Having almost completed my review of one recent evaluation of Gordon Clark's apologetic and epistemology (link), I thought I might as well interact with another. In The Fernandes Guide to Apologetic Methodologies (link), Phil Fernandes spends a chapter on Gordon Clark and refers to him in the course of other chapters as well. The book itself has received generally positive reviews and been cited a few times, so I thought I might engage it to correct, as I see it, a few flaws.
1) In chapter 18, Fernandes writes, "Whereas Gordon Clark had argued that there was no common ground between believers and non-believers, Carnell insisted that there was." This is a mistake, and it is due to a persistent pattern throughout the book: a reliance on sources other than Clark to articulate Clark's own thought. In this case, the footnote that attempts to substantiate Fernandes's claim refers to Gordon Lewis's Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, which I have elsewhere mentioned is a book that also inaccurately summarizes Clark (link).
In my debates with some who deny it, I have maintained that Christians and non-Christians have certain “common ground.” That is to say, a regenerate and an unregenerate person may believe the same proposition. But this by no means implies that a given proposition can be deduced indifferently from Christian and from secular presuppositions. But this by no means implies that a given proposition can be deduced indifferently from Christian and from secular presuppositions. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 205-206)
...that revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axioms, whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way... by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 53)
One can "test" whether an axiom is consistent with its resultant theorems. If it is not, then the axiom is self-defeating. Clark falsified other axioms - that of a logical positivist, for example - by using the this "test" in this way.
On the other hand, in the case of Scripture, the nature of this "test" is apologetic, not epistemic (link). That is, the axiom of revelation is consistent with that which can be deduced from it, but such a point is an apologetic defense or confirmation, not a circular method of epistemic justification. That one can "test" the claim that Scripture is God's word by examining the consistency of that axiom with any deductions from it does not mean the axiom is capable of being falsified:
Carnell also says: “Since their systems [the systems of thought of finite minds] are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability.” But if this is true, it itself is not true but only probable. And if this is true, the propositions in the Bible, such as David killed Goliath and Christ died for our sins, are only probable – they may be false. And to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37)
3) I found some of Fernandes's language to be "charged". It is somewhat confusing to read him, for instance, describe Clark (in chapter 29) as being "very rationalistic in his thought" or say that Clark "exalted man's use of reason." It is confusing because, in chapter 14, Fernandes (correctly) argues that "Clark rejected the idea that unaided human reason could arrive at truths about God" as well as that "Clark listed several problems with rationalism in his writings." One might therefore say that Fernandes qualifies the statements from chapter 29 in the course of the book, but I would regard the language as misleading, even if that were not the author's intention. A few further examples will be noted below.
4) Also in chapter 29, we read Fernandes write that Clark "believed that only that which could be rationally deduced qualified as knowledge." This is incorrect. Clark believed that one could know his axiom as well as that which could be deduced from it (see the above quote from God's Hammer and also point 5 in this link). While it is good that contemporary authors are less inclined to mistake Clark as a coherentist, there has been a tendency to mistake him as a positist rather than a foundationalist. It's probable that the mistake is unintentional, but it is an important distinction.
5) In one final remark from chapter 29, Fernandes believes Clark's views developed over time such that he "held the view that truth can only be found in the Bible and whatever can be deuced (sic) from the Bible." This depends on what Fernandes means by "found." Clark thought that the Bible (and that which is deducible from it) is the propositional content we can [currently] "know" (in a specific sense, at that), but he did not believe that all extra-scriptural statements were untrue (link). Moreover, Clark's views did indeed to develop over time, although whether they were developed in way in which Fernandes describes it is debatable (see below).
Chapter 14: The Primary Interaction
1) Some of what is said in this chapter is accurate: Clark rejected Aquinas' cosmological argument, empiricism, rationalism, and irrationalism. He argued for the necessity of first principles, that logic is tied to God's nature, and that human responsibility does not presuppose libertarian free will. While the focus of this post is on what I believe Fernandes gets wrong, I would not want to understate what Fernandes gets right.
At the same time, we find more charged language: apparently, Clark "deplored the utilization of historical evidences in defense of Christianity." No citation is provided for this. Clark may have subordinated the role of "evidential apologetics," but at no time did he indicate that he considered archaeological evidence useless, let alone deplorable, in defending the faith:
Let us use as much archaeological evidence as we can find. Let us go into great detail on J, E, D, and P. We shall discuss the presence of camels in Egypt in 2000 B.C., and the hypothetical council of Jamnia. But our arguments will be entirely ad hominem. We shall show that the principles our opponents use destroy their own conclusions; that their critical procedures on Genesis cannot be applied to Homer’s Iliad; that their historiography ruins Caesar’s Gallic Wars. The argument is ad hominem and elenctic. When finally the opponent is reduced to silence and we can get in a word edgewise, we present the word of God and pray that God cause him to believe. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 239-240)
Thus, when Fernandes says in Chapter 14 that a weakness of Clark's philosophy is "His downplaying of historical evidences for the Christian Faith" (again, an assertion made without citation), one wonders to what extent he has read Clark and to what extent his understanding of Clark has been colored by second-hand information.
2) Another example of charged language is Fernandes's reference to Clark as a "hyper-Calvinist" for believing that "one really cannot convince another of the truth of Christianity, for God alone sovereignly bestows faith upon an individual." It appears that the author does not believe God is the decisive factor by whose grace alone one man is enabled to accept the gospel (1 Corinthians 15:10). Even so, to label those who disagree as hyper-Calvinists indicates a poor understanding of Reformed history. Clark never dismissed the need to evangelize:
The immediate question, however, is whether the Scriptures command or prohibit the preaching of the gospel to the non-elect. The answer to this question is that such a prohibition is denied in Scripture and would be impossible in practice. It would be impossible to follow because no one knows who is and who is not elect. At a certain early date Saul of Tarsus was breathing out threatenings against believers; but nonetheless he was elect from all eternity. Many congregations must have certain persons who are elect, but not as yet believers. Reversely there are probably some communicant members of good reputation who are not elect. Hence the hyper-calvinistic principle cannot be applied.
Moreover, the principle is denied in Scripture. Aside from the historical fact that Paul in Ephesus and Corinth preached to everyone who would listen, he also wrote in Romans 10:14-17, “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher … So then faith comes by hearing …”
Perhaps more emphatic is the great commission: “Go ye therefore and teach all nations.”
In Iconium Paul preached both to the Jews and Greeks (Acts 14:1). A great multitude believed, but not all, for some sought to stone Paul and Barnabas; from which one must conclude that the two missionaries had preached to the non-elect. (link)
3) Continuing through the chapter, in the course of reviewing the strengths of Clark's philosophy (many of which are true enough), Fernandes writes:
He is right to seek confirmation for his Christian presuppositions. Many presuppositionalists are content in merely assuming the truth of Christianity. But Clark realizes that, after presupposing biblical truth, one must still seek justification for this assumption. Clark does this by showing that Christianity does what all secular philosophies have failed to do. They failed to give meaning to life, justify moral values, and find truth.
This paragraph is wrong on several accounts. Firstly, Clark did not seek to epistemically justify first principles. Confirmation that one's first principle is true - by, for example, examining it for internal consistency - is not the same as epistemically justifying it:
Spinoza does it another way. He formulates definitions of substance, attribute, God, and some others; then he posits seven axioms (e.g., That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself; and, If a thing can be conceived as non-existent, its essence does not involve existence), from which, after the fashion of geometry, he infers that God exists. This actual existence in the conclusion presumably justifies the truth of the definitions and axiom. Whatever validly implies existence, it may be said, must be true. Yet, on the other hand, this justification of axioms seems to be the fallacy of asserting the consequent. If Alexander was killed at the battle of Thebes, Alexander died young; Alexander died young, therefore he was killed in the battle of Thebes. Spinoza then must somehow refute this charge of invalidity. Otherwise his assumptions do not depend on logic alone. Rationalism therefore faces some embarrassment with respect to its first premises. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 24-25)
This quote, by the way, is found in Reason, Religion, and Revelation (1961), the very book Fernandes mentions as that in which Clark's Dogmatism is found (Three Types of Religious Philosophy also mentions "Dogmatism" but was written over a decade later). So this is not a change in Clark's thought over time.
Additionally, there are numerous instances that Clark said that first principles cannot be proved, demonstrate, derived, justified, etc. I could reference scores of such passages. Thus, the following argument by Fernandes rests on a false premise:
No Christian can show that every non-Christian system of thought is inconsistent. Clark claims that since every non-Christian philosophy has failed, people should presuppose the truth of the Christian world view. However, it is impossible for Clark, or any other person, to thoroughly examine every non-Christian system of thought. Even if it were possible for Clark to expose the contradictions in every non-Christian world view today, there is no guarantee that a totally consistent non-Christian world view will not be produced in the future.
Once again, no citation is provided for the assertions in this paragraph by Fernandes aside from references to Gordon Lewis's book. This particular paragraph is flawed because it assumes that Clark has made such a claim when, in fact, he said the very opposite:
I do not deny a that secular philosophies often attain a degree of consistency. Bertrand Russell was certainly consistent in deducing despair from his cold, dead, purposeless world. But Bertrand Russell is a very poor example if one wishes to mention a fully consistent secular philosopher. He has contradicted himself more often than Ayer and Wittgenstein. Even beyond this, I admit that there might be a secular system so carefully constructed that I could not discover the inconsistency. This in no way proves that error is consistent or that truth is inconsistent. How could my limitations imply that consistency is not the test of truth? And, I may add, my critic has not shown, nor even tried to show, that a given secular system is completely consistent. Only if he did would he have a basis for his criticism. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 291)
Now, Fernandes, following Ronald Nash, thinks Clark's views changed over time. Fernandes says Clark's earlier view of "Dogmatism" differed from his later view of "Scripturalism." So perhaps he would argue that Clark changed his mind over time on this issue. But consider the following quote from 1952:
...suppose there still remain two or more fairly self-consistent but mutually incompatible systems of thought. This is likely to be the case even if the coherence theory of truth is correct, for the coherence theory cannot be applied with final satisfaction unless one is omniscient. Since life is short and since the implications of various propositions have not been exhausted, there may remain false propositions whose absurd conclusions have not yet been deduced...
No philosopher is perfect and no system can give man omniscience. But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent whole others are self-contradictory, who can deny us, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 26-29)
This should suffice to show Clark consistently understood that he may not have been able - as someone who isn't omniscient - to discover, in practice, given inconsistencies in non-Christian worldviews. Nevertheless, as Clark points out, no one has "shown, nor even tried to show, that a given secular system is completely consistent." Hence, the Christian apologist has the high ground.
To conclude this point: Fernandes mentions a so-called "strength" of Clark's presuppositionalism... which he ironically believes relies on what he considers to be a weakness of Clark's presuppositionalism. But because he has misunderstood Clark in the first place - since he wrongly relies on Gordon Lewis's second-hand account of Clark's philosophy - the whole discussion is misguided.
4) Did Clark's views actually develop over time? Certainly. I think there is much that can be written on this point, and it is one reason I am refining my research on Clark. But Clark used the label "Dogmatism" for his philosophy in both 1961 and 1973. By 1968, Nash had already said that he thought Clark's thought had changed. So unless Fernandes thinks Clark meant something by his philosophy of "Dogmatism" in 1973 (in Three Types of Religious Philosophy) that he didn't mean in 1961 (when he used the same word to describe his philosophy in Reason, Religion, and Revelation), then in the absence of evidence, we should view Clark's thought as relatively consistent over this span of time.
That is, the assumption should be that Clark thought the same in 1961 ("Dogmatic" presuppositionalism as characterized by Fernandes) as he did in 1973 (by which time he must have affirmed, according to Fernandes - who follows Nash - so-called "Scripturalism") until contrary evidence is presented.
This leads me to remark that Fernandez often references Norman Geisler, Gordon Lewis, Ronald Nash, etc. for summary evaluations on Clark's philosophy. Others have, in turn, cited Fernandes in their own attempts to summarize Clark. I won't discuss every quote I have in mind, because such would be beside the point.
The point is that rather than say something like, as Fernandes does, "Assuming that Ronald Nash is correct in his assessment of Gordon Clark..." - in fact, rather than assuming any author correctly assesses any other author - I think it is best practice to summarize an author in his own words. Fernandes actually does this better than most. As I said, I don't want to understate that in much of his book, Fernandes does accurately summarize Clark.
Nevertheless, he is not (as evidenced by above examples) immune to this criticism. A primary reason Clark's views are so often mischaracterized is because Clark's views are not stated in his own words. This is an issue Clark faced in his own lifetime:
It is amazing that these men continue to circulate these false statements after I have so many times denied them, I denied them in the examination (cf. Transcript, 31:9-10). I denied them in The Answer (pages 20-21), I denied them in speeches in two Assemblies and in countless conversations. The report of the committee to the thirteenth General Assembly denied them for me (page 3, next to the bottom Paragraph). And in spite of all this, the committee for the complainants has neither seen nor heard these denials, and continue to make the same false statements. Truly, this is incomprehensible. (link)
While other authors may sometimes represent Clark correctly, this is one reason I am continuing to update my research project on Clark (link). It is my hope that such research will make it less difficult to let Clark speak from the grave... especially when he wrote a book with that very title in which he critiqued some of the same men through whom his philosophy is now being wrongly filtered!
5) Speaking of Scripturalism, Fernandes provides a very cursory examination of it, mostly relying on statements and arguments by Ronald Nash. The summary of Scripturalism as an epistemology is mostly fine, if lacking in nuance. Fernandes mentions a few criticisms of Scripturalism, including:
Is self-knowledge possible for Scripturalists? Can one know the contents of the Bible without using his senses? Can Scripturalists avoid fideism, i.e. blind faith? Does a Scripturalist have an apologetic against others who might claim to possess divine revelation, like Muslims?
However, Fernandes does not also reference Clark's answers to these criticisms, so the treatment is unsympathetic, to say the least. I myself have addressed each of these criticisms elsewhere. In short, I would argue that a Scripturalist can consistently affirm self-knowledge, that sensations may be secondary causes by which one forms his axiomatic beliefs (and, hence, said beliefs can count as "knowledge" in a certain sense), can defend his faith, and point out inconsistencies in the systems of others, like Muslims, who claim to possess divine revelation.
Clark agreed with some of what I would argue, had alternative answers to others, and, indeed, even changed his mind over time (e.g. on the possibility of self-knowledge). But his writings engage each of these questions, at least. To fail to mention any of this doesn't seem to do his philosophy justice.
This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 46)
Nothing in Paul suggests that the word of “cooperative investigation” (1:20) is more certain or reliable than the wisdom of God. Is it not strange that for any evangelical, for whom sola Scriptura is the formal principle of theology, should try to base the truth of Scripture on the conclusions of Dr. Albright and Miss Kenyon? For Paul revelation is self-authenticating. Athens, Oxford, and American universities have nothing in common with Jerusalem. (First Corinthians, 1991, pg. 58)
See other quotes already mentioned in this post, such as "to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation." Divine revelation, as Clark's epistemic axiom, was his foundation for knowledge and itself could be known. Does Fernandes think that we cannot be certain the Bible is God's word?
So then, Clark does treat his first principle differently than the first principles of others... precisely because those are not his own first principle and, therefore, must be judged as false by his own. Others may disagree with Clark, but this is not epistemically relevant.
Now, it may be relevant in the context of apologetics, wherein one person attempts to persuade another. In such a situation, stating the truth and praying God convicts the other person is one method of approach, as Clark sometimes mentions. It is also legitimate, as Clark also mentions, to examine the other person's worldview itself for internal consistency and, again, to pray God uses that as a means by which the other person is convicted of the truth. But in no case, as I understand it, is Clark allowing that the Bible may not be God's word, is not self-authenticating, or may not be true.
This also dispenses of Fernandes's later insinuation that Clark could not have refuted Islam, given his philosophy. That Clark may not have specifically demonstrated internal consistencies of Islamists (or Hare Krishnas, Satanists, etc.), for example, does not mean he could not have done so.
Apologetically, then, there are multiple legitimate choices one can make in a given scenario. Presenting a Muslim with the gospel and praying for God to convert him is as much a defense of one's faith as is a reductio ad absurdem, even if we allow that doing both is sometimes (or even often) wise. On the other hand, 1 Peter 3:15 does not mean we have to answer the questions of interlocutors ad infinitum. At some point, we can only pray over a matter and leave the rest in God's hands.
Finally, regarding probability, since Fernandes does not explain what he means by the term or how something is established as "probable" or "improbable," here is one sample (among many from which I could have chosen) of what Clark has to say on this subject:
The skeptics wish to act on what is probable; but if “probable” means only what seems good to a person at the moment, a man might commit the worst crime without blame, provided he thought it was probably good. But probability may mean something more. It may mean “approximating the truth.” The skeptics call propositions false, doubtful, probable, and plausible. Their basic principle, however, does not in consistency permit them to use any of these terms. A false proposition is one opposite to the truth. How then can one say that a proposition is false, unless one knows the truth? A doubtful proposition is one that might possibly be true; a probable or plausible proposition resembles or approximates the truth. But it is impossible to apply these terms without knowing the truth by which they are determined. One might well ask, Is it true that a foredoomed search for truth is wisdom? The skeptic would have to reply that he did not know. Is it probable that such a search is wisdom? Or with respect to everyday living, is it probable or doubtful that eating lunch today is wise? Again the skeptic could not know. A theory of probability must itself be based on truth, for if the method of determining the probable wisdom of eating lunch is false, the conclusion that it is safe to eat lunch could not be known to be probable. Without the possession of the truth, therefore, it is impossible to act rationally even in the most ordinary situations. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pg. 178-179)
Weakness #4: "His proposed solution to the problem of evil." Fernandes adds, "Since Clark denied human free will (man could not choose to do otherwise), Clark made God the ultimate cause of evil... A free will theodicy... is a much more plausible solution to the problem of evil than the solution Clark proposed" (emphasis mine).
The above paragraph by Clark from Thales to Dewey seems to serve as an appropriate response to this criticism. Perhaps Fernandes's free will theodicy merely "seems good to [him] at the moment." It is hard to tell, because Fernandes doesn't given any reason for thinking his solution is more "plausible" than Clark's. Clark himself, by way of contrast, provided reasons for his theodicy. One example:
If man has free will, and things can be different, God cannot be omniscient. Some Arminians have admitted this and have denied omniscience, but this puts them obviously at offs with Biblical Christianity. There is also another difficulty. If the Arminian or Romanist wishes to retain divine omniscience and at the same time assert that foreknowledge has no causal efficacy, he is put to it to explain how the collision was made a certain hundred years, an eternity, before the drivers were born. If God did not arrange the universe this way, who did? (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 254-255)
One might quibble with the semantics of Clark's use of "free will" vs. "free agency," but his reasoning itself, given his understanding of the terms in question (i.e. for Clark, "free will" = "libertarian free will"), is sound. Clark was, properly understood, a compatibilist: while a theological determinist, he nevertheless believed "man is still a “free agent” for that merely means, as Hodge says, that man has the power to make a decision" (Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1992, pgs. 47-48). Clark believed man is responsible for his decisions he makes, decisions which were determined by God. Responsibility does not presuppose libertarian free will, and one must muster more than an appeal to "plausibility" to persuade an unconvinced reader to the contrary.
A stronger argument against Clark in regard to ethics, by the way, might have been to highlight Clark's seeming ethical voluntarism. Clark very strongly argued that whatever God "does is just, for this very reason, because He does it." He bit a particular end of the bullet of Euthyphro's dilemma and, it seems, was happy to do so.
In fact, in order to be consistent, one might argue that Clark must have also held to alethic voluntarism. There is actually some evidence this might have - at some point - been the case: Clark once said, in reference to Hebrews 6, that "Truth is defined in terms of God’s pronouncements" (link). Does this mean that Clark thought God freely willed His own self-knowledge? Could He have made a different "pronouncement"? If so, are there undesirable metaphysical implications that could be drawn from this? If not, why not?
Such would seem to have a corresponding bearing on ethical voluntarism. There is exploration of Clark's thought that can be had along these lines, but such would require a thorough understanding of whether or how Clark's own views changed over the course of his life. I myself have a few thoughts on all of this but will leave them for another time.
Weakness #5: "He does not allow for the use of secular material during evangelism." This criticism stems from an particular understanding of Clark's statement that "in evangelistic work there can be no appeal to secular, non-Christian material." What Clark means, however (or at least, so I would argue), is that the system, worldview, or first principle of the non-Christian and that of the Christian do not (or should not) overlap. How is this relevant, and is this even the case?
To answer the latter question first, in the same context in which he makes the above statement, Clark denies that we should use a "fallacious argument from a non-existent common ground." Did Clark deny that there is any common ground between believer and unbeliever? As we saw earlier, no. Also in the same context, he says that a Muslim and a Christian may hold a common proposition, but it is not "logically common," for there are "two systems" at play.
In other words, I think Clark is opposing an evangelistic position on which we would appeal to a false system, worldview, or first principle - "a non-existent common ground." If we trace back agreement on a proposition far enough, we will find that we do (or should, since our system, worldview, and first principles should be different) believe said proposition for different reasons than does a Muslim or a secularist - the proposition is not "logically common" or, again, it should not be, for we should not be appealing to secular, non-Christian "material" (read: systems, worldviews, or first principles).
Thus, what do we do in such a case? Once the genus of our beliefs have been located, how is it that the Muslim or secularist can convert? Can the evangelist argue him into the kingdom? No. No amount of apologetic effort, of itself, can convert unbelievers. Even though we water, the believer must pray that God causes growth (1 Corinthians 3). To change one's system, worldview, or first principle ultimately takes an act of God. While this is not to diminish our role in presenting the gospel and providing the opportunity for the Spirit to work such a change, our role is an insufficient condition to that end.
A separate point: one might also point out, in reply to this alleged "weakness" of Clark's philosophy, that Clark appealed to secular "material" (in a certain sense) all the time. Why, he does it in the very book (Three Types of Religious Philosophy) from which Fernandes found the quote with which he took issue!
To the extent that one views Clark's book as an apologetic work, as Fernandes apparently does, how does he interpret Clark's mention of Brand Blanshard, a "brilliant, non-theological philosopher" whose work to which Clark makes "appeal" as he argues against empiricism (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 58-63)? Does Fernandes think Clark unintentionally contradicts himself in the same book? I think the alternative interpretation provided above is more "plausible."
Weakness #6: "His attacks on traditional apologetics." In some respects, I sympathize with Fernandes insofar as I do see a way in which one can utilize "classical apologetics" even as a Scripturalist. As just mentioned above, Clark is correct that given two different systems, agreement on the truth of a given proposition must be due to different reasoning. The agreement is a common ground, and one method of apologetics is working backwards to the discovery of the point of disagreement in reasoning whereby one's acceptance of the given proposition is demonstrated to be invalid or unsound. Whose first principle and worldview really stands up under scrutiny? Who is really justified in believing the proposition in question? This is a fine method of procedure.
Instead of this, though, picture again two people who agree on a given proposition. They may not only work backwards. Although this is, in my experience, how presuppositionalists - especially those who admire Clark - tend to operate, an apologist can also work forwards, taking agreement in a proposition as a starting point in a given conversation by which he can show where a belief ought to lead.
Clark said as much when he spoke of archaeology - he might as well have applied that to teleology, cosmology, contingency, etc. I could be wrong on this, but I do get the sense that Fernandes is right that Clark was, later in his life, skeptical of "traditional" arguments for God's existence. I think that is due, in part, to the unwillingness of some (e.g. Van Til) to explicitly outline said arguments to Clark's satisfaction. Perhaps, though, Fernandes is right in that Clark was not immune to misrepresenting others (like Augustine or Aquinas). I'm no historical theologian, so I will leave this criticism aside.
I do, however, find myself agreeing with Clark insofar as a certain understanding of divine simplicity - like that of Aquinas - would seem to prevent the possibility of our knowledge ever being identical with God's. It is not clear, from Fernandes's exposition, whether he thinks Aquinas believed that our knowledge of a given proposition is the same as God's knowledge of the same proposition. If God is identical with what He knows (Aquinas's position?), I don't see how this could be the case.
Nonetheless, while in some respects Clark's philosophy is capable of improvement - as is anyone's, for no one but God is omniscient - I do hope that this post illustrates that many people need to better understand his philosophy before they attempt to improve it.
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