A while ago, I wrote a post explaining why I didn't think Clark's position that "words are arbitrary signs" which "tag thoughts" made sense. I was thinking about this today and believe I have found a different way to phrase my problem with it. Firstly, however, I want to say that the point of that post and this post was and is not to refute Clark so much as develop a theory of language more consistent with his broader philosophy.
For instance, I agree with Clark that propositions are the objects of knowledge. Everything we "know," philosophically speaking, is propositional. Clark stated that a proposition is the "meaning of a declarative sentence" (Logic, pg. 28). But what is meaning? Or more to the point: at root, is that which we philosophically "know" wordless? No. Language is a precondition for knowledge. Knowledge comes from communication with God. But the implications of Clark's statement that words are "mere symbols or signs" (cf. here) seems to lead to the conclusion that our knowledge is, at root, wordless.
Suppose words are, as Clark said, arbitrary signs. Now consider any declarative sentence. The words in that sentence are not, if arbitrary, intrinsically meaningful; each of those words "tag" something else. If they "tag" other words, we must remember that the words which are tagged are likewise arbitrary by Clark's definition, so those words would in turn "tag" something else. This process can either continue ad infinitum or terminate on a wordless Ding an sich. In either case, whence comes meaning? What is the proposition?
Clark rejected the empirical version of the correspondence theory of truth, where the object of knowledge is "a representation and not the reality itself" (Language and Theology, pg. 29). I agree with him. I think the reality is the object of knowledge and the physical correspondent is the representation. But then again, signs and symbols are themselves intermediaries of sorts. I believe Clark himself made the point somewhere in God's Hammer that symbols must symbolize something. What is it, then, that Clark think words arbitrarily signify or symbolize? Is it something "physical"? Then it would seem Clark's theory of language relies on the very correspondence theory of truth he opposed. Is it something "spiritual"? Then it would seem Clark's theory of language logically leads to mysticism, which he also opposed.
Thus, while it may be the case some words can be "arbitrary" - that is, they are assigned meaning by "tagging" other words - it appears that other words - the words to which the "arbitrary" words must eventually be traceable - must necessarily be intrinsically meaningful. As such. they would not be signs or symbols.
I realize this post may leave much to be desired, and that is because the philosophy of language is highly complex for me. To show my awareness, I wish to explicitly state that I do not here intend to comprehensively address 1) which words are intrinsically meaningful, 2) the relation between words which are intrinsically meaningful and the fact knowledge is proposition rather than conceptual, nor 3) the fact that despite the intrinsic meaningfulness of certain words, to know one proposition requires knowledge of other propositions. I think these are "problems" either capable of resolution or merely the result of ill-definition, for which I fully bear the responsibility.
To alleviate some of that responsibility, I would, in brief, argue that 1) isn't a problem because I don't see why I need to know which words are intrinsically meaningful, 2) isn't a problem because what I mean when I assert that some words are "intrinsically meaningful" is nothing other than that some subjects have necessary predicates (predicates which, when are subject to definition, also have necessary predicates), and 3) isn't a problem both because of my answer to 2) and the fact that not all knowledge is tautologous (thus, knowledge of predicates is to a certain extent necessary in order to know a subject). But I will give all of this more thought.
It's good to take note that only sentences have meaning, and not the individual sounds that combine to make the sentence, since those sounds have different significations in different sentences. Like "see" and "sea" are the same sound in English. Maybe that will help.
ReplyDeleteRight. That is what I meant when I said knowledge is propositional, not conceptual.
ReplyDeleteOops I didn't read very well. Anyway on your 2nd paragraph, the word "word" can mean the meaning of a written or spoken sentence, like in John 5:47, "if you believe not his writings, how shall you believe My words?" and also Gal 5:14, "all the Law is fulfilled in one word: ... you shall love your neighbour as yourself." So it depends on how you define "word."
ReplyDeleteAlso communication can be without audible speech, as Hannah's prayer in 1 Sam 1:13, "Now Hannah, she spoke in her heart; only her lips moved, but her voice was not heard." Prayer requires thought. Another piece of the puzzle!
Also noteworthy is the semantic shift recorded in 1 Samuel 9:9, "Formerly in Israel, when a man went to inquire of God, he used to say, Come and let us go to the Seer; for he who is now called a Prophet was formerly called a Seer." So two words can be synonyms for the same class of things. Why did people change the term for the same thing? I guess it's arbitrary. Hope that helps somewhat
"Why did people change the term for the same thing? I guess it's arbitrary."
ReplyDeleteI would note that the use of one word over against one which means the same as another may be arbitrary without either of the meanings of the words themselves being arbitrary. Even so, I don't have a problem admitting that some words may have assigned (arbitrary) rather than intrinsic (necessary) meaning, so long as such is not asserted of all words.
Ok, so different languages can be translated into each other; exhibiting the same meanings. So, words (I take you mean "sentences" by "words") are meaningful only when they are still used by people; they are subject to change. But the meanings remain the same.
ReplyDeleteA proposition is composed of a subject, verb, and object. So in order to know, you must know the subject, verb, and object in a sentence.
God provides man with language, and man can change terms in a language, but cannot change the whole language in a single day - he is mostly confined to the framework given by God, and many meanings of terms in a language can be ascertained by examining their opposites (what they DON'T mean).
So I agree that in this wide sense, sentences have intrinsic meaning within the framework of language. Meanings are propositions or thoughts in your mind. Yup, this is a tough puzzle. I'll just keep reading the Bible and maybe God will reveal the answer.
Forgot to add something: I believe these expressions we're using about signs and meanings are shrouded in idiom. The phrase "sentences have meaning" is itself an idiom meaning "sentences mean things" which is also an idiom meaning "the person who spoke/wrote the sentence means something." So in actuality persons are the source of meaning and not signs or symbols properly.
ReplyDeleteFor example we say "his book says" [3 syllables] instead of "he says in his book" [5 syllables] to shorten the length of communication and improve speaking style.
"So in actuality persons are the source of meaning and not signs or symbols properly."
ReplyDeleteGod is the source of meaning, yes, but I'm denying that all words-sentences are signs and symbols. That would imply all signs and symbols signify or symbolize something else. But as I note in the post, "This process can either continue ad infinitum or terminate on a wordless Ding an sich," neither of is sensible. When I say sentences have *intrinsic* meaning, then, I'm saying not all sentences are signs or symbols. To take your example:
"For example we say "his book says" [3 syllables] instead of "he says in his book" [5 syllables] to shorten the length of communication and improve speaking style."
My point is that one statement must be the root for the other, or both must be synonymous with a different, intrinsically meaningful root. What can't happen is the following:
"his book says" means "he says in his book" means "in his book, he says" means... ad infinitum. At some point, one of those statements has to be intrinsically meaningful, i.e. in need of no other statement in order for its meaning to be understood. There has to be a sentence that is intrinsically meaningful.
"God provides man with language, and man can change terms in a language, but cannot change the whole language in a single day - he is mostly confined to the framework given by God, and many meanings of terms in a language can be ascertained by examining their opposites (what they DON'T mean)."
Not only can man not change the whole language in a single day, he cannot change the whole language at all. He can add signs and symbols which may signify or symbolize those eternal, intrinsically meaningful sentences which are objects of God's knowledge, but ultimately, these additions must be traced back, derived from, or reducible to intrinsically meaningful sentences.
Ryan,
ReplyDeleteThanks for taking abuse in the GHC discussion group. I have an eye in that group that gives me info. Keep fighting the Monad.
There are quite a few people who seem to be open to the possibility - otherwise I don't know why they like my posts - but several of them appear stalled by Western tradition. I've stopped replying to Monty altogether because it's a waste of time.
ReplyDelete