3. The Orthodox Church, in her unity and catholicity, is the Church of Councils, from the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem (Acts 15.5-29) to the present day. The Church in herself is a Council, established by Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit, in accord with the apostolic words: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” (Acts 15.28). Through the Ecumenical and Local councils, the Church has proclaimed and continues to proclaim the mystery of the Holy Trinity, revealed through the incarnation of the Son and Word of God. The Conciliar work continues uninterrupted in history through the later councils of universal authority, such as, for example, the Great Council (879-880) convened at the time of St. Photios the Great, Patriarch of Constantinople, and also the Great Councils convened at the time of St. Gregory Palamas (1341, 1351, 1368), through which the same truth of faith was confirmed, most especially as concerns the procession of the Holy Spirit and as concerns the participation of human beings in the uncreated divine energies, and furthermore through the Holy and Great Councils convened in Constantinople, in 1484 to refute the unionist Council of Florence (1438-1439), in 1638, 1642, 1672 and 1691 to refute Protestant beliefs, and in 1872 to condemn ethno-phyletism as an ecclesiological heresy.
Note also that the Council of Crete declares itself to have been given by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit:
With a hymn of thanksgiving, we praise and worship God in Trinity, who has enabled us to gather together during the days of the feast of Pentecost here on the island of Crete, which has been sanctified by St. Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, and his disciple Titus, his “true son in the common faith” (Tit 1.4), and, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to conclude the sessions of this Holy and Great Council of our Orthodox Church – convened by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, by the common will of Their Beatitudes the Primates of the most holy Orthodox Churches – for the glory of His most holy Name and for the great blessing of His people and of the whole world, confessing with the divine Paul: “Let people then regard us thus: as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor 4.1).
Through a spokesman, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople further declared that the Council of Crete is "binding" (
link). Is this, then, an open and shut case that the Synod of Jerusalem (and Confession of Dositheus) is binding?
Not quite! Four Eastern Orthodox churches - representing a significant percentage of the worldwide population of Eastern Orthodoxy - declined to participate in the Council of Crete. Several of these churches (e.g.
Antioch) convened synods in which they stated that the Council of Crete is
not binding. But since then, the ecumenical patriarch wrote a letter of admonishment (
link) in which he reaffirmed "the binding nature of its documents for all the Orthodox faithful, clergy and lay..."
If I'm Eastern Orthodox, who am I supposed to believe, and why am I supposed to believe them? Are Eastern Orthodox apologists left with "private judgment" as
they themselves have constructed the concept when straw-manning Protestantism (regarding which I've always found
this post by Steve Hays to be helpful - see more below)? If not, what criteria are supposed to be applied, and - just as importantly - on what normative and/or epistemic grounds in said criteria used?
Robinson's once theorized answer of
pentarchical ratification was critiqued long ago by Steve Hays (
link,
link,
link,
link,
link). There's no need for me to repeat Hays' points, especially as it seems quite a few other Eastern Orthodox apologists have shied away from Robinson's theory (
example;
example,
example) in favor of different forms of the very "receptionism" view that Robinson suspects is due to a reliance on "pop-Orthodox" works.
Several of these other apologists explicitly
embrace circularity. If this sounds Van Tilian, it's because they have either implicitly or even explicitly borrowed from him and, therefore, are susceptible to points a foundationalist - such as myself - make (
link).
These apologists also tend to conflate performative contradictions (e.g. you can't perform an apologetic against language or logic without using language and logic) with the structure of epistemic justification, as if apologetic circularity somehow entails justificatory circularity.
Further, these apologists attempt to leverage this bait-and-switch by begging the question, analogizing an internal contradiction inherent in concrete examples of performative contradictions to an alleged internal contradiction if one rejects their particular "paradigm" of circularity. When it is pointed out to them that anyone can make an assertion such as "my circle is good and yours isn't" (do they think
that claim is
also "justified" circularly?) they completely fail to recognize that the way in which they typically respond to it - which is to admit the point and pivot to apologetics - is equally available to foundationalists who encounter objections on the grounds that anyone can assert their foundation is self-justifying. They further fail to address problems with a coherentist structure of justification, which I've critiqued elsewhere (
link).
Now, all Eastern Orthodox receptionists will need to answer whether there are any authorities in any situations in which one may instantly know they are speaking infallibly.
1a. If so, which and why? In one example I link to above, an Eastern Orthodox apologist appeals to the remarks of a fallible bishop to prop up his entire receptionist criteria. Talk about a fallible list of infallible "books"!
1b. Or if the Eastern Orthodox apologists will attempt to borrow still more from, say, a presuppositionalist such as myself and claim that one can know such foundationally, these apologists will have abandoned receptionism as meaningfully distinct from the Protestant doctrine of the self-authenticity of divine revelation, the usual arguments one encounters against sola scriptura, and any pretense that their position is advantageous with respect to Protestantism. In fact, they will have the harder responsibility of reconciling conciliar promulgations with their larger "paradigm," on which see more below. These apologists would also need to answer whether one may know that the eighth "ecumenical" council and Palamite councils are infallible, on which I believe there is some question within Eastern Orthodoxy.
2. If not - if "reception" is a condition for knowledge which takes time - then not only will these apologists face questions regarding what "reception" entails (what are the criteria and why?) but also the following question: for one who hears the words of a council before such time as it may be "received," is the hearer obligated to accept the promulgations of said council at the time he heard it or not? If he is not obligated, then it would appear that normative authority actually rests in whatever are the criteria for "reception." If he is obligated, then one is obligated to accept that which might be damnably false. And for those apologists who would argue ad hoc that a hearer is only obliged if the council is true and will be received (despite the fact the hearer doesn't know it at the time), they will be placing hearer of Councils in an epistemic dilemma: if they accept the council, they risk believing damnable error; if they reject or refrain from belief in the council, they risk rejecting or refraining from belief in that which is obligatory. Take, for example, the so-called "robber" council of Ephesus.
The Orthodox view of "normative authority" is not as perspicuous as their apologists project, let alone their claim that it advantages them in contrast to Protestantism. The reverse seems to be the case.
[Side note before proceeding: keeping in mind these criticisms, given that Eastern Orthodoxy would seem to view the second council of Nicaea in 787 as ecumenical and infallible, at the very least, Eastern Orthodoxy seems committed to accepting a doctrine of original sin. To understand why this is the case, take Canon 110 of the Council of Carthage (419), which states:
Likewise it seemed good that whosoever denies that infants newly from their mother's wombs should be baptized, or says that baptism is for remission of sins, but that they derive from Adam no original sin, which needs to be removed by the laver of regeneration, from whence the conclusion follows, that in them the form of baptism for the remission of sins, is to be understood as false and not true, let him be anathema.
For no otherwise can be understood what the Apostle says, By one man sin has come into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed upon all men in that all have sinned, than the Catholic Church everywhere diffused has always understood it. For on account of this rule of faith (regulam fidei) even infants, who could have committed as yet no sins themselves, therefore are truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that what in them is the result of generation may be cleansed by regeneration.
This council was accepted by the Council of Trullo (Canon 2). In turn, the Council of Trullo (otherwise known as the Quinisext Council) was ratified at the second council of Nicaea - the so-called seventh "ecumenical" council - as having been adopted at the sixth "ecumenical" council:
[After a number of other quotations, was read the Canon of the Council in Trullo as a canon of the Sixth Synod (col. 233).]
Tarasius, the most holy Patriarch said: There are certain affected with the sickness of ignorance who are scandalized by these canons [viz. of the Trullan Synod] and say, And do you really think they were adopted at the Sixth Synod? Now let all such know that the holy great Sixth Synod was assembled at Constantinople concerning those who said that there was but one energy and will in Christ. These anathematized the heretics, and having expounded the orthodox faith, they went to their homes in the fourteenth year of Constantine. But after four or five years the same fathers came together under Justinian, the son of Constantine, and set forth the before-mentioned canons. And let no one doubt concerning them. For they who subscribed under Constantine were the same as they who under Justinian signed the present chart, as can manifestly be established from the unchangeable similarity of their own handwriting. For it was right that they who had appeared at an ecumenical synod should also set forth ecclesiastical canons. They said that we should be led as (by the hand) by the venerable images to the recollection of the incarnation of Christ and of his saving death, and if by them we are led to the realization of the incarnation of Christ our God, what sort of an opinion shall we have of them who break down the venerable images? (link)
See also the part in bold from Canon 1 of this council which indirectly references the Council of Trullo:
Seeing these things are so, being thus well-testified unto us, we rejoice over them as he that has found great spoil, and press to our bosom with gladness the divine canons, holding fast all the precepts of the same, complete and without change, whether they have been set forth by the holy trumpets of the Spirit, the renowned Apostles, or by the Six Ecumenical Councils, or by Councils locally assembled for promulgating the decrees of the said Ecumenical Councils, or by our holy Fathers. For all these, being illumined by the same Spirit, defined such things as were expedient. Accordingly those whom they placed under anathema, we likewise anathematize; those whom they deposed, we also depose; those whom they excommunicated, we also excommunicate; and those whom they delivered over to punishment, we subject to the same penalty. (link)
I'm approaching this topic from the perspective of a Protestant who aims to provide an internal critique. Roman Catholics might object to Eastern Orthodoxy on external grounds, as they reject the Council of Trullo. Interested readers can see here for more on that question.
But even granting Eastern Orthodox assumptions, irrespective of their view of the Confession of Dositheus, the foregoing appears to show that Eastern Orthodox apologists ought to accept that infants have sin in need of remission.
On this note, quoting Against Julian (link), Daniel Castellano - a Roman Catholic who is referenced by the pair of apologists I mentioned above who tried to harmonize original guilt with Eastern Orthodoxy - renders a convincing case that Augustine, who was present at the Council of Carthage in 419 and whose theology would seem to provide context to the meaning of "remission" in Canon 110, grounded liability to punishment in culpability:
In this life, even the baptized are subjected to evils, so one can hardly avoid the fact that humans are born under a yoke of affliction. Yet if God is just, there must be in infants guilt (culpam) deserving such punishment (poenam) (Ibid., VI, x, 31) Here, for the first time, St. Augustine clearly says there is culpa in infants, as opposed to mere reatus. He does this on the basis that justice demands there be some culpa for every poena. Yet the culpa that is in infants, we have just seen, is not their own by action, but Adam’s. It is theirs only by contagion. It is only after making this distinction that St. Augustine dares to ascribe culpa rather than reatus to the descendants of Adam.
The Apostle unequivocally teaches that we are all condemned in our nature: We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. [Eph. 2:3] (Ibid., VI, x, 33) This indicates that the reatus is in our nature, and at least suggests that the culpa may be in there also.
St. Augustine finally offers an explanation of how we are all culpable for Adam’s sin toward the end of Contra Iulianum. While expounding in whom all have sinned, he notes that Julian, who accepted the Latin rendering, interpreted it differently as because of whom all have sinned. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 75) St. Augustine counters that a man does not commit personal sin because of Adam’s sin, but for some immediate cause; e.g., a murderer kills because he wants gold; Cain killed because he envied his brother. Rather, the Apostle means that all men have sinned by way of origin in one man, as it were in common, in the oneness of the mass. (Loc. cit.)
This is a sufficiently important expression that we should parse the Latin. In context, Julian denies the verse should be understood thus, so we discard the negative and the main clause, leaving: in uno homine omnes homines peccasse… originaliter, et tamquam in massae unione communiter. The first unusual word is originaliter, an adverbial form of ‘origin,’ so it modifies the verb. Thus we sinned by our origin. In other words, we have sinned by virtue of our descent from Adam. How can this be so? A second adverb is added, communiter. That is to say, we sinned jointly in the unity of the mass.
This need not mean that each of us was personally present in germine when Adam sinned. Rather, when Adam sinned, the human race sinned, for he and his wife were the human race. Since all partake of the same corrupted nature, we all sin jointly, not at some moment near the dawn of creation, but throughout all history on earth. St. Augustine is asserting a continuous solidarity of the human race in its corrupted nature. Indeed, such a solidarity is presupposed by any sensible interpretation of Christ’s redemptive act. The only innovation here is using that solidarity to express how the culpa for original sin is shared by the whole human race.
To uphold the view that all have sinned by our origin from Adam, it is necessary to refute Julian’s view that the Apostle is speaking only of our personal sins:
…if the Apostle had been talking about the imitation of sin, it would have been more fitting to say that sin passed to all men because there had first been Adam’s example, and he would have added that it passed to all men in that all have sinned by imitation of that one man. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 77)
Julian complained that if the Apostle meant what Augustine says, he would have stated it more explicitly. The response above shows that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. St. Paul was not writing for Julian or Augustine, so we should not expect either doctrine to be stated explicitly. Instead we should look to his context.
The context of Romans 5:12, repeated throughout the passage, is that through one man the wrath of God fell upon human race, and through another man the reconciliation of the human race with God was achieved. St. Augustine repeatedly cites Romans (as any reader can glean for himself) to prove that all, not just many, are said to be condemned in Adam and delivered in Christ. Once this is conceded, it must be acknowledged that this includes infants without personal sin, which leaves only original sin by which we are condemned.
More generally, he shows that it is consistent with reason, revelation, and justice that we have the culpa of Adam in us. He does not prove, however, that this really must be the case. The Orthodox, among others, would object to this strange way of speaking, where we are guilty of a sin that we did not commit in act.
A fitting conclusion given that the Eastern Orthodox apologist who cited Castellano has since defected to Roman Catholicism, a predictable outcome given that Augustine's doctrine of original guilt is incompatible with Eastern Orthodoxy's Mariology - her being subject to punishment for sin for which she is "culpable."
For the fuller context of Augustine's remarks, read Against Julian here.]
The first thing to note is that Hays agrees with me that the sola-solo description that Mathison puts out (posits) is untenable, right. And Hays essentially admits that my argument is successful - in not so many words, but that's pretty much what it ends up being. And so he constructs an idiosyncratic position - basically a kind of solo biblicist position - and he then reduces normativity to being accurate, to being truthful. So all that matters is that an interpretation is true, and so there really are no secondary authorities. You're not obligated to follow the Westminster Confession or anything else - only insofar as you judge it to be true. So in this way, he's essentially capitulating and rejecting the traditional, Reformed position.
Now, if your response to my argument - the only way you can get out of it - is to say "well, the Reformed position is wrong," and "I'm going to take this other position," and "hahaha you can't touch me here, the argument doesn't touch me there," well, you've admitted that my argument is successful against the Reformed position. And if you have to excise yourself out of the Reformed position, that's a win as far as I'm concerned.
Of course, people largely "follow" whatever they "judge" to be true. But that's descriptive, not prescriptive. And that description applies just as much to someone like Robinson as it does to Hays (link).
What, then, by way of prescription? I doubt Robinson agrees with Hays' alternative to Mathison's framework (link; link) - and I missed why Robinson does not consider Hays' position to count as within the purview of the Reformed tradition - so it would have been useful for Robinson to have responded to the following question by Hays:
Suppose Perry uses ecumenical councils as his benchmark. If so, doesn't that just push the question back a step? By what authority does Perry determine which candidates for ecumenical councils are legitimate?
Does this suggest Hays' position entails oneself as a so-called "final authority," as Robinson states in the video? No. It's a solid, internal critique of Robinson's view. To the extent Robinson pushes back that he is not acting authoritatively, such an answer will be analogously available to Protestants regarding sola scriptura.
Further, anyone who reads Hays' article can see that Robinson's above summary misstates Hays' position. Contra Robinson, Hays did not suggest that one is [only] obligated to follow what one "judges" to be true. Steve clearly writes: "We are obligated to believe a true interpretation of Scripture, whether or not we perceive it to be true."
We might approach the distinction between authority and epistemology from another angle. To what extent the following would intersect with Hays' position is unclear, but contrary to the existentialist philosophy which saturates contemporary American culture, humans exist relationally: family, state, and church structures are hierarchical. As such, each structure has authoritative heads (link).
What does this mean? Well, an earthly father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's father commands them to do their homework, eat their vegetables, or go to sleep, the child is bound or obligated to obey.
Likewise, a spiritual father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's spiritual father commands them to recite a confession or hymn in unison, to gather together at a certain time on the Lord's Day, or to give heed to a certain Scriptural reading, the child is bound or obligated to obey.
Note that in these examples I use, the fathers might have permissibly chosen to obligate their children to do something else. Nevertheless, commands such as these are within the scope of each authority's power.
That said, the authority of fathers only go so far. An earthly father cannot determine my spouse; a spiritual father cannot determine my job. Further, the authority of an earthly and a spiritual father are themselves normed by truth. These authorities have God-given prescriptions as well as proscriptions.
I doubt Hays would have disagreed with this. If, say, either father teaches something that is false - cf. Irenei - the truth revealed by our Heavenly Father overrides their subordinate authority. And adding a mother, several hundred bishops, or even an apostle or angel into the mix doesn't change anything (Galatians 1:8). God may delegate authoritative roles, but insofar as any authority (or, for that matter, subordinate) who speaks truth does so by themselves implicitly presupposing divine revelation, God is the "final authority." We can know His word just is truth. For that reason, it is epistemically foundational and our authoritative norming norm.
However, if one typically "follows" what one "judges" to be true (description), how can we ensure our judgments align with our obligations (prescription)? This dovetails with a few other comments Hays offered in his original response to Robinson:
vi) I disagree with how Perry frames the issue. It's not in the first instance a question of authority but truth and evidence. We have a duty to believe revealed truth, and the evidence for some interpretations is better than others.
vii) Apropos (vi), it's meaningless to say, in the abstract, that an individual has more authority than the church or vice versa. Those are empty generalities. They can't be true or false because it depends on the specifics. Sometimes individuals are right while collectives are wrong. Sometimes collectives are right while individuals are wrong. There's no fact-free principle that's true in general. Rather, it depends on specific claims and supporting evidence.
In most cases, I agree with Hays, and if Robinson thought Hays' position was worth mentioning, one would think he might have responded to points such as these.
One added caveat to Hay's remarks: when it comes to foundational knowledge - where one's knowledge and obligations begin - I think Robinson's own tutor, Russ Manion, says it well: "God’s revelation is self-authenticating, because, by it, everything else is authenticated" (link).
From what I've read of him, I quite like Manion - he seems to have derived much of his apologetic from the likes of Gordon Clark, Cornelius Van Til, and Greg Bahnsen. There are obvious disagreements I would have, but I've said before that Eastern Orthodox apologists should read him more closely (link), for as I've also said before, many Eastern Orthodox apologists appear to favor a species of sola revelation (link). Manion ironically confirms this in the most Protestant of terms. He may have even conceded this point - he appears to have been a genuine fellow.
Does Eastern Orthodoxy entail what Manion suggests? Well, on Eastern Orthodoxy, what could have been considered as one's "normative authority" between the time of the apostles and the first Council of Nicaea? Given that bishops can be wrong and sometimes were wrong, might it not be that God's revelation as propositional truth - regardless of whether the mode by which said truth was communicated was oral or written (link) - must be regarded as one's ultimate rule of faith? Everything else - councils and all - are to be measured by it, no? The only question is whether Scripture is materially and formally sufficient for knowledge; many Eastern Orthodox apologists seem to agree with the former, and their view seems to entail the latter. This would be rather Clarkian!
Regarding what "knowledge" itself means seems to be an open question amongst Eastern Orthodox apologists. Robinson himself disclaims "absolute certitude" (link) which, of course, begs the question as to how Protestantism is disadvantaged if Robinson could be wrong about that which he considers normatively authoritative.
On the other hand, an Eastern Orthodox apologist like Jay Dyer believes Christians were able to have certitude about the faith prior to Nicaea (see the 1 hour mark here). Dyer argues that this refutes the Roman Catholic magisterium as a necessary, "epistemic principle" - well, it also undercuts any analogous suggestion that might be made regarding conciliarism (pentarchical, receptionist, etc.). After all, how else did the participants in the various councils come to their theological conclusions about Trinitarianism, Christology, etc.?
For my part, I think our knowledge of all authority - final and delegated - comes from divine revelation. Of course, we don't need to have a philosophically strict "knowledge" of who our authorities are for them to be authorities. I have authority over my newborn son without him having philosophically strict knowledge of anything, although my status as authority is knowable in principle. But I do think a philosophically strict "knowledge" is possible, as I've argued in dozens of other posts.
So if and when my son grows to the point where he is able to point towards a higher authority as a corrective to some erroneous instruction I give him, he won't be obliged to or bound by that instruction. Just so with any delegated authority. As Hays says, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right." Thus, if I teach error, my son is not obliged or bound by my instruction regardless of his epistemic status.
Does this "right" to refuse to obey delegated authorities in certain situations imply delegated authority is unreal or useless? No. Daniel was really thrown into a lion's den, and powers possessed by delegated authorities often functions to deter reckless behavior. It's just that Daniel was righteous, not reckless. Robinson seems to be aware that Presbyterians such as myself take membership vows. For instance, I myself have vowed the following:
Do you promise to participate faithfully in this church’s worship and service, to submit in the Lord to its government, and to heed its discipline, even in case you should be found delinquent in doctrine or life? (link)
In taking this vow, I joined myself to a body which has the authority to excommunicate me from it. Aside from his view of my church, would Robinson think I take that lightly?
In short, Robinson's definition of "private judgment" seems to cloud his thinking. He defines it as follows: "Any Christian individual is ultimately obligated to adhere to belief X, if and only if they judge (determine, assess, etc.) that belief X is scriptural." But wasn't Palamas excommunicated by a Synod in 1344 for what he thought was scriptural? Would Robinson describe Palamas as exercising private judgment or right judgment in that case?
While our epistemic status does not determine that which is authoritative, I don't see the relevance in this statement given that one's epistemic scruples are what will determine that which one regards as authoritative. Put it this way: it is just as easy for a Protestant apologist to posit that they are in an advantageous position with respect to a point of metaphysics (e.g. about what is "normatively authoritative") over against Eastern Orthodoxy as it is for an Eastern Orthodox apologist to posit the same thing in reverse. Without argumentation - which is epistemic and/or apologetic - there will be no reason (by definition!) for either side to budge. In their discussions, Hays was "right" to reject Robinson's definition, to shift focus to the proper sphere, and to hold Robinson accountable for the implications of his metaphysical claims.
Robinson himself admits he could apostatize from Eastern Orthodoxy. He could come to accept the Westminster Confession 31.3. Does Robinson think, then, that his possession of this power entails that he uses private judgment in his rejection of the Westminster Confession or in his acceptance of the ecumenical councils as scriptural? Is Robinson the "final authority" in his own situation? Surely not, but just so for Protestants who, say, reject unbiblical statements in conciliar documents.
One can read here or here for more on sola scriptura, including the following observation:
Sola scriptura is a metaphysical statement of what Scripture is - the extant extent of divine revelation and, thus, our solely ultimate, authoritative rule of faith - not an epistemological statement of how we know what Scripture is. Certainly, what Scripture metaphysically is may and does inform how we can know what it is, but I equally certainly don’t have to answer the question of how I know what Scripture is by looking through Scripture for a table of contents.
This last sentence returns us to Manion and the question of the canon of Scripture. I wonder if Robinson departs from his tutor on the self-authenticity of divine revelation. Robinson derides the Protestant understanding as ahistorical, yet his own view (which he does not outline) would seem to beg serious questions. Let's take a concrete example. Canon 2 of the Council of Trullo reads:
It has also seemed good to this holy Council, that the eighty-five canons, received and ratified by the holy and blessed Fathers before us, and also handed down to us in the name of the holy and glorious Apostles should from this time forth remain firm and unshaken for the cure of souls and the healing of disorders. (link)
The eighty-five canons referred to can be found here, the last of which lists the New Testament canon as including the epistles of Clement and as excluding Revelation. Does Robinson accept this list as binding?
But we saw earlier that the Council of Carthage in 419 is also accepted, and that canonical list differs from those in the eighty-fifth canon above. Who [authoritatively?] decides which list is right, and why? If I disagree with another Protestant, at least I don't hold that Protestant to be infallible.
Does Robinson not regard this council as infallible after all? Or does he take this canon of Trullo and now that "push comes to shove," will he "throw it out the window"? Or does he bite the bullet and accept the contradiction?
Further, is it not viewed as an issue that the Moscow patriarchate accepts a canon of Scripture that differs from other patriarchates?
If one's normative authorities have different understandings of that which is binding - no matter how small the difference - then it is hard for me to take serious any claim about the superiority of Eastern Orthodoxy's concept or practice of normative authority. As an apologetic tack, it's a paper argument empty and devoid of real teeth.