradiction identify man and not-man. Those who deny the law of excluded middle assert that Socrates is neither man nor not-man. What they say is nonsense. Nothing sensible can be said without using the laws they deny. (1956. Logic and Language, The Gordon Review Vol. II No. 1 Feb)

Finally, readers should carefully consider whether Jesus' disjunctive words in Matthew 5:37 or John 8:42-45 are or are not truth as well as who Jesus says is the father is of one who denies that they are truth:

Matthew 5:37 Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil.

John 8:42 Jesus said to them, “If God were your Father, you would love me, for I came from God and I am here. I came not of my own accord, but he sent me. 43 Why do you not understand what I say? It is because you cannot bear to hear my word. 44 You are of your father the devil, and your will is to do your father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks out of his own character, for he is a liar and the father of lies. 45 But because I tell the truth, you do not believe me.

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 14)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's Conclusion in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses. 

Summary and References

Mr. Lazar wraps up his book on Scripturalism with a few final thoughts. I've already replied to much of the substance of this chapter in earlier reviews. Thus, like a recent review (link), this part will mostly serve as a chance for me to point out where specific, more thorough replies are to any who don't necessary want to go back and sift through each earlier review to find where relevant references are.

On why Scripturalists (like Clark) don't normally believe Scripture has a "monopoly on truth," see here.

On why sense knowledge is not "axiomatic," see here. Also note that Mr. Lazar himself "accepts sense knowledge on the basis of Scripture," so it can't be axiomatic.

On whether there is "extra-Biblical" knowledge and in what sense such instances are "knowledge," see here.

On whether we can "argue" that we have "warrant" (i.e. "knowledge" in the Plantingan sense) for "extra-Biblical beliefs," see here, here, here, here, and here. These links also discuss our inability to be aware of the epistemic justification for externally justified beliefs and why it follows that internally justified beliefs are more ideal. 

This link discusses whether skepticism really "pervaded Clark's philosophy" (it doesn't).

On whether we can "learn Biblical propositions by reading Scripture," see here.

Final Thoughts on Clark

Mr. Lazar alludes to the idea of a Paleo-Scripturalism and the possibility that "Clark's earlier writings actually accepted the existence of sense knowledge." In my own research, I have found that there are indications of this. For example:

If we have no reason to believe there is a God, why should we act as though there were one? The early Christians were more empirically minded than the modern development would lead on to believe. John in his first epistle insists on the testimony of ears, eyes and hands. Paul in his defense before King Agrippa requests consideration of evidence, “for this thing was not done in a corner.” The Christian preacher demands faith to be sure, but the faith he demands is a belief based on evidence. Those who reject Christianity act unwisely in refusing to engage in archaeological argument to demonstrate the mythical character of the Testaments. Such a demonstration would be far more convincing and presumably more scholarly than the actual publications of the day. (1935, Kant and Old Testament Ethics)

Compare this to Clark's later works about the same subjects. Clark was not an evidentialist for most of his life, and how Clark exegeted 1 John in 1980 carries a different tune than the above. That is why I find writings like the above all the more interesting. Clark thought one thing, then came to believe another. Even when I disagree with Clark, he tended to have some stimulating explanation for his thought, so I find it enjoyable to consider what reasons he may have had for changing his mind at various points. In time, I hope to demonstrate more of these and other developments in Clark's thought.

Another topic in Mr. Lazar's Conclusion concerns science:

The riddle of induction is still an open question for me. And Clark’s philosophy of science—and hence, his whole approach to evidence and evidential reasoning—seems inadequate to me given the amazing successes of the sciences. If someone keeps winning the lottery, maybe it’s not really a lottery at all? But that’s a gut reaction on my part, not a fully formed argument. It seems to me that much more work needs to be done in the area of the philosophy (and theology) of science. It’s certainly an area that I need to study more. (pg. 159)

Perhaps Mr. Lazar might be surprised to learn that Clark also, at least at some point in his life, approved of Mr. Lazar's lottery-analogy reasoning:

I hope you all know something about craps. I think knowledge is a very fine thing and I would not even prevent from knowing about shooting craps or breaking a safe. Knowledge is a very fine thing. Well these boys are gathered around a circle and they are shooting craps and one of them picks up the dice. He rolls them out and they come seven. That’s lucky! Then he picks them up again and rolls them out and they come seven. That’s remarkable! He picks them up and he rolls them out and they come seven. That’s suspicious. And the other urchins in the game begin to philosophize. I’m all in favor of philosophizing. All these urchins learn philosophy fast. They argue that the angles at which the dice hit the pavement and the force with which they hit, the velocity – all these things differ from one throw to another and hence these factors cannot explain uniform result. And by this process of elimination they arrive at the startling conclusion that the single cause that is present in all these throws is inside the dice. I would be willing to give those two each an A in philosophy. (Christ Died for Our Sins, 1961)

Who would have thought that as late as 1961, Clark would be so agreeable towards reasoning that, strictly speaking, is fallacious? Clark's reasoning here is like if one were to argue about a pitcher who can consistently throw strikes. Given different release points, rotation, and velocity - "all these things differ from one throw to another and hence these factors cannot explain uniform result" - do we thereby conclude that "the single cause that is present in all these throws is inside the" baseball? What about the thrower? The reasoning is too hasty for one to say he knows - without any possibility for error - that the dice is loaded, despite that our intuitions and expectations do lead us to believe otherwise.

Now, if Mr. Lazar wants to expand the semantic range of "knowledge" to encompass beliefs which may be erroneous, maybe the above illustrations can be revisited and said to be "knowledge" in that sense. That might also allow us to account for what Mr. Lazar alludes to - the "amazing success" of science - without worrying about whether some pragmatistic question-begging is happening. While scientific enterprise cannot be said to aid us in knowing truth without the possibility of error, a softer, colloquial definition of "knowledge" might be fine-tuned and defended. But then, this would not be the sort of "knowledge" that many, like Clark of I, would find ideal or worth bothering too much about.

A final thought: while Mr. Lazar and I have exposited Plantinga's or Clark's meta-epistemic views (link), I have not yet found a thorough, exegetical analysis of what "knowledge" means in Scripture - yet this is most important to a robust Scripturalism and, therefore, something I am attempting to make beginnings toward answering: see here (regarding internally and infallibly justified beliefs about which we can have full assurance) and here (regarding prophecy and externally justified beliefs).

Final Thoughts on Mr. Lazar's Book

I appreciated Mr. Lazar's efforts in writing this book and making it available for free. I enjoyed it despite the disagreements I have had, as it offered me an opportunity to consolidate and better articulate much of my reflections over the past dozen years. I'm glad Mr. Lazar has felt that he is able to revisit Clark and his thought of Clark. I hope Mr. Lazar, myself, and readers continue to investigate how to refine the content of "Scripturalism," even if we can't agree on the name.

In the final part of my review, I will turn to Mr. Lazar's Appendix on Gordon H. Clark and Assurance.

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 13)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's twelfth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

Clark, Occasionalism, and Internalism: One More Time

In this chapter, Mr. Lazar surveys a few objections leveled against Clark's Scripturalism to compare how his own epistemologically distinct views enable him to fare "better" against the same objections. 

One common objection to Clark's views is the question, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" In an earlier review, I mentioned that Clark responds to this question by defending occasionalism: "God and God alone is the cause" (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 27, cf. link). Clark cites Augustine, Jonathan Edwards, and Malebranche to make his case. While I would have liked to see more substance to Mr. Lazar's criticisms of Clark's occasionalism, I've elsewhere argued why I think occasionalism is flawed (link). 

On the other hand, I don't think any of the passages Mr. Lazar mentions are to the point. Clark didn't deny that men experienced sensation (see below quotes). He does deny that sensations were causes [of knowledge]... just as he denied anything besides God counted as a cause. But even if Clark had believed senses could function as causes, none of the referenced verses say anything about sensations causing knowledge. 

Still further (and more importantly), even if one's reading of Scripture itself causes knowledge, such does not necessarily imply that one's reading is a factor in one's epistemic justification. Clark himself puts the point quite sarcastically:

The professor insists that sensation must play a role in knowledge acquisition. Of course it does! Breakfast plays a role too. If some people miss their morning coffee, they get so irritated and irritable that they cannot pay attention to their studies. Hence Sanka is the salvation of scholarship. (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 23)

Even if eating "causes" (and Clark is fair to ask, in context, what "causation" means) one to learn the Bible - in the sense of it being a precondition for being able to learn (since one must eat to live, focus, and learn) - eating is not epistemically relevant to whether our study yields knowledge. 

Along these lines, a similar response I can imagine Clark making to Mr. Lazar is that language ought not be conflated with thought:

Obviously, Henry and Clark do not “reduce” truth to language, especially not to sounds in the air and ink marks on paper. (See Clark’s quotation from Abraham Kuyper in Language and Theology.) Before truths or thoughts can be “written,” that is, symbolized on paper, the thoughts must be thought. Different literal words can express the same thought. For example, “Das Mädchen ist schön,” “La jeune fille est belle,” and “The girl is beautiful,” are three different sentences with all different words, but they are the same, single, identical proposition. Daane’s argument seems to be based on inattention to the distinction between thoughts and their symbolic surrogates. (God's Hammer, 1995, pg. 182)

…if one may think the same thought twice, truth must be mental or spiritual. Not only does it defy time; it defies space as well, for if communication is to be possible, the identical truth must be in two minds at once. If, in opposition, anyone wishes to deny that an immaterial idea can exist in two minds at once, his denial must be conceived to exist his mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does not occur to us to refute it. (A Christian View of Men and Things, pg. 224)

Epistemology has to do with what we think is true - specifically, which thoughts do we say we know are true, and how do we know them? Now, if thoughts are immaterial, mental, or spiritual, to argue against Clark that a material, physical, or sensory process undermines his epistemology begs the question. One must, in providing such an external critique, specify his grounds for regarding a physical process as integral to epistemic justification. That is not Clark's burden of proof to discharge here. In response to, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" Clark is well within his rights to reply, "Well, do you? If so, how, and to what end?" 

There are plenty of indications, contrary to many Scripturalists today who think otherwise (Mr. Lazar not among them), that Clark was not an externalist. Consider the following quotes in which Clark demands that one show what he defends, theorizes, or claims to know in order to be justified or even have an epistemology:

I think you are begging the question. You would first have to show how black marks on a page can produce anything intelligible. You ought to define sensation, you ought to show how sensation produces perception, you ought to defend your theory of images, and try to construct abstract ideas out of images, and I think it cannot be done... (Clark-Hoover Debate)

If you are an empiricist there is no use of your beginning with saying, “well I have a Bible in my hand and I can see it.” You will have to begin and give a consistent philosophy of empiricism. You don’t start with midway through the system, that is begging the question. You must decide on your first principles. Now I think I said last night that observation can never demonstrate the validity or truth of observation. It cannot show that observation is the way of knowledge. In order to have a thoroughgoing empirical position, you, presumably, you must begin with sensation. Now if you disagree with that statement I’d be willing to listen to you for two hours or more but at least most of them say that. You must begin with sensation. Then, to make your system tick, you will have to show how sensation develops into perception. And this is something hardly anybody ever does. And beyond that you will have to show how perception develops into or involves images, from which concepts are abstracted...

I do not deny, of course, that the apostles had certain visual sensations, but they cannot deduce from those visual sensations any Christian doctrine. And I would repeat again that if you think that is possible you are under obligation to show how sensation becomes perception, how perception develops images, and to give a theory of abstraction so that you can get such doctrines as the Trinity and justification and the other doctrines. (Believer’s Chapel Tape Ministry, 1977, link)

The gentleman asserted that sensation plays “a role in knowledge acquisition.” How can one come to such a conclusion? Clearly by discovering what the role is. Unless one knows what the role is, one cannot know that there is any role at all. For example, in the case of the large debt of the United States government some economist hold that deficits play no role in producing unemployment, while other economists assert the contrary. To sustain their position, these latter must show what the role is. If they cannot, then neither can justify their position… Therefore one cannot logically maintain that sensation plays a role in the acquisition of knowledge without showing precisely what that role is.

All the apologists with whom I have debated refuse to face this question… When I ask them to show how images can be transformed into abstract concepts, not one of them has even tried to explain. They even refuse to define sensation. Likewise perception. They really have no epistemology at all, and their words, to omit an inapplicable part of a popular quotation, are full of sound, signifying nothing. (Lord God of Truth, 1994, pg. 22-23)

"Have to," "ought to," "under obligation to, "must" - quite strong language to use for persons to qualify as being able to "justify their position" or "really have" an epistemology. For Clark, we are intentionally active in acquiring epistemic justification (link). What Clark essentially argues is that a defense of externalist knowledge is, in the words of Mr. Lazar, a performative contradiction. In making knowledge claims with the intention of defending them (as one "ought" to do), one presupposes internalism.

The above implies Clark held to an internalist understanding of knowledge (cf. link), as I have ever thought - all the more so after my recent, brief glance through Lord God of Truth. I was also right to think my project of collating Clark quotes on epistemology (link) will, before I can be satisfied, require me to reread his books to catch material I may have missed. 

For my part, I think that while a defense of the possibility of externalist knowledge presupposes [a defense of] internalist knowledge (link), I also think having externalist knowledge is possible before one has internalist knowledge. It is possible for one to believe the truth due to the proper functioning of divinely designed second causes, and such a process can occur without one first having infallibilist, internalist knowledge. However, for one to defend that such an external, justificatory process has occurred or even can occur - that is, for one to make a knowledge claim or claim about knowledge - does, in turn, require [a defense of] internalist knowledge.

Now, I would qualify that what I mean by a "defense" of internalist knowledge is somewhat context-dependent. Since I defend a foundationalist structure of epistemically and internally justified beliefs, any "defense" of one's knowledge of axioms is not to be taken as a circular ground for believing said axioms. I don't think that knowledge of axioms in an internalist sense requires a "defense" in order to know them - as Mr. Lazar might say, "knowing" doesn't require "showing" - although an apologetic defense can be provided for purposes of persuasion.

As this is just a blog post reviewing a book, I won't expand too much on what I mean by the above, taking for granted that what I've written elsewhere is sufficient to get the point across should I myself ever revisit my own writing in the future. 

For the sake of any other readers, though, when critiquing or defending Clark, care is needed in these kinds of discussions. An example of this pertains to the very topic of axioms. On page 144, for example, Mr. Lazar says we accept that "sense perception produces propositional knowledge... axiomatically." But one page later, he says, "Based on the Biblical evidence, Neo-Scripturalism affirms that you have sense knowledge..." These statements are contradictory. Inferential knowledge - knowledge based on evidence - is not foundational or axiomatic. 

Additionally, the ideal way in which beliefs are known is not in an externalist sense. Mr. Lazar writes that our axiomatic beliefs are properly basic and warranted. To say that, though, would be to seemingly reject any internalist understanding of how Scripture is "known." Such a position means that our epistemic justification is always [partially] external, that there are elements to our epistemic justification to which we have no reflective access such that we cannot be aware or assured that we know at all, and, worse, that our knowledge of Scripture is seemingly, in principle, defeatable (link). Clark's occasionalism is not a good answer to his critics... but is Mr. Lazar's answer "better"?

At any rate, as already mentioned, the verses Mr. Lazar mentions would require deeper exegesis or engagement with Clark's position for it to be poignant. Yes, for example, the Bereans examined Scriptures. Clark would argue that Scripture is not just ink marks on paper, so a rejection of Clark's occasionalism in favor of a different interpretation, like epistemic externalism, will require more elaboration on why Acts 17 should trouble Clark than simply saying, "Many thought that Clark's Augustinian answer wasn't very satisfying" (pg. 141). Ironically, it is Mr. Lazar's critique that is not very satisfying, especially since there are good reasons for rejecting Clark's occasionalism.

Bahnsen: Clark and "Suppositionalism"

Mr. Lazar mentions Greg Bahnsen as a notable critic of Clark's presuppositionalism - or as Bahnsen sees it, Clark's "suppositionalism," for Bahnsen thought "Clark treats Christianity as a possibility" rather than "demand" that God's Word be regarded as "the precondition for all intellectual endeavor." 

That is, Bahnsen, like Van Til (cf. this post), takes issue with Clark's method of argumentation for Christianity. But as I questioned in the linked post, would Van Til or Bahnsen have taken issue with the apostle Paul's method of argumentation in 1 Corinthians 15:16-19? Does Paul really "suppose" it is possible the resurrection did not happen? Or is Paul not rather using apologetic rhetoric to highlight the implied existential despair that follows from the position of his anti-resurrection opponents? One can defend the faith in more ways than one. 

Further, several of Bahnsen’s objections rest on false assumptions, for Clark did not view Christianity as only hypothetically true or as only one of a number of potentially legitimate choices. Most citations of Clark that Bahnsen brings up in his book, Presuppositional Apologetics (which I read a long time ago), are either entirely true or seem to be misunderstood by Bahnsen. 

One example from Bahnsen's book that Mr. Lazar references is the following statement by Clark: “That religion or Christianity in particular furnishes a better method than secularism is a possibility not to be dismissed without discussion” (Presuppositional Apologetics, pg. 142).

Bahnsen’s response is that “The truth of the Christian world-view provides, not a 'better' or 'possible' method, but the necessary method, of all academic tasks.” But is not a necessary method a better method? And would Bahnsen prefer to dismiss Christianity without discussion? On the contrary, Clark's statement is entirely true. 

Perhaps Bahnsen wishes Clark phrased things differently. but apologetics is a practical business. There isn’t just one solitary moral or programmatic response to any given situation. Clark is entirely within his apologetic rights to defend the faith as he does, so long as he is truthful and faithful to his own epistemic axiom of revelation (as he is here). 

Now compare Bahnsen's accusation that Clark is a mere "suppositionalist" to the following:

Carnell also says: “Since their systems [the systems of thought of finite minds] are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability.” But if this is true, it itself is not true but only probable. And if this is true, the propositions in the Bible, such as David killed Goliath and Christ died for our sins, are only probable – they may be false. And to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation. Conversely, therefore, it must be maintained that whatever great ignorance may characterize the systems of human thought, such ignorance of many truths does not alter the few truths the mind possesses. There are many truths of mathematics, astronomy, Greek grammar, and Biblical theology that I do not know; but if I know anything at all, and especially if God has given me just one item of information, my extensive ignorance will have no effect on that one truth. Otherwise, we are all engulfed in a skepticism that makes argumentation a waste of time. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37)

While Mr. Lazar doesn’t refute Bahnsen's charge against Clark in this way - perhaps because Mr. Lazar rejects the possibility of internalist knowledge (on which see below) - he does, however, push back against Bahnsen on his own grounds: Scripture itself has something to say about this subject. For example, Scripture not only allows that new divine revelation can be examined for consistency with established divine revelation (Acts 17:11) but also, at times, demands it (1 Thessalonians 5:20-21, 1 John 4:1). And I agree with Mr. Lazar insofar as, when properly understood, God's word does invite one to "test" it. 

Now, [any advantages of] "testing" must indeed be balanced against what Bahnsen is likely worried about: if we say that "testing" God's word is a means to providing epistemic evidence for believing divine revelation, we have implicitly subjected God's word to a more sure, foundational standard. This is not what Clark or I am proposing. In the epistemic context of internally and infallibly justified beliefs, the success of a prediction, for example, can only provide confirmatory support that one is a prophet as opposed to epistemic grounding for his claim. 

Aside from concerns about subordinating knowledge of God's word to some kind of empirical epistemology, one reason I don't think mere predictive success can be "epistemic" (in the aforementioned sense of internalism and infallibilism) support for claims regarding prophethood or divine revelation is the following: suppose two people predict contradictories about whether or not it rains tomorrow. Suppose each person also claims to be a divine prophet. It either will rain or won't. Necessarily, one prediction will be false and the other will be true. While one claim will turn out to be false - falsifying that said claimant is a prophet - would such ipso facto mean the other claimant is a prophet, merely because his claim will be true? One would think not. But then, is there a non-arbitrary amount of predictive claims that would establish one as a prophet?

Consider: if everyone in the world were placed into a bracket in which, for each daily round, half of participants predicted rain the next day and half did not, several people would make it a full month in making correct predications before they might make an incorrect predication thereafter. But I would think that says little about whether those people actually are prophets. There must be more that goes into one's being able to recognize the authenticity of a prophet than the sheer amount of correct predictions one may make.

Now, there are some passages of Scripture that indicate that predictive success can, in some cases, lead to "knowledge" that the one who made the prediction[s] is a prophet. Some of these might also outline beginnings of what such a criteria for prophetic authenticity might look like, such as anomalous predictions (Jeremiah 28:8-9, Ezekiel 2:5, 33:33). However, given that Ezekiel 2:5 in particular makes mention that even the rebellious can possess knowledge that the man who speaks the word of the Lord is a prophet, it seems apparent that the sort of "knowledge" alluded to here is of another kind than an internalist, infallibilist sense of "knowledge," the latter being that alone by which one can have full assurance (link). I tend to read the above passages as supporting the possibility of an externalist view of knowledge, especially as they are third-person accounts in which God is saying something about what people know, not the people themselves who are necessarily accounting for their or aware of their own knowledge (cf. link).

One final point about prophecies and epistemology: Christians in particular should consider that at least one prophecy has not yet been fulfilled: the return of Christ. If we could only know that Christ, Paul, etc. are prophets after this prophecy about Christ's return has been the fulfilled, then we wouldn't yet be able to know Christ, Paul. etc. are prophets, which Christians must surely regard as false. We can now know that Christ, Paul, etc. were and are prophets. 

All this is to say - once again, and to assuage the concerns of Bahnsen - that divine revelation is epistemically self-justifying. Testing does, however, give believers in divine revelation apologetic recourse in that performing said tests tend to silence unbelievers and help instill psychological confidence in believers.

So, too, Bahnsen is mistaken regarding Clark's view about the relationship between Scripture and logical consistency, the latter of which indeed can be viewed, when properly understood, as a "test" of the former (cf. the Bereans). I've written about this elsewhere (link). Clark did not view logical consistency as an epistemically foundational method for knowing divine revelation:

To the same effect, it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore, the same conclusion follows: Either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 54)

How then could God show to a man that it was God speaking? Suppose God should say, “I will make of you a great nation...and I will bless them that bless you and curse him that curses you.” Would God call the devil and ask Abraham to believe the devil’s corroborative statements? Is the devil’s word good evidence of God’s veracity? It would not seem so. Nor is the solution to be found in God’s appealing to another man in order to convince the doubter. Aside from the fact that this other man is no more of an authority than the devil, the main question reappears unanswered in this case also. What reasons can this man have to conclude that God is making a revelation to him? It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. God may, to be sure, furnish “evidence” to man. He may send an earthquake, a fire, or still small voice; he may work spectacular miracles, or, as in the cases of Isaiah and Peter, he may produce inwardly an awful consciousness of sin, so that the recipient of the revelation is compelled to cry out, “Woe is me! For I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips.” But whether it be an external spectacle or an inward “horror or great darkness,” all of this is God’s witnessing to himself. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183

But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 113) 

Note the italics. Reading Clark charitably, I take this to mean that divine revelation cannot be subject to any epistemic test. Logical consistency is not superior to divine revelation:

The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth.

Ideally or for God this seems to be the case. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.

Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other...

Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions. Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest. Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth.

Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation.

Now, Bahnsen would be right to criticize Clark's mere coherence or consistency theory about the nature of truth. This theory of truth may be what pushed him to eventually accept necessitarianism (link), since if truth just is a consistent system of propositions, that implies there is and necessarily can be only one such system. If one argues there can be more than one system of consistent propositions, either the systems in question would be consistent (and, hence, would seemingly collapse into one larger system a la necessitarianism) or the systems would be inconsistent (which would constitute a reductio ad absurdem against the theory itself).

So the nature of truth is not merely "consistency." Some truths are necessary, yes; but Christians should also regard some truths as contingent, grounded in God's freedom - hence the Reformed distinction between God's natural and free knowledge. Better, then, is to argue that the nature of truth is both consistency and correspondence (link). There are multiple possible systems of consistent propositions, but truth corresponds to only one.

In any case, the larger point here is that in regards to epistemology, Clark was not a coherentist but a foundationalist. He did not believe that examining worldviews for logical consistency was a means by which we can come to know which one is true over against another. People can falsify worldviews that are inconsistent, but no worldview can be established as true just because it appears to be consistent.

Thus, while he makes some good points in this chapter, I wouldn't put certain things as Mr. Lazar does, such as in apologetically presenting Christianity as a "conjecture" or as "probabilistic" based on what it is that he can show about it to an unbeliever. Christianity is true, full stop. It doesn't matter that we can't "prove" our axiom to others (for no one can do that). Nor is it relevant that we can't believe the truth - that the divine revelation of Christianity is self-justifying - for the unbeliever with whom we are discussing (for no one can believe something for someone else).

Mr. Lazar is right that there is a distinction between knowing and showing. But his analogy to his knowing that he owned a certain car tends to undermine rather than support his case against Bahnsen. Our knowledge of Scripture is (or, at least, can be) more sure than anything we know in an externalist sense, such as knowledge that we owned a car in the past. We can reflect on and be fully assured that Scripture is true, whereas our belief that we owned a car in the past may, upon reflection, be [regarded as] false. The "certitude" Mr. Lazar has about owning a car is - and by his own admission - "psychological" (pg. 148), whereas the assurance we can have regarding the truth of Scripture is absolute and unfalsifiable (although "testable"). An externalist can't be aware that he knows he owned a car; an internalist can be aware that he knows Scripture is true. Or, as I've said in a previous review:

To argue we indeed can be aware that we have sense knowledge seems to assume we can be aware of when we have had sense knowledge. But for us to be aware of when we have sense knowledge would be to suggest that the are no external justificatory factors on which us having sense knowledge would depend. In turn, that would be to affirm an internalist understanding of sense knowledge, a proposal of a sort of empirical epistemology that Mr. Lazar has assured us is not on offer and would invite all the objections to empiricism that Clark wrote in his numerous publications (objections with which Mr. Lazar says he accepts). Thus, I have argued that when it comes to a basic epistemology, sense knowledge (or other kinds of "knowledge" that are justified in an externalist sense) may be important - and it may be that we have it without being aware of the fact - but ought to be regarded as subordinate in fundamentality to knowledge that is justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense, knowledge of which we can be aware. (link)

On this account, then, I think Clark's own writings provide better resources in responding to Bahnsen than Mr. Lazar's do.

Bahnsen, Scripture, and an "Absolute" Presupposition

One other criticism of Clark that Bahnsen makes in this chapter is that Clark does not really accept Scripture as his "absolute presupposition." I'll quote from Bahnsen's Presuppositional Apologetics and make a few points:

...one could easily be led to believe that logic per se is his transcendental rather than Scripture. Instead of the attempt to be independent of God’s Word, “the denial of the law of contradiction, or even the failure to establish it as a universal truth, was the downfall of secular philosophy. For the absolute presuppositionalist, God and His revelation guarantee the possibility of epistemological fruitfulness, for He who is the truth has deigned to give us a revelation of knowledge. Clark, on the other hand, concludes his chapter on epistemology in A Christian View of Men and Things by saying that it “has tried to show by an application of the law of contradiction—a law that is not merely formal but is itself an integral part of the system of truth—that truth exists and that knowledge is possible.” (Presuppositional Apologetics, pg. 144)

Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Bahnsen criticizes Clark for treating "Christianity as a possibility." While that charge is misleading, for Clark did not merely treat Christianity as one among many possibilities, note that an uncharitable reading of Bahnsen's above quote would lead one to criticize Bahnsen for the same language! Does Bahnsen mean that God's revelation only guarantees "the possibility of epistemic fruitfulness"? Surely not any more than Clark means that Christianity is only possibly better than secularism when Clark wrote, "That religion or Christianity in particular furnishes a better method than secularism is a possibility not to be dismissed without discussion." 

Secondly, I think Bahnsen’s unintentionally drives a wedge between Scripture and the law of contradiction. When Clark applies the law of contradiction, he does so because it is itself an integral part of God’s truth as revealed to us: there is a connection between the sufficient condition for knowledge (God’s word) and subsidiary, necessary conditions (law of contradiction, language, etc.). Indeed, the sufficient condition can be "tested" by whether it contains necessary, subsidiary conditions. As mentioned, this testing is not as though Scripture may fail the test; rather, it confirms what we already know about God's self-justifying revelation.

Turning to Mr. Lazar's response to Bahnsen, the following remark he makes is well-put: "God's Word does not teach that you must assume the Bible is true in order to think" (pg. 147). I'm not quite sure that Bahnsen actually means that, but the cited statement by Bahnsen to which this serves as a response is vague enough to warrant the point.

On the other hand, Mr. Lazar responds seems to fall into Bahnsen’s trap in driving a wedge between logic and Scripture, because Mr. Lazar says that Bahnsen must assume a list of hardcore common sense items and, therefore, "he cannot make the word of God his absolute epistemic presupposition, even in principle." But this would mean a rejection of Scripturalism - and neo-Scripturalism, for that matter – because then the Bible is no longer our epistemic axiom. 

Mr. Lazar's axiom[s] would instead be the list he created and says he and we all must “already [epistemically?] presuppose." Maybe that wasn’t his intention, but if not, it is hard to make sense of his paragraph. This goes to show the importance of distinguishing between sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge. Just like the persons of the Trinity are distinct yet inseparable, one must keep distinct - yet inseparable - the sufficient condition for knowledge, God's word, and any subsidiary, necessary (or ontological) [pre]conditions without which knowledge would also be impossible (link, link).

I'll add a thought or two that might help. Perhaps the concern is that Scripture is contingent whereas logic et al. are transcendental. If that is the concern, then while it may be contingently true that Scripture is the sole, extant extent of divine revelation - that is, perhaps God could have revealed Himself in another way had He so chose - the fact is that since it is transcendentally true that divine revelation is needed in order to for us to "know" anything (in the sense by which we may have full assurance of the truth of our beliefs), then we must regard a concrete revelation as divine. Since the concrete revelation which is divine (and self-justifying) is Scripture, it is in that sense we can and should regard it as our transcendental, axiomatic, sufficient epistemic condition for knowledge.

Analogously, this created world is contingent. God did not have to create it. God is free to have refrained from creating. But [by His own nature,] God could not both create and not create, so a concrete world (which happens to be this one) is transcendentally necessary (link). 

Scripturalism is a concrete epistemology - as it should be, for we cannot start with abstract, general truths (not even necessary ones!) and arrive at a concrete, sufficient condition for knowledge. Thus, Scripturalism's concrete axiom is not just a matter of apologetic conjecture or epistemological preference – first among equals – but necessary if one is to have a certain kind of knowledge. And so would and should the Scripturalist argue, at least if he is to have a "better answer": 

…one cannot validly infer from the collection of a few necessary preconditions for knowledge that one possesses a sufficient condition for knowledge. Hence, Scripturalists appeal to a top-down epistemic approach, beginning with a presupposition which is the sufficient condition for knowledge and accounts for all subsidiary, necessary preconditions for knowledge: divine revelation. Men do not need to be omniscient to know truth, but men are only able to know that because Scripture is the sole, extant extent of God's self-authenticating, self-attesting, and rational revelation which communicates this. (link)

In the next part of my review, I will turn to Mr. Lazar's Conclusion.

Gordon Clark on Necessitarianism

I wrote a post responding to a recent book defending necessitarianism (link) - the view that, as Amy Karofsky puts it, that "nothing could have been otherwise" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 153) - and God willing, I plan to write more about why I no longer, as it once did, believe the position. Karofsky herself seems unaware of any defense of necessitarianism in the past "300 years" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. x), so the following should serve well to show that is not the case.

A large reason I originally subscribed to necessitarianism was due to Gordon Clark. I also have a larger project in mind in which I demonstrate the Clark's thought developed over time, so for these reasons, I wanted to highlight some of what Clark has said on the matter. It would also be a bit lengthy if I were to include the below quotes in a post whose main point would be to undermine necessitarianism.

The earliest mention of necessitarianism that I could find is from a letter from Clark to J. Oliver Buswell (February 9th, 1939), in which Clark writes: 

...whether God might have created some other sort of world is a slightly different question, on which Augustine and Anselm disagree. Talking about the plan of salvation (and if true here it is true everywhere) Augustine says that God could have ordered it differently but Anselm says an absolute rational necessity prevents any other mode of atonement and God could not have decreed otherwise. So far as I can see, both views are consistent with creation. Anselm is not forced to say that the world is “not created but merely derived” (your letter p.1, next to bottom paragraph); but I must confess that I am unable to decide between the two views. Very consciously I tried to avoid this particular problem in my paper. 

While this letter is about the atonement in particular, it is related to the question of what God either can or must decree. 4 years later, Clark wrote "Plotinus’ Theory of Empirical Responsibility" for The New Scholasticism (1943, Vol. XVII No. 1 Jan.):

...the Stoics intend to place some things in our power. Nonetheless the theory is a failure. It is necessitarian because, when all the causes are taken into account, nothing can be otherwise than it is. Our impressions and ideas result from antecedent conditions, and our initiative is governed by our impressions. To speak of anything being in our power is on this showing, a mockery. It is of no use to say the impressions and the initiative are ours, for this does not advance us beyond the level of children, of the insane, or even of the inanimate activities of fire.

Given the unqualified disparagement, I take the above to be an argument meant against necessitarianism in general as well as against the Stoics in particular. Then, further, the following was written in 1963, when I gather Clark still rejected necessitarianism:

Christian theologians have commonly pointed out that creation as a voluntary act is incompatible with Hegelian philosophy. Hegel can very sincerely say that the world depends on God or the Absolute, and to this extent he sounds like a Christian, but Hegel continues as no Christian can and adds that the Absolute conversely depends on the world. This mutual dependence is essentially pantheism. No single thing by itself, the Sun, the Moon, or John Doe, is God but the whole, not in its plurality but in its unity, is God. God and the universe are one reality. Barth’s rejection of this mutual dependence, of this reciprocity between whole and part, is clear cut: “God would be none the less God if he had not created a world and man. The world’s existence and our existence is no wise essentially necessary to God, even as the object of his love” (I, 1, 158) (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 36 – original date of publication: 1963)

While I will have more to say about this elsewhere, I agree with the above in bold. I would also include another citation from 1964 in which Clark seems to deny any doctrine which would lead to an affirmation that "creation would add to God by offering new relationship to Him, and thus become both a necessity for Him, if He is to be fully God, and also a limitation to Him in the sense He cannot be fully God without its existence" (link). However, without access to the original publication, I am not sure if Clark or an interlocutor is expositing Kant, agreeing with him, or responding to him.

Now, compare the above to later works in which Clark has - for reasons I again will address elsewhere - revised his view and come to accept necessitarianism. The first two citations are from Clark's books The Trinity (originally published in 1985) and The Atonement (originally published in 1987). Clark had finished both as early as 1977 and had hoped would be published as early as 1978 as parts of a larger book - a systematic theology (link). Some time in this timeframe between 1963 and 1977, it seems Clark's views changed. 

I'll cite relevant sections from The Trinity first, as that would have been an earlier chapter in Clark's systematic theology and it was published before The Atonement:

These are decisions of God's free will, free in the very definite sense of not having been imposed on him by an external power, but not free in the sense that anything could be otherwise. To hold the latter position would be to aver that God himself could be otherwise than he is, an "unnecessary" being...

...it is not true that the Father could choose to create or choose not to create. God did not have, from eternity, a blank mind, undecided as to whether to create or not. God's mind is, or, better, includes the idea of this particular cosmos, with Abraham, David, and Jesus at particular points in time. It was not external power that forced him to create, nor was there any such from which he was free, for there was no external power at all. But God, being God, was a God of such nature that a creation naturally resulted from such a nature. If there has been a God who might not have created, he would not have been the God described in the Bible. To suppose that God sometime or other finally made up his mind to create is to deny both his immutability and his omniscience, These fatal implications follow from the Arminian introduction of time into the Godhead, which wreaks devastation upon Scriptural theology. The immediate point is that the view which we repudiate assumes that an act of will must be limited to a finite, momentary bit of time. We reply that God's act of will is eternal...

Obviously the world is not related to the Father, nor to the Godhead as a whole, as the Son is to the Father. Created objects are not homoousionta with the Father. This point is fixed. Yet the world is not "voluntary," if this term is used to denote some irrational, unnecessary freedom. The idea of free will is so widespread that people often think there can be no will unless it is free. But though our wills may sometimes be free, unfortunately, from our rational control, just as our intellectual endeavors may be vitiated by fallacious syllogisms, yet none of these defects can be attributed to God. The eternal plan of God included the crucifixion of Christ, slain from the foundation of the world. Hence God was not "free" in history; that is, God was not so insane as to will historically anything that contradicted his eternal decree. The death of Christ was necessary and inevitable... 

If now, God is rational as the Bible teaches in many places, if he is omniscient, if he predestinates whatever comes to pass; if consequently the world itself is rationally organized, and if God's image in man is rationality, then consistency would require that one or the other of these contradictory positions, necessitarianism or indeterminism, must fit. Either the world is necessary and inevitable or it is not ... The necessitarian is willing to accept the burden of proof, and that burden is borne by the items mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph: God is truth, he is omniscient, he decrees whatsoever comes to pass. 

There is, however, a further phase of this subject that most people ignore. It is rather recondite and is mentioned only for completeness' sake. It has to do with the definition of "philosophical necessitarianism." The name can bear two senses, and the one which in all probability Sir William Hamilton used is that of factual inevitability. Events are inevitable in the sense that, given a set of conditions, the event in question must occur. A different set would have necessitated a different result. Such a necessitarianism may be called factual or hypothetical, for the result is inevitable only under the hypothesis of certain conditions, and other conditions might have prevailed. 

The second type of necessitarianism may be called logical rather than factual, and absolute rather than hypothetical. On this view of things no other conditions than the actual conditions are possible. This is not "the best of all possible world," as Leibniz claimed: It is the only possible world, as Spinoza claimed. Any other world, on this view, can be imagined only by failing to see that it contains a logical contradiction or impossibility. 

Now, Spinoza is in ill repute among orthodox theologians; and even non-christians classify him, if not as an atheist, at least as a pantheist. But it does not follow that every idea he suggests is wrong, for otherwise geometry would be false...

We must ask therefore whether or not this world is logically necessitated. The answer must take into consideration that God is truth and truth is rational. Does this mean that the universe is not a voluntary creation? Does it mean that the generation of the Son is not voluntary? Of course not. Both these items are both voluntary and necessary. Naturally they differ in other respects, but not in these two respects. Given then the immutability of God's mind and the eternity of truth, so-called philosophical necessitarianism seems to be quite Scriptural and with respect to the creation of the world conflicts in no way with the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. Since God's mind is immutable, since his decree is eternal, it follows that no other world than this is possible or imaginary. (The Trinity, 1990, pgs. 135, 140, 142-143)

Again, while I do not endorse these arguments any more, the following found in The Atonement also shows that Clark came to accept necessitarianism: 

A. A. Hodge's repeated emphasis on justice, and his manner of doing so, almost immediately produces the impression that he is subordinating God to some superior law of justice, thus impugning God's sovereignty. This pinpoints the problem of absolute necessity.

Such an impression is supported by Hodge's later procedure. His early remarks on the governmental theory (58ff.) assert several times the intrinsic rightness of the moral law, an intrinsic rightness superior to the divine will: "He wills the precept because [italics his] it is intrinsically right." Hence there seems to be something superior to the will of God. But before quoting Calvin to the contrary, one may ask whether Hodge means only that God's will is subordinate to God's intellect, and that therefore there is no moral principle superior to God. Such a reply, however, entails a distinction between God's intellect and God's will, so that one "part" of God is subordinate to another part. Thus, combined with the separation of the divine attributes, raises difficulties with the simplicity of God's being. But we must proceed with the ultimacy of moral principles and the absolute necessity of one particular method of atonement.

No Calvinist claims that Calvin was infallible; but we all hold him in high regard, and we should not be ignorant of what he said on the subject. Beginning with the question of the necessity of the Atonement, Calvin asserts, "If an inquiry be made concerning the necessity of this, it was not indeed a simple, or, as we commonly say, an absolute necessity, but such as arose from the heavenly decree" (Institutes, II, xii, 1). Contrary to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo, I, 12), namely, "When it is said that what God wishes is just, and that what he does not wish is unjust, we must not understand that if God wished anything improper it would be just, simply because he wished it," Calvin writes,

How exceedingly presumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the divine will, which is in fact and is justly entitled to be, the cause of everything that exists... If you go further and ask why he so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found (III, xxxiii, 2).

Then, further, "Here they recur to the distinction between will and permission, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because of his will?" (III, xxiii, 8). There is no mistaking Calvin's meaning. "The will of God is the highest rule of justice." A moral principle is "just for this very reason, because he wills it." Calvin and Hodge bluntly contradict one another; and if Calvin was a Calvinist, apparently Hodge was not...

One question previously raised was whether God could have sovereignly dispensed with justice. The two Hodges decide in favor of justice and reject sovereignty. Let the reader understand that this treatise maintains that Christ satisfied the justice of his Father. What the treatise aims to show is that the Hodges and others have formulated an incorrect disjunction between the two. Or, to anticipate, justice is itself based on sovereignty. This includes the idea that the atonement was absolutely necessary...

We may agree with the former that the decrees, including of course everything connected with the atonement, are “rational determinations.” By this phrase, I understand that the whole plan of history is teleological. Prior events prepare for later events. Judas’s betrayal prepared for the arrest and the crucifixion. But contrary to what Hodge says, this does not rule out “the doctrine of necessity.” While one must reject the idea that there is any development in God, there is indeed development in history. Nor is the word “mere” very clear, when Hodge says that God does not act by a mere necessity of nature. If the term nature is meant to indicate the physical universe - Mother Nature as some poets call it, and natura naturans as Spinoza said - of course we agree with Hodge’s statement. Furthermore, Hodge’s reference to Spinoza seems to support the idea that he is thinking of the universe. Spinoza was a pantheist who frequently used the phrase Deus sive Natura. But Hodge seems to me to have confused Mother Nature with the nature of God. The important question is whether God acts necessarily by his own nature. Could God have willed to save no one? Could God have willed Anthony should have been victorious, or that the Duc de Guise should have defeated Henry VI? If one says that the defeat of Anthony was necessitated and that God could not have willed otherwise, it does not follow - as Hodge seems to say it does - that God would have acted without design. Nor does the doctrine of necessity require that God's intellectual force be analogous to the instincts of irrational animals. At best Hodge has in his attack on Spinozism used language that can be applied to views that are not at all Spinozistic. And one of these views is the Christian doctrine of God and his decrees. 

One of the terms the Hodges use with confidence and satisfaction is freedom. God was free to create or not to create; God was free to save or not to save men; but if he freely chose to save any, he was necessitated to sacrifice Christ. In this he was not free. It is reasonable to suppose that this language somewhat reflects the discussions on the free will of man. At any rate, the idea of God's freedom should be clarified. Some types of freedom are obviously irrelevant to the present discussion: A man may be free from disease, free from prejudice, or free from his previous wife. Though these meanings are irrelevant, one notes that freedom is often - almost always - freedom from something. 

Spinoza is an exception, for his freedom is a freedom to. A grain of wheat is free to grow if it is planted in good soil rather than having fallen on a rock where a bird can pick it up. The bird is more free than a grain of wheat because, if this rock had no grain of wheat on it, the bird can fly and find food elsewhere. A man is more free than a bird because he can survive in many more circumstances, Thus, Spinoza says, freedom is not the ability to do either of two things in the same circumstance, but the ability to do the same thing in many circumstances.

Arminian and Romish freedom is the power of contrary choice. There is nothing - absolutely nothing  in any circumstance in heaven above, or earth beneath, or the waters under the earth - but especially in heaven above - that necessitates a given volition. The opposite choice is always as possible as the one chosen.

But what might divine freedom be? One thing is clear. There is no power, circumstance, or principle external to God that necessitates or even induces him to do anything. Of course, before the creation of the world there were no circumstances at all, though some philosopher might say that there were eternal principles external to him. But for the Christian there was nothing before he created something. But does this mean that God could have chosen no to create?

The confusion that permeates discussion on this subject arises from the rather natural impulse to understand the will of God as similar to the will of man, or, more accurately, similar to what many theologians think the will of man is. In particular, they picture God as earlier undecided, and later at a moment in time God makes a choice. The theologian may indeed recognize that there is no external motivation, but he still holds to the possibility that God could have willed otherwise.

This confusion is due to the fact that the authors often forget that God is immutable. Grotius seems to have argued that no one form of atonement is absolutely necessary. The law, he maintains, is a product of the divine will and not something inherent in his nature. Therefore God is free to enforce, to abrogate, or in any way to alter the laws. Grotius is not the only one who seems to assume that God’s will is free in the sense that he can change his mind at any time. Freedom, however, should be defined, and the implications of the definition should be stated. For example, human freedom may consist in the circumstance that one’s conduct is not determined by physicochemical law. From this definition, if accepted, it follows that the universe is not a mechanism. But, so far as this definition goes, human conduct can be necessitated by a divine teleological law. As for the freedom of God, he is surely free from control by any superior power, for there is no power superior to God. But as immutable by nature - see Grotius’s distinction between will and nature a few lines above - God’s will and action are unalterable.

Hodge - who rejects Grotius’s view of the atonement - is perhaps a little, but not much, better. God, he says, “wills the precept because it is intrinsically right.... There must be an absolute standard of righteousness.” Such a statement places a standard of justice outside of God. The standard is intrinsically right, hence independent of God’s sovereignty - indeed, sovereignty has been abandoned. Hodge, however, wants to avoid this implication, for unlike Grotius, Hodge immediately adds, “This absolute standard is the divine nature ... the divine intelligence.” This addition gives the impression of maintaining divine sovereignty as against any external power or principle. But it faces an equally difficult objection. It raises the question as to the difference between will and nature. What is nature? Do we not speak of the nature of God, the nature of God’s will, the nature of God’s intelligence? Nature is not a constituent of anything. It is simply the thing’s characteristics. God’s nature, like a dog’s nature, is such and such because such are the characteristics of the dog or of God. The nature is simply the way the dog or God acts. There is no nature that controls God’s will. As Isaac Watts once wrote, “Dogs delight to bark and bite, for ‘tis their nature to.”

In addition to examining the term nature, one must ask what is will? If we speak of the human will, we refer to a somewhat momentary act of choice. After having considered the relative desirability of this versus that line of action-or, what is the same thing, between an action and doing nothing-such as investing in AT&T or just leaving the money in the checking account-and having puzzled over it indecisively for a period of time-we come to a conclusion and make our choice: We decide and do it. Then when we start to study theology and to consider the will of God, we are apt to think, or subconsciously suppose, that God makes decisions. He willed to create, he willed - after some deliberation - to save some, and so on. Though we may not say so out loud, we suppose that God was puzzled: He could create or he could refuse to create; he could save or could refuse to save some; and if he decided to save some, he could use any means imaginable.

Now, although these choices are all of one nature, all subject to the same considerations, Hodge and others want to give the last question an answer different from their answer to the prior questions. This seems to me to be logically inconsistent, for if it relieves God of indecision on the last point, it pictures him as indecisive on the prior points and assigns to him a relatively momentary act of choice. This makes God a temporal creature - or if not a creature, at least a temporal being.

Such a view is utterly inconsistent with divine omniscience. The immutable God never learned anything and never changed his mind. He knew everything from eternity. This everything includes both the number of mosquitoes in Jackson Hole and the number of planets in the solar system. Underlying these two examples is the creation of a temporal universe. For time began with the creation of the first non-omniscient angel.

Without claiming infallibility, and certainly no omniscience, I believe the above to be substantially what the Bible implies...

Could anyone be bold enough to assert that there are some non creatures which might not be manifest in his sight? The following verses show that God’s knowledge neither increases nor diminishes because he is immutable and eternal...

From the immutability and omniscience of God, it follows necessarily that there is indeed no other possible method of salvation - not, however, for the reasons Hodge gives, but simply because of this immutability. In much of this discussion, the authors speak as if God on one occasion produced an act of will and on another occasion he made another voluntary act. The Westminster Standards, however, reproduce the Biblical position that God is immutable. Therefore, not only is the propitiatory method of atonement absolutely necessary, but also the number of mosquitoes in the world at any given instant. Every detail is a part of the all-comprehensive divine decree. God foreordains whatever comes to pass. Everything is necessary. This view exalts the sovereignty of God. This view exalts God...

This settles the question as to whether the method of the atonement is based on sovereignty or on justice, and the question whether God could have refused or neglected to save anybody. Not a chance. As previously asserted by the present writer, the sacrifice of Christ on the cross satisfied the justice of the Father. But now it should be clear that justice is one facet of sovereignty. There is no moral principle superior to God. I can say that there is no moral principle superior to the will of God. God’s will and God’s intellect are identical. Justice is what God thinks. To suppose that anything could have been otherwise is to suppose that God could have been otherwise than he is. The salvation of the elect is a part of the sovereign play by which the universe goes on. God had to create - not because there was some power external to him, but because he is God. A God who might not create, or would not have created, is simply not the Biblical God...

Some people argue that knowledge or foreknowledge does not necessitate anything. Even a man may know that an event will occur tomorrow, but this does not mean that he causes it to happen. Perhaps so. But if he does not cause it to happen, there must be some other cause which does; for unless it were certain, he could not know it. Now, then, since omniscience shows that all events are certain, it follows that if God does not cause them, there must be a cause external to and independent of God. In other words, God has ceased to be God...

William Cunningham, Professor of Church History at New College, Edinburgh, recounts an interesting attack on Dr. Chalmers by Sir William Hamilton. The latter denounced the former as a fatalist, a pantheist, and as being ignorant and suicidal in theology. His reason was that Chalmers taught the doctrine of philosophical necessity. Cunningham’s conclusion was that the Westminster Confession permits but does not teach philosophical necessity, that Chalmers not only was at liberty to accept that view, but that also his orthodoxy was impeccable. (The Atonement, 1996, pgs. 100-101, 125-136) 

Finally, in his 1981 Gordon-Conwell Lectures on "John Frame and Cornelius Van Til," he alludes to necessitarianism one more time. Here, Clark rejects (rightly) that God's intelligence is unconnected to His will but does not offer any pushback against the dichotomy as Frame frames it except to clarify his own understanding of divine "freedom" along the same lines as his above, general alignment with Spinoza:

This is Frame summarizing Van Til’s position. This is not a quotation from Van Til though I rather suppose from what I know that some of these phrases are Van Til’s words. But he’s put them together. This is what he says: “The necessity and freedom of God’s will are also paradoxically related. If God’s will is directed by His intelligence, then His free acts, creating the world for example, become necessary. God had to create. If, on the other hand God’s free acts are truly free, then it would seem that they must be unconnected with His intelligence and therefore random.”

...if you talk about freedom of God, I suppose what a person ought to mean is that there is nothing external to God that controls him. But that doesn’t seem to be what is meant here. Here, the idea that God’s will is independent of his intelligence. And this would make God schizophrenic. And I don’t think we want to say that.

... Frame falls into embarrassing language because after he talks about God’s freedom then he has to enforce it a little bit by saying “truly free.” Well, now that doesn’t add anything. That simply shows that the man is embarrassed. Now, I must make this statement with a little hesitation because I’m not quite sure of it. But so far as I know, the last philosopher who tried to keep God’s will and God’s intellect distinct was Descartes who lived in the seventeenth century. And this attempt on his part seems to have failed. And well, maybe some Arminians have tried to do it, I don’t know. But at any rate, I don’t know. That is the last attempt that I know to distinguish between God’s will and God’s intellect. So if you insist on a very unified personality you don’t have that duality.

I'm sure there are other relevant materials, but this should suffice to establish a baseline for development in Clark's thought over time on necessitarianism.