I have been reading about Eastern Orthodoxy, and while I was recently visiting Emory's theological library, on a whim, I picked up a journal from 2011 called Greek Orthodox Theological Review. One article in the publication is by Eduard Borysov and entitled, "The Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Pavel Florensky and John Meyendorff: A Critical Examination" (link). In it, he outlines a few 20th century Eastern Orthodox theologians and their understanding of how "mystical union between the transcendent God and creatures" is possible.
While the bulk of the article is expository in nature, the final section ("Critical Evaluation") is one of the more incisive critiques of Eastern Orthodoxy I've read. So I thought to reproduce this section here for any who are interested:
In light of the presented views, the tension between indirect participation in God through his energies that are, at the same time, God himself remains unresolved. There are ambiguities in these ideas on several levels.
The first ambiguity relates to the issue of the definition of the divine energies and their distinction from essence. How can immanent, known energies of God manifest his unknown transcendent essence? If God is wholly present in his energies, in what way are those energies different from his essence? In other words, if the uncreated energies of God are God himself, how one can equate and at the same time distinguish manifestations of the nature with the nature itself? It is still unclear whether the deified person assumes two natures after union with Christ, that is, the deified human nature and the divine nature by grace. If so, what does it mean to be God by grace, and how is that different from being God by nature? Is it not true that complete participation in God implies the fact that he is no longer unknown to the participant and is not transcendent? If communication between God and man occurs at the level of the external manifestations of their natures, how does this happen? Since deification is an experience of God beyond human reason, emotions, or will, in what way can one claim that he has participated in God and not in some other sort of ecstatic or psychological phenomenon?
If a living essence cannot avoid manifesting itself through energies, they are inseparable. However, the problem of identifying energies with essence is that, in the doctrine of salvation, synergy would not only mean a divine-human energies partnership in salvific activity, but also a union of the natures involved in such synergistic salvation, namely, God and man. One should also take into account the notion of "symbol," which Florensky defined as essence, whose energy is mingled with the energy of the other, higher essence, so that symbol is a reality that is greater than itself." If we apply this analogy to deification, we would have to conclude that the energies of man are mingled with the divine energies. And since we cannot discern God from his energies, because energies are inseparable from the divine essence, then both human and divine essences are mingled as well, and thus are indiscernible. Even if Florensky would say that they are not mingled, they are still indiscernible, which brings in a problem for our understanding of the nature of God.
The second ambiguity is connected to the language used to define and describe deification. It seems that Florensky follows Maximus the Confessor closely, being at some points very ambiguous about the limitations of theosis. He is not afraid to be misunderstood when he talks about the patristic prohibition against participation in or contemplation of the divine nature. He scarcely mentions the traditional patristic teaching that the deified participates only in the divine energies and never in the divine nature. Another example of ambiguity in Florensky's terminology is the idea of synergy between two essences. He says that the synergy of two essences by means of energies produces something "new" to both participants. That sounds like Eutychianism.
The third ambiguity is based on the philosophical, mainly Platonic, dichotomy between a generic essence and a particular person. Rakestraw is correct when he points out the inappropriate "emphasis upon humanity, rather than human beings [;] being divinized seems to put the focus more on generic human nature rather than individual men and women." Since, according to Agiorgoussis's comment on Maximus, "will and energy do not belong to the person, but to the nature (essence)" by partaking in the divine energies, one shares in the divine nature, not in the divine person. However, the biblical language of participation and sharing belongs on the plane of persons, not natures. For Paul, Christians are transformed into the image and likeness of Christ, not into his deified human nature. Moreover, to what extent can one speak of essence-transforming in the experience of the deified? How would this person's divine nature be different from the divine nature of God? It is unreasonable to invent different kinds of divine nature, whereby God possesses a higher kind of divinity and man a lower kind.
There is inconsistency in presenting energies as belonging to essence in the Christological context and also as belonging to persons in the Trinitarian context. Meyendorff says, "Repeatedly in the writings of St. Gregory Palamas one finds the expression that divine energies—or the uncreated light—are 'hypostatic' (ÚTroaxaxiKOv cpcoç) or 'en-hypostatic' (évuTióaxaiov)." Since essence does not in reality exist by itself without a hypostasis, it is logical for Meyendorff to conclude that energies belong to a person. However, this statement would contradict the decisions of the ecumenical councils, which claimed that the Trinity has one essence and thus the same energy shared by the three persons, while Christ has two natures and two energies that belong to one person.
Finally, inconsistency is present in the ways deification is acquired. The Orthodox representatives are assured of the divine source of the union because the transformation of human nature can happen only as the result of God's gift of grace. At the same time, they agree that participation in the sacraments, virtues, and hesychastic prayer are essential in receiving that grace. Ultimately, synergy of the divine gift and human efforts results in a theoandric metamorphosis of the human partaker.
Borysov's comments stand on their own, but I want to make some follow-up observations.
1. The article immediately reminded me of similar criticisms of Eastern Orthodoxy provided by Steve Hays (link, link, etc.). I encourage readers to read these and search for other articles by him.
2. Borysov writes the following in the main body of his article:
Palamas's theology of energies, according to Meyendorff, has no philosophical rationale behind it. However, one should not forget that the philosophical notions of hypostasis, nature, and energies played a key role in the Christological controversies and had become the basic principles for Palamas's theology proper as well as his soteriology. God is, by definition, unrelated to and above any essence, hence he is unknown by any essence. (Gregory Palamas, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, § 3.2.24, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), 95)
If God is unrelated to and above any essence, in what way can humans be images of God?
3. I'm going to highlight one of the more fascinating parts of Borysov's article:
Since essence does not in reality exist by itself without a hypostasis, it is logical for Meyendorff to conclude that energies belong to a person. However, this statement would contradict the decisions of the ecumenical councils, which claimed that the Trinity has one essence and thus the same energy shared by the three persons, while Christ has two natures and two energies that belong to one person.
I imagine Borysove is referring, for example, to the third council of Constantinople:
…as we confess the holy and inseparable Trinity, that is, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, to be of one deity, of one nature and substance or essence, so we will profess also that it has one natural will, power, operation, domination, majesty, potency, and glory…
Consequently, therefore, according to the rule of the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ, she also confesses and preaches that there are in him two natural wills and two natural operations. For if anybody should mean a personal will, when in the holy Trinity there are said to be three Persons, it would be necessary that there should be asserted three personal wills, and three personal operations (which is absurd and truly profane). Since, as the truth of the Christian faith holds, the will is natural, where the one nature of the holy and inseparable Trinity is spoken of, it must be consistently understood that there is one natural will, and one natural operation…
…we confess God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; not three gods, but one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: not a subsistency of three names, but one substance of three subsistences; and of these persons one is the essence, or substance or nature, that is to say one is the godhead, one the eternity, one the power, one the kingdom, one the glory, one the adoration, one the essential will and operation of the same Holy and inseparable Trinity, which has created all things, has made disposition of them, and still contains them. (link)
To summarize, Borysov's initial point seems to be that the divine essence doesn't exist or subsist apart from the persons of the Trinity. Therefore, the persons of the Trinity are who will, think, choose, operate, etc., for "energies belong to a person." If I am understanding him correctly, this makes sense to me, for I myself have argued for a long time that the persons of the Trinity are not (contrary to, say, absolute divine simplicity) identical to their acts of will, thoughts, choices, operations, etc. To all appearances, such would lead to modal (and, seemingly, hypostatic) collapse.
Borysov's initial point also reminded me of the following comment by Joseph Farrell who, I recall, used to be cited as a go-to theologian by Eastern Orthodox apologists (I'm not sure if this is the case any more since he deconverted): "there must be in each case a unique enhypostatization of the will in the person, each free to do with the natural will and its objects of choice what he sees fit" (Free Choice in Maximus the Confessor, pg. 189, link).
While it is true that, in context, Farrell is referring to human persons, insofar as there is an admitted analogy between Trinity, Christology, and anthropology, Farrell's above statement seems to agree with Borysov that "energies belong to a person," for then each person of the Trinity would have "a unique enhypostatization of the [divine] will in the person."
Now, I understand the argument against grounding "the will" in persons or hypostases, for that would either lead to either Monothelitism (Christ only has one will because He is one person) or Nestorianism (Christ has two wills because He is two persons). Both of these positions are false, so "the will" shouldn't be grounded in the individual or subject but rather his nature(s). The one Christ has two natures and, therefore, two wills.
We must be careful to strike a balance here, however, for to say the will is grounded in nature does not mean that people who have the same nature make the same choices. My actual choices are not your actual choices, for even though we have the same nature, "there must be in each case a unique enhypostatization of the will in the person," "energies belong to a person," etc. You and I are consubstantial, but the actual choices you and I make are particular to us as different persons or hypostases. In short, I think that to understand this is to understand the difference between numeric and generic unity which I have attempted to explain in several other places (link, link).
[Parenthetical: it bears repeated emphasis that one really needs to be careful to strike a balance here. While Borysov does not mention original sin and I do not want to stray too far from the point I am attempting to make, what I have said above does not entail that the Reformed understanding of original sin is false. Nothing I have said implies that only actual choices are sinful, that one cannot participate in the sins of one's forefather[s] (even though actual choices are made by persons), etc. While such Reformed views would require a nuanced defense (e.g. of traducianism), Eastern Orthodox apologists are too hasty if and when they suggest the Reformed understanding of original sin implies nominalism and so forth.
While I am on the subject of Eastern Orthodoxy and original sin, their own synods affirm that infants are subject to eternal punishment:
We believe Holy Baptism, which was instituted by the Lord, and is conferred in the name of the Holy Trinity, to be of the highest necessity. For without it none is able to be saved, as the Lord says, “Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, shall in no way enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens.” {John 3:5} And, therefore, baptism is necessary even for infants, since they also are subject to original sin, and without Baptism are not able to obtain its remission. Which the Lord showed when he said, not of some only, but simply and absolutely, “Whoever is not born [again],” which is the same as saying, “All that after the coming of Christ the Savior would enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens must be regenerated.” And since infants are men, and as such need salvation, needing salvation they need also Baptism. And those that are not regenerated, since they have not received the remission of hereditary sin, are, of necessity, subject to eternal punishment, and consequently cannot without Baptism be saved. So that even infants should, of necessity, be baptized. Moreover, infants are saved, as is said in Matthew; {Matthew 19:12} but he that is not baptized is not saved. And consequently even infants must of necessity be baptized. (The Confession of Dositheus, Decree 16)
Since Eastern Orthodoxy rejects the Reformed understanding of original sin, their apologists have a challenge in accounting for this.]
Returning to my former line of thought, this is one reason I am inclined toward the view, for example, that the Father, Son, and Spirit have distinct thoughts. If they are distinct hypostases or persons or subjects or individuals, then we would expect that each would refer to Himself using reflexive indexicals and would not do the same when referring to the other persons. And, indeed, this is what we see in Scripture (e.g. John 17, in which the Son prays to His Father using first person pronouns for Himself and second person pronouns for the distinct person of the Father to whom He is praying).
Of course, I affirm each Trinitarian person is omniscient. The propositional knowledge they share is common, but the mode in which each person would affirm this knowledge (e.g. of the economic activity of the Trinity, although the same could be applied to their intra-Trinitarian relationships, such as they are) cannot seemingly be the same without collapsing the three persons into one. That is, only the Son can think, for example, "I became man."
Analogously, each Trinitarian person would also seem to have a different mode of will. While this mode of will would not be what Eastern Orthodox refer to as "gnomic," nevertheless, only the Son could truly affirm (because it corresponds to the enhypostatized, willed reality), "I became man," whereas only the Father can truly affirm, with respect to the Son, that "I sent you" (because it corresponds to the enhypostatized, willed reality), etc.
This also coheres well, for example, with the Reformed idea of a covenant of redemption. The Father and Son agree (which language already suggests "unique enhypostatization[s]" of the natural, divine will that each Trinitarian person has) about how to act to redeem the elect. The nature of the Trinitarian persons would entail that they necessarily and conjointly agree about what free choice[s] they make - for our creation, let alone our redemption, was not necessitated or obligated - but [their roles in] said choice[s] require distinction.
I will leave aside the question (as interesting as it is) about whether this has implications regarding historical councils. Rather, an ironic point I think Borysov underscores is that the above may be underemphasized in Eastern Orthodoxy, apologists of which make a big deal about absolute divine simplicity (as if Reformed theologians have universally affirmed this; they have not, link).
That is, just as Eastern Orthodoxy argues against identification of the divine attributes, so too they ought to be careful to avoid identification of the modes of thought and will of each divine person. But this is a danger if Eastern Orthodoxy rejects (for whatever reason - adherence to historical councils or otherwise) "generic unity" by taking consubstantiality to mean that the Trinitarian persons share the "same energy" - as if such energy does not belong to persons, as if the divine will or nature is not enhypostatized a la Farrell, as if reflexive thoughts of members of the Trinity collapse into a singular referent, etc.
Perhaps such dangers are not a necessary consequence of Eastern Orthodoxy (despite that Borysov seems to think so). Naturally, this discussion could beg a host of other questions, and I don't intend to address all of them (e.g. further nuances of the Eastern Orthodox view of an essence and energies distinction). The main point is that if or when I have said anything in the past about there being three wills or minds among the members of the Trinity, I have not meant to suggest that three wills or minds are suggestive of distinct natures or that "the will" is grounded in hypostases; rather, the language I have been trying to convey is of unique enhypostatizations of the same, generic nature (in which "the [divine] will" is located) by which we call the distinct persons consubstantial. This seems to be a more precise formulation.
I think (although I could be wrong) that this is also what Ian McFarland is getting at when he discusses Maximus the Confessor:
...one of Maximus' chief arguments against the Monothelites was that their association of will with hypostasis led to the unacceptable conclusion that there were three wills in God. As one nature, God has one will. If follows that what God wills, God wills naturally. Maximus takes it as self-evident that such a conception of willing does not amount to a form of necessitarianism; moreover, it remains internally differentiated by virtue of its enactment in and through the three hypostases... (link)
See also footnote 68, wherein McFarland cites Maximus as writing, "For [Christ] came with the good pleasure of the Father and the co-operation of the Spirit" (Opuscule 7). This language too implies that the energies of the persons are distinct precisely because, as has been said several times now, "energies belong to a person." The Trinitarian persons necessarily co-operate, for there is more than one person and, thus, more than one person's energy or energies in question.
Anyways, the point I am making about generic unity and distinction in choice, thought, etc. wouldn't, I think, be all that controversial when applied to men. To the degree one takes issue with a Trinitarian-Christological-anthropological analogy, then, he would have to explain what is relevantly different about the Trinitarian situation (i.e. something more than just pointing out that the consubstantiality of the Trinity entails that they necessarily work towards the same end; such a point does not address the examples of unique thoughts or choices each person has). This, though, I gather that this is precisely what an Eastern Orthodox apologist would wish to avoid.
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