Before proceeding, however, I want to reiterate what I mentioned in my first post: I believe "Scripturalism" is not Gordon Clark's brainchild. In fact, I cannot find a published instance in which Clark applied the term to his own views. Obviously, the shoe does fit, for I think anyone may be legitimately referred to as a "Scripturalist" whose "theory of knowledge ought to be founded upon the Bible as [the extant extent of] divine revelation." It is understandable that Clark, a prominent popularizer of Scripturalism as such, would be the lens through which Scripturalism is evaluated, so I will say little more about this matter as I proceed in reviewing Mr. Lazar's book. But I hope the reader understands that I do not consider a sound criticism of Clark to necessarily entail a sound criticism of Scripturalism.
Chapter 1: How to Evaluate a Worldview
In his Introduction, Mr. Lazar refers to “Clark’s distinct philosophy of Scripturalism.” Elsewhere, he lets the reader know of his intention to explore “why Scripturalism failed as a worldview.” As he is describing his own background, Mr. Lazar states that he “began to notice… problems with Clark’s apologetic,” so he “turned away from Scripturalism” until he rethought whether he could “improve Scripturalism” while being “faithful to the core of Clark’s apologetic.” The very subheading of the book itself is "Reviving Gordon Clark's Apologetic. Finally, Mr. Lazar will, in the chapters 2 and 3, refer to “Scripturalist epistemology” and Scripturalism as “Clark’s… theory of knowledge.” All emphases are mine.
In various parts of the book, Mr. Lazar refers to Scripturalism either as being or containing a philosophy, apologetic, worldview, and an epistemology. The reader should be careful when reading such statements, for while one might consider a “philosophy” or “worldview” to mean the same thing, an “epistemology” and an “apologetic” are narrower in focus and, at the same time, distinct from one another.
For example, Scripturalism considered as being a “philosophy” or “worldview” would contain an epistemology and apologetic, but it would also encompass a metaphysic and ethic. Mr. Lazar is mainly interested, it seems, in the epistemology and apologetic of Scripturalism – of course, there is nothing wrong with this interest.
It should be kept in mind, though, that when Mr. Lazar states in the introduction to this chapter that “Clark’s students pointed out some crucial flaws in his apologetic that Clark failed to answer to their satisfaction,” all this would mean is that Clark’s students weren’t satisfied with Clark’s defense (apologetic) to flaws in his defense (apologetic) [of Christianity]. When read in those terms, the indictment against Clark does not appear so bad.
Firstly, who can ensure that his critics will ever be satisfied? Is it not by the grace of God – divine action over which we have no control except in providing opportunity for it – that anyone accepts the truth? Secondly, if the flaws in Clark’s apologetic really are “crucial,” then his students were right to remain unsatisfied, and Mr. Lazar is right to mention them. But an apologetic failure is not necessarily an epistemic one.
For example, Scripturalism considered as being a “philosophy” or “worldview” would contain an epistemology and apologetic, but it would also encompass a metaphysic and ethic. Mr. Lazar is mainly interested, it seems, in the epistemology and apologetic of Scripturalism – of course, there is nothing wrong with this interest.
It should be kept in mind, though, that when Mr. Lazar states in the introduction to this chapter that “Clark’s students pointed out some crucial flaws in his apologetic that Clark failed to answer to their satisfaction,” all this would mean is that Clark’s students weren’t satisfied with Clark’s defense (apologetic) to flaws in his defense (apologetic) [of Christianity]. When read in those terms, the indictment against Clark does not appear so bad.
Firstly, who can ensure that his critics will ever be satisfied? Is it not by the grace of God – divine action over which we have no control except in providing opportunity for it – that anyone accepts the truth? Secondly, if the flaws in Clark’s apologetic really are “crucial,” then his students were right to remain unsatisfied, and Mr. Lazar is right to mention them. But an apologetic failure is not necessarily an epistemic one.
The Distinction Between Epistemology and Apologetics
It will be extremely important for the purposes of my review(s) to distinguish a Scripturalist epistemology (a Scripturalist’s theory of knowledge) will be distinct from his apologetic methodology (how one defends Scripturalism as a worldview, not just as an epistemology, and how one attacks other worldviews), Mr. Lazar’s book intends to criticize Clark on both accounts.
At the risk of anticipating too much discussion, to illustrate the difference between epistemology and apologetics, we might ask a Scripturalist how he knows how to defend his faith. If he wants to answer this question, the Scripturalist would presumably respond by offering an apologetic (he will make a defense). Particularly, he would endeavor to communicate how his apologetic method is deducible from his epistemic axiom. The Scripturalist’s apologetic method is – if it is something he wants to defend as knowable – derived from and subordinate to his epistemology.
Perhaps Clark’s students or others have criticized Clark’s apologetic because they regard it as unbiblical. If so, then while that would be a criticism against Clark’s apologetic, it would not necessarily entail a criticism against Clark’s epistemology. Rather, it would just mean that if the charge sticks, Clark would need to revise his apologetic to be internally consistent and in accordance with his theory of knowledge.
An apologetic failure does not necessarily indicate a failure in one’s epistemology, metaphysic, or ethic. We might say that many people aren’t well-equipped to defend their faith; we would not suggest that their faith be revised. Likewise, one might argue that if Scripturalism, as a philosophy or worldview encompassing these topics, only needs revision to its apologetic, this would be relatively less troubling than a needed revision to its epistemology. A revision to one’s epistemology could entail change to one’s apologetic.
Perhaps Clark’s students or others have criticized Clark’s apologetic because they regard it as unbiblical. If so, then while that would be a criticism against Clark’s apologetic, it would not necessarily entail a criticism against Clark’s epistemology. Rather, it would just mean that if the charge sticks, Clark would need to revise his apologetic to be internally consistent and in accordance with his theory of knowledge.
An apologetic failure does not necessarily indicate a failure in one’s epistemology, metaphysic, or ethic. We might say that many people aren’t well-equipped to defend their faith; we would not suggest that their faith be revised. Likewise, one might argue that if Scripturalism, as a philosophy or worldview encompassing these topics, only needs revision to its apologetic, this would be relatively less troubling than a needed revision to its epistemology. A revision to one’s epistemology could entail change to one’s apologetic.
For example, if Clark’s theory of knowledge required revision in regards to source[s] of knowledge, scope of knowledge, means of knowledge-acquisition, etc., then the content of what Clark could know would change; thus, what he could defend as knowable would change. His apologetic methodology itself could require revision. This completes a second reason why Mr. Lazar's introductory indictment against Clark does not initially appear so bad.
Regardless, the primary point I wish to make is that a Scripturalist’s epistemology and a Scripturalist’s apologetic are distinct and must not be conflated. If one is to be consistent, his apologetic must conform to his theory of knowledge. The former depends on the latter, not vice versa.
Regardless, the primary point I wish to make is that a Scripturalist’s epistemology and a Scripturalist’s apologetic are distinct and must not be conflated. If one is to be consistent, his apologetic must conform to his theory of knowledge. The former depends on the latter, not vice versa.
Defending this Distinction in Clark's Thought
Keeping this distinction in mind, Mr. Lazar raises two questions following the initial indictment against Clark: "what kind of flaws should you look for in an apologetic? And what methods can you use to discover those flaws?" My thought process was to immediately wonder whether Mr. Lazar would conflate flaws in an epistemology with flaws in an apologetic methodology, both of which are found in a worldview. This question was in my mind as I read the first sub-heading in Mr. Lazar's chapter, called "How to Choose a Worldview," where he attempts to begin to answer to the above questions by expositing Clark's thinking.
The first paragraph is a fair summary. In particular, Mr. Lazar's first summary of Clark is correct: "he argued that you must choose your first principles, because if you could prove them to be true, the proof would rely on premises that were more basic that your first principles, indicating they were not first principles after all."
As indicated in the above summary, however, in the middle of the paragraph, Mr. Lazar seems to switch from choosing worldviews (per the title of the section) to choosing first principles, since "all worldviews have first principles." The language of "first principles" is epistemic. There is a subtle shift from discussing worldviews, which are broad, to first principles, which are narrow. While the initial discussion surrounding this shift is fine, it is important to note, for starting in the second paragraph, Mr. Lazar cites the following statements by Clark:
1) "...our belief is a voluntary choice; but if one must choose without a strict proof, none the less it is possible to have sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice. Certainly there are sane reasons for rejecting some choices." (Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 41)
2) ...no philosopher is perfect, and no system can given man omniscience. But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent while others are self-contradictory, who can deny, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 1998, pg. 16)
3) We can judge the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system. (An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, 1993, pgs. 59-60)
From these statements, Mr. Lazar concludes that Clark/Scripturalism suggests we first "identify a worldview to be tested," then "take the worldview as a conjecture of a hypothesis," and finally "evaluate the worldview" in order to "make a sane choice between worldviews."
Without having read any further in the book, I suspected the direction in which Mr. Lazar's criticism of Clark might lead: that of Gordon R. Lewis in his book, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, which I reviewed many years ago. In that review, I argued Lewis makes the very conflation between apologetics and epistemology that I think that Mr. Lazar has made in forming the above conclusion. It was no surprise to me that Lewis' criticisms later made an appearance in chapter 3.
Here is the question we must ask of Mr. Lazar: in the above contexts in which Clark cites persons having "sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice [of a first principle]," "judg[ing] the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system," and a "right to choose the more promising first principle," does he think Clark is speaking about epistemic justification or apologetic justification?
If the former, does that mean he thinks Clark wants his readers, in these contexts, to reason towards a first principle from premises which are more basic (e.g. the four "tests" which are the subject matter of Mr. Lazar's next four chapters)? That would indeed undermine whatever so-called first principle or axiom Clark chose, for the first principle(s) would really be the tests.
This understanding would also seem to agree with Mr. Lazar's citation of Ronald Nash in one of the footnotes, where Nash argues that a presuppositionalist is like a scientist who tries to test hypotheses to see whether or not his "world view can measure up to the standards and tests for trust" and "reflect reliability back upon its first principles." As Clark argued against the possibility of knowing scientific hypotheses by means of testing and inductive reasoning, it would be quite ironic (and damning) if Clark advocated epistemically justifying a first principle or worldview by the same reasoning.
If any of this is what Mr. Lazar would argue Clark believed, I would disagree. In addition to my above review of Lewis, see point 5 here, in which I defend Clark against a similar argument by Michael Butler. I think Clark need not be interpreted as being inconsistent.
Rather, I think Clark means that there are "sane reasons" by which one can defend the choice of his first principle, that no one with an inferior first principle may deny Christians the right to choose a superior one, and that one can therefore defend it to be a "success." In other words, I think the above contexts in which Clark speaks are meant to be apologetic.
Consider these paragraphs by Clark which immediately follow quote 1) cited above by Mr. Lazar:
Consistency extends further than a first principle narrowly considered, so that it can be shown to be self-contradictory in itself; it extends into the system deduced from the first principle or principles. The basic axiom or axioms must make possible a harmony or system in all our thoughts, words, and actions. Should someone say (misquoting by the omission of an adjective) that consistency is the mark of small minds, that he does not like systems, that he will act on one principle at one time and another at another, that he does not choose to be consistent, there would be no use arguing with him, for he repudiates the rules, the necessary rules of argumentation. Such a person cannot argue against theism, for he cannot argue at all...
When now the theist speaks of theism as a practical postulate, he is not indulging in any "as-if" philosophy. He means that God exists and that one should conduct his daily life by that belief. It is called a postulate because it is an indemonstrable first principle and not a theorem derived from more ultimate premises (Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pgs. 41-43)
The "sane reasons" for choosing our first principle are not "more ultimate premises." Rather, a worldview is apologetically tested or evaluated by methods which [ought or are purported to] come from the worldview itself which is in question. One can, for example, apply a test of reason to the axiom of Scripturalism because Scripture itself is and claims to be, as God's word, reasonable. On the other hand, there would be no reason in arguing with a person who chooses insanity or inconsistency. Of what use would it be to apply apologetic tests of sanity or consistency to a person self-admittedly doesn't want to defend his worldview as being so (and thus, logically, is prevented from attacking or "arguing against" other views such as theism)? One could, of course, do so for the benefit of third-parties; this would, I think, be more like an external critique rather than an internal one.
Side-note: Bahnsen, who makes a later appearance in Mr. Lazar's book, misinterpreted Clark in similar respects in his book, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, when the latter used language like the "hypothesis of divine omniscience." Clark does not mean divine omniscience is to be taken only "as if" it is true. He means it is an undemonstrated assumption, presupposition, axiom, or first principle:
When unbelievers object to Christianity on the basis that it views the world on the basis of undemonstrated hypotheses, the reply should plainly be made that everyone more or less consciously bases his conclusions on undemonstrated assumptions. There are no facts, no meaningful facts, apart from presuppositions. (The Bible Today, 42.4, 1948)
Likewise, in quote 2) above in which Clark asks, "who can deny, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle?" Clark is speaking rhetorically and against those with an inferior apologetic whom we will try to persuade, an idea he alludes to in a preceding paragraph:
...after the humanist or theist has worked out a consistent system by arranging all his propositions as theorems in a series of valid demonstrations, how is either of them to persuade the other to accept his unproved axioms? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pg. 26).
Persuasiveness is apologetic, not epistemic. And because the Christian is able to produce a better apologetic due to a better epistemology, it is true that non-Christians cannot deny our right to choose a more promising first principle – note that this does not mean Clark believes our first principle is premised on any apologetic test he mentions. On the contrary, as Clark says later in the same book:
How then could God show to a man that it was God speaking? Suppose God should say, “I will make of you a great nation...and I will bless them that bless you and curse him that curses you.” Would God call the devil and ask Abraham to believe the devil’s corroborative statements? Is the devil’s word good evidence of God’s veracity? It would not seem so. Nor is the solution to be found in God’s appealing to another man in order to convince the doubter. Aside from the fact that this other man is no more of an authority than the devil, the main question reappears unanswered in this case also. What reasons can this man have to conclude that God is making a revelation to him? It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. God may, to be sure, furnish “evidence” to man. He may send an earthquake, a fire, or still small voice; he may work spectacular miracles, or, as in the cases of Isaiah and Peter, he may produce inwardly an awful consciousness of sin, so that the recipient of the revelation is compelled to cry out, “Woe is me! For I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips.” But whether it be an external spectacle or an inward “horror or great darkness,” all of this is God’s witnessing to himself. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183)
...that revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axioms, whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way... by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 53)
Axioms are tested by evaluation of their resulting systems, but they are not known by those means. Some might say Clark would have agreed with John Robbins' implicit positism in defining knowledge as "giving reasons" (in which case, an axiom cannot be known because no reasons for it can be given). Others have thought Clark was a coherentist, thinking he could know his first principle by evaluation of the resultant system. I would disagree: Clark was a foundationalist (link; cf. point 5 again in the Butler link above), which buttresses my argument that he viewed a distinction between epistemology and apologetics.
Another aside: unless people are prepared to argue that Clark was a traditional coherentist, other forms of coherentism collapse into foundationalism. Among others, Ernest Sosa and Peter Klein have each noted that “emergent” coherentism, on which the justification for a proposition or belief emerges in virtue of its being a member of a coherent set, is a form of meta-justificatory foundationalism.
To return to Mr. Lazar conclusion, he believes that Clark/Scripturalism suggests we:
1) "identify a worldview to be tested," then
2) "take the worldview as a conjecture of a hypothesis,"
3) "evaluate the worldview" and finally,
4) "make a sane choice between worldviews."
Is the outlined procedure here a reference to the epistemology of Scripturalism, to its apologetic, or both? And if it is a reference to the apologetic, does Mr. Lazar think Clark's epistemology is grounded on his apologetic or vice versa? It preliminarily appears as though Mr. Lazar makes Clark's apologetic the ground of his epistemology, since it looks like he is arguing that the choice of a worldview['s first principle] comes at then end of a process. Further evidence for this is found when he expounds on the second step:
Second, you take the worldview as a conjecture or a hypothesis. At this point, it's not important whether you already believe the worldview to be true or false. For the sake of the evaluations, you consider it on its own terms to test it for consistency. (emphasis mine)
One already believes a worldview to be true before he attempts to apply apologetic tests. This is inescapable: by the time a reader realizes that we all choose first principles, he has already implicitly chosen one. No one begins in an epistemically neutral position (link):
...if one were ever truly thoroughly epistemically neutral, there would be by definition no criterial basis on which he could ever move to non-neutrality. The first step toward knowledge is not neutrality, it's committing to some criteria by which one can allegedly distinguish what is and isn't knowable.
On Clark's system, for example, I need to know another's first principle in order to show it to be self-defeating on its own grounds. But apagogic argumentation itself presupposes I hold to a worldview from which I am able to operate. To know how to undermine skepticism, for instance, I must first be able to know what skepticism is. But how? Certainly not on skeptical grounds, for skepticism is self-defeating. You can't really criticize another's worldview until you have - or, at least, think you have - one of your own. But then is it is clear that one can't criticize from a self-pronounced position of epistemic neutrality, for one cannot operate from a position whose sole requirement just is to abstain from all positions, including criteria for knowledge. That itself is self-defeating.
What, then, does Mr. Lazar believe was the criterial basis on which Clark believed by which he claimed to know anything? The three or four tests he mentions, or Scripture? It is one thing to say that the epistemic axiom ought to be self-consistent. It is another to suggest that we have no idea whether the worldview (and, thus, the epistemic axiom of that worldview) is true until we test it, or that the truth of the worldview is irrelevant. That line of thinking would lead to considering Clark's apologetic being the root of his epistemology and result viewing Clark as being a traditional coherentist who, for some reason, likes to talk about first principles.
I have mostly been offering a counter-exposition as to what I think Clark believed. If I were writing a book about Scripturalism, I would probably mention many other instances in Clark's writings from which I gather he is a foundationalist, why I think several writers are mistaken about whether or not he views Scripturalism as just one axiom among many others (any of which may be, antecedent to testing, possibly true), etc.
I might also put forward for consideration that because, for Clark, it is by grace that we believe in the Scriptures, there is a further distinction at play which could be discussed: the distinction between a metaphysical, etiological explanation for a belief (e.g. the causation of the Holy Spirit) and epistemic justification (which itself can be categorized, broken down into further distinctions: inferential reasoning vs. self-authentication).
But I hope it is clear that in my view, the apologetic of Clark proceeds from the epistemology of Clark, an order with which I agree (and perhaps Mr. Lazar does as well, in which case much of this is just discussion about what Clark actually believed). I think Clark is able to attack other worldviews and defend his own, not because he began with certain tests in mind, struck upon the idea of an epistemic axiom of revelation and, since it passed those tests, chose to accept it. Rather, he was able to test anything only because he first believed the axiom of revelation. The knowledge of the tests doesn't precede the axiom, they come from it (or, depending on the worldview in question, purport to). Epistemology grounds apologetics, not vice versa. I will mention this again at various points in the rest of the review at pertinent points.
Scripturalism's Two Tasks
Before Mr. Lazar turns to examine whether Scripturalism passes four tests, he describes Clark's apologetic as having "two tasks: negative and positive." I think Scripturalism itself has more tasks than that if one considers to to be a worldview, not just an apologetic. But Mr. Lazar is correct that the apologetic Scripturalism has these two tasks.
Something that I think is missed in ensuing discussion, though, is that Clark did not think that the negative test of consistency was a sufficient one. Mr. Lazar concludes this section of exposition of Clark's thought by writing, "In sum, demonstrating the consistency of Christianity and the inconsistency of non-Christian worldviews is how you can make a sane choice between first principles." Yes, it is extremely useful to, where possible, show that a person contradicts himself and examine why. It is also useful to show, to as great an extent as possible, that Christians can be consistent. And indeed, apologetics is concerned with being useful, persuasive, and practical. With all of this, Clark would agree. But besides logical consistency, Clark was also clear that Scripture itself is also a test of truth (which would, of course, be in line with his epistemology):
The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth.
Ideally or for God this seems to be the case. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.
Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other...
Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions. Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest. Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth.
Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 287, 290)
In addition to the tests of truth Mr. Lazar mentions, a further chapter on Scripture as a test of truth may have solved some of the problems he finds with Scripturalism. But I don't blame him for missing this, because despite earning the moniker of Scripturalism and advocating for Scripture as his epistemic axiom, it is remarkable how many people fail to mention that Clark thought Scripture itself is useful in apologetics. If we can know Scripture is true (and we can, axiomatically), then we can appeal to it when defending our faith. Now, it is a standard that some people reject. But just as there is use in mentioning to third parties that a person who chooses insanity or inconsistency fails the test of reason (an external critique), there is use in mentioning to third parties (e.g. Christians) that a person who chooses to reject the inerrancy of God's word has failed the test of Scripture.
My final comment on this chapter is about the following statement by Mr. Lazar: "As with all other worldview conjectures, Scripturalism can be falsified, but not verified." I would argue that Scripturalism cannot be falsified. It can be tested, but there is no possibility that a correct examination could lead to a conclusion that it fails. For something to be falsifiable means that it could be proven false.
Suppose one regarded every worldview as falsifiable. Then everything is capable of being proved false... but how? If no test is exempted from being proved false, then how would you test whether something is false at all? And is the very meaning of true and false subject to falsifiability? Is a principle of falsifiability itself falsifiable? All of this is an indirect argument for infallibilist knowledge (link). Clark certainly didn't believe that his first principle was falsifiable. He thought, as a good foundationalist, it was self-authenticating and infallible:
This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47)
Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe?, 1985, pg. 18)
The only reason I can think of as to why one would think Clark believed or held beliefs which imply that Scripturalism is falsifiable is if he thought Clark appealed to various tests (reason, skepticism, explanatory power, etc.) in order to epistemically (rather than apologetically) justify his axiom. As I hope I have shown, this is not what Clark believed, nor should the reader.
In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 2, which concerns what Mr. Lazar calls the test of reason.
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