Meta-epistemology and Gordon Clark

Recently, I've been reviewing a book on Scripturalism (link). Before proceeding any further in that review, I wanted to clarify that I am speaking about "knowledge" in the same sense in which Clark usually does: "knowledge with a capital K" by which "certainty" is possible (Clark and His Critics, pgs. 75-76). I will return to what this means in a moment. 

As I was organizing my thoughts on the next chapter, I found that what I was writing (i.e. what follows) was less of a review of that book and more of an important background for an historical understanding of the epistemological thought of Gordon Clark. While I have maintained and continue to maintain that Scripturalism is not synonymous with the thought of Clark, Clark popularized Scripturalism. 

Since a discussion of Scripturalism usually involves evaluating or mentioning the thought of Clark, it is helpful to exposit that thought for a few reasons: 1) most importantly, to distill what ideas are or are not Scriptural; 2) to be historically accurate (so far as is possible) in representations of Clark; 3) to determine whether an author correctly understands Clark, which may or may not be relevant to how he understands Scripturalism. With these reasons for this post in mind, I want to wade into the waters of "meta-epistemology."

If an epistemology is a theory of knowledge, a meta-epistemology questions what epistemology itself aims to answer: what is the nature of knowledge? What is the structure of epistemic justification? What is truth? These sorts of definitional questions are important in establishing a context for and focus of an epistemology, and they are questions I have been thinking about in the context of Scripturalism for almost 10 years (link). 

One point I would immediately make about definitions is that in order to "know" one's own answers to these questions and be consistent with one's own epistemology, one's own source[s] of knowledge must be able to furnish the answers:

One’s first principle is his first principle... when one is evaluating opposing first principles, definitions of truth, or methods of epistemic justification, he cannot pretend that he is evaluating them abstract from his background as a skeptic, agnostic, coherentist, pragmatist, empiricist, rationalist, Scripturalist, etc. Even the meta-epistemological statements I have made throughout this post have been informed by my own epistemological background. (link)

In other words, what a word means is context-laden. Especially in epistemic discussions, establishing a meta-epistemic context for what it is that under discussion is helpful, for it frames what the "knowledge" is that is in view, why such knowledge is important, etc. This takes some time (as this blog demonstrates!), yet it should not distract us from the point that our source of knowledge should itself inform any meta-epistemic context we wish to set and claim to know; otherwise, we would either have another source of knowledge. 

For example, to return to Clark, from what he wrote, it is clear he understood that his own source of "knowledge" allowed for various meanings of the word:

The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. (The Pastoral Epistles, pg. 166).

While "knowledge" can refer to different things, it is not surprising that Clark's primary interest related to forming a "basic epistemology." That is, Clark's interest in a basic theory of knowledge had little to do with a theory of sex! He was not interested in "opinion" or "conjecture," "accident or good luck" (Lord God of Truth, pg. 40). Such things are not formative in a basic epistemology. 

He was rather, as was quoted initially, interested in "certainty" and "infallibility." In contemporary epistemological terms – and distinct from whether or not he was entirely consistent, logically or personally (i.e. did he change his mind on some issues) – Clark [implicitly] sought to defend an internalist and infalliblist epistemology (link). That is, he was interested in beliefs in true propositions sourced in a self-authenticating, axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect. 

[Parenthetically, to many, this may not seem to be not so "basic" upon close inspection! However, let the reader understand that I am only attempting to describe Clark's epistemology. I will, below, quote reasons why I believe the above is an accurate summary of Clark's meta-epistemic views, and in these quotes, Clark will defend, successfully or not, why his views are what they are. While reading this entire section, let the reader keep in mind the distinction between epistemology and apologetics that is critical to a right understanding of Scripturalism (link). 

That is, it is one thing to know "the truth of the Bible" - the truth of the Bible "is the basic axiom of Christian theism," according to Clark (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 43). It is another thing for Clark [or I] to expound on the meanings of terms Clark used in order to describe his axiom - and its theorems - as "knowable" (including spelling out some context as to what that entails). This is meta-epistemic and can be known only in virtue of Clark's [or my] epistemic axiom. It is yet another thing for Clark [or I] to defend his epistemic axiom or implicit meta-epistemic views. Only if we constantly keep in mind that Clark's apologetic is subsumed under his epistemology and not the basis for it will we realize that his epistemology is simpler than we think. To summarize:

...a man may learn several propositions about God without reflecting on the method by which he learned them. Musicians and painters usually produce good works of art before they understand the theory. Hence in temporal psychology a knowledge of God precedes a knowledge of method. But to explain this process an apologist ought to start with the methodology. For while the unreflective reader may be unaware of the methodology – he may not realize how he does what he does – he nonetheless uses the method. And for Clark and Henry the method is Scriptural. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 184-186)

Thus, "skepticism ends where divine revelation begins" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 258-259)... just as our salvation really begins when we are regenerated unto faith in the gospel. Yes, we could define and elaborate upon meaning of faith, the content of the gospel, and more. We could even defend our views in these areas. Nevertheless, a child can be saved by grace through faith, because actually having faith in the gospel is itself simple, albeit only possible by grace.]

Returning to Clark, I said he was interested in a certain kind of knowledge: "beliefs in true propositions sourced in an axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect." While I have argued these points in scattered posts across this blog, I do not suppose anyone has read all of my published thoughts on this matter, let alone retained them (I haven't!). So, here are some definitions and reasonings from Clark about various components of epistemology: propositions, beliefs, truth, sources, axioms, foundations, infallibility, awareness, and reflection.

Propositions defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

…all propositions require a distinction between subject and predicate. Knowledge also requires the distinction, logical if not actual, between the person knowing and the object known. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 146-147)  

Knowledge consists of propositions, of predicates related to subjects, i.e., of truths. The meaning which the words designate is the object of knowledge. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 149-150)  

In Thales to Dewey (455) Clark, after some pages of technical detail, arrives at the subhead “Propositions and Concepts.” But the simplest reason why truth must be propositional is that a noun all by itself can be neither true nor false. Suppose someone says, without any implicit context, “Two,” or “Cat,” or “Star.” No one could understand; neither truth nor falsity has been spoken. Only when a predicate is attached to a subject by a copula can the expression be true or false. “Two is an even number” is true; “Two is an odd number” is false; but just plain “Two” is unintelligible. Therefore, Clark insists that when a botanist says, “A cactus has no true leaves,” he uses the word true in a metaphorical sense, contrasting the spines of a cactus with the ordinary leaves of an ocotilla or rose bush. What the metaphor means, a good botanist can explain in literally intended propositions. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 180-182)

Truths defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

...every item of God’s knowledge must surely fit in with every other item. This also seems to me to solve the philosophic problem of truth. The three chief contenders in this field are the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. For reasons too numerous to include here, I believe pragmatism leads to complete skepticism. The correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object. This is impossible. The coherence theory remains. (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948)

This gentleman distinguishes between logical consistency and a coherence view of truth. Since he stresses the latter rather than the former, he might think that Nash rates me too highly by asserting that I hold to coherence. However, neither Professor Nash nor I acknowledge this distinction, and while I now prefer the word consistency for clarity’s sake, I have no objection to Nash’s statement at this point. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 142)

Beliefs defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Belief is the voluntary assent to an understood proposition. (First John, 1980, pg. 119) 

Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will... Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pgs. 83, 85) 

Faith is the belief in or assent to an understood proposition. Saving faith is assent to certain Scriptural propositions – the good news of the Gospel, the information the Scriptures put before us. The power and strength we derive in answer to Paul’s prayers come through and are proportionate to our grasp of Scripture... Scripture tells us, if I may condense it, “Believe and be saved.” Believing is an intellectual process... we may add, believe presupposes understanding. A true Christian, by definition, loves the truth. He must oppose both the existential emotionalism of the so-called Neo-orthodox and also those scientists who have a zeal for truth but do not have the truth. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pgs. 87-88) 

How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169) 

Assurance and conviction are belief, strong belief, voluntary belief, and as intellectual as you please. They are intellectual because their objects are meaningful propositions. Their objects are truths. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 79, 175)

Self-Authenticating Sources, Axioms, or Foundations for knowledge defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

To the same effect, it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore, the same conclusion follows: Either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 53-54)

The argument is that every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically... Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures... The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation of the notion that theology has several sources such as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion, or psychology. There is but one source, the Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. God is truth. Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life. (Against the Churches, 2002, pg. 34)

Mavrodes notes, “It is a common tactic of Christianity’s opponents to direct some of their first and most effective attacks against the Axiom.” In this tactic, so it seems to me, there is a satanic wisdom that passes by derivative propositions and fixes on the very basis of Christianity. These opponents know or perhaps dimly but rightly surmise that if they can destroy the foundation, nothing remains. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 235)

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47)

Infallibility defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

How then may we know that the Bible is true? The Confession answers, “Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority [of the Scripture] is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit.”

Faith is a gift or work of God. It is God who causes us to believe: “Blessed is the man whom thou choosest and causest to approach unto thee” (Psa. 65:4).

Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe, 1985, pg. 18) 

With infallibility gone, the other doctrines of Scripture automatically drop by the wayside. If the writers of the Bible were not infallible, could any of us be infallible percipients of our needs? Dare we claim to have made no error in our self-analysis? The Bible furnishes us with an analysis of human nature and need. It tells us that the guilt of Adam’s first transgression was immediately imputed to us with the result that we were born in iniquity and that our heart is deceitful above measure. If this Biblical statement is true, any merely human analysis of human nature is bound to be unreliable. And if the Bible is not true, what reason is there for thinking that we have a more accurate understanding than the prophets, who even on Neo-orthodox principles stood so close to the fountains of the faith? May I suggest therefore that anyone who says he does not need the doctrine of infallibility has misunderstood his own needs? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 55, 61-62)

Awareness or reflection defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Communication is of course possible only by means of words or some other signs; but the words, instead of teaching anything new, rather stir up our memories of things we had previously understood. Thus, when a speaker says something, unless he is referring to sensory objects present at the moment, we consult the Truth within our minds to see whether or not he is telling the truth. In the Platonic dialogues a series of questions stimulates reflection, and the learning or assent comes from within... communication and teaching, although making use of words or signs, is possible only because the mind possesses Truth. Socrates or Augustine is not really the teacher or master: The true master is Christ, who is the Truth and who enlightens every man. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 184-186) 

Now since it is the conclusion of a demonstration that we are trying to prove, and since it is proved by giving the premises, it follows that the premises of demonstrated knowledge are better known than the conclusion. If we did not know the premises, obviously we could not know the conclusion. The conclusion cannot be more certain than the premises on which it is based. The premises are the cause of the conclusion, and therefore they must be prior to it. And also, in demonstration, although not in every formally valid syllogism, the premises must be true. For demonstration is knowledge, and there can be no known of the non-existent. The premises, therefore, must be statements of what exists or what is so, i.e., they must be true... It has been shown above that scientific knowledge or demonstration is impossible without immediate premises. However, since these principles are indemonstrable, a knowledge of them cannot be “scientific” knowledge. There must therefore be another kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is actually superior to scientific knowledge because conclusions cannot be more certain than the premises on which they depend. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 101-103) 

...the mind can rest in this knowledge with greater security than in any reasons. This is obvious because the security of a conclusion can be no greater than that of the premise on which it is based. That the sum of the squares on the other two sides is equal to the square of the hypotenuse cannot be any more certain than the axioms from which it is deduced. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21) 

This criticism, so it seems to me, proceeds on the assumption that the “Bible” is just a word – a sound in the air, to use a nominalistic phrase. Apparently Mavrodes thinks that I would be better off technically if I made every verse a separate axiom. To me this seems like more machinery, which can be obviated by referring to them all under one name, the Bible. Similarly, the proposition “Everything God says is true,” need be a separate axiom, only if “God” too is just a word. But if the word has a meaning, the Biblical meaning, then it is analytically certain that everything God says is true. Indeed Mavrodes acknowledges this in his immediate discussion; and that is why these initial criticisms cannot be taken seriously. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 232-233)

Quotations could have been multiplied, and if I were writing a book, I might organize and explain this a bit more precisely and thoroughly. To summarize, to "knowledge" is about truth. Truth is the set of coherent or consistent propositions. When one reflects upon a true proposition, believes it, has either deduced it from an axiom or believes it axiomatically, and the axiom [and/or deduction] is infallibly justified, he can be certain (in an epistemic, not merely a psychological, sense) that what he believes is truth. He possesses knowledge of the proposition[s] in question.

[Another, longer parenthetical: It is not the case, as Clark says, that "the correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object" (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948, pgs. 173-177). Clark has confused a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification. Note Clark's conflation of a "test of truth" with a "theory of truth." Just as his acceptance of a coherence theory of truth doesn't require him to accept coherentism, acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth doesn't require one to accept a theory of epistemic justification on which we must look to the correspondent to justify, by comparison, the corresponding truth. 

For example, I can and do still hold that truth is propositional and denotatively defined as the meaning of the thought[s] of the Trinity. Their revelation of these propositions to us may indeed be mediated to us by non-propositions. However, just as Clark should have replied to his objectors ("Don't you have to read your Bible?") that his source of knowledge does not require a certain, causative means by which we are justified – an internalist variety of epistemic justification is not etiological, except perhaps in relation to the structure of epistemic justification (which needn't be empirical even if non-propositions are secondary causes of our propositional thoughts) – he should have recognized that a theory of truth likewise does not necessarily entail a certain method of reasoning by which we know.

The correspondence theory of truth also needn't mean that we only have an analogy or representation of the truth; it only means that truths (propositions) correspond to other realities (some of which would be non-propositional). We may not immediately interface with non-propositional realities intellectually... but that is to be expected, because these realities are not reducible to propositions. Thus, I suspect Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and hasty reasoning – if one "knows reality, there is no need for an extra something which corresponds to it" (God's Hammer, pgs. 34-37) – led him to accept unorthodox views.

For instance, the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in favor of coherence or consistency (as if one can't hold to both) means that unless one accepts necessitarianism, there could be multiple coherent yet mutually contradictory systems. In this case, not only would knowledge of which system is "true" be impossible, it would be unintelligible, for intelligibility presupposes truth. Mutually contradictory yet internally coherent propositional systems would mean the supra-system[s] that would constitute truth unfortunately can't, for coherence or consistency would break down. Hence, necessitarianism seems unavoidable, and this is a view Clark held only late in his life.

Another example of an unfortunate conclusion was Clark's view that persons are propositions. Truth is real and propositional, but if there is no correspondent to it, then to speak of persons as real leads to the idea persons just are propositions. If he had pushed this another (again, seemingly inevitable) step further and applied this line of reasoning to all of creation, then all of creation would just be propositional, in God's mind, and Clark would have landed in panentheism, not to mention propositional monism.

Frankly, Clark's discussion of the correspondence theory of truth on pg. 181 of Modern Philosophy (2008) leads me to wonder whether he even understood the theory, because he says "this theory provides us only with pictures of [reality]." In this quote, it sounds to me as if he didn't understand the correspondence theory of truth still held propositions to be truth-bearers, especially since he continues to talk about "similarity" between the "picture" we have and corresponding "object." Perhaps he is just arguing that even if truths would be propositions in such a scenario, we can't tell whether they correspond to objects by comparing them. I don't know if it would be better to say that Clark just didn't understand the theory or worse to say he thought he understood it and rejected it. If it is the latter, then to repeat the above, no correspondence theorist needs to suggest that we compare a proposition to a non-proposition to see if they correspond. That confuses a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification.

Better would be to follow Clark's own conclusion, when discussing his own theory of language, that correspondence is not objectionable:

In one sense of the term, a photo corresponds to or looks like its object, but no one supposes that a word corresponds to a thing in this way. Language is not a picture of reality. The letters c-a-t do not look like the purring animal. It is all the more true that words cannot possibly look like spiritual realities, if such there be, for these are not visible entities. But in a non-photographic sense a mathematical formula may be said to correspond to the motion of a freely falling body. Could not this be an absolute correspondence? Or, if the term absolute causes hesitation, could not such a formula be or be understood as a literal assertion? Further, if the sound cat is essentially an arbitrary sign of the animal, what more correspondence could be desired? (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 194-195)

Indeed, one needn't compare cat to the animal to epistemically justify the legitimacy of the word referring to the animal. So, too, a Christian needn't epistemically justify the legitimacy of a proposition about a cat corresponding to the animal. One may even hold that correspondence between propositions and non-propositions is not even arbitrary but rather established by the will or persons of the Trinity (depending on the realities involved, such as God Himself). But the main point is that Clark never repudiated words as symbols of concepts, so it appears that, to the extent words are not propositional, he never fully embraced propositional monism.

One last thought. If Clark's line of reasoning leads to even "belief" itself just being a proposition, then insofar as he held that belief is an act of will, it would again seem to follow that the will is reducible a mere proposition. In that case, insofar as propositions are eternal - because God knows them eternally - it would appear that we ourselves are eternal, for our persons as well as our actions would be eternal.

For more of my thoughts on why the correspondence theory of truth is compatible with Scripturalism, see here and here.]

Why is it important to establish a meta-epistemic context? One reason is that since, as we have seen, apologetics is subordinate to epistemology, one's apologetic will be better to the extent one is better able to explain one's epistemology. Further, the better we can both explain and defend our epistemology, the more grounded or full our assurance (link) of our salvation will be, as Clark says:

With some diffidence and reserve because of the complex difficulties, I suggest the following: By loving in deed and truth we shall know that we are of the truth... Assurance of eternal life can be deduced from a knowledge that one is a believer. Of course, as the negro spiritual says, “Everybody talking about heaven ain’t going there.” With constant frequency people are assured of many things untrue. Indeed certainty increases in direct proportion to ignorance. The less educated a man is, the more things of which he is certain. If this obvious truth disturbs anyone, he should also realize that assurance is not essential to salvation. Different people have different mentalities. John Bunyan was so morbid he could hardly have had much assurance. With others more careless, doubts never arise. But if one knows, if one has a clear intellectual understanding that he believes, he should have legitimate assurance. (First John, 1980, pg. 113, 161)

This confidence, in turn, should lead us to boldly work out our salvation. The more brightly our light shines, the more glory is given to God. Whether our labor bears fruit on earth - such as God shining light into the darkness of the hearts of others - or in heavenly rewards, there is every reason to develop our understanding of our faith-knowledge in God's word.

Clark believed this too, and while he was inconsistent (both in that he changed his mind over time and that he accepted some positions which were inconsistent with other beliefs of his), what this amounts to is that Clark's attempt to explain his epistemology (i.e. his meta-epistemology) falls short of perfection. It does not, however, imply that his epistemology itself is false.