Saturday, September 25, 2010

Omniscience: Eternal or Bust

I was thinking about this post today as I was reviewing both Robert Reymond's version of the argument from which that post received its inspiration (cf. The Justification of Knowledge, pgs. 36-37) and some books on Open Theism, and I had an interesting thought. First, for convenience, here is the argument:

//For a being to claim to know a proposition is true presupposes that he knows it's truth is not contingent or, if it is, said being knows that upon which the veracity of the proposition is contingent. Let's call this being Ryan. This implies two things:

1. Ryan is omniscient or has acquired his knowledge from a being who is omniscient, as Ryan would be required to know the relation between a proposition and anything upon which the veracity of the proposition might be predicated (which in turn implies knowledge of everything, including respective contingencies).
2. Ryan's knowledge is infinite or has acquired his knowledge from a being whose knowledge is infinite, as there are infinitely many possible relations one might posit between the proposition in question and everything imaginable.//

The thought that occurred to me was that not only is man's knowledge dependent upon an omniscient, infinitely knowledgeable being, but said being cannot have become omniscient or infinitely knowledgeable through a process; that is, it is necessary that the being in question is eternally omniscient. For simplicity, let's call this being God and let "eternal omniscience" encompass the notion of infinite knowledge.

Now God, if He is not eternally omniscient, must, if one is to allege that He has or can become omniscient, have at some point learned that which He did not know. In other words, God was not omniscient prior to having learned that which He did not know. So far, so obvious.

But if this is so, it would not have been possible for God to know the relation between that which, prior to His learning, God did not know and everything else imaginable. Given this, however, God would have been in the same boat as man! Again, from the aforementioned post:

//Or we may consider these questions: how does Ryan know the proposition he claims is true isn't contingent on x, y, or z? If Ryan doesn't know, can he justifiably claim to know the proposition is true? No.//

Or: how would God have known any proposition He claimed is true isn't contingent on that which He did not know? He couldn't, precisely because He can't know any relation between that which He does not know and everything else imaginable until He actually knows the unknown proposition. This in turn implies God either wouldn't know anything unless He knows everything from eternity or that He has, like men, acquired His knowledge from one who is (but in this case, He from whom God would have acquired His knowledge would actually be "God" in the traditional sense).

The implications of this thought appear deep: for instance, predicating God's knowledge on that which is extrinsic to God would, since God alone is eternal, not only destroy God's omniscience, it destroys God's knowledge, period. It refutes Open Theism outright, and it is yet another weapon in the Christian's arsenal of elenctic arguments for which secular philosophy cannot answer.

[I've tried to make this post as short as possible even though I think I could make the thought contained herein clearer, because I wanted to put the point as simply as possible before I forgot it.]

P. S. Should anyone ask how I know that this argument is self-affirming, I'd point him to the Bible..

6 comments:

  1. So, how would this look in a debate format? How would you utilize this apologetic?



    yes, this is Beau

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  2. The following is just a rough sketch. I would start a debate with definitions. If the topic is how we can know God, who is "we" and what do we mean by "know" and "God"? Often, debaters just assume that they are talking about the same thing when they aren't.

    After definitions and depending on the topic, I would explain the difference between my knowing God and my defending that I can know God. This is what informal apologetics usually come down to. No one else can know if I know God - they can know that I don't know God, if the God I claim to know or the means by which I know are, say, internally inconsistent.

    This is also a good point to bring up foundational or presuppositional beliefs, beliefs which are self-justified and thus need no prior premises in order to be known. When we defend such beliefs, it isn't to suggest that how we defend them are means by which we come to conclude those beliefs are true, it's to suggest that those beliefs themselves fulfill certain conditions - coherency with other beliefs, relevancy to epistemic questions, etc. Rejection of these lead to trivialism and, thus, skepticism.

    Then I would talk about different proposed foundational beliefs. I would show examples of how some lead to inconsistencies and therefore are reduced to absurdity, others don't provide enough information, etc. I would end by talking about my basic belief, the axiom that all things I know or could know are products of divine revelation, and that the extant extent of divine revelation is found in Scripture.

    Again, at this point in my explanation, this presupposes I've already defined "knowledge" (in an internalist sense) and that I'm claiming this belief is self-justified or known because Scripture is God's self-authenticated word. And the defense I would next present of this belief is not the means by which I know it, as that would make the foundational belief a conclusion (i.e. not foundational).

    It is only after this has taken place that I would defend this foundational belief with transcendental/classical arguments which aim to show certain necessary truths Christianity can account for that other systems don't. Is there a logical proof of Christianity such that any statement can be shown as requiring the gospel to be presupposed? Maybe only an omniscient person could provide such a proof. But this is irrelevant, as logical proof is not the only method of knowledge. Divine revelation is foundational, and as such, we can know the gospel is necessarily true, even if we can't defend it with a logical proof. If someone says this isn't enough, let us hear his explanation of how he claims to know anything and go from there.

    So I would also reiterate the pragmatic function of apologetics. Given that function, it makes sense to engage beliefs people do hold even if they have no means by which to account for them. And if you can get those people to admit certain truths as necessary for knowledge - the laws of logic for instance - you can show why those truths are mutually dependent on other, most specifically theistic or Christian views, e.g. that what we know must have been communicated by a person or persons who are omniscient, and that the[se] person[s] must likewise be eternal to avoid having at some time been in the same epistemic predicament that we are in. This require defining eternity and time and whatnot. The communication must also be self-authenticating because it would otherwise stand in need of support from something or someone not omniscient, and skepticism ensues.

    With such arguments, if you can open a person's mind this far, you can make headway in showing why a Christian worldview is rational. Maybe they irrationally reject that, maybe God uses that as a means (though clearly apologetics is not a precondition for God using the gospel to save) to change their minds. At that point, you've done your job.

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    Replies
    1. Hello,

      I really appreciate your writings. They’ve been very helpful.

      Are you saying that instead of saying that *all* non-Christian worldviews fail (or presuppose the Christian worldview, which is, I believe, the common Transcendental Argument), the better approach is to simply say, here’s how these kinds of worldviews fail and here’s how the Christian worldview succeeds? And say that all the worldviews *that we can currently know/talk about* fail?

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  3. Hi Michael, glad to hear that.

    "Are you saying that instead of saying that *all* non-Christian worldviews fail (or presuppose the Christian worldview, which is, I believe, the common Transcendental Argument), the better approach is to simply say, here’s how these kinds of worldviews fail and here’s how the Christian worldview succeeds? And say that all the worldviews *that we can currently know/talk about* fail?"

    I wouldn't say that that is the subject of this particular post. This particular post is a kind of transcendental argument that has a twofold apologetic goal:

    1. It tries to eliminate from contention any worldview in which a person claims to be able to justify (in an internalist, infallibilist sense) his knowledge claims without either being eternally omniscient or dependent upon one who is.

    2. By implication, it tries to show that a [presuppositionalist] Christian is self-consistent in this regard.

    Regarding your question:

    I would say that all non-Christian worldviews fail. It is impossible for me, as a Christian, to entertain another alternative. This is just me living and believing out of my own worldview consistently.

    Is it possible to reduce to absurdity every individual non-Christian worldview fails? Yes - God's word says they fail, and because it says that, and because it is our extant extent of knowledge that we can justify in the aforementioned sense, that is sufficient to the purpose.

    Is that going to satisfy non-Christians who do not believe the Bible in the first place? Probably not. But is that relevant? In one sense, yes; in another, no.

    It is not relevant in the following sense: what non-Christians think about the above method of relying on God's word to demonstrate the failure of non-Christian worldviews has no impact upon whether or not the demonstration is true. This speaks to how a Christian can be assured even if non-Christians reject his message. He can be assured because his knowledge of the truth of his message doesn't depend upon how non-Christians respond to it, it depends on God's word.

    Furthermore, the non-Christian does not have any goal posts to move at this point - what I mean by that is that sometimes, when conversing with an unbeliever (especially online, but sometimes in person too), it isn't uncommon for them to retreat to a different position, so long as that retreat isn't to Christianity. They may grant you that their current view is false but feel no worse about immediately changing to another false view. Instead of repeating this process, it is at this point useful to point out what they are doing and why it isn't legitimate: God's word rules out any other positions or views to which they would instead retreat.

    Continued...

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  4. Continuing...

    To return to the question of relevancy, the question about unbelievers' "satisfaction" is relevant from an apologetic standpoint. Practically speaking, there is use in bringing up how individual non-Christian worldviews actually fail. That can act as a mediate means by which the Holy Spirit works conviction in men's minds. And we can show how those worldviews individually fail in that they are, for instance, internally inconsistent.

    Contrastingly, there is no use in trying to eliminate all non-Christian worldviews by some method other than the Bible, not even logical consistency. Our knowledge of God's word does not derive from a feature of the Bible such as its logical consistency (although it is indeed logically consistent - but that is a metaphysical feature I learn about after I have accepted God's word as my sufficient presupposition, not logical consistency per se). Even the original post must, if I am consistently presuppositional, ultimately hinge upon that.

    But it is good, right, sound, and practical to show how something is logically inconsistent, because such a view we know to be false (again, by God's word).

    I think much of the confusion when it comes down to it is the need to distinguish epistemology and apologetics. Epistemology has to do with how we know things, whereas apologetics is how we try to communicate that knowledge such that the Spirit, if He pleases, epistemologically enlightens others. Viewed in this light, apologetics is mainly about practicality, because while the Spirit operates through us - so we still must be speaking truth - exactly what truth we speak is somewhat left to our discretion.

    On the other hand, epistemology is rigid: our [internally and infallibly justified] knowledge comes from God's word. There isn't anything left to our discretion, because what should function as our foundation of such knowledge is the same in every case: God's word.

    Hope that helped, and thank you for the question. I was able to sort a few things out in my own mind as well.

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  5. Thanks for such a thorough reply, and I'm glad you found some value out of answering, too :). Keep up the great work, and know that your writings are helping others!

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