1929. Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Aristotle's De Anime. PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania. Mar. 7
EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS IN ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA
A THESIS
IN PHILOSOPHY
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
GORDON HADDON CLARK
PHILADELPHIA
1929
PREFACE
Save us, we pray, from those who have so entombed themselves
in the dark and damp of antiquity that they no longer appreciate the light of
the present day; but save us all the more from those who go blithefully on
their way in utter disregard of the lessons the past can teach. Why is it
necessary to insist that the wise man should learn by the mistakes of others?
Yet we do our forefathers great injustice if we think of them merely as makers
of mistakes. Not only have they formulated an ideal for us and given us
inspiration, they have as well, among their mistakes, laid the basis of our
more exact science which short-sightedness alone would call emancipated from
the past.
Much of the literature intended to explain ancient
philosophy to modern minds deals only with antiquities as such. Professor Edgar
A. Singer, Jr., however, who is not an historian of philosophies but a modern
philosopher, by his proving all things and holding fast to that which is good,
crystallized my own suspicions in showing how ancient thought could contribute
to contemporary problems, instead of losing itself in merely philological labyrinths.
To him I am greatly indebted for the appreciation of problems which are
eternal. (The work of Professor Paul Shorey more specifically demonstrates the
applicability of this general principle to the details of the texts.) Owing to
the vast amount of scholarship required in such an undertaking, this thesis
merely suggests one or two minor possibilities in this respect.
My grateful acknowledgments are also due to the late William
Romaine Newbold, who, though he died before this study was begun, gave me a
foundation of inestimable value during my first two years of study in Greek
philosophy. He would sometimes criticize the literature for leaving
untranslated those sections which by reason of their obscurity—I remember well how
he spoke of certain works on Proclus—stood in need of interpretation in the
form of translation. Translation is interpretation, and while in this study
there is nothing as difficult as Proclus, the Greek text has been replaced by a
translation; especially since anyone wishing to study the subject would in any
case have to consult the texts themselves. Where it was necessary to quote the
De Anima, the translation of R. D. Hicks has been used uniformly. All other
translations of the sources are my own unless otherwise indicated.
Finally I must express my appreciation of the kind help of Professor
Isaac Husik. He has not only scrutinized my translations and criticized my
work, but it was he who first introduced me to the De Anima by reading
it through with us in a seminar course, during which he suggested the subject
of this thesis. That his aid was given to some extent according to professorial
routine detracts not one whit from his graciousness and scholarly assistance.
The purpose of the thesis became more clear as the work progressed.
Its germ lies in the gradual realization that generalizations like those about
to be quoted in the Introduction are too general and frequently misleading. The
aim therefore was carefully to examine each of Aristotle’s historical
statements, trying to harmonize wherever possible and always giving the ancients
rather than the moderns any benefit of doubt. The writers quoted in the
Introduction either are giving a hasty impression for which no detailed
evidence can be produced, or, they are not giving the evidence. At any rate, no
one has published a study on this particular topic.
What would be necessary for the final verdict on Aristotle would
be a series of such theses, treating each philosopher referred to in each of
Aristotle’s works. Only after such an induction could generalizations be made.
But how easy it is to anticipate the generalizations without going through the
induction is perhaps only too well illustrated in the following pages.
Gordon Haddon Clark
Philadelphia
March 7, 1929
INTRODUCTION
We have set for ourselves an interesting problem when we wonder
if Aristotle’s history of philosophy is trustworthy and substantially correct.
Naively one may ask, why should it not be? He was a man of superior acumen and
had the sources at his disposal. But a study of his writings develops a doubt.
The firm belief in the final truth of his own system led him to examine others
through Aristotelian spectacles. How far is this permissible? How far does it
vitiate his accounts? The most noticeable efiect of this bias is his attitude
toward Plato. Against him an uncompromising polemic is carried on through all
his works. Two conclusions are equally untenable: that Aristotle merely points
out the absurdities of an impractical dreamer, and that Aristotle is unfit to
criticize philosophers. Some of the same suspicion attaches to his treatment of
the earlier philosophers as well. Various views have been advanced to satisfy
our curiosity.
One of these is stated by Walter Veazie in an article
entitled, Empedocles’ Psychological Doctrine (Archives of Philosophy, Columbia
University Press.) In the Prefatory Note he criticizes the usual method of
approach and outlines a new method. ‘‘We will thus be in a position,”’ he says,
‘‘to show the irrelevancies of the setting in which Aristotle and his
successors tried to record or ridicule the early naturalistic philosophy.”
A. E. Taylor’s introduction to Aristotle on His
Predecessors, which has primarily to do with Book I of the Metaphysics, also
expresses similar if not so skeptical opinions of Aristotle’s attempt at
expounding preceding philosophy. On p. 35 he states that ‘‘little can be
objected against his treatment of the early Ionian Monists... except a tendency
to employ. technical terms of his own system... When allowance has been made
for this habit we readily see that Aristotle’s interpretation of these naive
monistic thinkers is in all essentials thoroughly historical... We can hardly
say as much for his treatment in the present work of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.”
(Miss) Clara E. Millard, On the Interpretation of
Empedocles, p. 37, while speaking of Aristotle’s criticism of Empedocles
and Anaxagoras with reference to ‘‘motor causes,’’ says, ‘“‘There is a clearly
recognizable and easily calculable bias in all of Aristotle’s reasonings in
such matters.’’ And she censures subsequent writers for following Aristotle
instead of correcting him. Further, on p. 79, with reference to psychology we
read, ‘‘Aristotle… entangles himself in a confusing and misleading attempt… etc.
“It is quite the manner of Aristotle to draw this inference, but, so far as we
know, it was not involved in Empedocles’ own reflections.”
Burnet is more generous in Early Greek Philosophers, first
edition, p. 370, where he says it is easy to make allowance for Aristotle’s
bias, and in the second edition, p. 270, speaking of the four periods of the
world, he states, ‘‘Aristotle was specially interested in Empedocles and was
not likely to misrepresent him on such a point.”
The present study will examine the De Anima, in which
also Aristotle is specially interested in Empedocles, and will attempt to show
how Aristotle uses his predecessors in psychological theory. It may be that
Aristotle is more just to Empedocles and Anaxagoras here than he was, according
to Taylor, in the Metaphysics.
Empedocles is chosen as the major subject of this thesis, partly
because he has never been treated in this manner, but more especially because
his is one of the earliest, if not the very first attempt systematically to
base a psychology on an underlying philosophy. Though it is impossible to
determine his dates exactly, it is fairly certain that he died before Plato was
born. His activity therefore, falls a full century before that of Aristotle.
And yet, in the field of psychology, Aristotle discusses none at greater
length. The reason is obvious. Empedocles makes a serious attempt to explain
everything consistently, including psychic phenomena, on the basis of the
fewest and most simple principles. We want to know, therefore, if Aristotle was
reasonably trustworthy in his account of Empedocles, and if his criticisms are
just.
Yet there are difficulties in an undertaking of this nature
so serious that some have thought it useless to try. They claim that it is well
nigh impossible to determine what Empedocles himself thought, and hence that
there is not the least hope of determining whether Aristotle is trustworthy or
not. He wrote with a bias, and so did all the other so-called ‘‘sources’’; to play
one off against another reduces itself to a game of chess. (Yet even a game of
chess can be won by careful playing.) Then there are difficulties of textual
and philological criticism. Over a period of hundreds of years, from Empedocles
to Sextus Empiricus, for example, words change greatly in meaning. Again, quotations
are hard to understand. We must always take the purpose of the writer into
consideration and study the context into which he fits his quotation. But there
is not merely one context, there are two, first, the context of the man who is quoting,
and secondly, the original context from which the quotation is taken. Now if
the quoter ignored the original context and we ignore the present context our
result can be valuable only by a happy cancellation of blunders.
And even granted freedom from error from all these sources, i.
e. let all the fragments be of equal worth, free from bias, even so we only
have fragments. Do you think that if you picked at random a hundred quotations
from Kant which by the mere chance of fate had survived a thousand years,
quotations taken from Hegel, Bergson, James, Fichte, McCosh, do you think you could
piece together Kant’s philosophy? Would space-time coordination suggest his
theology? Would the Schematismus lead you to his Ethics? And if, in such a
case, Hume were in like obscurity, could you see the motives for his doctrine
of causality?
Now this is too skeptical. Fragments are not preserved by mere
chance. They are quoted because they represent the kernel of the doctrine;
supposedly and usually they are selected with the greatest care. One of the
contexts at least we always have, and this sometimes throws light on the
original.
For example, I am satisfied that if one took the time he
could collect a hundred quotations from Kant which would give a tolerably good
account of his philosophy. We might begin with Some Problems of Philosophy
by William James. On p. 51 there is a German quotation in the footnote which
has an excellent context. On p. 84 there is a shorter quotation in English.
Here we have reproduced the two-language difficulty and practically all the
conditions of our knowledge of the Pre-Socratics. To be perfectly fair, we can
next turn to a less valuable attempt at philosophizing, Realistic Philosophy,
by McCosh. In volume two he quotes the twelve categories and gives somewhat of
an explanation in the context. He quotes the antinomies and indeed tries to
give an account of Kant’s system, just as Diogenes Laertius did, and Sextus
Empiricus, and Hippolytus in some sections of his work. That his criticism is
confused and unjust makes no difference. Disregard his criticism, compare his quotations
with those made by James and others and we discover Kant. Or we could do with
McCosh what we are here doing with Aristotle; discover the effect of his own
system, or lack of it, by comparing his criticisms with the quotations he
himself makes and those of others.
In the case of Aristotle we are not dependent on fragments, for
we have his complete works; we are perfectly familiar with the usages of his
language; the only difficulty is textual, and whoever bases a skepticism on
textual criticism asserts that not only nearly all philosophy, but nearly all
history as well, before the Renaissance, is forever unknowable. This is a
reductio ad absurdum. We can with tolerable certainty ascertain the exact
wording of Aristotle; but to understand his thought we need also to know the
arguments and discussions of previous men which were the motives to his
solution. Are these unknowable? My answer would be, try and see.
Of course there should be caution. Philological changes should
be ascertained and if relevant taken into consideration. But a priori doubts
with regard to the possibility of the problem do not provide the right
approach. What is needed is a careful induction of the individual passages. If
all of them are entirely buried in doubt and difficulty we are condemned to
skepticism. But if the knowledge they give is slight, let us not for that
reason despise it. Our conclusions may be far more limited than our desires but
I can not consent to a complete skepticism. We must study each passage and in
doing so determine the limits of our knowledge.
EMPEDOCLES
In his usual manner, A. in introducing the De Anima first enumerates
the difficulties and problems to be faced and indicates certain steps which
must be taken. In order better to understand the question it is highly
beneficial to review what previous thinkers had to say on the subject. Thus ‘we
may adopt what is right in their conclusions and guard against their
mistakes.’’ (This view might well be adopted by some contemporary thinkers who
seem to think that Descartes belongs to the Middle Ages and that Modern
Philosophy begins in the twentieth century.) The men who have considered the
nature of the soul may be roughly divided into two groups. The first is that
group which regards motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul and
which includes men, otherwise so far apart, as Democritus and the Pythagoreans.
Anaxagoras may also be placed with this group. Empedocles is the most notable
example of the opposite party, whose chief psychological principle is that
knowledge and perception are to be stressed.
The first mention of E. in the De An. is at 404 b 11
ff.1 After a line and a half of text come three lines of quotation
which Diels gives as fragment 109. First we ought to determine the accuracy of
the quotation to see if A. is at all careful in recording those he criticizes
and second, to try to ascertain if his deductions and criticism are just. A.
has quoted this passage twice, the other place being Meta. 1000 B 6. In
the Meta. he wishes to show that according to E.’s theory God would be
less wise than anyone else, for like is known only by like and there is no
strife in God. This is a conclusion Aristotle will draw in the De An.
The best manuscripts of the Meta. indicate that the second half of the second
line is omitted and that the correct order of the first three words in the
third line is in doubt. Now if we were desirous of
1; γαίῃ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα
δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δὲ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.
determining the precise wording of E. differences like this,
and there will be numerous such, might trouble us. But the point is, such
differences do not in the least affect the thought of the passage. And after
all we are far more concerned with thought than with wording. Of course changes
in wording may vitally affect the thought. At such times it is our duty to note
them in accordance with our inductive method. In this case the change of wording
is negligible. It merely shows either that A. is not always meticulously exact
in quoting or the existing manuscripts do not preserve the original rendering.
But if we can find other reasons for thinking that this quotation does come
from E. we have no reason at all for assuming we do not have E.’s thought. To
determine whether this fragment is originally from E. the only method is to
find it referred to E. by someone who is not dependent on A. for his
information. This is where a skeptical attitude can enjoy itself, for no matter
how likely a suggestion may be, one can always ask, ‘‘might it not have been
otherwise?”’ Such a skeptical position is, it seems to me, hardly worthy of consideration.
Doubt for the sake of doubt never overbalances other evidence, incomplete
though it be. If there be evidence against, it must be compared with the
evidence for, but the bare possibility that it may have been otherwise is no
evidence and need not be considered.
In the case of this fragment, the evidence is fairly good.
The quotation is found both in Hippolytus, Ref. Om. Haer., VI 11, p.
165, and in Sextus Empiricus Ad. Math. VII 121. Now it is a possibility
that Sextus quoted these three lines from De An. but the probability is
that he did not. For he immediately continues in 123-126 to quote long
passages, twenty-two lines in all, which are not found anywhere in Aristotle.
In Diels these are fragments 2 and 4. It seems to me then that we can not
reasonably deny that Sextus had independent sources and that these three quotations
came from the same manuscript which was lying before him as he wrote.
There is another way of confirming this opinion, viz., find other
quotations in other authors which present, not the same words or even the same
idea, but thoughts which are closely connected with the one we are
investigating. The quotation in De An. 404 b 13-15 states: ‘that we
perceive earth by earth, etc. This is one application of the principle that
like perceives like. Of this fundamental principle we shall have sufficient confirmation
in due time. If on the other hand we found ideas so in- consistent that they
could not be explained by a natural amount of inaccurate analysis, such as we
find in every philosopher, it would be a serious jolt to the position here
maintained. It will not be necessary to set down such confirmatory passages at
this point as they are to be used more directly in other connections, but specimens
may be found in Theophrastus De Sens. 10 and 17, especially the latter.1
There may be some question as to the admissibility of Theophrastus’
testimony. He was A.’s pupil and hence less likely than any other to have
independent material. In certain instances this is true, but in others it is
not. Theophrastus has interests which differ from those of A. and he is led to
explain and refute parts of E.’s system. The very lopsidedness of Theophrastus’
interests, which makes Veazie, p. 16, call him “without qualification the
worst’’ source of Empedoclean material, leads us to suppose his independent
reading of E. And further, since he was a favorite pupil, he probably had early
access to the manuscripts which A. possessed. There is no reason to suppose he
learned of E. only through editing A.’s lecture notes.
This certainly is sufficient to show that we do have
something positive from E. just as certainly as we have a quotation from Kant
in James. We now come to the more interesting and more difficult problem of
determining how A. made use of this quotation. Was he biased by his own system?
Do his conclusions follow from E.’s statements? The short mention on p. 404 b
is not sufficient to form an answer in general. Therefore I shall take up the
long critique of E. which begins at 409 b 23 and relate wherever possible the
other references to E. to this section.
409 b 23
A.’s aim is not to give E.’s philosophy, but by a critique
of
1. συμβαίνει yap τῷ ὁμοίῳ γίνεσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν.
all views hitherto expressed to prepare for the exposition
of his own. The problem is the definition of soul, i.e. what distinguishes the
animate from the inanimate, and does this explain their obvious differences.
Because A. is more interested in schools of thought than in individual men, we
may suppose that in the critique beginning 409 b 23 he has others besides E. in
mind. That like perceives like was held by Plato. In his account of sight it is
stated explicitly, 77m. 45 c,d. But perhaps Plato was more original than
consistent. For in the composition of the soul he placed the other, as well as
the same, Tim. 37 a, and quite possibly A. found here the solution he
offers later in De An. A. testifies that Heraclitus also held to this
principle, 405 a 27, 28. But it is apparent that A. is thinking chiefly of E.
For in 410 a 4-6 he quotes E. as implicitly contradicting himself. And in 410 b
5, the ‘‘at any rate’’-—~ye—seems to indicate that this consequence could not
be charged to others who held similar views of the soul, and therefore E. is
the chief object of criticism.
In the preceding quotation, which the evidence indicates as actually
coming from the pen of E. himself, we saw that like is known only by like. Then
it follows that the soul, since E. is classed as one who makes knowing and
perception the chief characteristics of the soul, must be what it perceives.
Stated thus we are reminded of those in modern times who make the soul, if they
still care to use the term, a succession of conscious states characterized only
by the objects of consciousness. But this was far from E.’s thought, nor is it
what A. finds in him. The soul is what it knows. It knows the four elements, as
indicated in 404 b 13-15, hence A. concludes that the soul is com- posed of
elements and each element is a soul, for each can know. Let us however keep one
distinction very clearly in mind. What A. quotes is one thing, how he
understands it is another. Our question, after we have determined that he
quoted correctly, is, does he understand correctly? At 409 b 24 we read,
‘‘Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements...’”’ which, I should think,
refers back to 404 b 11. From the quotation there given A. infers that E.
taught that the soul was composed of elements and that each element was a soul.
Zeller, p. 802, note 2, 5th German edition, considers the
statement, the soul is composed of elements, as A.’s inference and as inexact.
He says, ‘‘Empedokles hat nicht die Seele aus den Elementen zusammengesetzt,
sondern er hat das, was wir Seelentatigkeit nennen, aus der elementarischen
Zusammensetzung des K6rpers erklart, eine vom K6rper verschiedene Seele kennt seine
Physik nicht.”
Zeller is right in a sense. E. did not make the distinction between
the animate and the inanimate rest on an immaterial substantial soul. He did
not make such a soul the Ego within our bodies which knows. But he did
constitute the knowing ability out of elements; and it seems to me that Zeller
is trying to read E. in terms of some modern behavioristic modification of nineteenth
century materialism. If soul means that by which we sense and perceive, then E.
constitutes the soul of the elements. In this A. is assuredly correct even if
it is an inference.
The only objection to A.’s interpretation is that E. is not interested
to any great degree in what A. calls soul. E.’s main interest is physiology
rather than psychology. There is no hint in the fragments we have of any
attempt to distinguish the animate from the inanimate. If E. had attempted this
problem A. would certainly have recorded the fact. And for once the argument
from silence has some weight. Indeed instead of trying to accentuate the
difference between the animate and the inanimate, E. tacitly erases it. The
individual person is able to perceive earth because of the earth in him.
Anything then, for all that E. says, which has earth in its composition can
perceive earth. This is one of A.’s criticisms of E.; all things would then perceive.
If A. is to be blamed at all, it is not for deducing this consequence but for
thinking it is a thoroughgoing criticism, as E. admits it. To this effect, we
have one line quoted by Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII 286,1 and
this same line again together with nine preceding lines in Hippol. VII 29 p.
251; (the chapters immediately preceding contain a wealth of material on E.
which
1. πάντα yap ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἷσαν.
can hardly be thought to come from A.) and the same thought
is expressed again in Hippolytus, VI 12, p. 165."1
These passages would indicate that it is the inherent nature
of things to know and think. The difference between animate and inanimate
objects is one of degree only. Εἰ. has not been the only one so to hold.
Giordano Bruno was of this opinion. Similar sentiments, expressed as vaguely as
those of E. himself, are found in Spinoza.
“... in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others
for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the
mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many
simultaneous perceptions;’’ and, II XIV: ‘‘the human mind is capable of
receiving a great number of things and is so in proportion as its body is
capable of receiving a great number of impressions.’’ But the clearest and most
straightforward defense of this position is the Monadology of Leibniz. There is
then nothing in E.’s position which is too fantastic to find reputable
defenders. And in deciding what E. said and how correctly A. understood him, we
should pay as much if not more attention to the logic of the theories than to lengthy
philological investigations.
Contrary to Zeller, then, I would say that A. is essentially
just in attributing this inference, viz., the faculty of perception is composed
of material elements, to E. but apparently mistaken in supposing that E. would
not accept the consequence that all things think. We do not expect to find a
quotation from E. stating explicitly that the soul is composed of the elements,
for everything is composed of the elements and E. is not interested in exactly
the same problem as A. In drawing the inference A. is doing only what any
critic should and must do.
But A. also says that each element is a soul. Is he exact
here? A.-Ed. Chaignet, Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs, vol. I, p. 85,
thinks not. ‘‘Ainsi non seulement les éléments seraient animés, mais ils
seraient chacun une 4me. Cette opinion est si étrange, elle comporte si mal
avec les autres théories d’E. que
1. After quoting the lines found also in 404 b 11 ff., see
p. 11 above, Hippolytus continues, Πάντα yap, φησίν, ἐνόμιζε τὰ μέρη τοῦ πυρὸς
τά ὁρατὰ καὶ Ta ἀόρατα φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἷσαν.
Zeller, malgré l’autorité d’A., ne croit pas pouvoir la lui
attribuer, et je partage ce sentiment.”
To anticipate what will become more fully clear only towards
the end of this investigation, I would say that this is not only consistent
with what we know of E. but in reality is the key to the understanding of him.
Hicks, however, points out that the proposition under discussion
is A.’s inference and continues, note on 404 b. 12, p 221, “ΤΙ soul is
compounded of the elements and a part of each element enters into its
composition, then, in virtue of being such a part, anyone of the elements may
be said to be a soul.’’ This seems to have been a slip of the pen on Hicks’
part. If A. had concluded that each element must be a soul because it was a constituent
part of the whole soul, he would have committed the fallacy of the distributive
and collective use of each and all. But A. does not do this, as is seen in a
relevant passage, De. Gen. et Corr. 334 a 9-15, which Hicks quotes.
There, A.’s argument is, that if each element be a soul, the soul, or at least
that soul, will have the qualities of fire qua fire. But if the soul be a composite,
though it may no longer have the qualities of fire, it will have the qualities
of body qua body, since no combining of bodies can do away with length or
weight. Now Hicks really recognizes this, for he tacitly refers to the
above-mentioned fallacy and gives the correct explanation as taken from
Simplicius, but had Simplicius never said anything we would still have the explanation.
A. is primarily interested in soul, i.e. the distinction between the animate
and the inanimate. Previous thinkers considered soul either the principle of
motion or the principle of perception. E. is among the latter, hence, for E.
anything which knows isa soul. Therefore A. is quite justified in drawing this
inference. If we are to criticize him at all it will be either that he
considered E. interested in the distinction between the animate and the
inanimate or that he supposed his inferences could have changed E.’s mind. A.
is easily defended on this point. If E. wanted a complete system this
distinction would have had to be made. But as I have already shown, E.
considers this to dismiss it, and the second point rests on A.’s belief that his
system is final and therefore any inference which is inconsistent with his
principles points out a weakness in the philosophy of others. But to disagree
with A. on this is not the same as to charge him with misreading his
predecessors.
Having drawn these inferences, which we have shown to be legitimate,
A. proceeds to criticize E.’s fundamental psychological assumption, like is
known by like, by deducing impossible con- sequences. The first of these is
that, although composed of the same elements, nevertheless, flesh, bone, man
and God are very dissimilar. How does the soul perceive these compounds? That they
are real compounds and not mere haphazard aggregates, A. quotes E. himself, 410
a 4-6.
To this difficulty there is an obvious solution, viz. the
soul contains the principle of harmony or proportion. But this is a far-reaching
development of the original theory with which we cannot now deal. A. will
discuss it presently. The immediate point of interest is A.’s quotation. Did E.
posit a principle of proportion in things?
Simplicius gives the same quotation, Phys. 300, 191
and adds another line. If he had given only the three lines found in A. we
could not be sure that he was not copying from A. But the extra line indicates
an independent source, and it is impossible to think of Simplicius as dependent
on A. in view of the great number of quotations found on his pages. Moreover,
the thought of that last line makes our argument still more convincing because it
is really more clinching for A.’s argument than the three lines he himself
quotes. Similar ideas are expressed in Simplicius Phys. 32, 3; from
which Diels gets fragment 98.
We may also refer to Aetius V 22, 1. There it is said, ‘E. generates
flesh from an equal mixture of the four elements; nerves were mixed of fire and
earth by water as much again; (one part fire, one part earthand two parts
water?); fingernails are grown by animals from the nerves where they are
chilled in meeting the air. Bones are of two parts water and earth and four of
fire…”
1, ἡ δὲ Χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι τὰ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ
μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέτταρα 5’ Ἡφαίστοιο. τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα λευκά γένοντο ‘Apuovlns
κόλλῃσιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων αἰτίων καὶ μάλιστα τῆς
Φιλίας ἤτοι ‘Appovias’ ταῖς γὰρ ταύτης κόλλαις ἀρμόζεται.
A.’s objection then seems clear cut. Flesh and bone are what
they are because of a certain proportion, as well as because of certain
elements; and unless there be a principle of harmony in the soul, flesh and
bone qua flesh and bone will remain unrecognized though qua elements they may
be known. This recalls the discussion of 407 b 27-408 a 28. It isa criticism of
the harmony theory. Harmony has two meanings, first, a combination of bodies,
and second, the formula of the compound. In the first case, what compound can
be pointed out as intellect and what one is sensibility? A. of course supposes
that this is an unanswerable question. In the second case, if the mere formula of
the compound is a soul, there will be in the body many souls, since there are
many formulas, as of bone and of flesh. And the unity of the soul of a person
is destroyed.
It might serve as a relief and a stimulation to break the
continuity of the discussion at this point for the purpose of pointing out in
modern philosophy a problem somewhat similar to this one. Today, all
group-phenomena make quite popular subjects of investigation. But before we
deal with group-minds, we must first have dealt with mind itself. And this
presupposes some theory of life, or as A. would say, of soul. But right here,
in distinguishing between one living being and what is not one living being, we
find the same difficulty which troubled A. in the section under consideration.
It is generally agreed that man is a unitary living being. Now, instead of
saying that there are a group of harmonies or formulas of flesh and bone in
man’s body, and hence the unity of his personality is destroyed; we must face the
fact that there are a number of corpuscles in man’s blood, or a number of cells
in any animal. Are these, then, living beings? Several arguments can be adduced
for either view. Here then, is a delicate point which a comprehensive
philosophy must clear up. What is the difference, if any, between a hive of
bees and the group of living cells we call a plant? It may not be as insistent
as many other problems, but, nevertheless, it is a real problem.
We return, however, to the subject matter. By these reflections
on the widely accepted harmony theory, there are suggested to A.’s mind several
questions which are intended to puzzle E. They are: Is the soul such a formula?
Or is it something else superimposed on the compound? Does Love cause a chance mixture
or a determinate one, one with a definite formula? Is Love itself a formula or
not?
But A. does not attempt to answer them, or to intimate how
E. did or might have answered them. The only bit of information we can squeeze
out of this section is that E. held that each part of the body was a compound
of given proportions and is hence faced with the two general difficulties of the
harmony theory pointed out above. Yet E. might have succeeded in escaping these,
for A. himself practically confesses that this theory contains the guiding
thread to the final solution, 408 a 24-28.
The main objection, then, is that of 410 a 7 ff., viz., how
can one compound know another of a different formula? Of course, A. has in mind
his own solution of the problem in making the criticism. He introduces all this
history only to prepare the student for his own system. But regardless of that,
the criticism is so applicable that it is impossible for anyone to charge A.
with misrepresenting E. owing to a bias of his own. All that is necessary is
E.’s fundamental postulate that only by similars can similars be known. And
there is absolutely no evidence that E. ever modified this bald statement in
any manner similar to A. A. is leading the student to see that some
modification is necessary. And throughout the process he is entirely fair to E.
So far our statements have been very positive; but we are
not to suppose that no difficulties at all exist. For example, if we turn to De
Gen. et Corr. 323 b. 10, we read to the effect that Democritus “‘had a
peculiar doctrine all his own, for he says that both the agent and the
recipient are the same and similar. For dissimilar things cannot be affected by
each other.’”’ This apparently denies that E. held what is assumed to be his
fundamental doctrine. Beare, p. 98, speaking of the dictum, like is perceived
by like, says, ‘‘The principle itself is a deduction from the metaphysical
theory that ‘like affects like’ and seems intended merely to procure for the
latter its psychological application.”’ If this is so we have trouble in A.
H. H. Joachim in A. on Coming to Be and Passing Away
says in his notes on this passage, ‘‘It is strange that A. should attribute this
view to Democritus alone: for in discussing the theory of E. that ‘Like
perceives Like’ he treats it as an application to the relation of the
Percipient and Perceived of the general principle that ‘Agent and patient are
like’.”’ And he refers to De An. 409 b 23 ff.
We must also compare with this De An. 410 a 23-25.1
Here A. charges E. with inconsistency because he said both that only dissimilars
are capable of interaction and at the same time that like is perceived by like.
Various students differ as to the interpretation of this
seeming contradiction. Beare and Joachim seem to agree, but we can learn little
from Joachim, and Beare is not treating specifically of this text, though he really
ought to have noted it. But Clara E. Millard, On the Interpretation of
Empedocles, p. 41, differs from these two. ‘“‘It has been urged that
universal mixture is the only possible basis for interaction, since only like
can act on like. But while likeness is the general basis of attraction and of perception
with E. it is not a necessary condition of all forms of interaction. The
hardening power of fire is an operation exerted upon other elements.’’ And she
refers to De Gen. et Corr. 323 b 10 to show that Democritus alone held
that similarity was the basis of interaction. And further she criticizes Beare
for the statement quoted above.
Hicks in his note on 410 a 23 quotes 323 b 1 ff. and says,
‘‘This was the opinion of E. who made his four elements qualitatively different
and (unlike A.’s ἁπλᾶ σώματα) immutable. The opposite view, viz. that like acts
upon like, was held by the Atomists who recognized no qualitative distinctions
in matter. : E., like all the rest, is open to the charge of inconsistency.” (i.e.
all the rest except Democritus and Anaxagoras.)
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, translated by Magnus, p.
237, seems to agree with Beare by saying, ‘‘The perception which made the
deepest impression on the mind of E. was that of the mutual attraction of like
by like.’’ And Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 246, 7, says, ‘‘It
follows that we must carefully
1. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ γινώσκειν τῷ ὁδοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον.
distinguish between the Love of E. and that ‘attraction of
like for like’ to which he also attributed an important part in the formation
of the world. This latter attraction... depends simply, as we shall see, upon
the proper nature of each element...”’ Tannery also in Pour l’Histotre de la
Science Helléne, p. 308,9, speaks of the property immanent in matter which
causes the attraction of like by like.
We might reflect that the elements are immutable and therefore
cannot interact at all, thus approaching the Leibnizian monad and the theory of
pre-established harmony. But we should be on our guard. The pre-Socratics are
rich in suggestive material but they rarely work out their suggestions. Nor are
the suggestions of any one of them always self-consistent. Philosophy was in
its infancy then, and a good many points which seem obvious to us were very
puzzling at that date. Terms were ambiguous. Analyses had not yet cleared up
the difficulties. Certainly if E. denied the interaction of unlikes he did not
mean to deny that a lump of earth dropped into a pool of water would make a
splash. Nor did he exclude the composition of elements into flesh and bone, as
we have seen. He seems to mean only that one element cannot cause qualitative
change in another. But then how could one lump of earth cause qualitative
change in another lump?
Perhaps Beare, Gomperz, Burnet and Tannery are misleading us.
Maybe, as A. indicates, E. did not affirm that like acts on like. But about the
only use for such a priori suppositions is to drive us to the sources.
The only fragments which promise any help are, Diels 22, 33,
34, 37, 56, 62, 73, and 90. Some of these, like 33 and 34, are so short and
inconclusive that we hardly put any hope in them at all.
Fragment 22 comes from Simplicius Phys. p. 160, 28.
On the preceding three pages there have been abundant quotations from E. but
unfortunately the context does not help us. We are limited to fragment 22 and
in this fragment especially to lines four to six, where he says, ‘‘ All those
things which are most readily mixed are similar to one another.’’ Undoubtedly
the fragment seems to indicate the interaction of similars, but I think
everyone will agree that alone it is not conclusive. If we find more like it,
we may be forced to say that A. was wrong iη 323 b 10.
Fragments 33 and 34, one from Plutarch, the other from A., are,
on account of their brevity, still more inconclusive, though in the opposite
direction. But at least A. in the Meteor. 381 b 31 is consistent with
himself in De Gen. et Corr., for evidently unlikes interact in some
manner.
Fragment 37 is also from A., De Gen. et Corr. 333 a
35. Here A. is arguing that E.’s theory of a plurality of irreducible elements
renders impossible any explanation of growth, for the only sort of increase
would be addition. Now growth is not mere addition because growth displays a
regularity and plan for which mere addition cannot account. In the argument A.
uses what is now fragment 37. At first glance this seems to indicate the
interaction of likes in conflict with A.’s testimony a few pages before. But in
reality there is no conflict because addition is not the kind of interaction
referred to in the first passage.
Fragment 56 is found in Hephaestion, Ench. I p. 2. He
is discussing the quantity of syllables for purposes of scansion and quotes
lines of poetry as illustrations of his rules. Needless to say the context
gives us no help. The line he quotes from E. indicates that fire can produce a
qualitative change in salt. Yet without the original context it will always
remain a question how much emphasis can be placed on an isolated line and
whether we should refer to it at all. Besides, salt is not an element; it may
therefore possibly have fire in its composition. Hence it cannot be used to
support A. against Beare et al.
Fragment 62 from Simplicius Phys. 381, 29 is also
inconclusive. It merely indicates that fire had something to do in the original
generation of men and women. Fire was probably in the composition and the
result insisted upon was a motion of the com- pound, rather than a qualitative
change of an element.
But we may find something a little more definite in fragment
73, from Simplicius De Caelo 530, 5. He is discussing the functions of
love and hate and the whirl which A. claims cannot keep the earth in its place.
In doing so he quotes quite a number of lines from E. The lines under
discussion as quoted by Dr. Leonard are:
“As Kypris after watering Earth with Rain
Zealous to heat her, then did give Earth o’er
To speed of Fire that then she might grow firm.”
Now if this translation be correct, it would seem to
indicate that fire hardens earth; and if hard and soft are qualities, then one
element would be producing a qualitative change in another. But aside from the
various readings in the MSS. the sentence is incomplete and further we do not
know how much emphasis to place on “στον firm,’’ κρατῦναι.
The last fragment that seems to have anything to do with the
subject is 90, taken from Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. IV 1, 3, p. 663 a,
and repeated with an insignificant change in Macrobius, Sat. VII 5,17. In
Plutarch there is some difficulty as to whether nature takes the required
nourishment from similar or dissimilar things, but the best opinion reads ὁμοίων,
although Good- win in his translation puts ‘‘dissimilar.”” The main point as I see
it is that whether the nourishment comes from similars or from dissimilars,
when in the body, it goes to similars, as a sweet part of the body grasps after
sweet nutriment and soon. Macrobius bears out this interpretation fully. This
fragment, then, with its two contexts, illustrates without any ambiguity the
interaction of like upon like in the form of attraction. But it gives us no
right to generalize and say that interaction occurs only between likes, any
more than the preceding fragment can sustain the contrary generalization.
There is one other reference we might mention. In Theophrastus,
De Sens. 9, we read (Stratton’s translation), ‘‘Pleasure is excited by
things that are similar (to our organs) both in their constituent parts and in
the manner of their composition; pain by things opposed.’’ And in section 16:
‘‘Moreover his explanation of pleasure and pain is inconsistent, for he
ascribes pleasure to the action of similars, while pain he derives from
opposites.’’ Theophrastus calls him inconsistent because he assumes both pleasure
and pain to be sensations and therefore the result only of the interaction of
likes. E. can be acquitted of this charge only by assuming in opposition to
Theophrastus1 that E. did not regard pleasure and pain as sensations
on some basis such as the lack of organs corresponding to the five familiar
ones. Or in other words, we would have to suppose that pain, not requiring sense
organs, might be due to the interaction of unlikes. But neither has intellect
any organ and it is difficult to see why E. should have made such a radical
distinction between acquiring knowledge and suffering pain in view of their
similarity.
Now what can be derived from all this testimony? Skepticism merely?
The testimony in a law court, we must remember, is often quite as perplexing
and often more so; yet many seeming impossibilities have been untangled. One
conclusion at least we may adopt, viz. A. in De Gen. et Corr. was
correct as far as E. is concerned. We have found no evidence that he made similarity
the basis for all kinds of interaction. On the contrary, there is evidence that
likes act on one another and unlikes do the same. Beare was evidently mistaken
as were the others if they meant the same thing. Miss Millard is justified in
her criticism.
But we have seen that we cannot from the evidence conclude that
dissimilarity is the basis of all forms of interaction. Yet this brings us to
another difficulty. In De An. 410 a 23,2 A. assumes that E. made
dissimilarity the necessary basis for qualitative change, though not
necessarily of all interaction absolutely. We have found no other evidence that
like is unaffected by like, and some seemingly to the contrary. Then we must
decide either that A. is incorrect at this point or that Theophrastus is
incorrect and that Simplicius, fragment 22, and Plutarch and Macrobius,
fragment 90, may be interpreted consistently with the statement that ἀπαθὲς εἶναι
τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.
As somewhat of a consolation for the confusion of this
result it may be brought to one’s attention what must have become
1. De Sens. 16. αἰσθήσεις yao τινας ἢ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ποιοῦσι
τὴν ἡδονὴν mal τὴν λύπην,
2. cf. note on p. 21.
increasingly evident to anyone who has carefully followed
through this discussion and examined all the sources, viz., the real trouble is
a lack of definite analysis. Interaction, qualitative change, like and unlike
were used by E. in an almost popular sense. There is no careful definition and
hence the various brilliant suggestions—and after all E. had a brilliantly
inclusive world-view— when examined in detail often dissolve into hopeless inconsistencies.
It is for us to remember that the confusion of these difficulties was a
necessary step in the solution of a problem which first had to be clarified.
And modern attempts at sounding the depths of quality and quantity ought to
make us respect all the more the degree of success which attended the early
ones.
410 a 13
In advancing to the last section discussed, we omitted one short
paragraph criticizing E.’s theories on the basis of A.’s categories. The verb
‘‘is’’ and the term ‘‘being’’ have several meanings, corresponding to the
categories of substance, quantity, quality, action, passion and so on. These
categories are quite distinct from one another. They have no common element. “Et
par suite,’’ says Rodier, in loc. ‘‘on ne peut pas dire que l’Ame soit formée
des éléments communs 4a toutes les catégories, puisque le seul rapport qu’il y
ait entre elles c’est qu’elles sont toutes relatives ἃ une méme chose.’’ But if
its composition be confined to one category, it cannot know any other. And if
its composition include all the categories, the soul will be at once quantity,
quality and substance. Just why this is impossible, A. does not say and Hicks
makes a note that the argument is rather elliptical. Themistius 33:27—35, or,
61, 5 Sp. writes,1
“For the genera are our thoughts and not elements of things.
But even let us grant that the categories are elements. Is then the soul
composed of all
1. νοήματα yap ἦν ἡμέτερα τὰ γένη Kal οὐ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων.
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστωσαν Kal ai κατηγορίαι στοιχεῖα. πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἁπασῶν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή; ἀλλ᾽
οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πασῶν εἷναι στοιχεῖα, οἷον ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ
πάσχειν καὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ μόνης τῆς οὐσὶας ; πῶς οὖν γνωριεῖ τὸ ποσόν; ἢ
φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους εἷναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν
συνεστάναι; ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ οὐσία, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων ποσὸν γίγνεται
καὶ οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ πρός τι πρός τι γίνεται καί οὐκ οὐσία.
of them? But it is agreed that there are no elements common
to all of them, for instance, man, action, passion and so forth. But is it
composed of substance alone? How then will it know quantity? Or do they say
that there are elements and principles peculiar to each genus out of which the
soul is composed? The soul, however, is substance; but out of the elements of
quantity, quantity arises and not substance, and out of relation, relation
arises and not substance.”
Sophonius also has attempted to clarify the argument, 33, 18-25,
but with little success.
The first part of the argument is clear enough however. E. has
composed the soul out of elements, and these are, in A.’s philosophy,
substances. Then if like is known only by like, the knowledge of quantity,
relation and the others is inexplicable. Passages like these lead us to charge
A. with bias, for E. had nothing approximating A.’s categories. Why then should
he be criticized on such a basis? But A. would have called such a question
beside the point. If the categories are true philosophy, as A. believed, then
E.’s ignorance is no excuse. A. is not complaining that E. is inconsistent with
his own principles exactly, though he does that at times too, but that he is
inconsistent with truth. He is asking puzzling questions of an old theory in
the light of recent developments. These questions are not so much for
discrediting E. but rather, as is more consistent with A.’s temperament, for
showing how an examination of E. leads to A.’s own psychology. You will recall
how this attitude is explained in Eth. Nic. 1096 a 11 ff. He hesitates
to proceed because it will entail an attack on his friends. ‘‘It would seem
best however, and obligatory to sacrifice, for the salvation of truth, even our
dearest things, especially since we are philosophers. For, although both are
dear to us, it is a sacred duty to prefer truth.” So, sections such as this may
at first seem unsportsmanlike. but they are easily noted, entirely in harmony
with A.’s avowed purpose, and can in no conceivable way deceive anyone with regard
to preceding history.
410 a 27
At this point a new departure is made which becomes the final
criticism of E. in the first book. The first objection is that bones, sinews
and hair, because they are composed of earth alone, can perceive nothing at
all, and hence cannot perceive their like, although, according to E. they
should be able to. This promises to be interesting, for just above A. had
quoted E. to the effect that bones are composed of part earth, part water and part
fire. Following this he uses bone as well as man as an illustration of a
compound which a simple element could not know. In Aetius V. 22, 1, the sinews,
instead of being composed of earth alone, have also fire and water in them. So
we seem to have found A. clearly in error, whether judged by others or compared
with himself. The second point in these two and a half lines is the apparent
implication that E. claimed bones, sinews and hair did not perceive, καίτοι
προσῆκεν had he been consistent.
In both these points the mistake is our own and not A.’s, although
we may feel that A. should shoulder the blame. Just how far a man can adopt
A.’s position that all other systems must be judged on the basis of his own,
just how far one can do this and not arouse antagonism, depends partly on the
temperament of the reader and partly on the frankness of the presentation. So
far this paper has been defending A.’s attitude, though it became difficult in
the case of the categories. Here, however, we think A. might have been more
explicit. There is no hint given that it is A. and not E. who said bones are
composed of earth alone, though with reference to the statement that earth perceives
nothing we have been sufficiently informed that E. held the contrary. In Meteor.
389 a 12, A. states that in bones, sinews and hair, earth preponderates.
Themistius also bears witness,1 34: 7-11, or, 61, 26 Sp., ‘‘E.
astonishes us in saying, by earth we perceive earth, not seeing that even in
the parts of living beings, all those things which are made of earth alone, as bones,
nerves and hair, are least of all capable of sensing, and yet they should at
least be able to perceive their similars.”’
In De An. 410 a 27 ff. and 435 a 11 ff. we find the
statement that objects composed of earth alone are incapable of perception. Thus
A. in the section under discussion has not made any technical
1 θαυμαστὸς 5é’E., ““γαίη μὲν yap γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν᾽᾽ λέγων, οὐχ
ὁρῶν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ζώου μορίοις ὅσα γῆς ἁπλῶς, οἷον ὀστᾷ νεῦρα τρίχες,
ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀναισθητότατα. καίτοι προσῆκεν τῶν γοῦν ὁμοίων ταῦτα αἰσθάνεσθαι.
mistake; but it requires enough patience to refer to his other
theories to appreciate this. If in this and other cases he had inserted, as
occasionally he does, the phrase, ‘‘as we have shown elsewhere’, he might have
been saved a great deal of criticism. The explanation is, however, that A. did
not write for those who so lacked patience that they could not acquire a complete
system of philosophy.
A. goes on to argue that God will be very ignorant because, while
in him is no strife, things could not have become had not strife entered into
their composition. Hence God is excluded from such knowledge. In thus arguing,
A. makes one statement of minor importance which, nevertheless, requires
notice. The element, strife, ‘‘God will not know; while mortal things, being composed
of all the elements, will know them all.’’ The question centers in the words,
‘‘mortal things being composed of all the elements.’’ Is A. pointing out an
inconsistency in E.’s theory, i.e. did E. say that mortal things were composed
of all the elements? And if he did, did he mean merely that all things collectively
are composed of the elements or that each individual object contained a share
of each element? Or is this again an illustration of A.’s criticizing E. on the
basis of A.’s own theories?
Torstrik has concluded that the words in question are
spurious. Rodier in his notes says, ‘‘La raison invoquée par Torstrik est qu’E.
n’a pas dit que tous les éléments fussent contenus dans chacun des composés.
Mais il convient de remarquer 1. que si aucun fragment d’E. ne prouve qu'il ait
admis l’opinion en question aucun, non plus, ne prouve le contraire... 2. que le
mot θνητά dans le texte d’A. ne désigne, sans doute, que les étres vivants...
et qu'il est vraisemblable qu’E. a admis, pour ceux-ci du moins, que tous les
éléments entrent dans leur composition.’”’
Hicks, referring to Themistius 62, 6-11 Sp., voices some discouragement
and satisfies himself with the general clarity of the argument. And that is
clear enough. Hicks is probably right so far as an irrefutable conclusion is
concerned. Anything else must contain considerable guesswork. But there are
certain considerations which may justify one guess rather than another. Rodier
said that it is impossible to show whether E. admitted or denied that every
living being contained a share of each of the elements. And here I am assuming
that θνητά does mean “living beings” rather than ‘‘things’’. For A. is very
careful of his terminology and Themistius explicitly bears out this interpretation
in the above-mentioned quotation which reads as follows:1
“It also follows for E. that God is most unintelligent. For
his Sphere-God’ coming forward as he does through the commingling efforts of
love, and having no share of hate, will be the only one who will not know hate.
But all living and mortal beings by participation in all things will know all
of them. For mortal beings are composed of all the elements.’’
Now throughout this study I have had in mind, perhaps more constantly
than some other writers, a rather definite conception of E.’s system. To a
great extent neglectful of detail, he aimed to attain a comprehensive
world-view. He tried to describe a continuous development from the simple to
the complex, from elements and contact to sensation and thought. And in Theophrastus
De Sens. 11, we find him attempting, on the same basis, a theory of
temperament. This development from physics to psychology is continuous, it has
no break. Psychic phenomena are immanent in the physical, and the physical
explains the psychic. ‘All things have fixed intent and share of thought.” This
means, according to Dr. Leonard, that all things are conscious living beings.
We immediately think of Leibniz or, with limitations, of G. T. Fechner, as
analogies. Hence E. would admit that all things have soul—much to A.’s disgust.
Now if these suppositions be correct, then each thing or each living being, for
they are the same, has not a share of every element, for the proportions given
of the composition of some things omit some of the elements. Bone, for example,
has no air in it. Then if the words in question do not represent E. they must
be A.’s own opinion. And this seems to be consistent with A.’s thought in
general. In De An. 435 a 11 ff. it is stated that the bodies of animals
are compounds. For reasons given in De Gen. et Corr. II 8, they must
therefore contain all the elements. The statement in De An. 435 b 1,
that plants are made of earth cannot be taken absolutely for the same reasons.
1 συμβαίνει δὲ ’E. καὶ ἀφρονέστατον ποιεῖν τὸν θεόν᾽ ὁ μὲν
yap σφαῖρος αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς παριὼν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν συγκρίσεως, ἀμέτοχος δὲ
Hy τοῦ νείκους, ob γνωριεῖ μόνος τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ ζῶα καὶ θνητὰ πάντα τῷ πάντων
μετέχειν ἅπαντα γνωριεῖ" ἐκ πάντων γὰρ τὰ θνητὰ τῶν στοιχείων.
The most probable conclusion, then, is that the words are genuine,
Torstrik to the contrary notwithstanding, and represent A.’s own opinion. If
one hesitate to accept this conclusion, he might find a slight inducement to
become more favorably inclined by considering that θνητά might be restricted to
the meaning of ¢a, which certainly have all four elements, as well as being the
equivalent of ἔμψυχα which, since they include plants, include also the very
slight difficulty of De An. 435 b 1.
The closing criticism is perhaps the most searching of all. What
gives unity to anything in general and to the soul in particular? For the soul
must be one. A few pages later he resumes the subject in objection apparently
to Plato’s trichotomy. But if the soul be naturally divided in anyway
whatsoever, and yet possess sufficient unity not to be called a mere aggregate,
there must be a higher unifying principle. And this principle should have been
called soul at the outset. This may call to our minds the sharp division Kant
made between sensation and thought, and how his successors erased that
distinction and restored unity. A. wants unity also, even though, near the end
of the De Az., he makes enter from without a something very different and seemingly
unconnected or ununified with the soul itself. But whether A. is violating his
own principles or not, we cannot here enquire. E. is violating them. From lack
of careful analyses he failed to see the need of a formal cause. His elements
are merely the substratum. Why they should adhere to one another, he does not say.
At least A. thinks he does not.
This problem is a somewhat intricate one; it involves
whatever E. said about Love and Hate; so, since it receives such a short notice
here, and since it will be resumed in book two, we shall defer its discussion
until then.
It is doubtful whether the paragraph immediately following
is aimed at E. or not. It is stated to be a criticism ‘‘alike of those who
derive the soul from the elements on the ground of perception and knowledge,
and of those who define it as the thing most capable of causing motion.’’ This
obviously includes not only the greater figures of E., Anaxagoras and
Democritus, but also a host of minor philosophers, some of whom perhaps have
left no record behind them. The part of this criticism which would apply to E. if
any, is the statement that ‘‘plants are found to live without any share in
locomotion or sensation and many animals to be destitute of thought.’’ But if
the account of E. given above is in any degree correct, we must confess that
A.’s objection, from E.’s point of view at any rate, is a glaring petitio
principii. The brevity of the section however, shows that A. did not mean it to
be a final and complete criticism. It is not addressed to E. in particular and
might therefore very well be directed against those who admit that plants have
no sensation and yet assert that the soul is derived from the elements.
De Anima Books Two and Three.
The first mention of E. in book two is in reference to the
same subject which furnished A. with his last criticism of E. in book one. Some
inconsistencies in E.’s account of botanical phenomena lead him again to raise
the question of unity.
E. is mistaken, A. claims, when he says the roots of plants
grow downwards because they contain earth, and the stem and leaves grow upwards
because they contain fire. Aetius V 26, 4 says that plants grow out of the
earth by reason of the heat in the earth. This at first may seem slightly
inconsistent with A.’s statement, but obviously before the plant has pushed its
head above the ground, the fire, which even according to Aetius is later in the
fruit, is both in the embryonic plant and in the earth also. The fire then
would want to disengage itself from the ground and arise toward the heavens.
Theophrastus knows nothing which would vitiate A.’s statement, for in De Caus. Plant.
1 12, 5 he also locates earth in the roots of plants and fire in their leaves.
The reasons A. objects to this account of affairs are two,
viz. the meaning of up and down, and the lack of a principle of unity. E. saw
that roots do grow downward. Since, then, earth is be- neath, and since like
attracts like, he can explain growth by assuming that there is earth in the
roots of plants. But if this assumption were true, it would lead to
difficulties. For there is a functional analogy between the heads of animals,
which are upper- most in the universal sense of up, i.e. nearer the sky, and
the roots of plants, which from the standpoint of the universe grow down. The
functional analogy is that both are the organs by which nourishment enters the
body. Now, for a living being, ‘‘up’’ means “‘toward the head,”’ hence in the
case of a plant, up means down.
In the Phys. 208 b 14 ff. A. says, “‘Such things, up
and down, right and left, do not exist in relation to us only. For with respect
to us, they are not always the same since they come into being according to the
position in which we place ourselves. Therefore the same thing is often right
and left, above and below, before and behind. In nature however, each
(direction) is determined apart (from us). For up is not just any direction,
but that direction in which fire and light things are borne. Similarly, down is
not just any way, but the direction of those things which are earthy and
possess weight.”
More to the point is De Incessu An. 705 a 29-b 1.
‘‘Not only do animals have a top and bottom, but plants as well. This is determined
by function and not by position merely in respect to earth and sky. For whence
nourishment enters each being and the direction of growth is up. And the end
where this stops is down. For the first is the beginning and the other is the
end. But the top is the beginning. Although in the case of plants, it might
seem that the bottom should more properly be the beginning; but up and down do
not have similar positions in plants and animals. With respect to the universe
the cases are not similar; but with respect to function they are the same. For
in the case of plants, the roots are the top; for this is where nourishment
enters plants and by means of these (roots) they receive it just as animals do
with their mouths.”
And there are a number of other references of similar
nature.
A., then, would seem to assume that if the head of a plant
is composed of earth chiefly, then the head of an animal must also be so
composed. Therefore, E.’s assumption to explain the growth of plants fails
utterly in explaining the growth of animals.
We can hardly be fair and at the same time criticize A. for noting
the functional similarity between the heads of animals and the roots of plants.
Today the botanists hesitate to say that a plant receives nourishment through
its roots. What happens is that water (and salts) is received through the roots
and carbon dioxide through the leaves. The chemical process, 5H20+6 CO2—C6H10O5+6O2,
represents the plant’s manufacturing nourishment out of other materials, and is
held to be essentially different from the chemical process in animals. But A.
did not recognize that chlorophyll and chloroplasts characterize plants only
and thus distinguish them from animals, nor was he familiar with enzymes. Hence
it is hardly right to criticize him on this basis. Let us assume that plants
eat through their roots. Still it seems strange to us, and it must have seemed
strange to the Greeks, to say either that the roots of plants are their heads
or, if the flower is the head, that the head is on the bottom. Today we not
only speak of a head of cabbage or of lettuce, but also of the heads of wheat
and rye. We say corn has ears, and surely ears are on the head. Chrysanthemums
have heads, in technical botanical language, as do daisies also and sunflowers
and dandelions and composite in general.
The Greeks used the word κεφαλή in the same way. Theophrastus,
Hist. Plant. I vi 9, uses it in a section where he is trying seriously,
and not absurdly either, to make out analogies between the parts of plants and
the parts of animals. Thus he speaks of muscle, veins, flesh and marrow. In the
same work, IV xii 3, he uses the same word twice and it does not mean roots. In
VII ii 2, with respect to beets and onions, he uses the word ‘‘head”’ to denote
something on or under the ground. Again in IX viii 2, he uses κεφαλή with
respect to the flower of a poppy.
Finally, it does not seem clear why organs functionally
similar should be likewise similar in respect to their composition. We are so
accustomed to things vastly different structurally performing the same
function. For example, a lady’s wrist-watch has a mechanism quite unlike an
electric telechron and this in turn has nothing in common with a water clock or
sundial. Yet all of these keep time. Nevertheless, A.’s assumption is
absolutely necessary to his criticism of E.
A.’s second criticism of E. in this section, that concerning
the principle of unity, is a more serious one. To quote De An. 416 a 6, ‘‘
Besides, what is there that holds together the fire and the earth, tending, as
they do, in opposite directions? For they will be rent asunder unless there is
something to prevent it: while if there is, it is this which is the soul and
the cause of growth and nourishment.”’ Hicks in his notes on these lines says,
‘‘Whether E. really thus ignored this unifying function of soul is extremely doubtful.’’
But no references are given.
This question, however, cannot be restricted to plants;
animals also must have a unifying principle, and, to use a distinction which E.
discarded, inanimate objects as well. The question really is, why is anything
an object? This is the problem, the discussion of which we omitted at 410 b 10,
where it was applied specifically to the soul. The ordinary conception of what
constitutes an object for E., derived from A. and understood in the terms of
last century’s physics, is that the elements are like so many motionless
billiard balls to be set in motion only by the love of the game. Love and
Strife, then, were the forces which cause things to move. Burnet and Gomperz
modify this conception. For them, the elements themselves have a minimum of
power by which they can attract or repel each other. Yet if this be correct, we
must guard against the same mistake. We are always in danger of interpreting E.
in terms of the physics we know best. Moreover the modification referred to,
the mutual attraction among like elements, however interpreted, does not
explain the unity of the plant or other object composed of several
constituents.
In the first book, A. complains that E., by making the
elements the substratum, fails to see the need of a formal or final cause. He
has given no explanation of how a combination of elements can make a soul. It
would seem therefore that aside from calling every element a soul, and tacitly
inferring that a collection of souls must result in a soul—and this is exactly
where the real difficulty lies—E. has no answer. Hence the unity of the individual
living being is left unexplained. Not only is it unexplained, but E. has shut
the door to any possible explanation, A. thinks. For a unifying principle would
be superior to that which it unifies; whereas E. makes the elements themselves
prior to all else.
Beare, p. 253, puts still more emphasis on this question.
Taking it for granted that a philosopher should discuss unity, he insists that
even one who limits his investigations to psychology is under obligation to
clarify this problem.
The easier question involved is that of 416 a 6. ‘‘What is
it that holds together the fire and the earth (of plants) tending, as they do,
in opposite directions?’’ The only promising answer is Love. Love and Hate, so
long as neither is in total possession of the world, alone can serve this
purpose. Diels, fragment 20, may be quoted in support of this. I shall again
use the translation of Dr. Leonard whose poetry so well conserves for
English-speaking people both the literary assets of E.’s style and its
philosophic deficiencies:
“The world-wide warfare of the eternal Two
Well in the mass of human limbs is shown:
Whiles into one they do through Love unite,
And mortal members take the body’s form,
And life doth flower at the prime; and whiles,
Again dissevered by the Hates perverse,
They wander far and wide and up and down
The surf-swept beaches and drear shores of life.
So too with thicket, tree, and gleaming fish
Housed in the crystal walls of waters wide;
And so with beasts that couch on mountain slopes,
And water-fowls that skim the long blue sea.”’
Among the more definite hints further bearing out this view are
fragments 21, 22, 26 and 35. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is that E.
did not write on this problem with a view to minor and scientific detail, as A.
so frequently does. We said before, and this bears it out, that E. contented
himself with a general world-view, with indicating how special problems might be
solved, but without solving them. If the fragments mentioned above are sufficient
to show that, had E. been asked, he would have designated Love as the unifying
principle, we might at first be inclined to say that A. was at least a little
hasty in making this criticism.
That this view of Love as the unifying principle would require
us to identify Love and soul is by no means an insuperable objection, at least
from A.’s point of view. True, Beare, p. 253, objects: ‘‘for to reason from his
metaphysical conceptions of Φιλία and Νεῖκος to psychological analogues of
synthesis and analysis would be merely fanciful.’”’ It is true that E. gives no
account of a sensus communis, above asserting that the blood about the heart is
the center of thought; and no one wishes to minimize the difficulty of relating
the love in each object with the Love in the universe, the individual soul with
the world-soul.
But philosophers are adepts at finding methods of
intellectual gymnastics for doing many astonishing things. Just how Love unifies,
E. never said. But this at least seems certain, Love unifies, and, according to
A., 416 a 8, that which unifies is the soul.
This is probably exactly what A. wanted us to say. If we answer
his question here, we enforce his objection of 410 a ff. If Love is the soul,
the super-soul, what becomes of all the element- souls, and the definition of
soul as that which knows? If Love is not the super-soul but merely the unifier
and an element-soul in so far as it knows its like, what becomes of the unity
of the knowing principle in man?
If we refer back to the discussion in book one and compare
it with what has just been said, we shall see that the difficulty is a very
real one. And it lies either in A.’s being incapable of recognizing the actual
identity of two apparently different things, or E.’s identifying and confusing
two things which are actually very different. For E., Love, like glue, can make
the elements stick together, and it is in this sense that it is the harmony
required in book one. For Love is not a formula nor an incorporeal force. The
expressions denoting its corporeality are not merely poetic. It is true that E.
speaks of the four roots of things and thus indicates that Love and Hate are
something different. They are different, they cause a special kind of motion,
they glue things together and tear them apart again, and this is what none of
the four elements can do. Nevertheless, Love is corporeal. E. has not yet
achieved the conception of spirit. But, and here is the main point, in addition
to being corporeal glue, Love is also mental glue, a sensus communis manifested
best of all in the blood. Love is the unifier of mental life.
A. could never accept and seemingly never appreciate this identification
or confusion. Having once for all separated the element from a something which
knows, his criticisms are not only keen but just. And as we try more profoundly
to understand E.’s position, A.’s criticisms appear more and more just on account
of E.’s very important omissions.
De An. 418 b 18-26 contains another of A.’s
scientific mistakes; for him, light was a qualitative change in transparent
material; for E. it was the emanation of particles from the sun, or other luminous
body. Sight consisted in the eyes’ receiving emanations from the body seen.
Plato, Meno 76 c, gives the theory briefly. It is interesting to note at
this point the widely different estimates placed on Plato with reference to his
historical ability. Dr. Veazie says, p. 3, ‘Plato alone took this position
seriously and with some appreciation”’ (the problem of sight, the theory of emanations
and the structure of the eye) ‘‘and it is from his controversy that most is to
be learned.’’ On the other hand, Beare, pp. 42, 43, writes, ‘‘For empirical
psychology Plato had only the regard of a stepmother. He was averse to physical
studies... Accordingly we find comparatively little in Plato’s dialogues
bearing on this subject’’ (vision), “‘and that little not always up to the
standard of what was to be expected from a writer of his transcendent genius.”’
A discussion of E.’s theory of vision, which is not necessary here, is
excellently worked out by Beare, pp. 14-23, in spite of his estimate of Plato.
Aside then from other passages in A., and aside from the general
theory of vision which is quite consistent with the passage we are studying, I
have found no statement either to corroborate or to disprove the statement that
light travels at a given speed. What little evidence there is, then, is in
favor of A.’s being correct.
427 a 21 ff
We here come to a short enough mention of E. but one which leads
us into something comparable to Plato’s ‘‘ocean of arguments.’’ For here
especially is a section in which A. has risen above the limitations of
contemporary science and attacks eternal problems. Here is a section which no
philosopher, no matter how perfect physiological psychology become, dare
ignore. The subject matter is the same yesterday, today and forever.
The question concerns the relation between intelligence and perception,
τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, which, A. states, were identified by E. We have
already hinted in a previous discussion the extent and interest of a history of
this attempt. Professor Singer of this university in his seminar takes great pains
systematically to pass from life to sensation, and from sensation to mind,
distinguishing each from the other, yet using the lower term in the definition
of the higher. Thus we see the history of the problem extends from E. to A.,
from A. to Aquinas, to Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, and to the present moment.
In the course of this development, the terms sensation, perception,
intelligence, thought mind and consciousness, have meant various things. It is
reasonable to suppose, however, that φρονεῖν and especially αἰσθάνεσθαι, meant
for E. something fairly similar to what it means today, not for a philosopher,
but for the ordinary unphilosophical business man. Dr. Veazie in his second
chapter, a study of the use of the former word in the fragments, considers that
it means ‘‘something far more elemental and general than our word ‘thought’.’’
This may be a trifle too vague. I should prefer to call it just slightly more
elemental than the idea of the general public. Now, E. did make some distinction
between intelligence and perception, but not such a great deal. Several writers
emphasize fragment 17, line 21, which may freely be translated, ‘‘Use your
head, don’t sit there with eyes like saucers.”1
A., however, says E. identifies the two and quotes what are fragments
1062 and 1083 as evidence. There is practically no way of
checking up on these two quotations by independent sources. But we have shown
that A. is very exact in quoting and he quoted these two a second time in Meta.
1009 b 2-20. This passage in the Meta. more pointedly gives his criticism. The
only problem then, is to see if A. understood these quotations correctly.
W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, in his note on
1009 b 11-33, says: “‘Bonitz argues that A. attaches too much importance to isolated
phrases of the early thinkers. Certainly neither E. nor Democritus nor
Parmenides nor Anaxagoras can fairly be charged with consistent sensationalism.
E.’s denial of the reality of generation and destruction... are sufficient
evidence of a rationalistic strain in them;... They did not deliberately identify
thought with sensation, but in their time the two things
1 τὴν σὺ vows δέρκευ, μηδ᾽ ὄμμασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς.
2 πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.
3 ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται.
had not been clearly distinguished, so that it was
impossible for them to be definitely either rationalists or sensationalists. ’’
Zeller, in the edition previously mentioned, p. 804, argues:
“Wenn jedoch A. hieraus schliesst, er habe die Wahrheit in der Sinneserscheinung
suchen miissen (1009 b 12), so ist diess eine Folgerung, die unser Philosoph
selbst ohne Zweifel abgelehnt hatte. Denn wenn er auch das Denken dem
sinnlichen Erkennen nicht so schroff und grundsatzlich entgegenstellt, wie
Parmenides, verlangt er doch immerhin, dass man sich bei Fragen, welche iiber
den Bereich des Wahrnembaren hinausgehen, nicht auf die Sinne verlasse, sondern
auf den Verstand.’’ And he quotes the line from fragment 17.
The note of Hicks on this passage is not so outspoken in
differing from A., though obviously Hicks thinks that A. said more than he had
a right to say. I think his explanation of παρεόν, based on the Greek
commentators, is very well taken. But it does not change the force of A.’s
argument in the least, since a different object’s being present, and a
different bodily state’s being present are, in this case, one and the same
thing.
On the other side, we have, first of all, Theophrastus, who
might be expected to agree with A. Yet I think it wrong to assume that he was
prejudiced. Either his testimony is worth something, or, he copied from A.
without ever knowing the sources. It is hard to suppose that this latter is the
case, and still harder to suppose that had he found a mistake in A. he would
have concealed it. At any rate, in De Sens. 10, we read: ‘‘He talks in a
similar way about knowledge and ignorance. Knowledge exists by means of similars,
ignorance by dissimilars, since knowledge is either the same as or very similar
to sensation. . . . Therefore, we know chiefly by means of the blood, for here
the elements are better mixed than in other parts of our bodies.’’ And quotes fragment
107.
Beare, p. 253, also takes this view, for he says: “‘he did
not really distinguish sense from reason or intelligence.”
A more explicit statement, harmonizing with the last two
views expressed, is made by Miss Millard, pp. 80, 81. “‘We perceive objects by
the like element in us, we think with the blood, and the blood is but an
effective mingling of the elements. There is clearly no suggestion here of
differentiation of the two faculties. They are on precisely the same basis. Yet
they are not identified in a fully conscious way, limiting our knowledge to
that gained through sense perception. The problem of their relation simply is
not raised... E. is just on the verge of becoming fully aware of the
psychological distinction between the two.’’ But in the note at the foot of the
page, she says, strangely enough, that A. in both De An. 427 a 26 and Meta.
1009 b 12 15 clearly misleading. Just whom these statements mislead is not so
obvious.
It seems to me that A. is doing precisely what an accurate
and self-respecting critic must do. He goes on to say, “‘all of them conceive
thought to be corporeal like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as
perceive, like by like, as explained at the outset of the discussion.’’
Certainly this is consistent with all we know about E. E. did not go on to draw
the consequences of this theory. A. does. It leaves no room for an explanation
of error. And so he further distinguishes thinking from sensation with respect
to truth and error, animals and men, and then passes on to imagination.
The final mention of E. in the De An. is at 430 a 28.
It is used merely as a line of poetry intended to illustrate A.’s own position and
forms the basis of no criticism or argument. It seems to be totally irrelevant.
So E. is ‘‘aufgehoben” as Hegel would say, or, to use a
language different in several particulars from that of Hegel, ‘‘the old order changeth,
yielding place to the new.”
ANAXAGORAS
When we come to An. we find the situation greatly altered in
several respects. In the first place there are only twenty-two fragments as
against E.’s one hundred and eleven, not including the purifications which
would raise his total to more than one hundred and fifty. Of the twenty-two
quotations from An. the first nine and the eleventh to the seventeenth come
from Simplicius. Thus the type of information, both in respect to extent and
source, is far more limited than was the case with E.
Although Theophrastus, De Sens. 27, says An. treated
of each sense, in the material we have the psychological terminology is conspicuous
mostly by its absence. ‘‘Soul’”’ occurs but twice, Fr. 4 and 12. Not in the
fragments themselves but in the immediate contexts, ‘‘intellectual’’ occurs
once, ‘“‘sensible’’ once, “‘sensation”’ once, and “‘sight”’ once, Fr. 14 and
20. Though of the special senses we have information in Theophrastus, ‘‘mind”’ which
forms such a large part of every discussion on An. occurs in the context but
three times and in the quotations twelve times, seven of which are in Fr.12.
The others are found in 7, 11, 13 and 14.
One might now well suppose, before studying any further, that
we can know far less about An. than about E. Yet the work of men like Breier,
Heinze and Arleth, meagre as their results may be, precarious as their
reasoning sometimes is, prevents us from falling into the lazy state of
skepticism.
The quotation which is most important, for two reasons, very
fortunately, viz. its length and its content, is Fr. 12. Since by reason of its
content it will be necessary often to refer to it, it seems wise and convenient
right at the outset to quote it in full:
“Other things have a part of everything else, but mind is
unlimited, independent and is mixed with nothing, but is alone all by itself.
For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would
partake of altogether everything, if it were mixed with one; for in each thing
a part of everything is present, just as I said previously; and the things
mixed with it would hinder it from ruling as it does while alone by itself. For
it is the finest and purest of all things, and knows everything perfectly, and
is most powerful. And whatever has soul to a greater or less degree, mind rules
them all. Mind also rules the revolution of the universe, consequently it
started the revolution. And first it started a very little to revolve, and it
is causing more to revolve, and will affect still more. And mind knows both all
that is mixed and that which is separated and differentiated. Moreover, mind
orders everything which is to be, everything which was, whatever does not now
exist, and everything that is. (It also rules) this revolution by which the
stars and sun and moon, the air and ether, all of which are separate, revolve.
It separates the thick from the thin, the warm from the cold, the light from
the dark and the moist from the dry. But there are many parts of all things.
For strictly speaking there is nothing separated or differentiated from
anything else, except mind. But all mind, whether great or small, is similar.
Nothing else however is similar to anything, but whatever it has the most of,
these most evident constituents are and were the unitary object.”
The first mention of An. in De An. is at 404a 25.
This is near the beginning of the treatise and A. has just said that the two characteristics
of soul, viz. motion and sensation, serve in general to classify the
predecessors. Democritus and the Pythagoreans are clearly in the first class.
In the other section of this study, we have seen that E. was an excellent
example of the second class. But where does An. belong? A. is puzzled.
Evidently, even with the full information antiquity could give and only a century
after An. wrote, there were some questions which could not be answered. He
seemed to make the soul the moving principle, but this proposition is based on
the supposition that the mind of An.’s philosophy and the soul A. is discussing
are to be identified. Now there were passages which A. had before him, and
there are passages which we have, that seem to make this identification. For
example, in Plato, Cratylus 400 a, mind and soul are made identical. But
the subject-matter of the passage, the etymology of the word soul, will permit
us to consider this only an approximate identification if other evidence points
to a divergent conclusion.
There has been considerable written to clear up this
difficulty, but, as it seems to me, with little success. Fr. Breier, Die
Philosophte des Anaxagoras nach Aristotles, p. 56, points out that A. could
not settle this point nor could his successors. Yet on pp. 73, 74, he argues
for an identification. Max Heinze, Uber den Notts des Anaxagoras pp. 41
ff., notes the inconclusive nature of the evidence and rather pointedly adds
that there are a good many questions left unanswered by Plato and A. in their own
systems.
But these men always assume that A. is generally
trustworthy: the very point we are trying to determine. Beare also, p. 208, makes
the same assumption and interprets A. as identifying mind and soul, explaining,
p. 256, note 2, that this was probably an easy way to descend from teleology to
the mechanism which caused Socrates to complain against him. Though this
explanation is quite without basis, Beare may not be altogether mistaken in so categorically
understanding A. For as Hicks in his notes says, the next mention of An., 405 a
13, practically grants the identification. Yet there is always the note of
uncertainty. And A. seems plainly to put the uncertainty into the very words of
An., Av. δ᾽ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν.
Neither does the conjecture of M. Léon Robin, La Pensée Grecque
p. 152, that souls are emanations from mind have evidence for it in the
sources, but it testifies to the need, as does Beare’s suggestion as well, of
some link between mind and soul. Otherwise An. makes too little sense. But A.
said all this long ago; the judgments of the scholars then confirm A.; and the present
passage, 405 a 15, 16, seems to infer that soul must be understood as in some
way an individualized form of mind, and the phrase in Fr. 12, ‘‘but all mind,
whether great or small, is similar,’’ may be taken to indicate some particular
manifestations of mind.
The evidence by which we can test the accuracy of A.’s account
is very limited indeed and any definite conclusion must frankly in part be
subjective. We cannot infer that because A. knew and recorded the teachings of
E. with what accuracy we have shown, he did the same for An. Historical
accuracy in one place, however, gives rise to some probability for care in
another place. Second, the ambiguity and indecisiveness of the fragments
correspond to the account A. gives. And finally, the acknowledgment of
difficulty in interpreting An., when made by a person who surely ought to have
had enough acumen to understand anything clear, is a mark of carefulness. It
might be proper to mention here that any strain of subjectivity discoverable in
this paper to the favor of A. as an historian, is not based on an exalted
admiration of A. as a philosopher. While one wishes to be fair and acknowledge
his proper position as one of the world’s greatest thinkers, it is very
difficult to overlook the inconclusiveness, and consequent lacunae in his
system, of many of his arguments. The νοῦς of An. is not the only νοῦς in
history which has been difficult to understand.
The lines under consideration go on to say that he “really
treats both as a single nature, except that it is preeminently mind which he
takes as his first principle.’’ This seems to me to be, if not the solution to,
at least the source of, most of the difficulty. A. is interested in soul, i.e.
the life principle in plants, animals and men. He is an empirical psychologist
willing to make his observations mean something by raising them into a theory. But
An. was interested in another problem. He was the first clearly to see, though
how unsatisfactorily to apply Plato’s Phaedo tells us, the need for a universal
teleology. He had also made some psychological observations and wrote out some
of his ideas. And apparently he connected in some way unknown to us and hardly
intelligible to A. the principle of his universal intelligence with human
psychology. Heinze, in the last half of his dissertation, puts very well the
universal aspect of An.’s theory. It is the beginning of Greek theism. And with
the proper restrictions which Heinze notes, he makes out a very good case. Now
obviously to argue from a man’s theism to what his psychology ought to be is
rather precarious. But I do not doubt that the reason A. did it was that An.
himself had indicated that it ought to be done.
“He says at any rate that mind alone of all things that
exist is simple, unmixed and pure.’’ Here we are on as sure ground as we can
be. Whether An. himself used the words here mentioned, ἁπλοῦν, ἀμιγῆ, καθαρόν,
or whether they are merely A.’s expressions to explain An.’s doctrine, does not
interest us here. Arleth, pp. 72 and 81, has sufficiently discussed it. There
seems to me no good reason for denying that An. used these words, especially
when the thought expressed by them is the most certain knowledge we have of An.
There is uniform testimony that An., as A. says, made the first principle
simple, unmixed and pure. Aside from the fragments where these statements
occur, 11, 12, 13, 14 and their contexts, there are several hints in Aetius I,
7,5; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum I, 11, 26; and Plato, Cratylus 413 c.
The word γοῦν in the text of A. also indicates that he knew he was now on
certain ground,—a further indication of care. It appears, therefore, even in
the little so far covered that A. is as trustworthy as any historian can be
expected to be.
The same evidence corroborates the last point of this
passage: “he refers both knowledge and motion to the same principle when he
says that mind sets the universe in motion.” The participial clause may be
explained on the supposition that naturally anyone would regard mind as the
principle of knowledge and when it is also made the principle of motion, there
is posited but one principle for both. This explanation seems to be sufficient
to make the clause a reason for the preceding statement.
The next reference to An., 405 b 19-23, contains three positive
statements. First, An. alone says mind is impassible; second, mind is unmixed;
and third (after criticizing him be- cause knowledge and impassibility
conflict), An. never attempted to answer this objection.
The second statement above is found also in Plato’s Cratylus
413 c., and is further explained at length in Fr. 12. There cannot be the least
doubt of A.’s accuracy here. The third is such as to admit of no conclusive
investigation. It would be necessary to have An.’s complete works. Some weak
criticism might be directed against the basis of A.’s objection. The knowledge of
an infinite mind, which is not the result of a learning process peculiar to
finite minds, may be made compatible with impassibility. Yet the more we insist
that God is unchangeable, the less we understand how he recognizes temporal
events as having happened or as about to happen. Certainly in the sphere of
learning beings, which is A.’s topic though not that of An., impassibility and
knowledge conflict. Yet did An. make the statement that mind is impassible? Not
only here but in a later passage which we shall note at the proper time, A.
says he
did. Hicks regards it however as A.’s inference. If this is
so, A. is manufacturing straw men to knock over. And that is not the most
excellent procedure in philosophy. Hicks also notes that A. is firmly convinced
that this is An.’s position, since he repeats the statement in Phys. 256
b 24, where ἀπαθής is apparently An.’s own word. But unfortunately outside of
A. I have been able to find no other reference to the mind’s impassibility.
Whether we agree with Hicks or whether we consider A. correct depends, then,
not so much on the evidence bearing on this individual passage but rather on
our general attitude toward A. If A. could have been thrice mistaken and could
have manufactured false difficulties we may be led to reject this sentence. But
such a conclusion based on such flimsy evidence hardly seems reasonable. Yet if
on the unsupported testimony of A. we accept the impassibility of mind as the
assertion of An., while we defend A. we attack An., for A. shows clearly the
absurdities attendant on this view.
This discussion gets its full share of emphasis in the last
two passages where An. is mentioned, 429 a 19 and 429 b 24. Before entering on
these sections, let it be noted that a careless reading of the De An.
might lead one to suppose the mention of An. to be little more than a literary
embellishment. A. finds himself using some familiar phrase and by a clever
perversion or play on words reproduces An. with a peculiar twist. In the Eth.
Nic. A. very obviously aims at occasional literary effect. But De An.
is more similar to the technical, dry-as-dust Meta. It is a serious work
and an historical reference can have only the purpose of making a point clear
to the student who knows the historical situation. Each phrase, historical or
dogmatic, must be estimated at its full worth.
The paragraph in which the first of these two references
occurs considers the distinctive character of that part of the soul by which
thinking is done, and how thinking comes about. Though dissimilar in other
respects, thinking, in being a reception of forms, is similar to perception.
Reception is a sort of being acted upon, but aside from the mere reception of
forms, the mind must remain unaffected by them (cf. Hicks p. 476). ‘‘The mind, then,
since it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of An., be unmixed with
any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by intruding its own form it
hinders and obstructs that which is alien to it.’’ One is interested in seeing
that A. said, since knowledge must be pure the mind has no a priori forms,
while Kant replies, since the mind cannot think without forms, knowledge is not
pure.
Unfortunately as was before indicated, An. is speaking primarily
of the divine mind, laying the foundations of theism as Heinze would have him
do; whereas A. is speaking solely of the human mind. When An. says mind is
unmixed, he is separating mind from material things; if he did more we do not
have the fragments. A.’s purpose, however, is to separate the human mind from
concepts, and identifies ‘‘to rule’ and “tο know”. Some have considered this
identification unwarranted, though with perhaps insufficient evidence. The
fragment quoted at the beginning states that the mind rules the universe and
knows all things. And Socrates’ criticism of An.’s imperfect teleology indicates
that An. had at first given promise to show that mind rules by doing what is
best, which certainly requires knowledge. And it would seem especially
appropriate to identify ruling and knowing in the case under consideration. How
mind could rule thoughts without knowing them is difficult to imagine.
A few lines further on A. raises the final objection against
An. not so much with the intention of ridiculing An. but rather as the most
advantageous manner of explaining his own opinions. A. himself regards the mind
as impassible in a certain sense. The difference between this sense and the
absolute sense of An. will furnish the answer to the problem, ‘‘assuming that
the mind is something simple and impassive and, in the words of An., has nothing
in common with anything else, how will it think...?” The idea here attributed
to An. is completely harmonious with what we know of him. And A.’s criticism is
directed against his own loose previous statement as much as against An.
Our conclusion, then, must either ascribe philosophical impossibilities
to An. or historical impossibilities to A. The particular philosophical
impossibility is to assert that mind is both impassible and capable of knowing.
However philosophically impossible this may be, it is not psychologically
impossible. One might easily call the mind impassible without noting the inconsistency
with knowing. We have an excellent illustration of a similar slip in the Phaedo.
There the ideas are immutable. But in the Sophist the fault is detected
and motion introduced. Thus it is quite likely that An. was philosophically
impossible. As to whether A. made historical blunders or not, we have reviewed
the evidence.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arleth E.—Articles in Archiv fiir Geschichte der
Philosophie. 1895.
Beare J. I—Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition.
Chaignet, A——Ed. Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs.
Joachim H. H.—Aristotle on Coming to Be and Passing Away.
Heinze M.—Uber den Nofis des Anagoras.
Hicks R. D.—Aristotle De Anima.
Leonard W. E.—The Fragments of Empedocles.
Millard C. E—On the Interpretation of Empedocles.
Rodier G.—Aristote Traité de l’Ame.
Ross W. D.—Aristotle.
Ross W. D.—Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Stratton G. M.—Greek Physiological Psychology.
Veazie W.—Empedocles’ Psychological Doctrine.
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