The Precondition of an Omniscient Communicator Revisited

Every so often, I like to revisit my favorite apologetic argument, that [revelation from] an omniscient person or persons is a precondition for knowledge. By working on making it more accessible – without sacrificing key components of the argument, of course – it’s kept fresh in my mind. The following is my latest attempt.

Take any knowledge-claim and any claim about which one is ambivalent or ignorant. For example:

A: [I know that] Christianity is a religion.

B: [I do not know whether or not] Paul wrote Hebrews [is true].

Why is it the case that I can know A, the knowledge claim, without knowing B, the ambivalence claim? Answers may vary, but it is likely that any variation will be roughly equivalent to “because I don’t need to know B in order to know A.” Now, as a Christian, I agree with this. But the point is to provide an account of why this is the case.

Consider the fact that “I don’t need to know B in order to know A” is itself a knowledge-claim. In that case, it is evident that it can be substituted for A as follows:

C: [I know that] I don’t need to know B in order to know A.

B: [I do not know whether or not] Paul wrote Hebrews [is true].

But then it is equally evident that I can repeat the question I asked above: why is it the case that I can know C, the knowledge claim, without knowing B, the ambivalence claim?

It may go against common sense to entertain such questions, but given that philosophy is supposed to question superficial intuitions, this actually presents a pretty little problem. Simplistic answers like the above fall suspect to an infinite regress: “I don’t need to know B in order to know C” is itself a knowledge claim (D) which, upon substitution for C, is in turn subject to the same line of questioning.

Now, suppose one actually does need to know everything in order to know even one thing. Then it’s clear that omniscience is a precondition for knowledge. But is it possible that we don’t need to know everything in order to know something, and, if so, how can we determine what propositions do not, in fact, need to be known? 

If possession of omniscience is not a precondition for knowledge, then it is clear that truths are not related in such a way that a single knowledge-claim entails a[n implicit] claim to knowledge of all others. But therein lies the rub: on what non-arbitrary grounds can we rule out the possibility that possession of omniscience is an epistemic necessity? This is a problem everyone who is not omniscient must face, and of everyone in this group, there emerge two types of relevant worldviews:

1) ones which state either a) that there is no one who is omniscient or b) that while there may be an omniscient person or persons, we cannot know that he or they has or have communicated to us;

2) ones which state that we can know there is an omniscient person or persons who has or have communicated to us.

If the first – i.e. deism, agnosticism, atheism, etc. – then any knowledge-claim will indeed beg the question regarding its relation to ambivalence-claims. For in that case, any knowledge claim could be substituted in place of A, C, or D. This includes knowledge-claims that certain propositions are self-evident (cf. here). The proper reply to these persons who stubbornly insist on their whims is to say that “it is self-evident the Bible is true.” There’s not much else one can do.

If the second – if there is a person or persons who is or are omniscient – then it is possible that he or they know the relationship among truths is such that they can be communicated without requiring that the person[s] to whom such is communicated know all things. This is the true means by which skepticism can be avoided.