Scripturalism and Self-Knowledge Revisited

Having recently updated one of what I have argued to be necessary preconditions for knowledge (link), I have been meaning to update another, the necessity of self-knowledge (link), and Sean Gerety’s reference to and rejection of my view here will make for a useful foil. While I agree with Sean that knowledge, opinion, and ignorance are different, how I would categorize some beliefs about oneself would differ from how Sean would. That is, with reference to the class of mortal men, I think some beliefs about oneself can and indeed must be [unmistakably] known. Sean would argue any such beliefs must be opined or possibly erroneous.

Now, despite the title of Sean’s post – Biblical Epistemology 101 – Gordon Clark held that self-knowledge was one of the most complicated philosophical subjects:

The one piece of ignorance that Reymond seems most anxious to press against my view is knowledge of oneself. Self-knowledge has indeed been a philosophical ideal ever since Socrates said, Gnōthi seauton. But it is very difficult. Plotinus’ Enneads, the extreme difficulty of which philosophers all acknowledge, can be understood as a gigantic attempt to achieve self-knowledge. Even those who think the ideal is possible of attainment must wonder whether anyone has succeeded. (Modern Philosophy, pg. 273)

Further, Sean himself has cited John Robbins as saying that while he did not believe self-knowledge is currently attainable, he was open to correction (link). In any case, a dogmatic rejection of self-knowledge is clearly not necessary to be a Scripturalist, let alone to understand the “basics of [Gordon Clark’s] epistemology.” So perhaps Sean rather meant that “not all truth is knowledge” is what is epistemologically basic. But in that case, disagreement as to whether self-knowledge is possible or justifiable does not imply either party has a low understanding of [Clark’s] epistemology, a reckless accusation Sean has made elsewhere (link). This dubiously contrasts with Sean’s own repeated allusions to my placement in two TrinityFoundation essay contests. Then again, Sean has not dealt charitably with me in recent discussions of the Trinity, so when he says the following, I unfortunately can’t even feign surprise:

I would think all this is an obvious and if it’s admitted that we cannot know who God’s elect are, the same applies to us even when we look in the mirror.  Yet, when George Macleod Coghill made this point on a “Clark” Facebook discussion group, even adding that “all knowledge has to be truth, but it is not the case that all truth has to be knowledge,” a number of self-styled “Scripturalists” went bonkers.  Even people like former Trinity Foundation Worldview Contest winner Ryan Hedrich, a young man who claims to be in “broad agreement” with Clark’s epistemological views, if not much else, took issue with Clark’s theory at this point (so much for any “broad agreement). Hedrich said: “I do have true knowledge about myself. ‘I am regenerate’ is a proposition I can and do know.”  Now, admittedly, this is assertion from a young man who has recently come out of the closet rejecting the Trinity and the doctrine of God.  Needless to say I tend to be considerably more skeptical concerning Hedrich’s claim even if I wish I could be more charitable.  Frankly, I find it hard to think of any Christian church that would find Hedrich’s profession of faith credible for membership. The point is, and despite his bravado, unless a person like Hedrich can provide an account for how he arrived at the knowledge of his own regeneration, it appears to me to remain an opinion, and, in this case, one I have little confidence in as should he.  Besides, how can anyone be so arrogant to ignore Paul’s warning to the Corinthians; “let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall.”  I would think that would be enough to humble even a Trinity Foundation Worldview Contest winner.

Firstly, Sean is lying about what statements George made with which I disagreed. I never argued “all truth has to be knowledge.” I argued that Scripturalism can and must be able to account for self-knowledge. Clearly, saying that some truth has to be known does not imply all truth has to be known. For someone who pontificates about basic epistemology, Sean either has a poor grasp of it himself or, what is more likely, is resorting to misrepresentation here as he did in our discussions of the Trinity.

This inference is also justified by Sean’s challenge for me to “provide an account for how he arrived at the knowledge of [my] own regeneration.” Now, I wonder whether Sean is capable of outlining what it means to “provide an account” for truth. What does it mean for true belief to be “justified”? If it simply means to show that one’s knowledge-claim is not capable of being mistaken, I justified [the need for] self-knowledge numerous times in our discussion on facebook. Each time, Sean evaded engaging the argument, though he did take the trouble to “Yawn” once in response. It’s always impressive when a man twice my age acts like a child to those who attempt to have a serious discussion about epistemology and then moralizes on his blog about the need for humility instead of arrogance. Yes, I’m sure anyone would agree that Sean’s references to “mother’s basements,” “witlessness,” and the pejorative nicknames he has delighted in bestowing on me are indicative of the sort man from whom I should take ethical advice seriously. Just the same, as Sean is a self-admitted potential reprobate, I think I will decline. 

The reader will excuse my attempts to turn the subject matter to more serious lines of inquiry, such as what my argument for self-knowledge was. It is actually the same argument I made in one of my comments on my last post on self-knowledge:

P1. Knowledge precludes the possibility of error.
P2. If you may not be a sheep, you cannot know you’ve heard the voice of the Shepherd. 

P3. If you cannot know you’ve heard the voice of the Shepherd, you cannot know which propositions are God-breathed.

P4. If you cannot know which propositions are God-breathed, you cannot know anything.
P5. You may not be a sheep.
C. You don’t know anything.

P1. is by definition (cf. link). 

P2. and P3. follow from John 8:43-47, 10:1-5, 26, 1 John 4:1-6, etc. Essentially, the point is that only regenerates can know the canon of Scripture (link) because only regenerates can know that they aren’t suppressing God’s self-authenticating and revealed truth in unrighteousness.

P4. is Scripturalism. 

Since the argument is valid yet the conclusion is self-defeating (link), that leaves P5. as the premise I argue is reduced to absurdity. Excluding P5., I have argued for each of these premises in separate posts. One would think, then, this would warrant some attention from fellow Scripturalists who have every reason to wish to know themselves. Or maybe not. 

Instead, Sean continues to cite Jeremiah 17:9 as if he knows it’s God’s word. Well, he can cite it until the cows come home, but I will give the same reply here as I did when he mentioned it the first half dozen times, at least until he answers my questions: how does he know it is God’s word? Only God’s sheep hear, listen to, and follow His voice. Is Sean a sheep? How do he know? These are questions which require self-knowledge, and answers to them are necessary in order for Sean to know Jeremiah 17:9 is Scripture. Ironically, Sean can’t even begin to use Jeremiah 17:9 to support his argument unless he admits his argument against self-knowledge is false. That is, denial of self-knowledge on the basis of Jeremiah 17:9 presupposes self-knowledge, for otherwise he wouldn’t be able to identify Jeremiah 17:9 as God’s word in the first place. I’m not interested in Sean’s opinion to the contrary. I would be interested in his knowledge to the contrary.

Moving on, another tactic Sean uses is the argument that since the name “Sean Gerety” can’t be found in Scripture, self-knowledge is impossible. This is obviously question-begging: Sean assumes his name is “Sean.” I never said one’s own individual name can be found in Scripture. But that doesn’t preclude self-knowledge. Knowing “I am regenerate” does not imply I know “Ryan Hedrich is a regenerate.” Remember Sean’s reference to the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why can’t that distinction be applied here? I know I am regenerate. I opine I am Ryan Hedrich. Therefore, I opine Ryan Hedrich is a regenerate. What’s the problem?

I have already been down the road Sean is traveling. I have already tried to construct Scripturalism as an epistemic system from an objective, third-person perspective. It doesn’t work. One must himself be a regenerate to know what God’s word is. One can’t hypothesize what regenerates believe is God’s word, for one cannot know anyone other than himself is regenerate (that we are excluding those explicitly named in Scripture is obvious). Although the above argumentation is sufficient to demonstrate the epistemic need for self-knowledge of one’s own salvific status, there is no harm in explicit Scriptural support:

1 Corinthians 2:11 For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God.

Romans 8:16 The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God.

In addition to contravention of Scripture and a self-defeating epistemology, there are other interesting implications which follow from a denial of self-knowledge. To highlight the most amusing ones, Sean may actually agree with my view of the Trinity, or Sean may not even know the difference between knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. He may protest against both of these possibilities, but the problem is that his denial of self-knowledge has in effect prohibited him from stating as fact any proposition which begins with the phrase, “I know...” So Sean can’t say “I know I don’t hold to this or that view of the Trinity.” He can’t say “I know the difference between knowledge, opinion, and ignorance.” Whereas Van Til has no access to God’s thoughts, Sean has no access to his own thoughts. But both are epistemologically critical.

Less humorous is the fact Sean has no possible assurance of his own salvation. He can’t say “I know I’m saved.” No matter what our differences are, that’s sad. He has basically negated the whole purpose of 1 John. John, Paul, Peter, and other authors of the New Testament wrote letters to elect believers in which a chief concern was to impress upon them the knowledge that while they may suffer in this present life, they yet had the knowledge of an imperishable inheritance. They directly addressed these letters to specific churches and even mention specific individuals. The epistles were not written “to whom it may concern.” What point would there have been in these letters if no one could know to whom they applied? If persons can’t even know what they opine, what reason could anyone have to consider himself a Christian? And could that reason be known? Is it not evident such questions demonstrate an infinite regress of groundless opinions?

Little more needs to be said. In the historical order of events, I read and heard Scripture, was regenerated by the Spirit, believed the gospel, and was therefore able to recognize the canon of God’s word according to which, in the epistemic order of justification, I am thereby able to justify philosophic knowledge, including the necessity of these historical events. Whether Sean is deceiving himself with regards to his salvation, I don’t and can’t know. But he is deceiving himself with respect to the possibility of self-knowledge.