Gordon Clark: Review of A Christian Theory of Knowledge by Cornelius Van Til (The Presbyterian Journal)

1970. Review of A Christian Theory of Knowledge by Cornelius Van Til. The Presbyterian Journal. 21 Jan. pg. 18.

A CHRISTIAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, by Cornelius Van Til. Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., Nutley, N. J. 390 pp. $6.50. Reviewed by Gordon H. Clark, Butler University, Indianapolis, Ind.

Dr. Van Til's philosophy is often called "presuppositionalism." This means that a philosophy is always governed by its own a priori assumptions, and is never an induction from objective, uninterpreted, neutral, brute facts. The presupposition of Dr. Van Til's philosophy is the triune God.

This volume is a substantial revision of the author's earlier The Defense of the Faith. The expansion is extensive enough to warrant a different title.

Yet I cannot see in it a Christian theory of knowledge. The book is Christian, granted. It is also about the theory of knowledge. But it omits what needs to be said. For example, after complaining that Augustine did not consistently base his theory of signs and things signified on the triune God (and making an historical blunder in the matter of ostensive definitions), the author does not explain the relationship between signs and things signified. We want to know what the Christian theory of semantics is.

Or, again, Dr. Van Til objects to another writer because his theory cannot justify a knowledge of individuals. Now it may be true that a non-Christian presupposition makes a knowledge of individuals impossible. And it may be true that the Trinity as a presupposition justifies such knowledge. But we cannot know that this is true unless it be shown how the Trinity explains the possibility of knowing individuals.  Dr. Van Til does not give the expected explanation.

Suppose individuals are known by sensation. If so, one must define sensation and show how a sensation is distinguished from an hallucination. Or, if individuals are known by perception, then one must explain how sensation gives rise to perception, if it does. All this material, which should be included in a theory of knowledge, is missing.

So far as the fundamentals are concerned, however, presuppositionalism is far better than the empiricism and inductionism of some of the other authors discussed.