Clark and Nestorius

John McGuckin writes that Cyril of Alexandria

“…was appalled by the way Nestorius kept referring to the different prosopa as well as to the prosopon of the union… The problem was that Nestorius was using one and the same technical term to connote the disparate concepts of differentiation and convergence: there are two prosopa (Jesus and the Logos) and only one prosopon (Christ). There is of course, no sensible context whatsoever that would allow one to speak of three prosopa. It may well be that this economy of language in Nestorius led to a fatal weakness in the coherence of his theory, as Cyril argued, but it is clear enough that the caricature of his teaching that described it as no more than a repetition of the old Two Sons theory is an uneven reading of his intent. To this extent Cyril’s synopsis of his opponent was inaccurate. But Cyril had nonetheless put his finger on the key matter and his criticism still had force in the way he argued from Nestorius’ explicit statements to his necessary implications. In this regard Cyril had posed the essential question and voiced fears of many others when he asked whether such a theory had done enough to secure a concept of unitive subject in Christ.” (pgs. 149, 159)

If true, Cyril makes an excellent point. Indeed, one can read Nestorius make this exact sort of statement in the Bazaar of Heracleides:

…the union of the prosôpa took place for the prosopon and not for the ousia and the nature. It is not indeed that one ousia without hypostasis should be conceived, as if by union into one ousia and there were no prosôpon of one ousia, but the natures subsist in their prosôpa and in their natures and in the prosôpon of the union. For in respect to the natural prosôpon of the one the other also makes use of the same on account of the union; and thus [there is] one prosôpon of the two natures. The prosôpon of the one ousia makes use of the prosôpon of the other ousia in the same [way]. For what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity? Therefore thou wilt not call God the Word flesh nor the flesh Son.

This statement by Nestorius is troubling and why I find a graphic shown here to be misleading. Nestorius says that the prosopon (defined by McGuckin as the “observable character, defining properties, manifestation of a reality,” pg. 138) of the divine ousia (essence) and the prosopon of the human ousia are united in one prosopon.

Two prosopa somehow unite such that one prosopon results. And yet, for Nestorius, even given the resultant prosopon, there are still two prosopa, each making “use” of each other. How is this intelligible? McGuckin goes on to argue that Nestorius grounded the union in God’s will: the prosopa of the Logos and the man Jesus are extrinsically related rather than ontologically grounded. Thus, when Nestorius rhetorically asks, “what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity?” it seems that Nestorius is denying an enhypostatic-anhypostatic distinction - not that I think human nature can exist apart from a hypostasis but that Christ's human nature is enhypostatized by the divine Son, not a distinct individual/subject/person/hypostasis.

Another implication would be that for Nestorius, the prosopon who was glorified with the Father before the world existed (John 17:5) cannot be the same prosopon as the enfleshed Christ whom the Father sent (John 17:3). Along these lines, I can understand better now the Chalcedonian concern regarding “theotokos” (on which, see below).

Now, the same author who used the graphic I linked to above goes on to conclude, “It is recorded that Nestorius agreed with Leo of Rome in regards to Chalcedonian Christology.” The author then cites a statement Nestorius made in The Bazaar of Heracleides: “I was content to endure the things whereof they accused me, in order that while I was accused thereof, they might accept without hindrance the teachings of the Fathers.”

This appears a little too quick. Driver and Hodgson, who wrote an introduction to The Bazaar of Heracleides, qualify this:

The book must have been written by Nestorius in the year 451 or 452, seeing that there are references to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and to the flight of Dioscorus of Alexandria. Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, but though formally deposed by the Council in October of that year was not condemned to banishment until the following July. On the other hand, Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon. It appears, therefore, that Dioscorus must have fled when the Council decided against him, and that when Nestorius wrote he must have heard of his flight, but not of the formal decision of the Council or of the imperial decree by which sentence of exile was pronounced upon him.

Even if Nestorius knew of the council’s decisions and that there was a great deal of each side talking past one another, there certainly were substantial disagreements. Christology is very technical. It should not be surprising that the progressive, historical outworking of Christology was complex... let alone our second-order, contemporary reflection on this historical outworking. In any case, one should not look to Nestorius for a proper understanding of Christology.

With the above in mind, I recently alluded to the way in which elder Gordon Clark's gradual, metaphysical synthesis (link) may have contributed to the two person theory that he proposed in the last book he penned, The Incarnation. Clark wrote:

It seems absurd that the Second Person of the Trinity would have gone to Gehenna, and certainly peculiar if he had gone to Hades, this last because the Second Person could not die. He was the eternal, immutable Son of God. Hence since “the man Christ Jesus” is the only other possibility, the one who died on the cross was a man, he had or was a soul, he was a human being, a person. 

Note how late this particular change in Clark's mind must have been. In 1982, a Trinity Review article on Traducianism was published. This was taken from Clark chapter on The Atonement in Clark's unpublished systematic theology, completed some time around 1978. The Atonement itself was posthumously published in 1987. This suggests that Clark approved the publication of Traducianism in 1982 - at the very least, there is no record that Clark had any problems with its publication. Why is this point relevant? In the article, Clark writes:

J. Oliver Buswell, Jr. defends creationism in a most unfortunate way. In his A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Zondervan, 1962, Vol. I, 250-252) he speaks three times of Christ having been born with a sinless body: “The body of Christ was perfectly sinless.” Nothing is said about a sinless soul. This is peculiarly strange, for, contrary to orthodox doctrine, Buswell teaches, “He, that is, his personal eternal being, his soul, became a human person, a human soul, without in any way ceasing to be a divine person, a divine Soul” (251). But this seems to be Nestorianism unless Buswell means to annihilate the divine Person, and other creationists would not be pleased with this defense of their doctrine.

This is consistent with another remark Clark makes in his in book, The Trinity (which was originally another chapter in his aforementioned systematic theology):

As a prelude to the discussion of this Athanasian Creed, and all the more of later argumentation, certain terminological difficulties require attention. Some of these terms occur in the creed; others have come into use from other sources. Over the centuries discussions on the Trinity have utilized the words nature, essence, being, substance, subsistence, and the very unfortunate Latin term person. These are hardly ever defined with precision. For example, one would ordinarily think that a person must have a will. But the orthodox doctrine allows the three persons of the Trinity to have one will only, while surprisingly the incarnate Jesus has two wills, one divine, one human; and yet even with a human will, and “reasonable soul,” he is not a human person. Nestorianism, with its assertion that Christ was two persons, though plausible on the ground of this psychology, is nonetheless, on the ground of the mediatorial atonement, a heresy. (Gordon Clark, The Trinity, chapter on The Athanasian Creed)

Thus, in 1978 - and probably in 1982 - Clark rejected Nestorianism. Even in his book on The Incarnation, he denies association with Nestorius on the basis of having provided definitions for key terms. Clark thought Nestorius did not provide any such definitions (McGuckin might disagree, although I'm unsure on this point). Nevertheless, his admission to John Robbins in a 1985 that "it is hard to avoid Nestorianism" suggests that on this matter, Clark was of two minds(!)

Now, definitions are important. But how we formulate theological definitions is even more important, for these must accord with God's own self-disclosure in His word. With that in mind, the point Clark makes in his book on The Trinity is pertinent: Nestorianism is a heresy because its two-person Christology leads to a rejection of one Mediator. It is be strange that so specific and excellent a criticism should have been left unanswered by Clark himself upon his change of mind in The Incarnation. Of course, Clark passed away before completing the book to his personal satisfaction.

Much of this is recounted in Doug Douma's book, The Presbyterian Philosopher. But what might also be pointed out is that it is hard to see how Clark's understanding could avoid the charge that the Son of God is not the Son of Man:

Luke 22:69 But from now on the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of the power of God.
70 And they all said, “So You are the Son of God?” And He said to them, “You say correctly that I am.”

Do two [per]Sons sit at God's right hand? Even Nestorius insisted that it is "not as though again two sons were sitting but one, owing to the union with his flesh." Nestorius verbally denied two that there were two Sons. Whether Nestorius' position is consistent with such a verbal denial is another question.

Instead, the point I wish to make is that despite elder Clark's protestations against comparison to Nestorius, his position begs the same questions: who sits at God's right hand? Is there one mediator between God and man, or are there two? Who intercedes for us: God, man, or the God-man? Is the Son through whom God spoke the same Son whose throne is forever and ever (Hebrews 1:3, 8)? Etc.

For the same reasons, we should not hesitate to affirm that Mary was "theotokos." I've spoken with Protestants (and not only those who read Clark) who have had reservations about affirming this. But in his book on The Trinity, Clark said, "theology cannot be divorced from church history" (chapter on Athanasius). Well, did any patristic or theologian in church history who affirmed "theotokos" also affirm that Mary gave birth to the divine nature? Of course not. Any hesitation on this point seems to be a needless worry, whereas accidentally affirming Nestorianism is a real worry.

Take an analogy: would the same people who have reservations about affirming Chalcedon's reference to Mary as "the mother of God" also hesitate to affirm that "the Father is God," "the Son is God," and "the Spirit is God" because they don't want to be confused with tritheists? Wouldn't they rather affirm each statement and just qualify them appropriately (such that monotheism is also affirmed)?

Or take Matthew 1:23. Mary is prophesied as the one who will give birth to Immanuel. She will give birth to "God-with-us." Should we have reservations about affirming this Scripture just to avoid a position that no important theologian in history has ever affirmed? These are fair challenges to those who refuse to accept orthodox doctrines and inferences.

Now, as with his Trinitarian model, I would like to think Clark's attitude regarding his theory of personhood was something along the following lines: 

The discussion of the main problem in the doctrine of the Trinity may now be called completed, even if it is not complete. Other students and scholars may add to, subtract from, modify, contradict, or otherwise alter the foregoing. Such responses would be a great improvement over the present almost universal neglect of the doctrine. (chapter on Individuation)

Charity towards Clark would, I think, read him as primarily encouraging thoughtfulness regarding metaphysical conundrums. However, there can be little doubt that Clark's own thought has inhibited some people from accepting orthodox Christology. That's the charitable way to put the matter. One might reasonably be more blunt. Even so, it remains for us to take up Clark's challenge:

...if someone does not like these definitions, he is free to present his own for consideration. (The Trinity, Bavinck and Van Til).

I have offered a definition of the term person. Most people will find it queer. Most theologians will find it unacceptable. Well and good, let them formulate and propose a different definition. That is the honest and logical thing to do. Then there will be an intelligible subject of discussion. One can reasonably suppose that it could be a better definition than mine. (The Incarnation, Conclusion)

A Nestorian Christology of any flavor is biblically untenable. Clark's view causes worse problems than it aims to solve. But unless we are content with apophaticism, some positive theory must be given. 

The problem for Clark was when he defined a person as "his mind or soul" (The Trinity, chapter on Some Conclusions). In fact, for Clark, a single person always has a single mind because a single person just is his mind... not to mention that he is also the objects "he" thinks (I go into more detail about this ontological collapse here). This too strict equation of a single person with a single mind led Clark to believe that Christ incarnate was two persons because Christ incarnate has two minds. That is the problem stated. 

What follows is a solution - a positive theory which coheres with the foregoing analysis. I do not argue my solution is the most coherent one possible. But I take it as prima facie acceptable insofar as it can account for the Scriptural data while avoiding a few of the conundrums Clark mentions. I mentioned it a long time ago, and as it's held up in my mind over time, I'll attempt to outline it in a little more detail below.

A helpful way to begin a formulation of a definition for "person" is to point out that Jesus Christ is the single subject of many biblical propositions. Whatever explains the unity of Jesus Christ as a single subject might also help us to explain what persons are.

That is, suppose one wrongly accepted some version of Nestorianism (Clark's or otherwise). That person would still tend to make statements such as, “Jesus Christ is a human person and divine person.” But this still implies a single subject, Jesus Christ, which or who the Nestorian thinks is the unity of two persons. Well, how would the Nestorian unite the two persons in a single subject? 

Just as importantly, if and once such an explanation is provided, why can't that explanation about how Jesus Christ is a single subject also help us to explain how Jesus Christ is a single “person” in the first place (rather than two persons)? Christ is one subject. Therefore, is it not plausible that He is one person? However one attempts to explain that Christ is one subject can also be used to help explain how He is one person. I take this to be a good start.

Pushing the matter a bit further, I think any thorough solution should recognize that Christ incarnate does indeed have two minds. Thus, the definition of "mind" is not identical to the definition of a person. Instead, a mind is that by which a person can think. Note that this does not suggest that the relationship between persons and minds is one of one-to-one correspondence (see below).

Now, in certain cases, minds think self-referentially. Take an example: "Ryan is a male" is a true proposition. Because I am Ryan, I am also able to truthfully think, "I am a male." This thought reflexively indexes the true proposition "Ryan is a male." Other persons (like females) cannot truthfully use the reflexive indexical "I" to think the proposition that I think in the mode that I think it. Females would only be able to truthfully affirm the true proposition, "Ryan is a male," not the self-referential thought which indexes the proposition to myself.

In normal cases, when we talk about one, singular person, we usually associate him or her one mind. Thus, Clark's faulty definition of persons is natural, if dangerous. However, given the unique case of Christ, we should allow for the possibility that a single person can have multiple minds. A better definition of "person" than Clark's, I think, is one which is not too far removed from it: a person is a mind or minds capable of reflexive indexation. Perhaps the underlined portion is redundant, but at any rate, here's an example of how this cashed out in the case of Christ incarnate:

The human mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "I grow in wisdom."
The divine mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "I am all-wise."

In both cases, the "I" has the same referent, a singular subject, individual, or hypostases: Christ incarnate. Thus, one can truthfully affirm that "Christ incarnate grew in wisdom" and that "Christ incarnate is all-wise." This is not a contradiction, because Christ incarnate does not grow in wisdom in the same sense that He is all-wise. He grows in wisdom by His human mind and is all-wise by His divine mind. On this definition of "person," we can avoid the error of Nestorianism.

Accepting this definition would mean one would have to reject elder Clark's metaphysical synthesis. But I think this turns out to be a case of addition by subtraction: the less one relies on Clark's metaphysics, the better.

Now, I have seen the following citation float around which might seem to pose a problem for the view I've expressed. In his book Paradox in Christian Theology, James Anderson writes:

If claims about Jesus possessing two distinct ranges of consciousness, two distinct sets of experiences, beliefs, etc., are to be coherent then it must be possible to refer to those mental features without those features being necessarily owned by any particular person. Yet this is precisely what our concept of a person rules out. If experiences are necessarily individuated with respect to persons, then at the most fundamental logical level it makes no sense to speak of one person with two distinct consciousnesses (in the sense that each consciousness might in principle be ascribed to a different person that the other)...

If persons and not minds are the logically primary subjects of experiences and other mental states then it makes no more sense to say Christ believe that water is H2O with respect to his divine mind but did not believe that water is H2O with respect to His human mind than it does to say that Christ broke break with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet. A person either breaks bread or he does not; likewise, a person either believes that water is H2O or he does not. To try to isolate two distinct minds or consciousnesses within one person, as Morris seeks to do, is to kick against the goads of the very concepts needed to formulate the christological problem in the first place. (Paradox in Christian Theology, pgs. 97-98)

Frankly, I personally don't see a problem with the statement that Christ broke break with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet. Despite his seeming incredulity, does Anderson think that this statement is false? In what way does this conflict with Anderson's argument that "If particular experiences are to be meaningful, they cannot be logically isolated from the subjects of those experiences"? Subjects are not attribution-less particulars. To say that there is a distinction between the subject or person of Jesus and His divine and human minds does not seem to entail that Jesus' divine mind (in particular) is not "necessarily owned" by the person of Jesus. 

Here is an analogy: "if claims about the person of the Father possessing two distinct attributes is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those attributes without those attributes being necessarily owned by any particular person." Does Anderson really think that [the divine] attributes are not "necessarily owned" by the Father? Or would Anderson suggest some sort of extremely strong, Plotinic view of divine simplicity on which God has no attributes? I wouldn't think so, as I recall Anderson had some relevant criticisms of Dolezal's book on divine simplicity (link).

In fact, Anderson himself accepts theistic conceptual realism. He thinks that God's thoughts are identical with propositions. Insofar as propositions are distinct, God's thoughts must also be distinct. So here's another, even better analogy: "if claims about the Father's possessing two distinct thoughts is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those thoughts without those thoughts being necessarily owned by any particular person." Would not Anderson deny that this follows? If so, that would mean his original argument doesn't follow either.

One final thought: a separate objection to the definition I've proposed for what a "person" is might be that it is contrived. Well, in some sense, I grant that this is true: the incarnation is a special case, after all. The language of "personhood" is one the church did contrive to deal with heresies and of which the church should take the data of special divine revelation in account when formulating a coherent Christology. This is less a criticism and more so an obvious statement of a historical reality.